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AbstrAct 
This study analyses in full the history of the Ku-
wait oil concesaion, which has proved to be one ot the 
most valuable in the world. Interest in Kuwait's oil 
deposit. tir.t arOSe more than twenty years before the 
oil concesaion WAa tinally .ecured by an Anglo-American 
combine. Many partie. were actively involved in the 
quest for oil in Kuwait durino the lono negotiations 
which spanned the years 1912-1934. Companies backed by 
the British and United States Governments were all bar-
gaining tor the concesaion while the Shaikh was deter-
mined to secure the best tinancial terms possible. 
koreover. events in Kuwait were inter-related with 
and parallel to negotiations in Bahrein and Saudi Arabia, 
where American interests succ.eded in securing exclusive 
oil conces.ions. This commercial success, which even-
tually drew the United States Government deep.r into 
the Persian Gulf, was achi.ved despite a relatiVely 
early Britiah recognition of the political and strategic 
illportance of the region's oil cone.ssions. 
Thi. thesis diseuss.s the formulation and applica-
tion ot the policies of the various participants. It 
also provid.s an accoWlt of the way in which the Ameri-
can oil compani •• competing against British companies 
established th .... lv •• firmly in a region which was under 
British intluence. 
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PREFI\CE. 
In today's world the importance of Middle East oil 
to the West is very much in evidence and needs no elabo-
ration. The West is now deeply involved in the region 
as a result of a greater appreciation of its strategic 
importance, in particular the essential nature of its 
abundant oil supply for the free world and the recycling 
of petro-dollar. in the We.t's economy to relieve gro-
wing unemployment and balance national deficits. It 
i. no longer possible to understand the policies of the 
United States of America, the Common Market countries 
and Japan particularly in the .. tiddle East without refer-
ring to oil diplomacy. All regard the maintenance of 
the Per.ian Gulf oil supply as a primary objective of 
foreign policy and are thus eager to ensure a. great a 
political stability in the region as possible. 
However oil diplomacy in the Persian Gulf is a 
phenomenon which has existed .ince the quest for the re-
gion'. oil conce.sions commenced. During the inter-war 
period when the key oil concessions were being obtained 
mostly by American and British interests the oil issue 
influenced the parent governments and was reflected in 
their foreign policies. although on a much smaller scale 
than today. The British Government endeavoured to pre-
vent the Americans entering the Persian Gulf while the 
United State. Government rendered diplomatic assistance 
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to its nationals who were eager to gain a foothold in 
the region. Consequently the direct involvement of 
the .. two governments makes it important to examine the 
history o~ Persian GUl~ oil in relation to both coun-
tries' aspirations in this area. Apart ~rom facilita-
ting a better understanding o~ the region's oil history 
this will provide an insight into the origins o~ both 
countries' policies in the GUl~ and illustrate how and 
to what extent oil influenced their diplomacy during 
the inter-war period. 
Corporate strategy and rivalry are additional fac-
tors which merit consideration when dealing with th. 
i .I il ill h h Pera an GUl£ 0 cone ••• on.. In genera a myt as 
been created around the relationships betwe.n parent 
government. and major oil companies and the latter's 
role in international relations. It haa generally 
been accepted thAt the oil companies influenced their 
parent governments: however opinion as to the degree 
2 
of this in~luence remains divided. In the Persian 
Gul~ in many instances the oil companies initiated go-
vernment intervention and eventually it was they who 
determined the nationality of the bolder. of the region'. 
oil conces.ions. The agreements reached between them 
as regards the division of the .. conce.sions were ~ccep­
ted by the parent governments and therefore their role 
was at lea.t as important as that of their governments. 
In &dditi~ to exaaing the global iasu •• of oil 
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diplomacy and corporAte con~lict an emphAsis i& placed 
on the role o~ personAlities particularly active in the 
Persian Gul~. The role o~ these individuAls was more 
important than might have been thought despite their 
dependence on external authorities, and this is re~lec­
ted in the .ark they made on the political and commer-
cial development o~ the region. consequently the ap-
proach adopted in thia thesia,which combinea interna-
tional diplomacy, corporate policy and local strategy, 
providea a comprehensive account o~ the history o~ the 
key oil concessions in the Persian Gul~ which in gene-
ral haa been neglected. 
The bis~ry o~ the Persian Gul~ oil concessions 
3 baa never beea ~.tly outlined nor analysed in any depth. 
Events in thia area bave tended to be neglected because 
they were overshadowed by apparently more dramAtic ones 
in Perai .. and Iraq. Moreover, the unAvailability of 
in~oraation baa resulted in the publiCAtion o~ rela-
tively ~_ analyses o~ oil diplomacy in the Persian Gulf, 
whilst these thAt have been wri tten lack 8ubstance and 
detail.4 The accounts provided by ~oraer employ.es of 
the various oil ceapaai.s concerned render little AS-
siatance in thia respect as they hAve been inClined to 
treat their publicAtiona merely AS an exercise in pub-
lic relationa.5 
This stUdy centres on the negotiationa ~or the 
Kuwait oil conce •• ion ~ illustrAte the evolution o~ the 
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British Government's oil policy in the region and its 
con~rontation with the Americans' 'open door' VOlicy. 
Here n.gotiations were the longe.t and most complica-
t.d in the F.rsian G\ll~. Ihis provide. a unique op-
portunity to .tudy their inter-relationship with other 
oil negotiations taking place during the twenties and 
the early thirties particularly in Bahrein and Saudi 
Arabia Where American control was ev.ntually complete. 
However, it was only in Kuwait that purely Bri-
tish and American inter •• ts support.d by their res-
pective governments collided head-on and were ulti-
mately forced to ahare the concesaion on an equal ba-
aia. This was due to the fact that Kuwait was deli-
berately excluded by international agr .... nt as .arly 
as 191~ from the scope of the Turkish Empire oil con-
c •• sions. This enabled the major oil companies inte-
rested in Middle East oil and party to the agre .. ent 
to compete for this particular conce.sion independently. 
Moreover, apart trom presenting th. history of 
the Kuwait oil conce.sion and explaining why over twen-
ty years elapsed before the concession wa. aigned, a 
whole serie. of complex relationship. which evolved 
between 1912 and 193~ wi th ari tain a. the central pivot 
are discussed. Events during this long period demon-
strate and elarity the British Government's attitude 
towards Kuwai t, whos. AlBbiguous .tatus as an indepen-
dent Arab state under British protection caus.d con-
siderable con~usion aa to its specific rights and ob-
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ligations vis-a-vis Britain and other countries. 
rhe negotiations tor the Kuwait oil concession al-
so reflect the British Government'. exceptionally close 
relations with a major British oil company - the result 
of which was a controversy which raged for years as to 
whether the Government's controlling interest in the 
company was responsible tor initiating the company's 
policies abroad. COnversely, events during this period 
indicate the extent to which this company in turn were 
involved in tormulating the British Government's toreign 
policy. Thus a better understanding can be gained of 
government decision-making in Great Britain during the 
inter-war period when the country suddenly found i t-
selt under pressure trom the Americans who wanted to 
enter the Per.ian Gult. 
Finally, the introduction ot competition by govern-
sent .upported American companies broadens the scope of 
the •• bject and provides an insight into the Uni ted 
State.- attitude and influence in the region in the 
earl" thirtie.. In particular, a clearer picture than 
hitherto available can be formed ot the evolution of 
relations between the State Departaent and the Ameri-
can oil compani •• operating in the Middle Ea.t and th •• 
of the origin. of Uni ted State.' policy in the Persi an 
6 Gulf including Saudi Arabia. 
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I NTRODtJC1'l ON 
In october 1934 Lord Lloyd, the future Secretary 
ot state tor the Colonies, outlined in public for the 
tirst time an alarming situation which had gradually 
evolved in the Persian Gult. Speaking to the I<oyal 
Central Asian Society he enumerated recent American 
successes in securing a large proportion ot the Per-
sian Gult oil concession.. Despite world-wide recogni-
tion ot her political predominance in the Fersian Gulf, 
particularly since the Great War when Britain's tradi-
tional rivals had been deteated, Britain was now taced 
with a situation in which American interests had ob-
tained the Bahrein and Saudi Arabian oil concessions 
exclusively and were likely to obtain a tifty per cent 
share in the Kuwait oil concession in the near future. 
Moreover, Lord Lloyd argued that there was a con-
stant challenge to British oil interests in other parts 
ot the region whieh alao threatened to undermine Bri-
tain's established authority and supremacy. Although 
he admitted an incomplete knowledge of events leading 
to this .erious state ot aftairs, he nevertheless bit-
terly attacked and criticised the British Government 
and the British oil companies tor a lack ot fore.ight 
and compe~c. which had led to this unacceptable situa-
tion. In particular he referred to the Anglo-Persian 
Oil Company, now British Petroleum, which was known to 
- IX -
have established exceptionally close relations with the 
British Government AS early as the beginning of the twen-
tieth century and which had shown an interest in securing the 
region's oil concessions. 
The situation outlined by Lord Lloyd was particu-
larly surprising and inexplicable in view of Britain'. 
long-standing control of the Persian Gulf's internal 
and external affairs. The British Government had been 
successful aince the end of the nineteenth century in 
main taining a supr8lllacy in the area by commi tting the 
various Arab rulers to abiding by Britain's advice and 
also by preventing large scale foreign penetration, 
either commercial or strategic. 
In addition, Britain's relatively early recogni-
tion of oil as more efficient than coal for fuelling 
the Royal Navy contributed illilllilensly to the de.ire to 
prevent foreign interests gaining a foothold in the 
Gulf where indications of oil were in evidence. The 
u.e of oil in the Royal Navy since the beginning of 
the twentieth century .eant abandoning Britain's na-
tional fuel - coal - in favour of a product to a large 
extent beyoDd ber control as it WAS only found in dis-
tant foreign countries. As a result. the British G0-
vernment had _barked on an oil policy ai.ed at secu-
ring future supplies, particularly trora tho.e sources 
over which Britain's control and influence could be 
.. erted, ie. the application of A kind of Monroe doc-
trine to the grant of Middle East oil conce •• ions. 
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There.fore in the Persian Gul.f in particular, where 
.foreign penetration had already boen resisted on politi-
cal grounds, the British Government's desire to secure 
oil concessions .for British companies be.fore and a.fter 
the Great War assumed an unprecedented scale and indeed, 
seemed to yield promising results. The various Arab 
rulers had been committed by special agreements to grant 
their oil concessions only to a company nominated by 
the British Government. This committed the government 
to a deep involvement as it had to ensure that its no-
minee would ol.fer reasonable terms lor these concessions, 
and was Obliged to lace criticism .from other interested 
parties which were not given permiSSion to enter the 
lield. 
The Sri tish Government'. direct linancial invest-
ment in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (A.P.O.C.) in 
1914 o.f £2.2 million to acquire a majority shareholding 
commi tted them to supporting the company in its endea-
vour to domiDate the Arabian Gull. The company, which 
was Already operating successfully on the Persian side 
of the a.lf. ie. haviDg secured an oil concession in 
fersia in 1901, considered the Arab side to lall within 
its Datura! sphere o.f in.flueDce. eonsequently the com-
pany irl teftded to preven t. wi th governmen t support, any 
other interest British or otherwise .from entering the 
Gulf and endangering its flank. 
However, despite such solid and auspicious .founda-
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tions on which to build a secure 'oil empire' Britain 
failed in the twenties and thirties to secLlre some of 
the major oil concessions in the Persian Gulf. This 
gives special significance to Lord Lloyd's accusation 
and to the unprecedented scope ot American success 
whieb was greater than in any other area o{ the f.',iddle 
East. Eventually this American success changed the 
balance ot oil concession ownership in the Arab world 
between British and American interests and established 
the United States ot America .s a major force in oil 
production and associated politics in the region. 
However, as the Americans became involved in the 
Persian GUlf only after 1926 the initial chapters will 
examine in detail the evolu.tion of sri tain' s oil poli-
cy, particularly in the Gult, and Britain'. early ef-
torts to secu.re the region's oil concessions tor its 
'National champion'. Theretore the tirst chapter ana-
lyse. the initial stages ot Britain'. policy in Kuwait, 
which has been chosen as a case study, trom 1900 on-
wards and the early attitudes adopted by the principal 
British Government ministries responsible tor the {or-
mation and implementation of government policy in the 
region - the Foreign Otfice, the Admiralty and the Go-
vernment ot India - toward. oil and oil companies ope-
rating in and around the Persian Gult. 
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PART I 
G'IlNIitSIS. BRITAIN IN SEARCH OF A FOREIGN OIL POLICY 
- 3 -
1. harly Considerations 
Gritain's ~olicy in Xuwait as in other parts of the 
Fersian Gulf was in general influenced by imperial inte-
rests. The British Government's original interests in the 
region resulted from concern for India's security which 
was considered 'second only in importance to that of the 
1 British Isles.' Consequently Britain's supremacy in the 
Iersian Gulf was gradually established during the nine-
teenth century and her s~ecial interests in the area were 
widely recognised. In return for ~ritish protection of 
their hereditary and customary rights aqainst rurkish har-
rassment the Arab rulers along the }'ersian Gulf were COIfl-
mitted by various agreements to accepting British hegemony 
and supremacy. They and their fleirs were bound not to 
lease, dis~ose of or give concessions of land in their 
shaikhdollls to any individual .!-,ower for any purpose without 
British permission nor to receive agents or repres~nt3tivcs 
of foreign governments without British agreement. 
In protecting her special interests and the shaikhs 
from foreign harassment gritain vigorously resisted atterllpts 
a.ade by other powers at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury to alter the status quo by which Britnin's supremacy 
2 had been secured in the area. Lansdowne, the ~oreign Sec-
retary, announced in 1903 that 
••••• without hesitation we should regard the 
establishment of a naval base ••••• in the l'er-
sian Gulf by any other power as a very grave 
menace to nritish interests and we should cer-
tainly resist it with all the means at our 
disposal. 3 
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Although Lansdowne's declaration only specified ~ritain's 
resistance to a foreign military base, in reality however 
['.ri tClin was also opposed to any major atten:pt b~' foreign 
cora:ncrci al interests to gain a foothold in the I'ersian 
Gulf. It was obvious to Eritain as to other. powers who 
CI£-liJreciated the strategic iOI!.Iort<lnce of the !'ersian Gulf 
that commercial enterprises could provide the means by 
d1ich political influence could be introduced in an 
undeveloped I'ersian Gulf. 4 
This policy combining economic strength and politi-
cal pow~r had formpd prrt of a broad0r gritish policy in 
fersia since lR90, ie. the creation of a buffer to 1i-
5 
mit expan!Sion from the north. Cur:zon, who contributed 
imll'ensely to the increase of bri ti sh control in the I-er-
sian Gulf dud ng his term as Viceroy of India and eVen 
before his a~~intment, feared that britain's supremacy 
in the Gulf area was threatened by the increased con.lller-
cial activities of other powers in the area. He was 
convinced that 'commercial interests are the familiar 
precursor to political claims' and therefore did his ut-
IIIOSt during his term of office (1899-1905) to encourage 
Britain's commercial interests in the region. 6 Thus Bri-
tain's opposition to the honckhaus txide concession, the 
Kapni5t r;dlway scheme and the Baghdad railway project 
highlighted her desire to exclude foreign commercial in-
terests from the Fersian Gulf. 
The baghdad t:ailway scheme in particular significantly 
influenced thestr~gthening of relations between Britain 
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and Kuwai t and marked the beginning of the si.J€'cial con-
sideration given to Kuwait by Eritain. Kuwait bec&re 
exce~tionally important to Britain since it was con-
~iderpd t~ be the most suit~ble outlet in the rersian 
Gulf for the planned Baghdad Railway. This GerMan 
schcr,iQ t-:> build a railway from Constantino.)le through 
the Turkish Empire to the f'ersian Gulf increasingly 
occu?ied and worried ~~ri tish official s from the begin-
ning of the twentieth c<?ntury. 
The project was seen, especially by the Govern-
IIiEmt of IndiC\. which wa~ representE'o in Lonl'ion by the 
India Office, as a direct thr.eat to Britain's COlllmer-
cial and poli tical supremacy in the r'ersian Gulf. The 
Government of India assiduously ref.'eated its view that 
a German railway to the rersian Gulf would inevitably 
dimini sh Hri tain' s prestige and cOlll1uerce, disturb re-
lations wi th the /,rab chiefs and perhaps bring .... i th it 
the establishment of foreiQn military bases. Indaect it 
went even further by stating that 'in time this process 
can have but one result, namely, the consolidation of 
German influence throughout this vast and irllportant ter-
ri tory, and the eventual f,;>ssin0 into Germ.':In hands of <'Ill 
7 
ree,l r)ower in this particular ;:one.' It sP('med to hri-
tish officials that the means of averting ~uch a cata-
strol-Jhic outcome was to secure British domination over 
the southern part of the railway from ~!esopotamia to the 
lersian Gulf. Thus the British Government concluded after 
con~ider~ble internal consultation that eXClusive british 
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'control of the railway from a ~oint north of Eaghdad 
to the Persian Gulf' was essential for safeguarding 
8 Britain's special interests. In order to secure such 
control Britain's policy aimed during the early years 
of the twentieth century at securing special st~tus 
and rights at the proposed terminus of the Baghdad 
Railway, ie. Kuwait. Eventually despite a certain 
degree of hesitancy by the British Government a poli-
tical agent was appointed in 1904 and the Shaikh of 
Kuwait was asked to sign various agreements giving 
Britain the right to control both the internal develop-
ment of Kuwait and its foreign policy_ By 1914 there-
fore Kuwait had become a British Protectorate in all 
9 but name. 
The p.merging importance of oil as the fuel for 
the British Navy also served to increase Britain's 
desire to prevent foreign interests penetrating Kuwait 
and other territories in the Persian Gulf where indi-
cations of oil were in evidence. Before the British 
and other governments recognised oil as the future 
fuel for warships, the international oil industry 
was almost entirely centred on kerosene. a lighting 
fuel, and British oil interests received the same 
att~ntion and support as other British commercial en-
terprises operating abroad. However the conversion 
of Britain's warships from coal to oil from 1904 onwards 
gave rise to complex strategic and economic problems 
of a diu.ension which had not been encoun tered previously 
I 
, / 
I 
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by tho British Governmpnt. The British Empire lacked 
oil/thus lending a neVI meaning and importance to oil as 
t> 
an element in national security in addition to that 
stemming from commercial vi~.bili ty. Consequently Rri-
taints oil interests began to merit special consideration 
by the nritish Government. 
In particular two purely British companies opera-
ting in the Persian Gulf and India attracted the Bri-
tish Government's attention and consequently received 
preferential treatlnent. These two oil com?anies, the 
Burmah eil COlTlp~ny and the Anglo Persian Oll Cornp,'\ny 
(A.P.O.C.), which devoloped special relations with the 
British Government, contributed immensely to the develop-
ment of Britain's oil policy. A.P.O.C. in particular 
regarded the Persian Gulf as its natural sphere of in-
fluence sinc~ securing an oil concession in Persia in 
1901 and eventually drew thQ Eritish Government's atten-
tion to the region's oil potential. However before dis-
cussing the evolution of the special consideration given 
by the British Government to the Persian Gulf oil poten-
tial, there is a need to examine the initial attitudes 
of the ministries responsible for the formation and im-
plementation of British Government policy in the re~ion 
For~iQn Offico, Admiralty and Government ot India - to-
wards these two oil companies, attitudes ~hich reflect 
the main principles on which Britain based its emerging 
oil policy in th" Persian Gulf. 
At the turn of the nineteenth century Foreign Office 
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relations with oil interests did not differ from those 
with other British commercial interests seeking diplo-
matic support in the Middle East. Thp Foreign Office 
encouraged any British commercial enterprise, particu-
larly in an area considered to be of great strategic im-
portance, both for the general purpose of increasing 
British economic strength and for that of indirectly in-
cr~asin9 political influence. A whole range of British 
commercial enterprises were supported in the Middle East 
as a means of preventing foreign interests, especially 
those of Russia and Germany, from penetrating into the 
10 
area. 
In this light the Foreign OIfice rendered the usual 
support to a British national who endeavoured in 1901 to 
secure an oil concession in Persia. D'Arcy's agent, Mar-
riot, wpnt there to secure the oil concession equipped 
with a formal Foreign Office letter of introduction - one 
of the Foreign Office's devices employed to support Bri-
tish enterprises abroad. In Teheran the British Minister 
gave Narriot considerable. assist3.nce in obtaining an oil 
concession, which as it transpired later, proved to be one 
of the most important in the Middle EAst. D'Arcy was 
given the exclusive rights for the next sixty years to 
find, exploit and export petroleum in all of Persia except 
five northern provinces, and a monopoly in building pipe-
lines to the south coast. 
However, despite various accounts emphasising direct 
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intervention by the Foreign Office, in reality the Fo-
reign Office was no more involved than usual in the pro-
cess of securing the oil concession for D'Arcy and the 
whole matter was h~ndled independently by the Bri tish 
Minister in Teheran who WaS given to understand by Mar-
riot that a word fro(ll him might prove invaluable to 
D'Arcy's application. 11 
Nevertheless, the following yeArs saw deep Foreign 
Office involvement in the comp"my'& affairs in South West 
Persia end an exceptionally clo!"le relationship c1p.veloped 
between the Foreign Office and the company. The Foreign 
Office recognised and appreeiated the company's contri-
bution to increasing British influence in Persia. Their 
oil concession in Pllrsia becaf:l<3 particularly important 
after the 1907 agreement between nritain and I~ussla which 
divided Persia into three zones of influence. The south 
and the north were respectively reco~nisQd as British ano 
Russian spheres of domination whilQ the centre remained 
12 
an area in which both powers could operate. In 1908 
the Foreign Office encouraged the company to extend its 
operation to other parts of Persia. The Foreign Office 
wrote to D'Arcy th~t it was 'most d~sir~ble from the 
point of view of British interests both political and 
commercial' tn do so otherwise 'business will be secured 
and worked by the subjects of a foreign power •• 13 Evi-
dently the Foreign Office kept a close watch on the com-
pany and even objected to the possibility that its Ca-
nadi8n drill.rs might be replaced by Ametican ones. It 
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warned the company that • •••• a change such as that ••••• 
almost inevitably leads to the most serious consequences.' 
The Foreign Office also allowed D'Arcy to 'enjoy the 
facility of cabling' to his employees in Persia 'through 
14 the medium of His Majesty's Consular officers'. 
~lowever for political reasons the Foreign Office 
could not give the company a free hand in dealing with 
the local rulers and its intervention served to protect 
the interests of the latter as well as those of the com-
pany. As the friendship of the local rulers was impor-
tant to Britain the Foreign Office could not agree to 
the company's proposed underhand methods of conducting 
business deals with them. In 1909 the company's rep-
resentative in persia, George Reynolds, took steps to 
buy land required by the company from the Shaikh of 
Mohammerah, not directly but through a third party. He 
believed that by so doing he would secure better finan-
15 
cial terms for A.P.O.C. However Britain's officials in 
the area could not accept a situation which might create 
ill-feeling between Britain and the Shaikh if he became 
aware of this unorthodox method. The British Minister 
in Teheran told the Foreign Office that Lt.-Col.P. Cox 
would 'assist negotiations for land on Abadan Island 
if the syndicate drops the suggestion of their local 
manager.' Eventually the Foreign Office authorised the 
political resident in Bushire to conduct the negotia-
tions on behalf of the company after D'Arcy had agreed 
to accept the British Government's decision. The agree-
ment concluded was satisfactory to the British Government, 
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the company and the Shaikh.. The British Government 
obliged the Shaikh with A loan of £16,500 of which 
£10,000 was contributed by the company without the 
Shaikh's knowledge. The company secured additional 
land for their operAtion and the Shaikh obtained a 
further British commitment to secure his successors' 
customary rights. 16 
That policy of intervening in the company affairs 
for the purposes of extending Britain's influence, pro-
moting the company's interests and securing and deten-
ding the local rulers' rights drew the Foreign Ottice 
and the company closer and set the scene tor future 
relations between the two. In SOuth west Persia the 
Foreign Oftice and the oil company were in A sense 
mutually dependent and it was obvious that any change 
in the company's British character would alarm the Fo-
reign Office. 17 Eventually by 1912 it considered 
A.p.o.e.'s oil concession as 'the most important Bri-
tish concession in Persia' and was practically com-
mitted, as will be seen, to securing the company's in-
tegrity as a British concern. 1S 
From the beginning of the twentieth century the 
Admiralty became increasingly interested in and was 
occupied by the possibility of the navy converting to 
oil fuel from coal. Admiralty officials were aware of 
the work done by other foreign navies on oil-burning 
warships and knew of their potential advantages. The 
advantages of oil fuel over coal were considerable even 
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when oil was simply burnt under ordinary boilers. To 
provide the same amount of power as coal less oil and 
fe'Aer men were required. The use of oil made possible 
quick refuelling which could be performed at sea, thus 
giving oil-burning ships a wider radius of action. 19 
Therefore the Admiralty carried out a series of trials 
using oil in certain warships, and by 1905 the Royal 
Navy had made substantial progress in its experiments 
with oil fuel and had firmly established itself as a 
20 leader in this field among the navies ot the world. 
However, before the Navy could undertake to rely 
on oil instead of coal on a large scale, it wanted to 
solve the 'security' aspect of the supply problem. The 
Navy obtained its coal trom South Wales and could re-
gard this source of supply as politically completely 
reliable. There was no such security about oil. Oil was 
a commodity produced tor the most part entirely beyond 
the borders of the British Empire, and almost all of 
the Admiralty sources ot supply were toreign. In 1910 
the British Empire and British controlled territories 
produced only ~~ of the total world crude petroleum and 
Britain's main oil supplier was the united States of 
America. 21 Thus the conversion of warships to use oil 
meant abandoning a national fuel in favour of a commodity 
produced and controlled by foreigners. Such a situation, 
whereby Britain's control over its oil supply in emer-
gency was threatened, naturally alarmed Admiralty offi-
cials and thus influenced their policy. 
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In August 1903 a committee was set up to deal 
with the issue of oil fuel supply for naval use and 
laid do~n the principles on which supply policy should 
be based. Boverton Redwood, an oil expert, was asked 
by this comrui ttee to give his view. He recommended 
that 
it would be better to furnish the Burmah Oil 
Company with such inducement as may be neces-
sary to bring about an adequate extension of 
its operation than to seek to encourage com-
petitive work by others who would necessarily 
lack the special knowledge and experience 22 
which the Burmah Oil Company has acquired. 
This influenced the Admiralty in the first place to 
encourage British companies exploring and producing 
oil within the British Empire. Consequently, the 
Admiralty looked with interest at the Burmah Oil Com-
pany, a purely British concern operating within the 
British Empire, and one which hAd acquired specialist 
knowledge and experience in the oil industry. The Ad-
miralty were anxious to buy fuel oil for testing pur-
poses from the Burmah Oil Company and consequently 
made an approach. During these negotiations for a sup-
ply contract the company asked the Admiralty to back 
their representations to the Government of India. They 
wanted that government to increase the import duty on 
kerosene in order to drive their foreign competitors 
out of India and at the same time withdraw the current 
restriction on land concessions in India which was 
23 limiting the company's operations. 
Anxious to establish a trustworthy source of supply 
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from British territory the Admiralty informed the 
India Office that the Burmah Oil Company should be 
encouraged as much as possible in the interests o~ 
the Navy and the British Empire. The principles of 
promoting British oil interests and ot excluding ~o­
reign ones trom exploiting oil in the British Empire 
guided, and were further developed by a special joint 
committee set up in 1904 to consider conditions in 
which oil leases might be granted in the British Em-
pire. As a result ot the joint Admiralty and Colonial 
Oftice Committee's consideration, the Admiralty put 
betore the Government ot India tive basic guidelines 
tor satisfying the Admiralty's desire to secure an 
increased oil supply from sources considered to be 
reliable, especially in time of emergency.-
1. That the company concerned should be and should 
remain a British company in organisation and con-
trol. 
2. That retining should be conducted on British soil. 
3. That the right should b. reserved ot requiring 
the concessionaire to advance development within 
a specified limit. 
4. That the Navy should have a right ot pre-emption 
ot oils suitable for naval use. 
S. That the concessionaire should when required pro-
duce a minimum quantity of suitable residUal oils 
and place it at the disposal ot the Navy.24 
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Thes~ regulations, especially that regarding the Bri-
tish character of the oil concessionaire. remained in 
force for many years to come and later became kno~n 
as the 'National Clause' in oil concessions granted 
~~thin the 3ritish Empire and British zones of in-
fluence. They indicated the desire of the British 
Government, especially the Admiralty, to control an 
oil supply free from foreign interference. 
Naturally the Admiralty did not limit itself to 
the British Empire in their efforts to secure an ap-
propriate oil supply. In South-West Persia and the 
Persian Gulf, where Britain could exert a considerable 
degree of influence and which was an area to which 
strategic importance was attached, the Admiralty res-
cued British oil interests from possible control by 
foreign concerns. When it became known to the Admi-
ralty that the Persian oil concessionaire - D'Arcy -
was in financial difficulties and searching for addi-
tional financial support from toreign sources, they 
eagerly prevented the conce6si~n from falling into the 
hands of foreigners. The Admiralty brought pressure 
to bear on the Burmah Oil Company to come to an arrange-
ment with D'Arcy and thus maintain the British charac-
ter of the oil concession. As the Burmah Oil Company 
was also interested in D'Arcy's concession they suc-
cessfully concluded in May 1905 their negotiations 
with him and tormed a new company - the Conce.sion Syn-
dicate Limited - which assumed the assets of the 
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previous concessionaire - D'Arcy's First Exploitation 
Company.25 After the discovery of oil in 1908 a new 
company was tormed, ie. A.P.O.C •• and the Commander-
in-Chiet, East Indies - Rear Admiral Slade - told the 
Foreign Office with Admiralty approval that from a 
naval point of view 'the security ot the oil company 
is more important than anything else in the northern 
part ot the Gulf. ,26 
With the arrival of Churchill in 1911 the Admi-
ralty became more deeply involved with oil attairs and 
was committed to using more oil as tuel. Churchill 
confirmed that when he was appointed First Lord the 
Admiralty had built or were in the process ot building 
56 destroyers and 74 submarines solely dependent on 
oil. At the end ot 1911 a departmental committee of 
the Admiralty sat to consider the advisability of the 
further use of oil as a substitute for coal as fuel 
for the Navy and to make enquiries as to the sources 
of supply available. Its investigation was followed 
in April 1912 by the important decision to build tour 
fast oil-fired battleships, thus committing Britain's 
27 
elite battleships to a dependence on oil. From now 
on there could be no way back from the Admiralty using 
increasing amounts of oil fuel and it became obvious 
that the Admiralty would be increasingly interested 
in .ecuring an adequate oil supply and encouraging 
British oil interests, especially in areas under British 
influence. 
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The Government of India's special responsibility 
for and interest in the Persian Gulf were accepted and 
acknowledged by successive British Governments. It 
was reflected in the fact that the political resi-
dents and agents in the Persian Gulf - Britain's con-
suls - were representatives of the Government of In-
dia and reported directly to the Foreign Department 
of the Government ot India. These political resi-
dents exerted considerable influence on both the local 
rulers and the home government and their role will be 
carefully explored throughout this thesis. The Go-
vernment ot India influenced decisions taken in Lon-
don through the Secretary of State for India and there-
fore was also involved in determining oil policy in this 
area.. 
From 1904 onwards, as a direct result of the 
Admiralty campaign and influence, the India Oftice in-
formed the Admiralty that the 'Secretary ot State for 
India ••••• has approved the policy of the Government ot 
India to confine the grant of future concessions in the 
oil fields to British companies •• 28 The Admiralty went 
further and intended to bring the Government ot India 
to grant special privileges to its protege in India, 
the Burmah Oil Company, and it seems that the Government 
of India acceded to the Admiralty expert opinion thAt it 
was in the Empire's naval interests to support the Bur-
mah Oil Company against its rivals and to grant it addi-
tional oil lea.&e& in Burma. In 1907 the Government of 
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India overruled a scheme proposed by the Burma Govern-
ment to allocate certain blocks of land to other Bri-
tish companies in order to sUmulate competition ::md 
instead leased them to the Burmah Oil Company. As 
for the Baluchistan oil concession, another area 
under India's control, the Government of India granted 
it to the Burmah Oil Company despi te competi tion frolil 
a prominent British company offering bett~r terms. Lord 
Cowdray, on behalf of Pearson & Son Company offered the 
Government of India partnership in exploring Baluchis-
tan for oil deposits, which 'would lessen the net cost 
of the oil to the Government. ,29 
However the support given to the Burmah Oil Com-
pany in order to secure additionAl oil leases in ter-
ritories under Government of India control should not 
be seen as A company success in manipulating the Go-
vernment of India and causing it to comply with its 
every demand. Other requests made by the company were 
rejected despite Am~iralty. support. The company 
appealed unsuccessfully in 1904 and again in 1911 for 
an increase in the duty on forelgn oil, and in 1905 
the agreement signed between the Burmah Oil Company 
and the Asiatic Company (Shell's subsidiary) aroused 
suspicion and was criticized by the Government of India. 30 
Since the Government of India accepted responsi-
bili ty for pro'lloting to some extent the interests of 
a certain British oil company which had developed 
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special relations with the Arnniralty in India, natu-
rally the same practice was adopted in regard to another 
British oil corepany with similar relations and operating 
nearby in a strategically important area, ie. the Per-
sian Gulf. In the Persian Gulf, where the Government 
of India conducted a policy of excluding forei~n com-
mercial enterprises as a means of maintainin9 Britain's 
paramount commercial and political status, similar 
policies were rigorously applied to oil enterprises. 
The Government of India was aware of the needs of A.P.O.C. 
operating in Southern Persia and in many instances assis-
ted them in their operations. It seems that the Govern-
ment of India, although realising that the Eritish oil 
companies 'must be treated with caution', gave up to 
1912 considerable help to the two oil cOlllpanies which 
developed special relations with the Aruniralty, the 
31 Burmah Oil Company and A.P.O.C. 
Thus by 1912 the three government ministries res-
ponsible for Britain's policy in the Persian Gulf had 
committed themselves in various ways to securing and 
promoting the interests of the oil company operating in 
this area - A.P.O.C. The ~upport given to the company 
did not mean compli!lnce with every re'luest i t lTI~de nor 
protection of its interests re9ardless of other consi-
derations. British officials reg!.rded the oil company 
with a certain amount of suspicion e.nd WE're never willing 
to give it unconditional support. However, as a result 
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of the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf and 
the growing significance of and interest in oil by 
Sri tain and other great powers, the oil company re-
ceived special consideration when applying for Bri-
tish Government support and assistance. As the va-
rious government ministries were in general agreerr.ent 
as to the importance of A.P.O.C. to Britain politi-
cally, commercially and strategically, the company 
was in a position from 1912 to increase its influence 
on the British Government, while the government for 
its part was ready to consider seriously the com-
pany1s requests and suggestions.32 Thus a new era 
was dawning. 
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2. The ~ew Era 
The new era of 1912-1914 was marked by the emer-
gence of a significant British oil policy in the f.!iddle 
Last. From 1914 onwards this foreign oil policy affec-
ted relations between the Great Powers, determined on 
a nationAl basis the division of the region's oil con-
cessions amongst the major oil companies and eventually 
influenced the rate at which the region's oil deposits 
were developed. 
There were three main inter-related factors which 
made this oil policy unique. Firstly the government be-
came actively involved in the Turkish Empire oil con-
cessions which were being sought by British, German, 
Dutch and American interests. Eventually they succeeded 
in arranging the amalgamation of the European interests 
under British control and together with the German Go-
vernment pressured the Turkish Government into promising 
the t-1esopotamian concession to this combine company -
the Turkish Petroleum Company (T.P.C.). Secondly the 
British Government invested directly in A.P.O.C. -
today British Petroleum - acquiring a majority share-
holding and thus associating themselves with the Com-
pany's policy abroad. Thirdly the government took the 
unprecedented step of committing the rulers on the Arab 
side of the Persian Gulf, where indications of oil were 
in evidence, to granting the oil concessions only to a 
British company nominated by the government. By so 
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doing it ensured in advance its complete control over 
determining which British company would secure the 
region's oil concessions and on what terms. The 
first two developments have been dealt with in re-
cent research in detail. 1 In this study, therefore, 
attention will be focused on the third development 
which prevented any but a British Government nominee 
from securing oil concessions in the Persian Gulf, 
the deposits of which proved to be some of the most 
abundant in the world. 2 
From 1912 onwards the oil issue increasin9ly 
occupied the various British Government ministries. 
In the Admiralty a policy was adopted which in Church-
ill's words meant that 'the supreme ships of the ~avy. 
on which our life depended' soon 'could only be fed 
by oil.,3 As a result the First Lord of the Admi-
ral ty appointed in September 1912 a Royal Con,mission 
to study the problems involved in the increased use 
of oil fuel by the Navy. At the same time the Foreign 
Office intensified its efforts to prevent oil conces-
sions fallin9 into the hands of foreign companies in 
the Turkish Empire as a means of increasin9 Britain's 
influence. The ministry became involved in supporting 
British interests seeking to obtain the promising 
Mesopotamian oil concession against increased competi-
tion from various other interests, particularly German. 
Nevertheless, despite a deep appreciation of the 
political and strategical importance of oil, an outsider 
- 23 -
was needed to combine and formulate the objectives 
and interests of these two ministries into a de-
fined and acceptable foreign oil policy. During 
the new era the man who greatly influenced the evo-
lution of Britain's oil policy in general, and in 
particular Britain's drive to secure control over 
the Persian Gulf oil deposits, was Charles Greenway. 
Greenway, A. P.O.C. 's l-lanaging Direc tor, was 
engaged from 1912 in a new campaign to persuade the 
various government ministries concerned with the 
poli tical and commercial aspects of f>liddle East oil 
the Fore~.gn Office, Admiralty, India Office and 
Board of Trade - that it was essential for Britain's 
interests to preserve A.P.O.C.'s commercial inde-
pendence, ie. to save the company from foreign ab-
sorption. He wished to prevent his company being 
taken over by Shell, which was controlled by Dutch 
interests, and therefore sought British Government 
support in three main areas. 4 First, a large govern-
ment contract for navy fuel, secondly, a great increase 
in the company's capital and thirdly, strong diplo-
matic support for exploitation of the oil deposits 
5 in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf'. In his efforts 
to secure these special privileges Greenway indirectly 
introduced the British Government to the question of 
oil concessions in the Persian Gulf and bound this 
issue to the broader topic of preserving A.P.O.C.'s 
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commercial independence. 
Greenway's campaign to persuadp the Foreign Of-
fice to commit themselves to support his company's 
ambi tions started in earnest in the IIdddle of 1912 
after the Foreign Office had informed him of the for-
mation of a new company interested in the same oil 
concessions which A.P.O.C. had been unsuccessfully 
attempting to obtain for some time. In a letter 
dated 23 AUQust the Foreign Ottice told Greenway that 
the new company - the Turkish Fetroleum Company (T.P.C.), 
consisting ot British, Dutch and Gern.an interests, was 
seeking to obtain the ~esopotamian oil concession. 
The Foreign Oftice, impressed by the substantial Bri-
tish capital represented in it - more than 50% -
sought Greenway's comments on the possibility of amal-
gamation between A.P.O.C. and T.P.C. in order to ob-
tain the ~1esopotamian oil concession and secure Bri taints 
control over it. 6 These new developments narrowed 
A.P.O.C.'s prospects ot independently securing this oil 
concession and placed the company in an undesirable 
position vis-a-vis its sponsor, the Foreign Office. 
A.P.O.C. realised that the danger ot the Foreign 
Otfice switching its political support to T.P.C. lay 
in two areas. First, A.P.O.C.'s unsuccessful attempts 
during the previous ten years to obtain the concession 
exclusively, despite Foreign ottice support, and se-
condly, increasing German Government pressure on the 
Turkish Government on behalt of German interests, which 
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ndght COiHfilicate relations bet~een Bri tain, Germany 
and Turkey. It was feared that T.P.C. might Af-,l-iear 
to ttH:O! Foreign Office to have abetter prospect both 
com.T.ercially and poli tically, of securing the t-':eso-
potal"ian oil concession for uri tain because thQ new 
company, although dominated by British capital, was 
supported by the German Goverruuent and was s1'on-
7 
sored by sound commercial companies. Consequently 
the Foreign O£fice suggestion of amalgamation be-
tween A.P.G.C. and T.P.C. threatened the tormer 
as it meant secure British national control over this 
new united company but not necessarily A.P.O.C. control. 
Greenway, aware o£ the danger posed by the si-
tuation, rapidly set out to persuade the Foreign Of-
fice that it was in the British Government's inte-
rests for A.P.O.C. to secure control over any com-
pany obtaining the 1'1eso;>otamian oil concession. In 
his re?ly to the Foreign Office Greenway emphasised 
that A.P.O.C. could not accept their suggestion of 
entering into some sort of association with T.P.C. 
sponsors - The Deutsche Bank, The National Bank of 
Turkey and the Shell Group - unless this company, T.P.C., 
were prepared to concede A.P.O.C. at least one half 
share in their syndicate. The reason given for this 
extraordinary demand was that if this were not dona 
the new united company would be under foreign control 
and acting contrary to British Government interests. 8 
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Shortly therea£ter Greenway was able to pre-
sent personally and in great detail A.P.O.C.'s point 
o~ view to Sir Louis Mallett, Assistant Under-Secre-
tary in the Foreign O~~ice. In their meeting Greenway 
stated clearly and apparently convincingly that al-
though, on the ~ace o~ it, it appeared that the Bri-
tish character o~ T.P.~. waS s~eguarded by the right 
reserved to the English group to appoint the chairman 
o~ the company, who would have a casting vote. it 
seemed probable that T.P.C. would in reality be mana-
ged and controlled by a ~oreign company - Royal Dutch 
Shell. 9 Greenway quickly and e~~ectively emphasised 
to the Foreign O~fic. the Objects of the Shell com-
pany which according to him was controlled by the 
German Government - to absorb A.P.O.C., minimise 
world competition and impose higher oil prices. 
A.P.O.C. 's "Ianaging Director drew a bleak picture ~or 
the Foreign Office in which he stated that unless 
A.P.O.C. were supported in attempts to exploit the 
"1esopotamian oil concession, hi. company's oil conces-
sion in Persia would be liable to come under ~oreign 
control absorption by Shell. This would decrease 
Britain's political influence in Persia and the Per-
sian Gulf whilst making concessions to a foreign corn-
10 bine closely associated with Germany. 
~ter influencing the Foreign O~~ic. to change 
its attitude towards T.P.C. Greenway went on to discuss 
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the new situation with the Admiralty. In his meeting 
with Admiralty officials Greenway was able to pursue 
his case further by producing a new argument which 
greatly influenced the development of Britain's 
attitude towards oil concessions in the Persian Gulf. 
He stated categorically that A.P.O.C. would fall and 
lose its commercial independence to any company 
which succeeded in establishing itself on the bor-
11 ders of his company's current oilfield. in Persia. 
This additional argument,. introduced to the Admiralty 
and the Foreign Office for the first time, meant that 
the Persian Gulf area, like Mesopotamia, had to be 
controlled by A.P.O.C. in order to safeguard British 
Empire interests. The Admiralty and the Foreign Of-
fice accepted Greenway's argument and immediately 
translated it into practical policy by notifying C. 
Marling,. the British Councillor of Embassy in Turkey, 
12 
and refusing to assist T.P.C • 
. The next step taken by the Admiralty and the 
Foreign Office was to enlist support from the Govern-
ment of India in their efforts to secure A.P.O.C.'s 
commercial independence. The Admiralty proposed, 
with Foreign Office concurrence, that the issue should 
be fully discussed by representatives of the Govern-
ment of India, the Foreign Office and themselves. At 
the inter-departmental conference held on 20 November 
1912 these representatives admitted the importanc. 
o! supporting diplomatically A.P.O.C.'s interests in 
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Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. However, Greenway's 
demands, apart trom that tor diplomatic assistance, 
created India Ottice and Admiralty opposition and the 
meeting tailed to produce the results he had hoped for _ 
tinancial aid and a large fuel contract. The Aruniralty 
and the India Office approved Foreign Office diploma-
tic support tor A.P.D.C. but could not go as far as 
complying with the company's financial proposals, ie. 
two alternative schemes involving British Government 
tinancial assistance for'the company. Both ministries 
disapproved of suggestions to provide fin~,cial assis-
tance to a private company and to become deeply invol-
vedin protecting the company's property and interests 
in Persia. It was obvious that'in the event ot mili-
tary protection being needed the burden would be theirs. 13 
However the Foreign Otfice, which was the first 
ministry to be convinced that diplomatic assistance 
alone would be useless in preserving the independence 
ot A.P.D.C., was still determined to assist the company. 
For their part they telt that exceptional measures should 
be taken due to the political and strategic importance 
ot the region, the result of which would be to maintain 
14 A.P.D.C.'s commercial independence. Theretore they 
continued their ettorts to persuade the Admiralty and 
the India Office ot the validity of their attitude. 
Little success was achieved in persuading the India Of-
fice to take part in financing A.P.O.C., but the impor-
- 29 -
tance of securing the company's special interests -
domination of the Persian Gulf oil concessions - was 
acknowledged and had considerable influence on later 
developments, especially after the war. 
However, it seems that· the Foreign Office wer~ 
more successful with the Admiralty which since the 
beginning of 1913 gradually attributed increasing im-
portance to A.P.O.C.'s oilfields which were reported 
by the company as being abundant. Consequently the 
Admiralty opened negotiations with A.P.O.C. for a 
special supply contract and decided to send a com-
mission of experts, headed by Rear-Admiral Slade, to 
examine~ A.p.O.e.'s oilfields in Persia. Eventually 
after further negotiations, (discussion of which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis). and in view of 
Slade's positive report the British Government in 1914 
provided A.P.O.C. with financial assistance and ac-
quired the majority shareholding in the company.lS 
The description of the means employed by Green-
way to influence the attitudes adopted by the various 
government ministries towards oil concessions in the 
Persian Gulf has been given to illustrate the evolu-
tion of Britain's new approach regarding oil deposits 
in this area. Greenway's experience in dealing with 
officials and his knowledge of oil politics, which was 
superior to that of his counterparts in the government, 
assisted him in convincing the Foreign Office, the 
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Admiralty and the India Office of the political im-
portance that should be attached to Persian Gulf oil 
concessions. In t'act. he laid the t'oundations t'or a 
new and positive attitude to be taken shortly at'ter 
by the British Government which meant an even deeper 
government involvement in the quest t'or the region's 
oil. 
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3. The Making of a 'National Champion' 
As has been hinted betore the British political 
residents in the Persian Gulf were active in securing 
Britain's special interests in the area. They had 
been deeply involved for many years in promoting Bri-
tain's commercial and political interests and exer-
cised considerable influence locally and in London. 1 
Lt.-Col.P.Cox, the senior political resident in the 
Persian Gulf, for instance, admitted that he 'saw 
his ambition to make the Persian Gulf an exclusively 
English 5ea.,2 
In June 1912 Cox, influenced by rumours of the 
existence of oil deposits in Kuwait and eager to streng-
then Britain's influence there, (a policy which had 
been in operation since 1900 in connection with the 
importance attached to the Baghdad railway), sugges-
ted to the Government of India the necessity of se-
curing an option or concession for these oil deposits 
from the Shaikh of Kuwai t before the Bri tish Govern-
ment concluded its various agreements with the Tur-
kish Government. Nevertheless the Government of India 
and the Foreign Office in June 1912 were still not pre-
pared for such action. 3 
However, between June and November 1912 unrela-
ted developments influenced Cox to reintroduce the issue 
of oil concessions in Kuwait. The first was the commence-
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ment ot Greenway's campaign to enlist government sup-
port to prevent the T.P.C. from obtaining oil conces-
sions in the Turkish Empire, especially in Mesopotania 
and the Persian Gulf. The second was the formation 
of the Royal Commission, headed by Lord Fisher, to 
investigate and solve among other things the security 
aspect ot oil supply to the British Navy, before which 
4 
many experts were invited to present evidence. 
The correspondence which then ensued between the 
various government ministries and the evidence given 
by experts on oil matters before the Royal Conmdssion 
was regularly distributed among British officials in 
the Middle East. Cox'. opinion was strengthened by 
Greenway's arguments and he believed that Britain 
should obtain the first option on oil rights in Kuwait. 
By so doing, according to Cox, Britain would secure 
the oil concession for a chosen British company and 
prevent any attempt by the Turkish Government to in-
clude the Kuwait oilfields in concessions they might 
grant to foreign intere.ts. S 
The third development however provided a unique 
opportunity for Britain to search for oil deposits in 
Kuwait without raising foreign and local interest and 
expectation. In November the Shaikh of Kuwait asked 
Britain to assist him in furnishing the town ~f Kuwait 
with an adequate water supply. Cox, having receiVed 
the Shaikh'. request from Shake.pear, the political 
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agent in Kuwait, urged the Government of India to 
send a geologist to examine ostensibly the water 
potential and secretly the oil potential. Cox, the 
political resident in Bushire, and Shakesp~ar, well-
acquainted with local conditions, insisted upon kee-
ping the search for oil deposits secret trom the 
Shaikh of Kuwait and his subjects for political rea-
sons. Shakespear assumed, and it appears correctly, 
that after Britain had assisted the Shaikh in his 
~uest for water supplies 'he will be prepared to 
agree to almost anything we[Britain] like to ask.,6 
The Government of India, Atter receiving Fo-
reign Office approval, consented to send a geologist 
to Kuwait to search for water and oil, choosing a 
member of the Geological Survey of India to conduct 
the search. His oil report - the first geological 
survey of Kuwait'. oil potential - was kept separate 
from the water report and was published in May 1913 
only for British officials. It indicated 
that the chances are not unfavourable and 
that an oil company would not require much 
inducement to test it, if protection and 7 
permanencyof concessions were guaranteed. 
This promising report was known to the Foreien 
Office when Captain A. Wilson, Cox'. deputy, 5uggested 
to them in the middle of Greenway'. campaign that Bri-
tain should obtain a concession for the Kuwait oil 
deposits 'that are not unpromising and which are well 
6uited from a strategic point of vi~w.,8 
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By then, in August 1913, as has been seen above, the 
Foreign Office and other government ministries were 
aware of the political importance of oil concessions 
in the Persian Gulf and knew of the im~ortance atta-
ched to these by A.P.O.C. The Foreign Office sugges-
ted to the other government ministries involved in 
oil matters - the Admiralty, the Government of India 
and the Board of Trade - 'that there may be an advan-
tage in securing an option to these wells, in favour 
of a no~inee of His Majesty's Government from the 
Shaikh of Kuwait. ,9 
The Government of India, in view of their gene-
ral rlesire to tighten control of the area, quickly 
gave their consent to the Foreign Office proposal. 10 
'the Admiralty, which was at the time conducting the 
negotiations ~ith A.P.O.C. tor financial assistance 
and a fuel contract, indicated the importance they 
attached to oil in the Persian Culf. the Aruniralty 
proposed i~mediately to the Foreign Office that Rear 
Admiral Slade's Commission, which had already gone to 
examine the Persian oilfields, be allowed to visi t 
Kuwait and Bahrein to prospect for oil deposits. In 
addition they advi$ed the Foreign Office that atter the 
COffimission had seen the oilfields in Kuwait and Bah-
rein the political resident should secure options for 
the oil concessions. 11 
Alter the decision was reached quickly and 
unanimously in London the Government of India instructed 
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Cox that he should COIra.lit the Shaikh of Kuv.ait to 
grant oil concQssions only to a British Government 
nominee. Shortly thereaLter Cox himself visited 
Kuwait and persuaded the Shaikh to pe~it Lor the 
first time British officials - the Admiralty Com-
mission - to search for oil in his territory and 
to promise to grant the oil concession only to a 
British company nominated by the British Govern-
12 
mente (Needless to say, the previous geological 
survey for oil had been conducted without the 
Shaikh's knowledge and permission and its conclu-
sions were kept secret trom him.)13 
As the Shaikh was ready to comply with all that 
the ~olitical resident, Cox, regarded as advanta-
geous, he promised 'to show the place ot bitumen 
in Burgan and elsewhere' and promised 'never to give 
a concession in this matter to £nyone except a person 
alJf/ointed by the British Govermuent. ,14 That obli-
gatinn becD.llle an exemplary CO&lrni tJllcnt lrhich the llri-
tish Government secured later trom other Ara.b rulers 
in the Persian Gulf. In 1914 thc ruler of Bahrein 
gave the same pro~lisQ after considerable pressure had 
been exerted and aLter the Great War other rulers in 
the Persian CuI:! followed suit. IS 
'Ihis restrictive agreement, "hieh the British 
Governruent interpreted a. Qivingthem the right both 
to appoint a nominee to obtain Kuwait'. oil concession 
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and to participate in the negotiations alld dp.tenhine 
the concession terms, characterised the n~w British 
Government approach to oil concessions in the f'er-
sian Gulf. rreviously the Shaikh of Kuwait had 
been bound (as had other rulers) by a convE:ntion 
not to cede, sell,lease, mortgage or give tor occu-
pation or for any purpose, any portion ot his terri-
tory to the government or subjects of any other 
power without previous consent of His f.c;a.jesty's Go-
vernment. 16 However, regarding the oil concession 
this cOffimitment was not satisfactory to the British 
Government because it did not confer the right to 
deci~e which Eritish company ~ould obtain the conces-
sion. To use a British official!s ~ords - 'the ex-
clusion from possessing concessions not only of fo-
reigners, but also of unsuitable British subjects 
is desirable. '17 
The Admiralty fully supported the new Forei~n 
Office policy in Kuwait. Slade's COD.nlis-sion, which 
was sent to exaMine A.P.O.C.'s prospects in fersia, 
also visited Kuwait and ~ade enquiries about its oil 
potential. The Adrr,iralty, aware of Kuwait's strategic 
importance ~,d the ease with which oil installations 
could be defended due to the ~roxirnity o~ the s€a, 
wished to secure Eritish control over the oil deposits. 
In the oil conference held At Delhi iIllD.~dia.tel)l after 
Slade's visit to the Gulf, he assured the Government 
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of India that 'steps are being taken to ensure that 
any development in Kuwait is British.' 18 
This new British Government oil policy emerging 
in the Persian Gulf was different in aim and implementa-
tion from the previous policy as the Foreign Office 
and the Admiralty now insisted on having the right to 
choose amongst the British companies the future oil 
concessionaire. That fundamental change obviously 
produced also a change in Foreign Office practice 
when asked to support British interests competing for 
oil concessions in the Persian Gulf. 
The Foreign Office was involved generally in 
supporting various British oil inter:uts in their 
competition against those of other powers in the 
Middle East. Any British company which wanted to 
aecure Foreign Office diplomatic support for their 
claim had to be the first company in the field and 
the first company applying for diplomatic support 
regarding a specific oil coneeseon. That criterion 
of 'first come, first served' was the simple, justi-
fiable means of handling delicate situations where 
the Foreign Office had to decide which British company 
to support against others in the case of more than one 
competing tor the same concession. 19 
However, this principle did not guarantee Fo-
reign Office diplomatic support to British interests 
in their drive to secure oil concessions in the Persian 
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Gulf because the Foreign Office wanted to secure 
these concessions for its own special nominee in 
this part of the world. The Foreign Office could 
no longer support the first application from a Bri-
tish national interested in oil concessions in the 
Persian Gulf, and therefore the first applicants to 
approach the Foreign Office were denied diplomatic 
assistance. 
The first two Britons to be interested in oil 
concessions in the Persian Gulf and to apply to the 
Foreign Office for assistance were R.B. Silley and 
Lord Cowdray. However both were denied British 
Government assistance and were discouraged from fur-
ther activity as A.P.O.C. was being promoted to do-
minate the region's oil concessions. The company, 
as seen above, was able to relate successfully the 
matter of their commercial independence to their 
need to control oil concessions near their Persian 
oilfields and to influence the British Government 
20 to act accordingly. 
However for political reasons total support in 
some cases had to be modified. In March 1914 the Fo-
reign ottice decided, and consequently convinced the 
other government ministries, that A.P.O.C. should 
not be backed in its attempts to obtain exclusively 
the Turkish oil concessions in Asia, ie. Mesopotamia, 
the Persian Gult and Arabia. Instead the Foreign 
ottice suggested that the new T.P.C. which they had 
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helped to :form, o:f which 47.570 was controlled by 
A. P.O.C., 25~';; by the Deutsche Bank and 22.5j" by the 
Royal Dutch Shell Company, (5~;; by Calouste Gulben-
kian), was the best choice through which to secure 
Britain's control of the entire Ottoman concession 
in Asia. 21 
This decision, whereby T.P.C. from fwlarch 1914 
was chosen to succeed A.P.O.C. in sa:feguarding Bri-
taints oil interests in the Persian Gulf, except Ku-
wait, was rooted in the development of detente be-
tween Britain and Germany regarding their rivalry over 
commercial enterprises in the Turkish Empire. From 
1910-1914 Britain and Germany came to recognise each 
other's special interests in the Turkish Empire and 
were able to conclude a series o:f agreements between 
22 themselves and the Turkish Government. By October 
1913 Alwyn Parker and R. von Kuhlmann, the Counsellor 
at the GeruJan Embassy in London, agreed 'that it 
would be very undasirable to leave the oil question 
unsettled when so much in regard to other questions 
23 between England and Germany has been settled.' 
The Foreign Office, in its efforts to come to an 
understanding with Germany and to secure Britain's in-
terests in t-iesopotamia, accepted the Turkish proposal 
of an amalgamation between British and German interests 
competing for oil concessions in Mesopotamia. By 
forcing A.P.O.C. to modify its former demands and accept 
German participation in the Mesopotamian oil concession, 
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the Foreign Office was encouraging a satisfactory com-
promise. After prolonged negotiations, already well 
described, an agreement was reached between British 
and German interests regarding oil concessions in the 
Turkish Empire. The new T.P.C. was accepted by the 
British and German Governments as their nominee for 
oil concessions in the Turkish Empire including the 
Persian Gulf, thus obviously guaranteeing the com-
pany's success. Article 10 of the so called Foreign 
Office Agreement signed on 19 March by the companies 
and the governments' representatives restricted the 
companies comprising T.P.C. 'not to be interested 
directly or indirectly in the production or manufac-
ture of crude oil in the Ottoman Empire in Europe and 
Asia', except in Egypt, Kuwait and the 'transferred 
territories' on the TUrko-Persian frontier, 'other-
24 
wise than through T.P.C.' 
As a result of this important article the Kuwait 
oil concession was excluded from any concessions which 
might later be granted to T.P.C. in the Turkish Empire. 
It meant. therefore, that the Kuwait oil concession 
could be applied for by A.P.O.C. independently of its 
partners in T.p.e. However this clause, which'during 
the twenties was the basis for the famous Red Line 
Agreement, prevented on the other hand A.P.O.C. and 
the other participants in T.P.C. from securing inde-
pendently oil concessions in this vast area, Mesopotami.~ 
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the Persian Gulf and Arabia. The Foreign Office sup-
ported that commitment, which meant that only T.p.C. 
would be nominated by the British Government to ob-
tain oil concessions in the Turkish Empire because 
in their political judgement this company would be 
the ~ost expedient. In this way Britain's domination 
OVer the oil concessions in the Middle East would be 
secured.' 
However, A.P.O.C. had Some second thoughts, a 
fact not mentioned in the major research already 
2S done into T.P.C. Immediately after signing the 19 
March agreement the company Attempted to file for 
'permis de recherche' for oil in Nejd and secure the 
concession independently, (ironically the Nejd area 
proved during the thirties to be the richest area 
in oil deposits in the whole of Saudi Arabia). After 
receiving a Foreign Oftice ultimatum to cancel this 
application, Greenway complained to the Foreign Of-
fice that 'the retention of the article in question 
was only agreed to by us tentatively, subject to 
further discussion.' Greenway added another point 
which Parker, who dealt. with the oil issue, described as 
a lie 
••••• the foreign members of T.P.C. insisted 
very strongly on the incluaion ot this ar-
ticle ••••• and we were not in a position to 
resist their contentions on this point 
without a definite expression of the views 
of His Majesty's Government which had not 
been obtained.' 26 
The Foreign Office, in its desire to avoid future 
confrontation between British and German interests 
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supported by their relative governments, brought 
pressure to bear on A.P.O.C. to comply with Article 
21 10 of the 19 Narch agreement. 
Meanwhile, another development strengthened the 
Foreign Office decision to support T.P.C.'s and not 
A.P.O.C.'s drive ~or oil concessions in the Turkish 
Empire. The British Government's intention of becoming 
the major shareholder in A.P.O.C. and of ~urnishin9 
the company with financial assistance posed a new prob-
lem for the Foreign Office. It feared that A.P.O.C. 
in its new torm with the British Government as a major 
shareholder might endanger the integrity of the Turkish 
Empire. Parker was convinced that 
there ~~uld in all probability be strong ob-
jections of foreign policy to His Maj.sty's 
Government becoming interested as a share-
holder directly or indirectly in the Mesopo-
tamian oil concession. 1) The Turks would 
not like a foreign government to partici-
pate and 2) that it His Majesty's Government 
participated in the Mesopotamian oil conces-
sion the French Government might wish to 
participate in a similar concession in Syria, 
and the Russian Government in Armenia. 28 
Those arguments lay behind the Foreign Office wish to 
distinguish between A.P.O.C. and the D'Arcy Group, 
(a subsidiary of A.P.O.C. and holding the biggest 
share in T.P.C.). and they influenced the Foreign ot-
fice in deciding that politically T.P.C. was more ad-
vantageous than A.P.O.C. for securing Britain's oil 
interests in Asiatic Turkey. T.P.C. was predominantly 
British and this arrangement thus had the etfect ot 
securing the whole ot this area tor interests which were 
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predominantly British. Therefore the Foreign Office 
discouraged A.p.a.C.ts efforts in Nejd and Basra and 
encouraged T.P.C. to file independently for 'perrois 
de recherche' for oil in Nejd and Basra. 
However, as regards the 'transferred territories' 
and Kuwait, both were secured for future exploitation 
by A.P.O.C. The Foreign Office succeeded in pro!rloting 
the company's interests by inducing Turkey and Persia 
to agree to recognise concessions granted by the other 
near the border between the two countries. This meant 
that regardless of the outcome of the border dispute 
29 A.P.O.C.'s concession territory would not be reduced. 
As Kuwait had been excluded from the scope of the 
Asiatic/TUrkey oil concessions because Britain had re-
fused to admit the territory was part of the Turkish 
Empire, A.P.O.C. were given special privilege&. 
A company geologist who had accompanied Slad!3's 
Commission in the persian Gulf was allowed to carry 
out a geological survey for oil in Kuwait and nahrcin. 
It seems that in general it was accepted that even-
tually the company would extend its operation into 
Kuwait. 30 
Nevert~eles$. although the British Government 
granted A.P.O.C. special privileges, they declined 
for some years to meet the company's request to open 
negotiations for the Kuwait and Bahrein oil concessions. 
On 24 February 1914 the company informed the Foreign 
Office that the report of their geologist was encouraging 
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as to the prospects of oil being found in Kuwait and 
Eahrein anc asked the Foreign Office for diplomatic 
assistance in obtaining concessions ,there. The Fo-
reign Office inur.ediately sought the cou.ments of 
other government ministries - the Admiralty, the 
Poard of Trade and the India Office - and it seelllS 
that all agreed that the present moment was not appro-
l~riate for cranting the company further oil conces-
sion5. 
The primary reason for A.P.O.C.'s failure to 
obtain these concessions in the Persian Culf before 
the Creat War, despite their willingness and their 
advantageous position vis-~-vis other British inte-
rests, could be explained by their prolonged nego-
tiations with the British Government for 's~ecial 
relations'. Up to the beginning of the First World 
\l.'ar the con,pany was engaged in trying to conclude an 
agreemen t wi th the Bri ti sh Govermnen t in order to 
secure its comnlercial independence. Therefore the 
various ~overnment ministries in London conducting 
the negotiations wi th the cOIlipany preferred not to 
take steps to grant A.P.D.C. oil concessions in the 
Persian Gulf and declined to comply wi th the con.pany' s 
rec"uest to start negotiations for the Kuwai toil con-
c~ssion until the agreement with it was satisfactorily 
concluded. 31 
T.p.e.'. concession in Neaopotamia did not mate-
rialise either. Although the British and German 
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Governments exercised considerable diplomatic pressure 
on the Turkish Government with the result that the 
Grand Vizir promised to grant the company the ~:esopo­
tamian oil concession, the Great War was soon to start 
and with it the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and 
the beginning ot a new order in the Middle East. 
In the period leading up to the Great War the 
British Government promoted two companies for oil con-
cessions in the Persian Gult area. A.P.O.C. was en-
couraged and was granted. special privileges to search 
tor oil in Kuwait. where the British Government had 
secured in advance the right to choose the oil conces-
sionaire and had excluded the territory trom any con-
cessions which the Turkish Government might grant. In 
other parts ot the Persian Gult, where the Turkish 
Government was recognised as having the right to grant 
the oil concessions, as in Nejd and Basra, the British 
Government tor political reasons chose T.P.C. to be 
its nominee. Nevertheless A.P.O.C.'s interests were 
s~t.9uarded as the company was given the largest share 
in T.P.C •• ie. 47.5%, and in tact dominated the com-
pany, 
The promotion of these two companies by the British 
Government for oil concessions and the commitment of the 
local authorities to abide by such a choice indicated 
government intention to become deeply involved in the 
quest tor oil in the Persian Gult. The government was 
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obliged to support its nomineQ's vis-a.-vis othrt" go-
vE.'rnments and to p:r:evE'nt othE.'r cdl interests, whp-
ther British or foreign, from ~nterin~ the field. 
However, as th~ oil issue could not he i~olstE'd from 
diplomatic ccnsiderations it bE'came subordin,~te to 
Britain's foreign policy. Th~refore to avoid t~nsion 
with Germ~ny in the Middle East a comhine including 
foreign interests - T.p.e. - was also nomin.'lt""j tl') 
obtain a foothold in the Persian Gulf inst~ad of 
securing the region exclusively for a purely Dritish 
company - A.P.O.C. Furthermore as the British Co-
vernment appreciated the potential political danger 
in becoming closely tied to A.P.O.C., which opera-
ted abroad, it was decided that control should be 
~xercised over company decisions on matters ~hich 
might affect government foreign, n~val and military 
policy. 
Nevertheless, despite foreign policy considC'!ra-
tions, Britain succeed~d aft~r a short while in secu-
ring domination over the f.1iddle East oil deposits and 
securing its special oil interests as a n~val power. 
The evolution of a successful oil policy in tho Pnr-
sian Gulf was partly due to the broad understanding 
existing between the govcrnm,;mt ministries as to the 
importance of securing A.P.O.C.'s special interests 
in thll area and expl01. tine) the oil dp.posi ts for or! tain. 
That conviction which suited the particular intorests 
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o£ the Foreign Of£ice, Admiralty and India uffice 
at the tiLle, characterised Britain's oil policy in 
th~ fersian Gulf. During the war this common umler-
standing disinte~ra.ted. This caulied considerable 
con£usion in deciding Britain's oil policy, and 
thus atfecteu A.r'~O.c. 's lJrospects of securing con-
trol durir .. !;! the war of the eil deposi ts in Kuwai t as 
in other parts of the l-liddle ;;;:ast. 
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Though the outbreak of war between Britain, Ger-
many and Turkey obviously meant that the quest for oil 
conces.ions in the Middle East had to be postponed, 
A.P.O.C. continued its efforts to secure control over 
the oil deposits in areas situated near its Persian 
oilfields. As the company's status vis-a-vis the Bri-
tish Government had improved considerably since 1914, 
the company's directors were led to believe that des-
pite conditions affected by the war their plans would 
aoon come to fruition. 
By the beginning of the war the ~~vernment and 
company's close relations finally became legally re-
cognised in the fora of a unique agreement signed by 
the two. The agreement, conclud.d on 17 May and ap-
proved by Parliament on 10 August, made the British 
Governm.nt the aajor shareholder in the company in 
exchange for £2.2 million. This agr.ement comprised 
s.v.rAl s.ctions which secured the Admiralty and Fo-
r.ign Office's obj.ctives and reflected Britain's 
original oil policy. 
Admiralty interests wer. sat.guard.d by the supply 
contract committing the company to supply the Navy with 
six million tons of oil fuel at a specially reduced 
pric. over the next twenty years. In addition, the 
agr .... nt provid.d the Admiralty with preemptive rights 
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to purchase any oil fuel produced by the company, and 
in time o~ war the 'entire stock and production' o~ 
the company's oil tuel was to be held 'at the disposal 
ot the Admiralty. ,1 Foreign Ottice interests were 
sateguarded by ensuring the company's British charac-
ter,and,by the British Government's right to exercise 
a veto on company decision. in matters ot toreign and 
military policy.2 The.e two main principle., ie. to 
maintain the company'. British character and to grant 
the Admiralty the right ot pre-emption ot oil fuel 
produced, emerged a. the core of British oil policy. 
However, the British Government'. new formal 
relationship with A.P.O.C., critici.ed by foreign 
power. and other oil companies,' did not benetit 
the company a. its director. hoped. During the war 
Greenway and his colleagues sensed a change in the 
Foreign Office attitude towards A.P.O.C. and very 
quickly reali.ed that Foreign Office support parti-
cularly for the companY'.-oil claims in the Persian 
Gulf and Asiatic Turkey was declining. Indeed, a 
new Foreign Oftice attitude toward. A.P.O.C.'. oil 
claim. evolved during the war thus determining in 
particular A.P.O.C.'s prospects of securing Xuwait's 
and other oil conce •• ions in the Middle East. 
The tir.t indication of a pos.ible conflict of 
intere.t. between the Foreign Otfice and the oil com-
pany came to light when the Foreign Offiee decided to 
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consider the 19 March agreement signed between the Bri-
tish and G.rman interests concerning the Mesupotamian 
oil concession no longer legally valid. As a result 
o~ the .war the For.ign OLLice believ.d this course of 
action would be the best method o~ eliminating Ger-
man,interests from 'regions which in all probability 
will ev.ntually fall within a British sphere o~ in-
4 fluence.' .. A.P.O.C •. for its part favoured the agree-
ment which gave them ,control over the Mesopotamian 
oil concession.and.they feared the Foreign Office d.-
cision might prejudice their position. Therefore 
the company urged.the Foreign Of Lice to uphold the 
agr .... nt and to allow the company to obtain ~ pro-
S per share in .T.P.C. Cons.quently the Foreign OL~ice 
succeeded in obtaining the company's and other govern-
ment ministries' concurrence Atter promising that 
'the necessity oL sateguarding so far as possible the 
interests of the British parties to that agreement will 
6 not.be lost sight of.' 
This slight incident revealed a ~ar more serious 
development with far greater consequences - a growing 
division between the Foreign OLLice and Admiralty atti-
tudes towards A.P.O.C. Admiralty o~ficials apprecia-
ted to a greater extent the importance of A.P.O.C.'s 
oil supply contract and believed that the company 
could in future reduce the navy's heavy dependence 
on ~oreign oil. There~ore the promotion of the British 
- 51 -
Government-controlled company - A.P.O.C_became o~ 
great importance to the Admiralty and r.sulted in a 
joint stand with the company on. some oil issu.s, par-
ticularly in support ot claims tor additional oil con-
cessions.' A. a re.ult the Foreign O~tic. had to as-
sur. the Admiralty that provision would be mad. in 
7 the peace terms to .ecur. the company'. intere.ts. 
The anticipated contlict between the Foreign O~~ice 
and the company and it. ally, the Admiralty, was post-
poned during 1915 becaus. the Foreign O~tice still 
considered it advantageous and important for Britain 
to promote A.P.O.C.'. int.r •• t •• 
N.v.rth.l.... soon aft.rwards the For.ign Offic. adop-
ted a new attitude, thus initiating a period of ten-
.ion with the Admiralty with s.riou. con •• quence. ~or 
A.P.O.C. This new attitude adopt.d by the Foreign Of-
fice became prominent in March 1916 att.r A.P.O.C. 
suddenly requested Foreign Office .upport in obtaining 
'complete oil rightsover any portiono~ the Turkish 
Empire which may come und.r Briti.h influ.nc •• ' The 
oil company had v.ry car.fully timed its approach to 
the For.ign Offic. for promi ••• of the oil conce •• ion. 
in M.sopotamia and the Per.ian Gulf. Greenway, the 
company'. chairman, was aware of negotiations between 
the Shell Company and For.ign Office official. during 
January 1916 which were intend.d to .xplore way. o~ 
bringing Shell under Briti.h control. He was afraid 
that the Foreign Office might promi.e to .upport Shell'. 
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oil claim. in ,Asiatic TUrkey a. an ,induc.ment to bring 
Shell under British control. 
The Foreign Ottice, surpri.ed by this sudden de-
mand And with ,Shell's proposals still under review, 
suggested to the other government ministries that the 
government's attitude on the oil issue should be reas-
sessed •. In addition, ,the Foreign Ottice's answer to 
A.P.O.C.'. oil request was that 'the whole question' 
ot oil concessions in Asiatic TUrkey 'will be consi-
dered at & later dat •• '~ A.P.O.C •• already suspec-
ting a growing aftinity between the Foreign Ottice 
and Shell'sdirectors, immediately asked the Foreign 
Ottice tor assurance. that this postponement ot a 
decision did not indicate any intention 'to grant oil 
concessionsin the territory in question to any other 
group.', The company reminded the Foreign Ottice that 
the British Government had 
acquired a two thirds interest in this com-
pany and theretore that it is not in the in-
ter •• t ot the nation that any other rival 
oroup - whether British or toreign - should 
be allowed to acquire concessions in the 
territory in question.9 
, ' 
Meanwhile, the Foreign Ottice intormed various 
ministries - the AdmirAlty, the In'dia Ottice, the Board 
ot Trade and the Treasury - ot its revised attitude. It 
suggested constituting a really powertul and etticient 
oil combine, ie. that the Royal Dutch Sh.ll Group 
should be brought 'under British control by an amalga_ 
mation with the Burmah and Anglo P.rsian companies. or 
oth.rwi •••• and .ntrusted with the oil concessions ot 
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Asiatic Turkey.10 To under.tand thi., turn-about in 
Foreign O~~ice opinion, criticised by the Admiralty 
'as in direct con~lict with those previously held 
by the Foreign O~~ice', it i. nece •• ary to re~er 
once again to the motives behind the Foreign O~~ice's 
11 
support ~or A.P.O.C. 
As seen above, the original reason ~or the Fo-
reign O~~ice'. invo1vesent in oil matters wa. in or-
der to increase Britain's in~luence abroad, and the 
support given to A.P.O.C. was not without regard to 
other diplomatic considerations. According to the 
Foreign O~~ice. the war 'strikingly desonstrated the 
power which H.M.G. have ••••• on neutral countries 
by their exi.ting control o~ bunker coal.' Hence 
with the substitution o~ oil ~or coal as a navy ~u.l, 
the Foreign O~~ice ~eared that 'this in~luence may 
largely pass, to ~oreion countries' most dangerously 
I to the enemy, Germany. Foreign O~~ice o~~icials be-
l I ;1 " 
lieved Ge~any ,to have a ~ar greater control than 
i 
Britain I~~:til. supplies. This resarkable conviction 
which w.s tar ~rom true was partly the result o~ Green-
{ ", ! 
way's campaign against Shell's association with Ger-
~ , I. 
I I 
many and partly due to the ~act that German capital 
I 'j.' 
had participate4 in oil production in Central and 
'i " 12 
Eastern Europe, particularly in Rumania. The war 
! I ~ 
,i ' 
pre.ented ,:a golden opportuni ty ~or bringing under Bri-
f • 
tish controla,giant concern believed by the Foreign 
j 
O~:tice t4» be • aIn avenue •••••• ~or German economic 
I 
! 
i 
I 
• 
, 
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penetration' in the Middle East and which apart from 
the American companies was Britain's main oil sup-
13 plier after the outbreak of war. 
Evidently during the first eighteen months of 
the war the Royal Dutch Shell Group, which was in 
fact 4CY~ British, rendered valuable services to Bri-
tain's war effort and its directors expressed their 
readiness 'to make sacrifices in order to enter into 
closer relations with H.M.G.· 14 Therefore the Fo-
reign Office considered it to be more advantageous 
to wean the Shell Group away from German influence 
rather than to support A.P.O.C.'s monopolistic oil 
claims in Asiatic TUrkey, a move which would definitely 
alienate the Shell Group. Thus the Foreign Office 
stated its strong opposition to giving A.P.O.C. pre-
ferential rights for the Asiatic Turkey oil conces-
sions. 1S 
Naturally the Foreign Office's revised policy 
drew immediate protest from the Admiralty. Six days 
after being notified of the new Foreign Office view 
the Admiralty succeeded in holding an interdepart-
mental conference, without Foreign Office representa-
tives being present, to make decisions reflecting the 
Admiralty's point of view. On 8 March delegates from 
the Admiralty, India Office and the Board of Trade 
decided unanimously to reject Shell's proposals. which 
had been submitted previously to the Foreign Office, 
and to 'retain the existing all-British intere.t ••••••• 
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and trust to their developing at a ~uture time su~­
~icient resource. to .upply a large proportion o~ 
16 
our requirement •• ' 
Foreign Office official. were understandably 
angry when they learnt of the conterence and it. de-
cisions. A. they had already sugge.ted holding a 
conterence to di.cus. the oil i •• ue and had informed 
the other mini.trie. ot their difterent view, they 
telt 'deliberately excluded' and rai.ed opposition 
to A.P.O.C.'s extensive .urveys at the in.tance o~ 
the Admiralty in the Per.ian Gulf area. 17 
The Admiralty'. view al.o need. claritication. 
Admiralty official. did not oppose the idea ot 
bringing the Shell Group under British control be-
cau.e they .ere aware, a. many other British o~~i­
cial •• ot the group'. contribution to Britain's war 
et~ort. The Admiralty director. ot contract and 
.tore. tully agreed that 'Shell have been a great as-
set to us' and considered it desirable 'to secure 
British control o~ the group. ,18 In it. reply to the 
Foreign Ottice .ugge.tion to bring the Shell Group 
under British control the Admiralty clearly .tated it. 
readine.s 'to con.ider any .ean. tor .ecuring British 
control' over the group.19 In tact the Admiralty'. 
only critieiam was of the Foreign Oftice'. hostile 
attitude toward. A.P.O.C., and they were opposed to 
.ch .... which involv.d the .acritice o~ the interests 
and independence o~ A.P.O.C. 
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Careful examination ot the actual views and po-
sitions held by the.e two mini.trie., the Foreign ot-
tic. and the Admiralty, i. nec ••• ary in order to 
, 
understand in general the fluctuation. in Britain'. 
oil policy and in particular the r.ason. underlying 
A.P.O.C.'. tailur. to .ecur. British Gov.rnment .up-
port tor their oil claim in Kuwait during the war. 
Th. company continued th.ir .ttort., begun before the 
war, to .ecur. & tormal commitment from the British 
Gov.rnm.nt for th.ir future .xploitation ot Kuwait 
oil depo.it •• 
A.P.O.C.'. director. in London and the P.r.ian 
Gulf conduct.d parall.l negotiation. with Briti.h ot-
ficial. in order to .tr.ngthen the company'. claim 
and position in Kuwait. In October 1915 it pr •••• d 
tor permis.ion to carry out a g.ological surv.y ot 
Kuwait's t.rritory. Having r.c.iv.d Gov.rnme~ot 
India p.rmission, Cox, the •• nior political r •• ident 
in the Gulf, passed a •••• ag. to the company that 
'th.r. is now no obj.ction on the part of governm.nt' 
to the company examining Kuwait's t.rritory for oil. 20 
Acting on his own initiativ., the political agent in 
Kuwait ott.r.d to give ev.ry possible as.istance to 
the company's geological .tatf. However, according 
to the company, their g.ological employe •• w.r. fully 
occupi.d in P.r.ia, and they inform.d the Briti.h of-
ticials in the Gulf that the work would have to be 
d.laY.d. 21 
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It waa a year be~ore the company again approa-
ched the political resident in the Gul~ to ascertain 
whether their geologist could .urvey Kuwait and other 
territories in the Per.ian Gul~ for oil deposits. As 
regards Kuwait, Arnold Wil.on, who had now replaced 
Cox,answer.d that the work could be carri.d out at 
onc •• 
22 Again the company remained inactive ~or.ix 
month. until Wilson in~orm.d the. that the political 
Agent in Kuwait 'hAa discov.r.d an extensive bitumen 
deposit.' Ev.n then the company reply was that 'none 
of our geologi.t. are available' and a r.que.t was 
made ~ormoredetail. and ... ample o~ the bitumen 
diacover.d. Only att.r r.c.iving and .xamining the 
.ampl •• did the company,.end a geologi.t to Kuwait 
who confirmed previous report. indicating oil de-
po.it. in Burgan. 23 
'The company'. p.culiar behaviour whereby on 
the on. hand they pr •••• d for permi •• ion to survey 
Kuwait'. t.rritory ~or oil and on the other hand de-
"lay.d in sending their geologist, de.pi t. official 
British p.rmi.sion and .ncouragem.nt, was the fir.t 
indication ot th.ir policy in Kuwait. a" policy which 
oontinued atter the war. Originally the company" 
wished to .ecur. doaination over Kuwait'. territory 
so a. to pr.vent any other company trom penetrating 
the ar.a and endangering th.ir flank. 
However other priori tie. and ~inancial con.idera_ 
tiona compelled the company to po.tpone any sub.tantial 
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expenditure in Kuwait. Their priorities led them to 
develop their rich Persian oilfields, develop distri-
bution and refinery facilities, construct a tanker 
fleet and make .trenuous efforts to control the oil 
concession of Mesopotamia where rival interests were 
competing. These targets, striven tor by the com-
pany during and &it.r the war, were considered to be 
essential to s&ieguarding its commercial survival. 
The company was still small and relatively insignifi-
cant in ·the world petroleum industry and their finan-
cial resources were not sufficient to •• et the rate 
of development planned, esp.cially as they were r.s-
tricted by the British Government in raising extra 
capi tal on the .tock market. 24 In add! tion, the com-
pany'. government contract for supplying the navy wi th 
cheap oil fuel and the long-t.rm agr .... nt with the 
25 Shell Group li.ited it. profitability. It was only 
in 1917 that it started to pay a dividend to its shar.-
hold.r. and in 1918 that it obtain.d Bri tish Govern-
.ant cons.nt to raising part of the .xtra capi tal. re-
quired on the .tock mark.t •. 
Therefor. it ..... d that the only way open to 
the company to s.cur. their special int.r.st in Ku-
wai t lay in trying to str.ngthen their posi tion in 
r.lation to the British Government .0 .. s to d.ter 
any other group from .ntering the fi.ld, and in post-
poning any costly activity until such time as their 
financial situation improved. This the company did. 
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and on 10 October 1917 they tormally requested the 
India Ottice, the ministry responsible ~or the Gul~, 
to grant them the 'petroleum rights in Kuwait'. The 
company explained to the ministry that they had'car-
ried out at the instance ot the Admiralty' a thorough 
geologica! examination in Kuwait and wished to secure 
their claim 'betore incurring the large amount ot 
26 
addi tiona! expendi ture' needed. 
Atter considering the application and obtaining 
the views ot the Viceroy and Cox, the India Ottice 
generally tavoured the idea ot supporting the com-
pany in .. curing Kuwait's oil concession. According 
to the unistry, local considerations indicated that 
• the balance ot advantage would appear to lie in 
27 
supporting the company's application.' The Foreign 
Ottice, upon receiving the India Ottice's verdict, 
reterred the application together with their opinion 
to the Petroleum Executive, a new organisation tor-
med to advise the BritiSh Government on oil aitairs 
during the war. The Foreign Secretary, in accordance 
with the Foreign Ottice's revised policy concerning 
additional oil concessions tor A.P.O.C. as described 
above, &lao linked the Kuwait oil concession to 'the 
general question ot oil and ot various concessions 
in the newly occupied territories at the head of the 
Gulf.,28 This decision diminished A.P.O.C.'s pros-
pects of obtaining British Government support during 
the war tor thei r oil claim in Kuwai t because trom 
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now on the conces.ion became part of a broader i.sue 
tacing the British Government - that ot to whom and 
on what term. the A.iatic Turkey oil conce.aions 
would be entru.ted. 
It ...... th.refor., that the Foreign Otfic. 
not only changed it. attitUde toward. A.P.O.C.'s 
oil claim. in the Gulf but also toward. the que.tion 
ot the Kuwait oil conee •• ion. It betor. the war the 
For.ign Ottic •• ucc ••• tully .eparated the Kuwait 
oil conce •• ion trom thos. in M.sopotamia - the Fo-
reign Office agreement ot 1914, Article 10 - it had 
now rev.r.ed it. attitude and con.ider.d that gran-
ting the Kuwait oil conce •• ion .hould be delayed until 
.uch a ti •• a. the gov.rnm.nt had detinit.ly d.cided 
upon their oil policy in M •• opotamia. Th. P.troleum 
Executive, a ne. organi.ation which was later r.con-
.tituted and r.named the p.troleum Department, echoed 
the For.ign Otfice view and r.ach.d the obvious con-
clu.ion that 'the granting of petroleum right. in the 
newly occupi.d t.rritorie.' including Kuwait, '.hould 
be wi th.1d until .uch time as som. defini t. policy 
ha. been agreed upon a. to the Ilann.r in which our 
tuture .upp1ie. ot petroleum product. can be .ecured •• 29 
The Admiralty. although .upporting the company'. 
clai., also agreed that the application should be 
dealt with a. part of .. wider qu •• tion tacing Briti.h 
oil policy. 
A. a re.u1t, the India oftice intormed A.P.O.C. 
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that 'the government could not support their appli-
cation at pre.ent. aa the iasu. came under ,the broa-
der h.ading o~ the Asiatic Turk.y oil concessions. 30 
N.v.rth.l.... undaunted, the company again pressed 
the Foreign O~~ice soon ~ter for some kind ot Bri-
tish Government recognition and support ~or their 
Kuwait oil claim. But this time, in accordance with 
the new Foreign O~~ice de~inition, they reque.ted 
an extenaion o~ their claim ~or the Mesopotamian con-
cession 'so aa to cover the territory of Kuwait. ,31 
However. ~rO'lll May 1918 the Bri,tish Gov.mment and 
A.P.O.C. were occupied in other more pressing matters. 
The Sri ti sh Govemaen t was engaged in the tinal 
stages o~ the War and the peace settlemen t, and on 
the question ot oil 'they ~ound thems,el ves in ~ierc. 
competition with their allie. ~or a share in the 
Asiatic Turkey oil deposits. France and the United 
States of America beeame aore dete:rmined than ev.r 
to secure a ahare in the estimated oil reserve. ot 
the world32 
In the United State. of America the outcry 
that America's oil depo.its .ere ~ast declining 
grew lOUder and ~fected United Statea' ~oreign po-
licy. The intense de.ire to oain a ~oothold in the 
oil deposits in ~ormer Turkish territory was ini-
tially justified on the grounds that the Allies 
had relied heavily on oil suppli.s tra. America and 
'floated to victory on a wave ot[this]oil.,33 . The 
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StAte Department considered that the territories ta-
ken ~rom Turkey were spoils o~ the common victory 
to which the United States had 80 largely contribu-
ted, and there~ore American commercial interest. 
should be Accorded equal opportunities • 
. In addition, Britain's policy o~ excluding ~o­
reign oil intere.ts ~rom the Empire and British zones 
o! influence - the nationality clause - caused cri-
ticism in the United States. This policy obviously 
applied especially to American oil interests and 
was answered accordingly by America. In mid-1919 
the StAte Department ordered its diplomatic officers 
to give assistance to all legitimate American in-
terest. seeking oil conces.ions abroad. Moreover, 
in May 1920 Congress passed the Mineral Leasing Act 
,-,;4 /c"t:;" 
which provided ~or reciprocity against ~oreign ex-
clusivity. According to its provisions no lease. on 
public lands could be given to nationals ot countries 
that did not grant sbdlar privileges to American 
interests. Consequently the state Department campaign 
Atter the war was centred on tacilitating the admis-
sion of American oil interests into Mesopotamia. ie. 
34 & share in T.p.e. 
In Britain oil policy seemed more confused and 
auddled than ever be~ore despite the long awareness 
ot the contribution ot oil to national security and 
diplomatic in~luence abroad. By this ti •• the old 
ditterenc. ot opinion between the Foreign Office and 
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the Admiralty had broAdened to include a greater 
number o~ ministries involved in the decision-making 
process regarding oil policy. From 1918 not only 
were the Cabinet, the Foreign Ot~ice, the Admiralty, 
the War Oftice, the Petroleum Executive, tha India 
O~tice, the Petroleum Department of the Board of Trade, 
the Treasury and various committees all deeply invol-
ved in the question o~ oil, but the Prime Minister 
hi.self also concluded .. secret agreement with Cle-
menceau regarding oil matters. CO-ordination between 
the various ministries, obviously holding di~tering 
views and with varying interests to promote, seemed 
impossible and resulted in this fluctuating oil policy. 
The Lloyd George- Clemenceau agreement, the Lono-
Barenger agreement, the ministerial decision ot 23 
January 1920 and the San Ramo oil agreement, (all of 
which are beyond the scope ot thi s work and are com-
prehensiVely described by others), illustrate the 
sharp changes in Britain's oil policy at this time. 35 
In this situation it is not surprising that 
A.P.O.C. preterred not to reintroduce the issue o~ 
the Kuwait oil concession and made no representations. 
In any case, the company was deeply involved in se-
curing its share o~ the Mesopotamian oil conc.ssion 
against various competitors, and in making e~forts 
to win back British Government support. Gradually 
it became obvious to the British Government and the 
company that the only way ot securing Britain's oil 
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interests in Mesopotamia was to regard T.p.e. and 
its promised concession as a valid entity and to 
accord the American oil companies a share. The 
French were allottedthe German share·in T.p.e. and 
A.P.O.C., with British Government blessing, opened 
negotiations with a group ot American oil companies 
interested in exploiting Mesopotamian oil with a view 
to transterring to them a part ot their share. 
The revival ot the concession promised to T.p.e. 
had two very important by-products which determined 
the history ot Middle Eastern oil concessions. The 
American, British, French and Dutch interests ot T.p.e. 
which later secured the Iraq oil concession agreed 
not to become independently involved in oil ex~loita­
tion in the tormer Turkish Empire. in accordance with 
clause 10 ot the 1914 agreement. Aa regard. the Ku-
wait oil conce •• ion it was once again excluded trom 
consideration under the umbrella ot the tormer Turkish 
Empire oil conce.siona an1theretore A.P.O.C.'s claim 
tor it was atrengthened. Aa no other company but 
A.P.O.C. had made constant reque.ts tor the oil con-
ce.aion they .. erged as the only company Which was 
likely to be supported by the British Government and 
theretore to be successtul in obtaining the conc.ssion. 
This antiCipated .ucce.s wa. due to the oil conven-
tion signed in 1913 be~een Britain and Kuwait giving 
the tormer the right to chose the oil concessionaire, 
and to the tact that atter the War Kuwait was recognised 
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and treated as being Lirmly and entirely under Bri-
tish control. 
Although Lrom the beginning ot the war KuwAit 
had lost its vital importance to Britain as regards 
the Baghdad railway, via which it had been believed 
Ge~an intluence would penetrate the area, neverthe-
less British-Kuwait relations had grown atronger. 
The Shaikh, who had been otticially intormed on 8 
August 1914 oL the outbreak ot war between Britain 
and Germany, made A declaration ot loyalty on 21 
August and placed his 'ettorts, hi. men and his ships' 
at the disposal ot Britain. In return Lor hia co-
operation against the Turks, the Shaikh, in a letter 
Lroll the political resident in the Gul! dated 3 No-
v~ber 1914, waa given aaongat other things an assu-
rance that 'Kuwait shall be recognised as an indepen-
dent principality under British protection.' Shaikh 
p.:ub&rak, who had ruled Kuwa.! t since 1896 and who had 
promoted exceptionally close relations with'Britain, 
died on 28 November 1915. The Shaikh,' who was des-
cribed by Curzon as being the most energetic persor.a-
lity with whom he dealt in the Qllt, had delicately 
and&bly developed good relations with Britain thus 
gaining considerable political and linancial benelits 
tor Kuwai t and himselt. 
He was succeeded by his elder son Shaikh Jabir 
who was inLormed in March 1916 that 'so long as you 
act up to existing arrangement. with the British Go-
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vernment you may expect the same support AS WAS en-
joyed by your lAther.' On 5 February 1917 ShAikh 
~abir died and his brother Shaikh Sali~ succeeded 
him. Bri tain approved the succession And in March 
1917 gave hi. an Assurance similar to that given 
to his predecessor. The new Shaikh, who was des-
cribed by British ofticiAls as 'narrow in outlook' 
and • tactl.ss in his personal relations', was soon 
at odds with Britain. Ditticulties with his Majes-
ty's Government ar088 over the strict maintenance 
in Kuwait's territory and ports ot the blockade 
iaposed by Britain to prevent supplies reaching the 
enemy in the Arabian Peninsula. The blockade WAS 
naturally unpopular in Kuwait and the new Shaikh 
adopted an obstructive attitude toward~ it. As a 
result, Britain considered occupying Kuwait and in 
~uly 1918 the Shaikh was warned that he would be 
held personally responsible it he continued to act 
contrary to the intereats ot Britain. Victory in 
Palestine ~Ade the removal ot the blockade possible 
And eased the· situation. During the remainder ot 
the WAr the Shaikh adopted an attitude reoarded aa 
&Ati&tactory towards His Majesty's Government. and 
his co-operAtion was rewarded at tlle end ot 1918 
wi t11 a subsidy and the cancellation ot a loan ot 
£12.500 aade in 1914 in connection with Kuwait's 
water supply. 
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The end of the war necessitated a decision as to the 
status of Kuwait which 'the British Government had pro-
mised to recognise as an independent principality un-
der British protection. Because ot political, military 
and financial considerations Kuwait was not declared 
a British Protectorate, but was regarded asian inde-
pendent Arab state under British protection'. Never-
theless responsibility for it was transferred in 1921 
to the Colonial Office marking Kuwait t • new atatus. 36 
This reallocation of responsibilities indicated that 
every attempt was being made to return the adminiatra-
tion to a normal course, and for A.P.O.C. this meant 
it was a propitious time to reopen the question ot the 
Kuwait oil concession. 
The War years were characterised by the emergence 
of a diversity ot opinion within the British Govern-
.ent which later became more noticible. Each ministry, 
particularly the Foreign Otfice and the Admiralty, con-
sidered that ita particular view best 'suited the Stat. t • 
inter.st. and theretore each was determined to achieve 
it. objective. Thi. in turn was retlected in the Ga-
vernmentts inabili~ to promote A coherent oil policy 
and in A.P.O.C.'s tailure to secure a detinite govern-
.ent promi.e to the Kuwait oil conces.ion. 
The company for ita part, although unwilling to 
take on oil exploration in the Persian Gult tor several 
year. to com., was eager neverthele.. to .ecure govern-
ment acknowledgeaent at lea.t ot it. priori~ right. 
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Therefore the adoption of A.P.O.C. as its nominee 
contained a potential danger for the government 
which would have to assume the role of a biased refe-
ree and fa.ce criticis~ from any party wanting Kuwait'. 
oil d~posits to be developed forthwith. 
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PART II 
THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT - A BIASED REFEREE 
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1. The Concession Terms 
The allocation o~ responsibility for Kuwait's 
affairs to the Colonial Of~ice considerably increa-
sed A.P.O.C.'s prospects of securing the oil conces-
sion. As seen above, the Colonial Office had parti-
cipated in the evolution ot Britain's nationalistic 
oil policy since 1904 and the new Colonial Secretary 
was none other than Winston Churchill, a long standing 
supporter ot the company, who particularly appreciated 
its tinancial and strategic importance to Britain. 1 
Theretore as soon as the Colonial Otfice had 
settled its internal organisation regarding the Mid-
dle East at the Cairo Conterence, the company reintro-
duced its claim for the Kuwait and other oil conces-
sions in the Persian Gult. 2 On 12 May 1921 it re-
quested the British Government tor assistance in open-
ing negotiations with Arab rulers ot the Persian Gult -
the Sultan ot Muscat, the Trucial Chiets ot Oman, the 
Shaikhs of Kuwait and Bahrein and the Emir ot Nejd -
tor 'an exclusive prospecting licence' tor oil in their 
territories. 3 In order to strengthen their claims, 
especially those relating to Kuwait. the company first 
turned to the Foreign Otfice and asked it to transmit 
their application to the Colonial O~tice (now the minis-
try responsible) together with 'copies ot any necessary 
previous papers.'· Characteristically the company 
once again warned British otficials of the danger 
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threatened by ~or.ign penetration into the Persian 
Gul~, and on political ground. suggest.d that 'all 
oil conc •• sions in th.s. territories should be in 
S the hand. o~ a single British company.' 
. Furthermor., when making this initial approach 
the'co.pany .v.n propos.d tinancial terms tor the 
concession which were design.d to exempt it trom 
paying prosp.cting t.... The company stated very 
tirmly that 
a. very h.avy .xp.nditure .ust n.c.ssarily 
be incurred in prosp.cting •••••• tor oil, 
no paym.nt would beCome due to the Chiets 
in r.spect ot such prosp.cting lic.nc. 
and d •• and.d to be 'p.rmitted to import all r.quir.-
•• nt •••••••• ~r •• o~ duty. ,6 
Churchill, the chi.t gov.rnm.nt archit.ct in 
bringing together the British Gov.rnment and A.P.O.C. 
in the 1914 agr •••• nt, react.d tavourably to the com-
pany's r.quest tor all the P.rsian Gult oil conc.s-
sions. Initiating con.ultations on the subj.ct, the 
Colonial Secr.tary sought advice trom the two local 
s.nior British otticials r •• ponsibl. ~or Persian 
Gult altairs _ Sir Percy Cox, the High Commissioner 
o~ M.sopotamia and Colonel A.P. Tr.vor, the politi-
cal r •• id.nt at Bushire - the India attic. and the 
7 P.trol.um Departm.nt ot the Board ot Trad.. Th. 
Admiralty and the Foreign Ottice, which pr.viously 
had been d.eply involv.d in oil concessions in the 
P.rsian Gult, took no activ. part because the issue 
was considered to be internal. They r.-entered the 
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~ield only in the late twenties when ~or.ion po-
licy considerations were involved. 
The advice given by Cox and Trevor was in gene-
ral accepted by the Colonial Ottice •. They suggested 
that negotiations tor the Kuwait and Bahrein oil con-
cessions could be opened as soon as desired because 
Britain's position was sateguarded by the oil conven-
tions signed in 1913 and 1914 respectively, which 
committed the'Shaikhs to grant concessions only to 
a British Government nominee. However, ~or political 
and tactical reasons they advised that negotiations 
~or the rest o~ the Persian Gult oil concessions 
Should be delayed. 8 
The India Ot~ice, in accordance with support 
given earlier to A.P.O.C. in the Persian Gult, agreed 
that negotiations tor the Kuwait oil concession 
could be opened immediately. Furthermore, it adopted 
an idea put torward by Trevor and suggested to the 
Colonial Office that Britain should take the earliest 
opportunity ot sateguarding A.P.O.C.'s special oil 
rights in the Persian Gult by negotiating 'with the 
Shaikhs ot the Trucial Coast conventions similar to 
those already obtained trom the Shaikhs ot Kuwait and 
Bahrein.' By so doing, the India Ottice argued, Bri-
tain would secure A.P.O.C.'s right 'at some future 
9 date to prospect for oil in this area also.' Having 
received Colonial Ottiee clarification on some points 
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the Petroleum Department advised that the company 
was 'entitled to enter an application ~or a pros-
pecting licence' ~or Kuwait and to receive British 
Government support. 10 
While these consultations were in progress and 
while still awaiting the Colonial O~~ice's reply to 
their 12 May letter, the company opened a new line 
o~ direct communication with British o~~icials in 
the Persian Gult in order to strengthen their claim 
~or the Kuwait oil concession. Sir Arnold Wilson, 
the company's manager tor the Gult who had retired 
~rom government service, contacted his old triends 
Cox and Trevor and asked permission L1d support to 
open negotiations with Kuwait's ruler tor the oil 
concession. He reminded Cox that Kuwait territory 
had been specitically excluded trom the scope ot the 
1914 Foreign Ottiee agreement and requested Trevor's 
assistance in the negotiations with Shaikh Ahmad. 11 
,The draft concession proposed, ottering the 
Shaikh a royalty payment o~ 10% oL the net pro~it 
(compared with 16% accepted by the Persian Govern-
ment twenty years be~ore), was also .ent tor Cox'. 
approval. However, although Cox and Trevor could not 
permit wil.on to open negotiations with the Shaikh 
until the Colonial Ottice sanctioned it, they aided 
A.P.O.C.'s ease considerably by providing u.etul in-
tormation as to the time and way in which the company 
should approach the Arab ruler, and again pre.ented 
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the company's case to the Colonial O~~ice in a ~a­
vourable light. 12 
As a result ot the broad understanding exis-
ting among the various ministries and individuals 
concerned regarding A.P.O.C.'s entitlement to spe-
cial consideration in the Persian Gult, (in contrast 
to the war years when contlicting opinions preven-
ted a decision), the Colonial Ottice decided to take 
positive steps to secure A.P.O.C.'s supremacy in the 
region. A.P.O.C. 'was intormed that as a result ot their 
,request the political resident had been instructed 
to persuade the Arab rul.rs to sign oil conventions 
similar to those signed by Kuwait and Bahr.in and 
was promi.ed that 'when such 'an undertaking has been 
secur.d' the Colonial Secretary 
will be prepared to consider the propri.ty 
o~ r.comm.nding ••••••••• to grant to the 
D'Arey Bxploration Co. prosp.cting lic.nces 
tor th •• e territories. 
Consequ.ntly during 1922 the rest ot the Arab chiets, 
except Ibn Saud, signed oil conventions with Britain 
si.ilar to that sign.d by the Shaikh o~ Kuwait in 1913. 13 
As re9ards Kuwait. the Colonial attic. stated 
that in accordance with its int.rpretation ot the 
1913 oil convention the negotiations should be con-
duct.d through the political resident and not betore 
political and financial terms had been agr •• d with 
the company, ie. the British Govern •• nt should approve 
the t.ras to be propos.d. Th. political conditions 
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accorded with Britain's nationalistic oil policy and 
Arab and British sensitivity to Persian claims on the 
Arab side of the Gulf. The Colonial Office indicAted 
that the securing of an oil concession WAS conditional 
'upon the maintenance of the strictly British charac-
ter o~ the L.ssees' (the nationality clause). and that 
the applicAtion for the oil concession should be made 
in the name ot the D'Arcy Exploration Company and not 
in the name ot A.P.O.C. Although the D'Arcy Explora-
tion Company was a subsidiary totally controlled by 
A.P.O.C. the British Government insisted on using its 
name 'in order not to give colour to Persian claims in 
the Arab Gult' and not becAuse o~ Arab hostility to 
. ,.. 14 
A.P.O.C. as was claimed by others. 
The financial terms were designed to sateguard 
the Shaikh's interests and shortly became the topic 
o~ lengthy negotiation. between the Colonial Ot~ice 
and the company. Generally the Shaikh wAS to receive 
R •• 10,OOO (£750) tor A two-year exploring licence and 
would grant the company an ex_pUon fro. customs dues 
only on machinery u.ed tor oil prospecting. A.P.O.C. 
accepted the terms in general and intormed the Colonial 
Oftice of their willingness to open the negotiations 
for the Kuwait oil concession 'through the appropriate 
15 
channels'. ie. the political re.ident. However, the 
company requested some modifications of the teras,es-
pecially an extension o~ the period tor the prospecting 
licence from two to tour years and the inclusion in it 
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o~ the whole territory o~ Kuwait. 16 
By now the Colonial O~~ic. had become de.ply in-
volved in the neootiations ~or the Kuwait oil conces-
aion and was engaged in considerable consultations 
with the other ministries concemed, namely the India 
O~~ice and the Petroleum Department o~ the Board o~ 
Trade. On 21 January 1922 the Colonial O~~ice called 
~or an interdepartmental con~erence to discu •• matters 
relating to the Kuwait oil conces.ion and to con.ider 
A.P.O.C.'. re~e.t.. At the conte rene. it was agreed 
to modity the initial term. and to tix the royal tie. 
pay.ent tor the oil 1.ase. 17 
Several.or. month. o~ negotiation w.re reQui-
red to bring agr .... nt between the Colonial Ottice 
and A.P.O.C. on the term. to be o~t.red to the Shaikh 
of Kuwait for the oil conce.sion. Th •• xploration 
lic.nce WAS to includ. all Kuwait'. territory for a 
period of two year., extendable tor & turther two 
year., for a payment of R •• l.ooo(£75). Th. prosp.c-
ting licence was to cover not aor. than 400.000 acre. 
divided into not more than five block. for' & p.riod 
of two y.ar. and a payment of R •• I0,OOO (£750). The 
exploitation lea.e would cov.r not more than 100,000 
acres in not acre than thr •• block., with a royalty 
pay.ent ot R •• 3.8a •• (5. 3d) per ton of net crude 
oil with a guaranteed royalty of R •• 30,OOO (£2,250) 
p.r annum. In addition, the company would be per-
mitt.d to take up to 100 ton. of oil free of royalty 
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during the periodo~ 'the prospecting licence and 
would be exempt tor ten years~rom paying import dues 
on any machinery needed ~or the developing ot the oil 
18 industry. Accordingly after the company accepted the 
terms, the Colonial ottic. instructed the political 
resident in the P.rsian Gult 'to assi.t the represen-
tativ •• ott the company 'to n.gotiate an agr.ement' 
with the Shaikh ot Kuwait. 19 
The.e negotiation. between the British Govern-
.ent and A.P.O.C. tor the Kuwait oil conc •• sion illus-
trate the .pecial role assumed by the government. The 
Colonial O~fice interpretation of the 1913 oil conven-
tion .eant that the British Gov.rnm.nt was not only 
entitled to choos. the candidate tor the oil conces-
sion, as was agr.ed in 1913, but also become a party 
to the negotiations, .v.n without the Shaikh's know-
l.dg. or cons.nt tor a tim., which was not specified 
20 in the agr .... nt. In tact the British Government 
was to initiate a model concession which became the 
basis tor oth.r oil concessions in the P.rsian Gulf. 
This "phatically marked the continuation ot 
Britain's policy in the region and e.phasised the ex-
tent to which the revival ot a pre-war attitude lay 
behind policy during the twenties. This policy, as 
seen aboVe, had been aimed sinc. betor. the war at 
assuring A.P.O.C.'s domination ov.r any oil dePosits 
in ar.as situat.d n.ar th.ir P.rsian oil~ield •• either 
through T.P.C. (the 1914 agr .... nt) in the Turkish 
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Empire or independently in the transferred territories 
and Kuwait, while also being politicAlly committed to 
safeguarding the Persian Gulf rulers' interests. The 
ultimate step in that policy WAS to persuAde the other 
Arab rulers of the Persian Gulf to sion oil conventions, 
to negotiate with A.P.O.C. in order to improve its 
proposed terms for the oil concessions and to assist 
A.P.O.C. in negotiating with the Shaikh of KUWAit for 
the concession. 
Although A.P.O.C. expressed 'great satisfaction' 
that Trevor had been instructed by the Colonial Office 
to render a.sistance to Wilson, the company's local 
manager, they tailed to send the latter to Kuwait to 
open neootiations. 21 It seems that the company had 
second thoughts. It considered that some of the con-
ditions which the British Government was seeking to in-
corporate in the concession would be difficult to re-
concile with the conditions of its existing concession 
in Persia and were therefore not acceptable. 
However, Wilson's absence did not deter the po-
litical aoent in Kuwait, when he received instructions 
to assist the company, trom approaching the Shaikh and 
initiating negotiations for the oil concession. He 
presented the Shaikh with a single agreement to inclUde 
the prospecting, exploration and exploitation licences 
baaed on the financial terma agreed between the Colonial 
Office and the company, aa he considered thia format 
to be more convenient and acceptable to the Shaikh. 22 
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Evidently within only two months ot negotiations com-
mencing the Shaikh, according to the political agent 
'was ready enough to enter into a binding leAse with 
23 the A.P.O.C.' 
The Shaikh accepted most of the terms otfered by 
the company except the royalty payments. Nevertheless 
the company'. directors in London, despite Wilson's 
advice that it would not be ditticult to secure the 
conce •• ion, ordered him to take no turther action to 
conclude an agreement. The reason given to hiDl WAS 
that 
the opening ot the negotiations should be 
del~ed, owing to the company's heavy 
programme ot engagements and developments 
in progress elsewhere. 2. 
Instead they preterred the political agent to continue 
the negotiations which were in no way binding upon the 
company. 25 
This attitude, although su'rprising, was in accor-
dance with the company's basic policy regarding the Ku-
wait oil concession since betore the Great War - that 
ot securing British Government support and commitment 
so as to deter other interested parties without be-
coming involved in tinancial expenditure. The company, 
although somewhat sceptical about the existenee ot oil 
in Kuwait, wanted to pre •• rve the territory tor later 
operations and to bind the Shaikh with a concession 
which would allow them to start oil exploitation when 
t 
convenient. The first indication of this policy after 
the war was the company's insistenee on an extension 
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period of another two years for the exploration licence 
and the inclusion of the whole territory of Kuwait 
within the scope of the agreement. Although the com-
pany was aware that the prosp~cting field of Kuwait 
was more easily'accesible than other oilfields on 
either side of the Gulf, they explained.to the Colo-
nial Office that an extension of time was needed be-
cause of the extent of the territory, the unsettled 
political situation aldthe climate. 26 In fact the 
main reason tor thacompany'. behaviour, which later 
also became apparent to British ofticials, was its 
wish to delay oil exploitation in Kuwait as in other 
parts of the Persian Gulf tor .ome years, atter it 
. 27 had s.cured the option on favourable financial terms. 
Soon the company's attitude and the state ot 
negotiations between the three parties - the Colonial 
Oftice, A.P.O.C. and the Shaikh - were to change when 
a new British company entered the Persian Gult area, 
approaching the rulers directly for oil concessions. 
The appearance of the Eastern & General Syndicate (E&05) 
in Kuwait had serious consequence. tor Britain and de-
termined the development of the oil industry of the 
whole region. It is therefore important to examine 
thoroughly the particular case which paved the way 
tor the Syndicate's succes. in the Persian Gult and 
consequently the arrival of the Americans in the area 
the R1-Has. ea.e. 
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2. Ibn Saud's Lead. the EI-Hasa Case 1923 
The Eastern & General Syndiate (E.& G.S.) was 
incorporated in London on 6 August 1920 ~or the pur-
pos. o~ obtaining concessions and investigating busi-
n.ss opportunities in Arabia. The Syndicate was a 
purely British company and its principal shareholders 
were Sir Edmund Davi., Percy Tarbutt and Edmund Jan-
.on who were all engaged in mining enterprises world-
wide. rotajor Holme., .. company employee whom the 
Arab. later called 'the ~ather of oil' (Abu el-Naft), 
was .ent to the Persian Gulf to secure concessions. 
The Major'. first attempt toachieve this end 
resulted in failure when the Colonial Office, after 
being consulted by the Syndicate, rai.ed objection. 
to the Syndicate .ecuring an oil concession from 
Shaikh Idrisi of Asir. Having consulted the Foreign 
Office, the India Office and the Petroleum Dep .. rtment, 
the Colonial Secretary intormed the Syndicate that 
'he does not .. t present se. his way to accord •••••••• 
2 the desired permission.' 
Nevertheless the Syndicate wa. not di.couraged 
by the Colonial O~tice'. attitude and when Dr. Mann, 
the Sultan of Nejd'a agent in London, .timulated 
their inter •• t and offered hi ..... i.tanc. in .e-
curing an oil conc ••• ion from Ibn Saud, it wa. de· 
cided to make the nece •• ary overture.. Dr. Mann, who 
in anticipation of hi. retirement from hi. po.t a. 
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A medical officer in the employ of the Iraqi Govern-
ment. had persuaded Ibn SAud to appoint him as his 
agent in London, Advised the Syndicate to Approach 
Ibn Saud directly.3 
. The SyndicAte, acting upon Dr. Mann's advice 
that Ibn Saud 'was a completely independent sove-
reign, in a position to do as he pleased in such a 
matter', decided not to consult the Colonial Office 
this tirue and sent Holme. to meet Ibn Saud." Holme., 
accompanied by Dr. Mann, met Ibn Saud at Hofuf, ca-
pital of the mainland province ot £l-Hasa, in Oc-
tober 1922 and immediately opened negotiAtions tor 
an oil conce.sion. At their meeting At Hofuf, Dr. 
Mann Assur.d Ibn S .. ud th .. t the terms being offered 
by the Syndicate were very generous and urged him 
to grant £.&G.S. the £l-H ..... oil concea.ion. S Ibn 
Saud became dissatisfied with Mannts pre •• ure, .s-
peciAlly After reAli.ing that the British draft of 
the conce.sion was different 'in some particul .. r. 
trom what Dr. Mann had given him to understand they 
were', and refused to .ign the conce.sion. 6 InsteAd 
he decided to revi.e the draft along the line. he 
wanted and to s.ek Cox's advic. at their scheduled 
meeting on 22 November a.t Ojair. 
Meanwhile British otficials, a.ware ot Holmes' 
activities, intormed him on Cox's orders that 
hi. applic .. tion to Ibn Saud for the oil 
concession tor Najd w ... premature and 
could not be supported by H.M.G. who in 
any caSe h .. d received prior request. 
trom other partie. 
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1 namely A.P.O.C. Holmes, determined to secure the 
concession and encouraged by his preliminary talks 
with Ibn Saud. decided to accompany Ibn Saud to 
Ojair without Dr. Mann, who le~t for London, to 
conduct the negotiations and Ineet Cox. 
At Ojair, while Cox and Ibn Saud conducted po-
litical n~gotiations about resolving the problem of 
borders between Nejd and Iraq and Nejd and Kuwait, 
Holmes had the opportunity of presenting in person 
his company's c&se.to Cox and of continuing his ne-
gotiations with Ibn SAud. 8 Interviewing Holmes on 
1 December 1922 Cox gained the impression that Hol-
mes behaved 'straight-forwardly' and was pleased 
that Holmes had not only accepted his advice to show 
'the result of his discussion with Ibn Saud to Sir 
Arnold Wilson' but agreed to try and draft with hi. 
a 'joint proposal' for the oil concession to be put 
to the British Government tor approval. 9 Cox was 
also satis~ied with the attitude adopted by Ibn Saud 
who, although he did not sign an oil convention with 
Britain, promised not to sign anything until he had 
obtained British Government advice. IO Therefore 
Cox reported to the Duke of Devonshire, who had re-
placed Churchill as Colonial Secretary, that he did 
not t.el 'justified in humiliating ui. Highness or 
otherwise disturbing the atmoaphere by objecting to 
further intercourae betwe.n them.' 11 (Cox waa 
accused later by A.p.e.C. of having .aaiated Hol.ea 
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to secure the oil concession which obviously was 
not the case.) 
ALter the conference was over Holmes immediate-
ly went to Basra to see Wilson, as promised, to try 
to bring A.P.O.C. in so that the El-Hasa concession 
could be secured jointly. The Syndicate wanted to 
enter into partnership with A.P.O.C., not only be-
cause Holmes had promised this to Cox but chiefly 
because they lacked the means to develop an oil in-
dustry in the Persian Gulf. Only later did it be-
come clear that the Syndicate's policy in the Per-
sian Gulf was to s.cure oil concessions in order to 
sell them to the high.st bidder and not to prOduce 
oil. 
However, A.P.O.C. rejected the &.&O.S.'s offer 
to share the oil concession and informed the Colonial 
Office and the syndicate accordingly. Instead 
A.P.O.C. requested the Colonial Office to instruct 
Cox 'with the least possible delay either to veto 
the conces.ion to £.&0.5. or to get Ibn Saud to can-
cel it.,12 The decision taken by A.P.OC. not to 
associate themselves with the Syndicate, which pro-
ved very damaging to the Company's interests and 
pro~pects in the Persian Gulf and consequently to 
Britain generally, was justifiable at the time. The 
£.&0.5. was a relatively small company lacking capi-
tal and technical experience in oil exploration, 
without staff andmaterial in the Persian Gulf and 
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without knowl.dge o~ local conditions. In addition, 
the companY,consid.r.d the Syndicat. o~~er to Ibn 
Saud to.b. too generous and was con~ident that ul-
timately.they would, with Bri~ish Government support, 
,s.cure the ~l-Hasa and other. oil concessions in the 
. Persian Gul~ on t.rms more tavourable to the.s.lv.s. 
On r.ceiving A.P.O.C.'. demand, the Colonial 
Ot~ice .lowly became aware ot its awkward and em-
barassing position vi.-a-vi. A.P.O.C., the 8.&0.5. 
and Ibn Saud. Colonial Ottice otticial. became 
more and more un.asy at the .xt.nt ot its involv.-
ment in 'intrigues betwe.n th.s. rival oil com-
pani •••• 13 On the one hand they telt that A.P.O.C. 
could not be allowed to be penalised ~or obeying 
the Colonial Ottice' •. instruction in D.c.mber 1921 
,to hold back and not pursue th.ir application for 
Ibn Saud'. oil conc.s.ion, (a point emphasised p.r-
sistently by A.P.O.C.). On the oth.r hand, howev.r, 
they could not pre •• Ibn Saud to give the conce.sion 
to A.P.O.C. inst.ad ot to the 8.&0.S. which had made 
a very attractive ot~er and was a purely British 
company, because they teared that it they did the 
Syndicate 'would be in a posi tion to indulge in a 
v.ry unpleasant newspaper campaign on the subj.ct 
ot government par ti a.li ty in industry and the hidd.n 
1. 
hand etc. etc.' The .i tuation became more compli-
cated and _barassing as it became clear to the Co-
lonial Ottice that Ibn Saud favour.d the E.&O.S. 
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otter and was aware of the close links between the 
British Government and A.P.O.C. 
At the consultation. between government mini.-
tri •• that tollowed, it appear.d that the Petroleum 
Department, which wa. an advisory body without execu-
tive power, was the first department to change its 
attitude towards A.P.O.C. Now the department con.i-
d.red that 'the entry of .ome comp.tition for oil 
right. in the Per.ian Gulf littoral would not in 
it •• lf be unwelcome-, a. A.P.O.C. might be unable to 
develop with reasonable rapidity for financial rea-
son. the large areas about which they were currently 
negotiating in the Middle Ea.t - Iraq, Kuwait, Bah-
rein, the Trucial Coa.t etC. The Petroleum Depart-
ment of the Board of Trade advi.ed the Colonial Of-
fice. and it .eems with aome .ucc •••• that A.P.O.C. 
should be reminded that they had already obtained 
or were negotiating option. for large area. in the 
Per.ian Gulf and as they were not prepared to co-
operate with the £.&.O.S. th.y could not be giVen a 
monopoly. is 
Shortly afterward. the Colonial Office informed 
A.P.O.C. that politically it would be very difficult 
and di.advantageou. to Britain'. interest. to veto 
the conce.sion promi.ed to the £.&O.S. or to per.uade 
Ibn Saud to cancel it. Explaining the complicated 
situation the Colonial Office informed A.P.O.C. that 
they could not pre •• Ibn Saud to wait until a conve-
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nient time ~or a British .Government supported company 
to .xplore any oil potential in Nejd when another 
British company had indicated a desire to start torth-
with. 16 Altho~gh Ibn Saud had been barred since 1915 
trom granting a conc •• sion to toreigners. unlike the 
other Arab rulers he .didnot sign an oil convention 
wi th Bri tAin and was thus in a posi tion to grant the 
British Syndicate a conce.sion. 
N.v.rthel •••• still recognising A.P.O.C.'s claim 
to priority in opportunity. the COlonial ottic. was 
ready to intluence Ibn Saud to accept A.P.O.C.'s o~­
ter provided Ibn Saud tound it at least as ~avourable 
as the R.& G.S. on.. Th.re~ore ~ter A.P.O.C. in~or-
med the COlonial Ottice ot their int.ntion to open 
direct negotiations with Ibn Saud (permission having 
alr.ady been granted by the Colonial O~tice). and ot 
o~tering better terms, the COlonial Secretary urged 
COx to ask Ibn Saud not to accept the E.& G.S. otter 
'until he has had the opportunity ot considering otter' 
17 trom A.P.O.C. COx i_ediately in~ormed Ibn Saud o~ 
the COlonial Secretary's wiahes and advised him to 
accept A.P.O.C.'s ot~er as the company was prepared 
to give better terms and was 'the stronger and more 
expert organisation_,1S 
Wilson. upon receiving his instructions trom 
A.P.O.C.'s London o~tice, sent his deputy. who was 
alao :formerly in the civil administration 01 Mesopo-
tamia, to open preliminary negotiations with I bn Saud. 
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During their meetings in April 1923,Ibn Saud explai-
ned that for political reasons he could not accept 
terms inferior to tho •• oftered by the £.& G.5. He 
.ugge.ted commencing negotiations based on the terms 
otfered by Holme •• 19 Instead, Wilson'. deputy pre-
sented A.P.C.C.'. t.rms, which Ibn Saud rejected aa 
he consider.d them les. advantag.ous than those al-
ready off.red by Holme •• 20 
H. was instructed to break off the negotia-
tion. atter informing Wilson that Ibn Saud insisted 
on receiving his royalty payment. only by share 
participation, on the payment of 1% .xport duty 
and on the payment of import duty on all good. im-
ported for. the per.onal u •• of the company'. emplo-
y ••• (all conditions which had be.n accepted by the 
E.& G.S.). He informed Ibn Saud that Wilson 'saw 
no Use in hi. proceeding in p.rson to .eet you and 
that I should not prolong my .tay her.' because the 
.ultan did not agr .. to open n.gotiation. on the ba-
.i. of the t.ra. off.red. 21 
By now I bn Saud had became confus.d and .us-
piciou. of Briti.h Gov.rnment and A.P.C.C. motive. 
and activiti... on the on. hand h. was a •• ured of-
ficially by the Briti.h Gov.rnm.nt that A.P.C.C. had 
expr •••• d th.ir willingn ••• to give t.rm. at l.a.t as 
favourable as thos. otfer.d by the E.& G.S. and there. 
fore he was advi.ed not to accept the Syndicate'. 
otter. On the other hand, however, A.P.O.C.'s rep-
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r •• entativ. re~u.ed to accept Holme.' terms and in-
.tead o~t.red term. which were completely unaccep-
table and broke ott neootiation. when the.e term. 
were rejected. Theretore, .hortly afterward., when 
granting B.& G.S. the £l-Ha.a oil conce •• ion, Ibn 
Saud in.erted a .pecial clau.e preventing A.P.O.C. 
from .v.r becoming involved in oil exploration in 
El-Hasa, such was his tear ot being dominated by 80 
pow.rtul a concern. (Chi.holm's conclu.ion, ba.ed 
on this clau.e, was that lbn Sa.ud did not wiah to 
grant A.P.O.C. the conce •• ion trom the beginning, 
a conclu.ion which material pre.ented above doe. 
not support.)22 
The .igning of the £l-Ha.a oil conce •• ion on 
6 May 1923 with the B.& 0.5. and the inclu.ion of 
Ibn Saud' •• pecial in.i.tence upon binding the Syn-
dicate 'not to .. 11 the whole or part ot the Ha.sa 
conces.ion to the A.p.a.C.' cau.ed acme Briti.h ot-
ticials to teel that Britain's authority in the 
P.r.ian Gult was being underained. 23 Others like 
Harry St. John Philby, a Bri ti.h ofticial who thought 
Ibn Saud to be • the best material we have in all 
the Arab land.' and later played an important role 
in the development ot Saudi Arabia, had other rea.on. 
tor wanting the agreem.nt cancell.d. Philby wrote 
to Wilson saying 
The Hoi •••• conc ••• ion 1. att.r all not 
worth the paper it ia inscribed on and 
nothing would give .e greater pleaaure 
than to wreck it in tavour ot a .ch .... 
better calculat.d to .ecure solid adVan-
tages tor 1.5. 24 
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Ironically it was Philby who, ~t.r leaving govern-
ment service to become Ibn Saud's personal adviser, 
as.isted the American. in .ecuring this oil conc.s-
.ion in the thirties after it had been cancelled be-
cause o~ the Syndicate'. ~ailure to comply with the 
condition.. COnsequ.ntly the political r •• ident 
was in. true ted by the COlonial Office on 13 July 
to take any .tep. con.idered advi.abl. to '.ecure 
cancellation of Nejd conce.sion' granted to the Syn-
dicate. 25 
However, .hortly afterwards when a ••••• ing 
the .ituation, ie. Ibn Saud'. currently .trong oppo.i-
tion to A.P.O.C., the breakdown o~ negotiations be-
tween Ibn Saud and A.P.O.C. and the E.& G.S.'. de-
mand tor Briti.h Government approval a. they were a 
pur.ly Briti.h and reputable firm - the Colonial Of-
tic. r.con.ider.d its policy. In addition, the Bri-
ti.h Gov.rnment'. po.ition a. the principal .har.-
holder in A.P.O.C. also influenc.d the Colonial Office. 
It had no de.ir. to ••• its activities viewed as cham-
pioning A.P.O.C. becau.e o~ dir.ct tinancial int.rest 
in a region wh.re Britain'. declar.d and long-.tan-
ding policy was to protect the shaikhdom.' intere.ts. 26 
Atter considerable consultation which resulted 
in the conviction that Britain .hould not maintain so 
strong a lin. ot re.istance to the El-Ha.a agr.em.nt 
because it 'would not promote the general interests 
ot Britain and might have unde.irable ettects in other 
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ways' the Colonial O~~ice modi~i.d its policy towards 
A.P.O.C. and the E.& G.S. in regard to the El-Hasa 
caae. 27 It was decided to approve the E.& G.S. entry 
into the Persian Gulf and to accept the El-Hasa agree-
ment, but not without encouraging A.P.O.C. and the 
Syndicate to co-operate in El-Hasa and induce Ibn Saud 
to allow such co-operation, as it waa in his inter.st 
to bene~it ~roa the combined experience o~ both or-
ganisations.28 By adopting this compromise policy the 
Colonial Office hoped to continue and maintain two 
main but not always compatible objectives o~ its policy 
in the Persian Gulf - to secure A.P.O.C.'s domination 
over the oil conces.ions and to sa~eguard the Arab ru-
lers' interests. 
The El-Hasa case is hardly re~erred to in exis-
ting literature on Middle East oil and its importance 
for and influence on the course o~ negotiations ~or 
Persian Gulf and Arabian oil concessions has in gene-
ral been overloOked. 29 There has been a lack of accu-
rate and detailed description o~ the negotiations ~or 
the oil concession, the evolution of Britain'. attitude 
toward. A.P.O.C. and the E.& G.S. and the consequences 
of this case a. they were reflected in other later oil 
negotiationa in Arabia and the Persian Gulf. The Ku-
wait and Bahrein oil conce.sions apart, Ibn Saud' • 
• uspicion about A.P.O.C. and it. government connections 
which had developed during the negotiation. was bound 
to have repercu.sion. on the company'. prospect. in his 
kingdom. However. in the immediate future both the 
- 92 -
British Government and the Shaikh o~ Kuwait were 
influenced by the outcome of the EI-Hasa ca •• and 
therefore its influence and consequences will now 
be examined. 
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3. Competition tor British Government Support 
The aigning ot the El-Hasa oil conc.aaion on 
6 May 1923 had an imm.diat •• tt.ct on the oil n.go-
tiationa being carried on in Kuwait betw •• n the 
Shaikh and Major More, the political agent. Holmea, 
whilat in Bahrein negotiatin9 with the rul.r tor an 
oil conceaaion. aent a tel.gram on 9 May to Shaikh 
Ahmad ot Kuwait reque.ting hi. not to grant oil con-
ceasiona without tir.t conaidering an otter trom the 
B.& G.S. Hol •• a •• phaai •• d the tact that hia com-
pany had outbid all other companiea who had negotia-
ted with Ibn Saud tor the El-Haaa conc.a.ion and in-
formed the Shaikh that hia .. iaaary. Mohamm.d Yatin, 
would viait Kuwait in the n.ar future to pre.ent the 
Syndicate'a term •• 1 
Meanwhile Major J.C. Mor., aware ot Hol ••• • ac-
tion. immediately approached the Shaikh and intormed 
hi. that Hol.ea wa. 'in no way a person appointed 
from the Briti.h Gov.rnm.nt.' He also reminded hi. 
of the oil convention aigned by hi. grandfath.r which 
bound hi. to give the oil conce.sion only to a British 
Gov.rnment noain ... 2 Soon atter. Hol •••• having con-
clud.d an initial oil agr.ement in Bahrein (which the 
Britiah Government opposed until 1925). went to .e. 
the Shaikh of Kuwai t and p.rsonally op.ned negotia-
tion. tor the oil conc ••• ion. 
Th •• on.tary t.rm. ott.r.d by the B.& G.S. were 
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much more ~avourable than those o~~ered byA.P.O.C. 
and naturally created considerable interest on the 
part o~ the Shaikh. The initial payment was to be 
£2,500 in gold against A.P.O.C.'s R •• 10,000,(£750), 
with an annual minimum thereatt.r ot £3,000 i~ gold 
\ 
'I 
against A.P.O.C.'. R •• 30,000 (£2,250). In addition, 
~, 
the Shaikh was to rec.ive 20% ot the pro~it. An~ to 
\ 
have the right to subscribe up to 20% ot the capital 
\ ' 
\ 
requir.d again.t A.P.O.C.'. royalty o~~.r ot Rs.3.8 
anna. per ton ot net crud. oil. The E.& G.S. also 
ottered to pay 1% .xport duty on ev.rything .xtrac-
ted ~rOJll the ground and import duty on all imports 
except machin.ry needed ~or the development o~ the 
oil indu.try, whereas A.P.O.C. wer. not willing to 
pay export duty at all and r.qu •• t.d ten y.ar. eXeDlp-
tion trOJll any import duty.3 I.pr •••• d by the R.& G.S.' • 
• ucce.. in El-Ha.a and Bahr.in and by the term. being 
o~tered, and having been a •• ur.d by Holme. that the 
Syndicate'. principal. in London would .ake the neces-
.ary arrangement. with the Colonial Ottice, the Shaikh 
gave Holmes a period ot .ix month. in which to obtain 
" British Government approval ot the propos.d agr .... nt. 
By now A.P.O.C.'. rath.r dilatory attitude had 
changed considerably and i_ediate step •• ere taken to 
secure the company'. intere.t. in Kuwait. The company 
urged the Colonial O~~ice to instruct the political 
resident by cable to get their conces.ion 'signed at 
once' by the Shaikh o~ Kuwait, and instructed Wilson 
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to viait Kuwait and to make every ef£ort to induce 
the Shaikh to sign the oil conce.sion. S Upon re-
ceiving A.p.O.e.'s request the Colonial Office in-
structedthe political resident to inform the Shaikh 
that the Britiah Government 'think it is not desirable 
to bring in any competing interest' and to try and 
persuade the Shaikh 'to give a definite undertaking' 
to grant the conce.sion to A.p.o.e. 6 
Shortly thereAfter, only a few days atter Hol-
mes departed tor London, Wilson and the political r •• i-
dent met the Shaikh. At this meeting, on 2 ~une, 
Wilson strove unsuccessfully to coerce the Shaikh into 
signing the oil agreement or at least into giving a 
written undertaking not to conclude any contract with 
any other company. By now the Shaikh WAS exceedingly 
anxious not to cODUlli t hims.lt in any way (as he had 
given Holmes time to approach the British Government) 
and said that he considered the matter to be a commer-
cial affair which required considerable deliberation 
in order that 'full justice may be done to both parti •••• ? 
H. was reAdy only to promi •• Wilson v.rbally, as a 
personal favour, that h. would not conclude any contract 
without informing hi. ot the terms sugge.t.d by the 
other company. 
On·th. tollowing day the political· r.sid.nt and 
the political agent .et the Shaikh and rene.ed th.ir 
etforts to p.rsuad. hi. to sign the agr .... nt with wil-
son, although they knew by then that' A.P.O.C. ar. in 
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no hurry to exploit the Shaikh'. territory' and that 
the company'. 'chief anxiety was to be certain that 
no other party would be able to obtain a footing' in 
Kuwait,a policy con.idered by Briti.h official. who 
read the political re.ident'. report to be 'unfair to 
8 the Shaikh who pre.umably wanted revenue.' Wilson'. 
admi •• ion of A.P.O.C.'. policy in Kuwait which, a • 
• een above had already been reflected in the company'. 
previous activitie., gradually attract.d the Colonial 
Office'. attention and later influenced the d.partment 
into modifying it. policy toward. A.P.O.C. and the 
E.& G.S. 
Although Wil.on and the political r •• ident ex-
pr •••• d optimi.m that the Shaikh would ultimat.ly 
grant A.P.O.C. the eone ••• ion, the Shaikh after 
three week. of con.ideration informed Major More, the 
political agent, that Holme.' offer ..... d 'benefi-
cient and profitabl.' and .aid he wa. 'mo.t anxiou.' 
9 to grant the oil conce •• ion to the E.& G.S. Thi. 
attitude .urpri •• d and embara •• ed the Colonial Of-
fic., e.pecially a. the Shaikh had .tated that he par-
ticularly liked Holme.' offer becau •• the Syndicate 
was a Briti.h company and had promi.ed 'not to •• 11 
10 the conce •• ion to any but Briti.h compani ••• ' Fur-
thermore, aa the Shaikh knew 'that Ibn Saud has turned 
clown A.P.O.C. offer and i. dealing with Holm •• ', he 
hop.d that the Briti.h Government would rai.e no ob-
jection to hi. choice of conce •• ionaire a. it •• emed 
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11 to have done with Ibn Saud. 
However as the Colonial O~~ice was atill 0Vpo •• d 
to the E.& G.5. entering the Gult tor oil concQs.ions, 
their change ot opinion coming only a tew months 
later, the ministry raised strong opposition to the 
Shaikh'. preterence and the political re.ident·was in-
structed to stress this and again remind him ot the 
oil convention. The Shaikh's reaction was that his 
acceptance ot the otter trom the E.& G.5., which wa5 
a British tirm, was 'in no way contrary' to the 1913 
oil convention, and he asked More why the Colonial 
12 Ottice objected to the E.& G.S.'s otter. 
'aced with a growing determination on the part 
ot the Shaikh, the political agent made clear Britain's 
disappointment with his behaviour, e.pecially atter 
hi. 'personal.assurance.' to Wilson and the political 
resident. More intormed the Shaikh on 9 July that 
'any oil concession granted to Holmes will not be con-
tirmed by H.M.G.,13 (The same attitude was adopted re-
garding the oil concession whichth.·Shaikh ot Bahrein 
granted to Holmes). A.P. Trevor, the political resi-
dent, maintained the pressure on the Shaikh as h. was 
advised by More that the Shaikh was 'a man ot no 
strength ot character' who probably would not dety the 
British Government's advice tor long. 14 nventually, 
although the Shaikh gave way to Colonial Ottice pres-
sur. and intormed the political agent that he would 
not grant the concession to the E.& G.S., he also gave 
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the lie to More'. assessment o~ his character by reso-
lutely rejecting A.P.O.C.'. o~~er saying it was not 
15 
'acceptable either to him or his people.' 
By now, competition between A.P.O.C. and th~ 
E.& G.S. tor the Kuwait oil concession and especially 
~or Colonial Ottice support had intensitied in Lon-
don. A.P.O.C. continued to urge the Colonial O~~ice 
to support their prior right and to press the Shaikh 
to accept th.ir term. although they had already been 
r.jected by him. The E.& G.S. tor their part, having 
been intorm.d o~ the correct procedure tor applying 
tor oil concession. in the Persian Gul~, .ubmitted 
their draft conc ••• ion tor Colonial Ot~ice approval. 
Th. Syndicat. al.o .xpr •••• d their willingne.. to 
make .uch modification as the Colonial Ottice might 
direct, and asked for the mini.try'. support tor Hol-
me. in any further negotiations with the Shaikh ot 
Kuwait. 16 Furth.rmore, -the Syndicate complained o~ 
the behaviour ot British otticials in the Gult who 
had given the Shaikh c~ Kuwait the impr •• sion that not 
only did the Briti.h Government disapprove o~ their 
application but al.o ot their company, whereas. the 
Colonial Ottic. cl.arly .tat.d in ita 22 June lett.r 
17 that only the application was not approved. 
Th. Colonial Ottice was by now contronted with 
the sam •• ituation in Kuwait aa had occured in the 
ca •• ot the Hl-Ha •• conce.sion and also that ot Bah-
r.in wh.re the Shaikh .ign.d the conc ••• ion with the 
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Syndicate six days A.fter Ibn Saud. On the one hand 
the Shaikh o~ Kuwait wanted to grant the oil conces-
aion to the B.& G.S., a reputable British firm of-
tering by tar the mor. ~a.vourabl. terms, while on 
~le other hand he was being pressed by the Colonial 
O~~iee to gxant the concession to A.F.O.C. in ~hich 
the British Government 'have and are known to have 
a controlling interest.,lB Consequently just as th. 
Colonia.l Ottice moditied its attitude towards A.p.a.c. 
and the B.& G.S. in the ease ot El-Hasa, 80 now it 
did likewise. 
Having rec.ived consent trom the India Ottice 
and the Petroleum Department, the Colonial attice 
intormed the B.& G.5. that their application could 
not be approved until Kuwait'. ruler satisfactorily 
explained why he had rejected A.P.O.C.'s otter. 
Only if A.p.a.C. genuinely failed to aatiay the 
Shaikh would the ColoniAl ottic. be prepared to with-
draw ita objection to the B.& 0.5. draft. provided 
it was modified in certain particulars and its terwa 
were more tavourable than those ot A.P.O.C. The Syn-
dica.te was also informed that it had now been ma.de 
clear to British otficials in the Gult that the Bri-
tish Oovernm.nt regarded the Syndicate a. a firm of 
19 substance and repu.te. At the same time A.P.O.C. WAS 
instructed to re-open negotiations with the Shaikh 
for the conces.ion and WA. promi.ed Colonial Office 
support provided that they were prepAred to otter 
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the Shaikh terms at least as ~avourabl. as those of-
~ered by the E.& G.s. 20 
The Colonial Ottice considered the situation 
in Kuwait to ditter trom that in El-Hasa in that Ibn 
Saud had not signed an oil convention, thus Colonial 
Ottice support tor A.P.O.C. had continued but on a 
reduced scale. Now British Government support tor 
A.P.O.C. became conditional upon the company ot-
tering terms at least as favourable as those d the 
Syndicate, while at the same time opposition to the 
Syndicate entering the Gult for oil concessions was 
gradually decreasing. 
Naturally A.P.O.C. were most disappointed with 
the Colonial Oftice's moditied view. The company 
complained that the Colonial O~~ice had not been 
entirely consistent in ita support. They re~erred 
to the Colonial O~~ice letter o~ 22 June and to a 
.eeting held on 2S June, when it was explicitly sta-
ted that 'the Sheikh o~ Kuwait would not be permit-
ted to grant a concession to the E.& G.S.' The 
company now felt that their application had been 
placed upon an equal footing with that o~ the Syn-
dicate and that the Colonial O~~ice would permit 
the Shaikh to accept the better of~er.21 
Aa in the case ot ai-Has. the Colonial Otfice 
replied to the company saying that the government 
could not support it to the extent ot categorically 
refusing to allow the Shaikh o~ Kuwait to consider 
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an application for the oil concession from a repu-
table British company if he felt it to be more pro-
22 fitable than the offer made by A.P.O.C. The Co-
lonial Office felt it could no longer continue to 
oppose the B.& G.S. entering the Gulf for oil conces-
sions and still maintain Britain's policy of protec-
ting the Shaikh's interests, therefore the political 
agent was informed ot the revised attitude and was 
instructed to approach the Shaikh and to request him 
to state his objections, if any, to A.P.O.C.'s re-
vised dratt. 
However, despite a gradual change in the Co-
lonial Office's hostile attitude towards the E.& G.S., 
the political resident and the political agent con-
tinued to do their utmost to influence the Shaikh 
not to deal with Holmes and to grant the concession 
to A.P.O.C., because they considered Holmes' actions 
to be selfishly motivated and 'without any considera-
tion of general British interests. ,23 Therefore 
they agreed not to inform the Shaikh of the modified 
Colonial Otfice attitude and delayed giving him any 
information they thought might strengthen the E.& G.S.'. 
prospects in Kuwait. In one instance they delayed 
for .everal months informing the Shaikh that the 
British Government had agreed to his granting jointly 
with Ibn Saud the Neutral Zone oil concession to 
the B.& G.S. (The British Government had had no 
choice but to agree to this as Ibn Saud threatened 
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to grant the concession to Holmes whether or not the 
Shaikh o~ Kuwai t agreed.) Only after the Shaikh 
raised the matter was he told o~ the British Govern-
ment'a permission, and as was.teared it enhanced the 
Syndicate's status in Kuwait. 2• (In 1924 the Neutral 
Zone oil conces.ion was granted to the E.& G.S. jointly 
by the Shaikh and Ibn Saud.) 
On 6 December 1923 the Shaikh was requested by 
the political agent to consider A.P.O.C.'s revised 
draft again. The drait now included aome moditica-
tions made by the Colonial ottice, which the British 
Government recommended as a 'tair basis tor discus-
25 sion with the company.' Atter being pursued tor an 
. answer by the political agent, the Shaikh replied that 
he was going into every clause in great detail and 
conSUlting his advisors, and theretore he would not 
be in a position to reply tor six months. 26 Since he 
waa dependent on Britain, the Shaikh realised that the 
only way open to him to achieve his aim was to adopt 
a policy ot delaying the negotiations with A.P.O.C. in 
the hope that eventually the Colonial Ottice would per-
i 27 m t him to deal with the E.& G.S •. 
The Shaikh's policy and hia detinite wish to 
grant the E.&.G~S. and not A.P.O.C. the oil conc •• sion 
aoon bore truit. While visiting Kuwait during the last 
week o~ March 192., the political resident discovered 
a very determined opposition to granting the conce.sion 
to A.P.O.C. He reali.ed that the Shaikh 'ha. not the 
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least idea o~ giving them[A.p.O.C.]th. conc.ssion ~or 
his principality' because he now believed that he could 
no longer rely on British Government impartiality 
when the interests o~ A.P.O.C •. were contrary to his 
own. 28 This beli.t had be.n r.in~orced by Colonial 
O~~ic. policy and the fact that many o~ the company's 
employee. were ex-political o~~icers. 
Th. political resident therefore .xpressed 
doubts as to whether Britain should not limit its sup-
port for A •. P.O.C., especially as he knew that the cur-
rent situation, whereby the negotiations had been post-
poned and the Colonial O~fice was not allowing the 
Shaikh to accept other offers, only furthered A.P.O.C.'s 
interests in that th.y want.d 'to prev.nt other com-
panie. from coming in.' He .uggest.d in the interests 
ot both Britain and the. Shaikh that A.P.O.C. should be 
limited to a certain specified time in which to con-
clude an agr .... nt with the Shaikh, and that if their 
otfer were definitely refused th.n the E.& G.S. should 
be authorised to conclude their agr .... nt with him. 29 
J.H. Thomas, the Colonial Secretary who had now 
replac.d the Duke ot Devonshire, accepted Trevor's 
suggestion as it was in accordanc. with the ministry's 
revised policy regarding A.P.O.C. and the E.& G.S. 
Atter consulting the India Office and the Petroleum 
Department he informed A.P.O.C. on 21 May that their 
claim to priority tor the Kuwait oil concession would 
be recognised only up to 31 March 1925 and that it the 
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company ~ailed to conclude an agreement with the 
Shaikh by that time the E.& G.5. would be permitted 
to proceed with their negotiations ~or the conces-
sion. 30 
Alarmed by the situation, A.p.e.c. immediately 
requested an extension o~ the time limit beyond 31 
March and invited the Shaikh to view the company's 
operation in Persia. The company hoped to impress 
him by their extensive development of the oil indus-
try there and thus persuade him to grant them the oil 
concession in Kuwait. Aa the Shaikh had previously 
expressed a wish to see the Persian oilfields, he 
accepted the company'. ofter and vi.ited the oil-
tield. ~rom 25-29 June and the Abadan re~inery on 14 
August. The company provided the 'maximua of com~ort' 
for the Shaikh and he was duly impressed and grate-
ful. 31 
However despite A.p.e.C.'s pres.ure to re-open 
the oil negotiations immediately, with the explana-
tion that any delay would prevent the. trom organising 
a geological survey until the autumn ot 1925, the 
Shaikh refused to do so. He still preterred to wait 
tor Colonial Oftice permis.ion to deal with the E.& G.5. 
Nevertheless, faced with limited time, A.p.e.C. re-
quested the political agent to pres. torward with 
their draft and to try and per.uade the Shaikh to re-
open negotiations. Having failed to induce hi. even 
to discuss the oil eonce •• ion. the political agent 
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suggested that A.P.O.C. should send a representative 
to Kuwait 'ostensibly ~or'th. Oil Agency' but in 
~act toatte~pt to re-open negotiations. 32 
A.P.O.C.'s general manager at Mohammerah, visi-
ted Kuwait on 9 January 1925 and attempted to persuade 
the Shaikh to state his objections, if Any, to A.P.O.C.'s 
draLt. Although the Shaikh'was 'most gushing to him 
socially' he re~u&ed to comply, saying he was still 
waiting for some ot his advisers to return to Kuwait 
to discuss the matter. By now it had become apparent 
even to the political agent and A.P.O.C. that the 
Shaikh wanted to delay the reopening of the negotia-
tionsuntil a later date. More reported to Bushire 
that the reason given by the Shaikh tord.laying hi. 
reply had been acceptable in September but had now 
worn rather thin and concluded that he would not re-
33 
open negotiationa betore March 1925. 
Frustrated by the deadlock, A.P.O.C. urged the 
Colonial O~tice to pre.s the Shaikh 'to make a detinite 
reply' to their otter, and instructed one of their 
local managers, Haji Abdullah Williamson, an English-
man who for twenty-five 'years had been and lived like 
a Muslim, to visit Kuwait in order to mobilise public 
opinion ~or the emmpany and to establish the real 
reasons behind the Shaikh's behaviour. Williamson, 
who later became deeply involved in the negotiations, 
had many ~riend. in Kuwait whom he now contacted in 
order to in~luenee the Shaikh to grant the concea-
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34 sion to A.P.O.C. . Among his tAsks WAS to Approach 
~:ulla Saleh, the Shaikh's chief secretary, and to 
offer him £600 if the oil agreement were signed by 
the Shaikh before 31 March. The methods employed 
by Williamson were co~~on practice at the time in 
Kuwait and ~~re also used by Holmes. However, AS 
Williamson received the money and instructions via 
the political agent this Again emphAsises the unusual 
role played by the latter.3S 
Williamson tailed in hi. attempt to brin9 about 
an early conclusion to the oil negotiations, however. 
His report on the reasons for the eppeai tien to . 
A.P.O.C. in Kuwait reflected the company's direc-
tors' own belief.. He reported that 
a number of people still look on the A.P.O.C. 
as a government concern pure and simple, and 
object to it for that reason, other. do not 
want an oil conces.ion to be given to anyone, 
partly becau •• it would provide work tor a 
large number ot people and thus make it ha.r-
der to get pearl divers, and partly because 
they think 1. t would lead 
to deeper Briti.h interterence in Kuwait'. internal 
affair.~36 
Hi. report only .erved to .trengthen the opinion 
held by A.P.O.C. that local opinion in Kuwait wa.. 
equally divided over the .erit. of their company and 
the E.& G.S. and that therefore the Shaikh was having 
difficulty in deciding to whom the oil conce.sion 
should be granted. It i. interesting to note that 
A. Chisholm, a tormer employee of A.P.O.C., stated in 
his book that support tor the two partie. competing 
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~or the concession was evenly spread in Kuwait. He 
maintained that on the one hand. apart ~rom the bet-
ter terms the 8.&G.S. had o~~ered. the Shaikh was 
impressed both by Holmes' personality, 
by his strong recommendation by various 
~riends and especially by his success 
with Ibn Saud. On the other hand the 
Shaikh had had long dealings with 
A.P.O.C. and ~riendship ~or Sir A. wil-
son and was aware both o~ the A.P.O.C.'s 
strong position and that it was ~avou­
red by the British Government. 37 
However, in order to understand the situation 
correctly and the Shaikh'. attitude duri.lg the.e 
year. it must be understood that the ~actors sup-
posedly working in A.P.O.C.'s ~avour in reality 
weakened their position. Initially the political 
agent reported that he was quite sure that the 
Shaikh would not sign an oil agreement with A.P.O.C. 
automatically because their managing agents, Strick 
SCott & Co., had been responsible ~or the construc-
tion o~ an unsatis~actory water plant who.e opera-
tion, in ~act, was delayed ~or several years, a 
point later re~erred to again by More. 38 Moreover, 
because o~ British Government support and clo.e links, 
the company was regarded as a government concern 
which was 'likely there~ore to inter~ere more boldly 
than a private company would in the internal ~~airs 
o~ the state.,39 
There~ore in reality the company's position 
was very weak. and only the Colonial O~~ice opposi-
tion prevented the Shaikh ~rom granting the concession 
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to the E.& G.5. Neverth.l •••• A.P.O.C., unaware o~ 
it. precarious po.ition, continu.d to pursue a po-
licy ba •• d on the eroneou. aa.umption that aupport 
was evenly divided and that it only needed Britiah 
Government backing to tip the scale. in their ~a­
vour. Consequently they continued to urge the Co-
lonial O~~ice ~or support while at the same time 
re~u.ing to outbid the'ir rival, which waa the only 
way to prevent an agreement between the Shaikh and 
the Syndicate •. This re~usal to match th.ir rival's 
terms and .specially to pay cu.toms duty came about 
not because o~ the ~inancial burden that would ensue 
but because th.y were afraid it would eatablish a 
dang.rous precedent ~or th.ir conce.sion in Peraia, 
where th.y were exempt ~rom paying any duty and 
paid a lower royalty to the Peraian Governm.nt. 
Thua, aa .een above, the Colonial O~~ic. could 
not continue to support A.P.O.C. totally ~or lono. 
especially aa -the company re~used to match the E.&G.5.'a 
term.. Ther.~ore in accordance with ita r.vised 
policy the ministry had no choice but to rej.ct 
A.P.O.C.'s peraistent requests ~or an extension o~ 
the time beyond 31 March 1925 and advi.e the E.& 0.5. 
to aubmit their draft conceaaion ~or Qritiah Govern-
ment approval. 40 
The end o~ A.P.O.C.'s prior right to the Kuwait 
oil concesaion via-a-vis the Britiah Government mar-
ked the end o~ the ~irst pha.e o~ the oil negotiations. 
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During that period the special role assumed by the 
British Government dominated these negotiations. 
In accordance wi th its previous policy in Xuwa! t 
the British Government had on the one hand to bar-
gain with A.P.O.C.' to improve their proposed terms 
~or the concession, while on the other hand it was 
necessary to in~luence the Shaikh to grant the con-
ce.sion to this company. Thi. was because the Bri-
tish Government had been committed since betore the 
war both to giving ita nomine. - A.P.O.C. - .pe-
cial consideration in regard to the Kuwait oil con-
cession and at the same time protecting the Shaikh's 
interests. However as the negotiations progressed 
the contradictory nature o~ these two objectives 
became more and more apparent and intense, resul-
ting in growing disagreement between the British Go-
vemment and both A.P.O.C. and the Shaikh. 
The British Government's 'oil champion', al-
though alleged to be a British Government concern, 
was'generally independent in its commercial deci-
sions, which were not o~ a political or strategic 
nature. In Kuwait, as in other parts o~ the world, 
it bec .. e evident that the company was to pursue 
a policy based on and motivated by commercial con-
siderations-without much attention being given to 
the embarassing position this might create ~or its 
major shareholder, ie. the British Govemment. 
Theretore, as British Government support had been 
secured and the company's ~inancial resource. were 
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stretched to the limit in other more promising schemes, 
the company's aim was to secure the Kuwait oil conces-
sion ~or very little tinancial expenditure to be ex-
ploited later when convenient, or at least to prevent 
any other company.~rom securing the concession. 
The Shaikh tor his part, although heavily de-
pendent on British Government goodwill and advice, 
(Cox once reterred to'nlothering'the rulers ot the 
Gult as unsophisticated Arabs). naturally preterred 
to deal with the E.& G.S. which was also a British 
company. 41 As he was contronted with strong British· 
Government opposition h. deliberately procrastinated 
and delayed. the oil negotiations in the hope, which 
later proved correct, that in time the British Go-
vernment would withdraw its objection to the E.& G.S. 
o~ter. Consequently in a move to Achieve its two 
main objectives in Kuwait and in an attempt to break 
the deadlock a compromise attitude was adopted by the 
Colonial O~ticeJ to allow the Shaikh atter 31 March 
1925 to choose the best otter tor the concession made 
by British companies. This moditication ot govern-
ment attitude coincided with the government'. overall 
objective ot aaintaining British exclusivity in the 
region ,but neverthele.s at the same tim. it loosen-
ed government control a. it initiated the success ot 
an independent company without exceptionally close 
relations with the British Govern.ent. ' 
- 111 -
4. A Victorious Syndicate 
The decision taken by the British Government 
to permit the E.& 0.5. to compete ~or oil concessions 
in the Persian Gul~ atter 31 March 1925 had tar-
reaching consequences. The British Government thus 
legitimised the Syndicate's previous activities in 
the region and increased its prospects ot securing 
additional oil concessions, especially those ot Ku-
wait and Bahrein. (As seen above, the Syndicate had 
already secured the El-Hasa and Neutral Zone oil con-
cessions.) 1 ' 
As early as 12 May 1923 the Syndicate secured 
in Bahrein an oil concession which the Colonial ot-
~ice re~used to approve and prevented ~rom being fi-
nalised. In Kuwait the Shaikh was quite willing to 
grant the Syndicate the oil concession and it was 
Colonial O~~ice opposition which ~orced him to sus-
pend oil negotiations until this opposition to the 
Syndicate's o~ter had ceased. Theretore the Syndi-
cate waited an~iously tor the expiry ot A.P.O.C.'s 
prior right as determined by the time limit set by 
the British Government, which would mean that they 
were able to start negotiating with the COlonial Of-
~ice in the hope o~ tinally securing these oil con-
cessions. 
On 9 ..June 192.5 Edmund ..Janson, one ot the Syndi-
catets principal directors, and Holmes went to the 
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Colonial Otfice for intormal talk. about their wish 
to proceed with negotiation. tor the Kuwait and Bah-
rein oil conce.sion., and to request British Govern-
ment approval. At their meeting with J.H. Hall, from 
the Eastern Division ot the Colonial Ottice who was 
to be involved with the oil issue tor many year. to 
come, they were a •• ured that the British Government 
no longer had any objection to the Syndicate-. en-
deavouting to obtain these oil conce •• ion. provided 
they complied with Colonial Ottice procedure and 
term.. It was pointed out to the Syndicate repre.en-
tatives that the term. of any drait conces.ion would 
have fir.t to be approved by the governm.nt and that 
the actual negotiation. should be conducted through 
the political re.ident in the Per.ian Gulf. 
Jan.on and Hol.... already aware ot the condi-
tion •• et by the Colonial Ottice for negotiating oil 
conce •• ion. in the Per.ian Gulf, told Hall that they 
were pertectly willing to .eet Colonial Otfice .ti-
pulation. with regard to negotiation procedure and 
to the actual provi.ion. of the conce •• ion.. It was 
agreed that the Syndicate would write officially to 
the Colonial Ottice and reque.t permi •• ion to reopen 
negotiations with the Shaikh. ot Kuwait and Bahrein 
and alao to ask whether there were any provi.ion. 
the Colonial Otfice required to be modified in the 
drait conce.sion. which the Syndicate had .ubmitted 
some eighteen month. previou.ly to the.e ruler •• 
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On 18 Jun. the Syndicate open.d otticial negotiation. 
with the Colonial ottic., .ubmitting a copy ot the 
dratt conc ••• ion. which the Shaikh. ot Kuwait and 
Bahr.in had previou.ly approved a. a ba.i. tor di.-
cu •• ion with Colonial ottic. otticial •• 2 (In tact, 
in 1923 ~he Shaikh ot Bahr.in had .ign.d this dratt 
conc ••• ion while the Shaikh ot Kuwait had .xpr •••• d 
hi. willingn ••• to accept it.) According to Colo-
nial ottic. proc.dur. in oil attair. in the Per.ian 
Gult, the India ottic. was intorm.d and the Syndi-
cat.'s r.qu •• t wa. r.t.rr.d to the Petrol.um Depart-
•• nt tor th.ir .xp.rt advice, with a .ugg •• tion ot 
pr.liminary di.cu •• ion b.tw.en r.pre.entativ •• ot 
the Colonial ottic. and Petroleum o.partment. 3 
M.anwhil., in ord.r to precipitate a d.ci.ion 
Jan.on and Holm •• once again call.d on Hall to intorm 
hi. that Holm.s wa. due to l.ave .hortly tor the P.r-
.ian Gult. Th. Syndicate-s r.pre •• ntative •• xpr •• -
•• d a willingn... to a •• i.t in any way which might 
tacilitat. an early decision on th.ir application by 
the Colonial ottic., .0 that the political re.ident in 
the Per.ian Gult could be instruct.d accordingly and 
thus treat the R.& G.S. tavourably. Hall explained 
that the Colonial Ottice wa •• till waiting advice trom 
the Petroleum Departa.nt. He also ask.d wheth.r the 
Syndicate would be prepar.d to sub.titut. tor their 
original conc ••• ion pr •• ented to the two Shaikh. on. 
dratt.d along the line. ot the Colonial Ottice mod.l, 
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which had already been agreed upon back in 1922 by 
the Colonial Ottice and A.P.O.C. to be put belore 
the Shaikhs ot Kuwait and Bahrein and the rest 01 
4 the rulers ot the Persian Gult.. Holmes replied 
that he had seen this dratt conce •• ion and indicated 
that the Syndicate would be pertectly prepared to 
accept an identical one which in tact, as he knew, 
ottered the Shaikhs le.s tavourable terms than those 
already proposed by the Syndicate. He added that on 
Several occasiona he had attempted to persuade the 
Shaikhs to accept a royalty based on output, as re-
quested by the Colonial Ottice, rather than on share 
participation, as previously ottered by the Syndicate, 
but that they had retused, preterring the latter method 
.inee that was the system adopted by Ibn Saud in the 
case ot the El-Hasa oil concession. S 
Satistied with the Syndicate's positive and con-
structive attitude compared with A.P.O.C.'s ince.-
sant quibbling and requests tor moditication ot pre. 
viously agreed terms,6 Hall suggested the Syndicate 
should make the tinancial terms ot their otter slightly 
aore tavourable to the Shaikh than those ot A.P.O.C. 
This would lacilitate the granting ot the conce.sion. 
and also strengthen the Colonial Ottice's position vis-
7 
a-via A.P.O.C. The Syndicate repre.entatives, rea-
lising that in any case the Shaikhs would not accept 
less tavourable terms than those already ottered by the. 
in 1923, which as seen above had been aore generous 
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than those o~ A.P.O.C.,. theretore replied that 
there would be no dit~iculty on this point •. In con-
clusion, it was agre.d that a con~.r.nce including 
repr.sentativ •• ~rom the Colonial O~tic., the P.tro-
.leum Department and the Syndicate would be arranged 
in the near ~uture in ord.r to com. to a decision. 
The Colonial ot~ic., relieved that the Syndi-
cate had quickly agr.ed to accept a dr&tt conc.ssion 
id.ntical in its g.n.ral t.rms to that agr •• d upon 
betwe.n the British Governm.nt and A.P.O.C. in 1923 
and ev.n to improve i t. ~in&ncial t.rms, in.torm.d 
the Petroleum Department that pr.liminary discussions 
betwe.n r.pres.ntativ.s ot the two ministri.s which 
had previously be.n sugg.st.d s .... d to be unn.c.s-
sary. Instead, the COlonial O~~ic. propos.d holding 
a cont.renc. with r.pr.s.ntativ.s o~ the P.troleum 
Departm.nt and the Syndicate on 7 August 
at which the ~inal term. of an agr .... nt 
with the Shaikh. ot Bahr.in and Kuwait, 
on the lin •• o~ the agr .... nt r.c.ntly 
conclud.d betwe.n the O'Arcy Exploration 
CO.[A.P.O.C.) and the Sultan of Muscat 
would be discuS •• d,B At this conf.r.nc., h.ld on 7 
August, agr .... nt wa. r.ached on acc.pting the Colonial 
Offic.'. dr&tt a. a g.n.ral mod.l for the Kuwait and 
Bahr.in oil conc •• sion., but with bett.r ~inancial 
term. ~or the two Shaikh •• 9 
Mor. con.ultation ~ollow.d between the P.trol.um 
Departm.nt and the Colonial O~fic. on amendm.nt. ot a 
relativ.ly ainor charact.r, during which ti.e the 
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Syndicate becsme restlessl but the Colonial Office 
finally informed the Syndicate on 3 September that 
the political resident was to be instrueted not to 
object to the Syndicate coneluding an agreement with 
the Shaikh of Bahrein. with regard to Kuwait, the 
Colonial Ottice stated that they had no objection 
mutatis mutandis J to the Syndieate concluding an agree-
.ent with the Shaikh on terms similar,to those of the 
Bahrein eoncassion. 10 Accordingly, the Colonial Of-
fice intormed the political resident that day that no 
objection would be raised on the part of the British 
Government to the Shaikhs of Kuwai t and Bahrein gran-
ting an oil concession to the Syndicate on the terms 
agreed. 11 Thus for the first time the Colonial Office 
agreed that oil concessions in Kuwait and Bahrein could 
be given to a company other than A.p.a.C. and the door 
was officially open for the Syndicate to secure them. 
Although the Colonial Ottice approved th~ Syndi-
cate's otters to be put betore the Shaikhs ot Kuwsit 
and Bahrein, British otticials in the Persian Gult con-
tinued to support A.P.O.C. in every W&y possible, even 
to the extent ot suggesting that the Shaikh of Bahrein, 
who had been approached tirst by the Syndicate. be 
advised not to conclude an agreement with Holmes. On 
30 October the political agent in Bahrein intormed the 
political resident that 'it seems impossible to divert 
the Shaikh's sympathies in the direction ot the A.p.a.C.' 
and reque.ted instructions as to whether or not approval 
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12 should be given to the Syndicat.'s offer to the Shaikh. 
Th. Shaikh now wanted v.ry much to give Holmes 
the concession in view of the latter's succe.s in 
finding fresh water in Bahrein and thus solving the 
13 Shaikhdomts main problem. The political resident 
wrote to Wilson of A.P.O.C. that h. had advised the 
Colonial Office to oppose the conclusion of an agree-
ment betw.en the Shaikh of Bahrein and Holmes, but 
the Colonial Secretary regrettably after 
tw.nty five days consideration of my 
.ugg •• tion •••••••• r.pli.d that h ••• es 
no reason to ob.truct the grant ot the 
Bahrein oil conce •• ion to the Syndicate 14 
Consequently the political agent in Bahr.in was instruc-
ted to approve the E.& G.S.'s off.r and shortly there-
atter, on 2 December 1925, the Shaikh granted the 
Syndicate the oil concession on terms which the Co-
lonial Office had initiat.d and approved. 
Th. fact that the Colonial Otfice initiat.d the 
mod.l oil conc •• sion for Kuwait and Bahrein instead 
of accepting the original on. proposed by the Syndi-
cate and accepted back in the summer of 1923 by the 
rulers of the.e shaikhdoms cannot be str.ssed enough. 
It proved to be the critical factor which later .nab-
l.d the Americans to gain a footing in the Per.ian 
Gulf for the first time, which in turn facilitated 
their advance into Saudi Arabia. The draft conc.s-
sion which the Shaikh ot Bahr.in signed with the 
E.& G.S. in December 1925 was originally prepared by 
the Colonial Office for A.P.O.C. to put before the 
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Arab rul.r. of the Per.ian Gulf and did not include 
a clau •• explicitly prohibiting the conc ••• ionair. 
from tran.ferring the conce •• ion to a foreign com-
pany. The onlyclau •• r.garding this was that 
the right convey.d by this l.a •• shall not 
be convey.d to a third party without the 
consent of the Shaikh acting with the ad-
vic. of the r •• ident in the Per.ian Gulf. 
Such con.ent .hall not be unreaaonably 
witheld. 15 
Thi. clau •• was perfectly adequate to .afeguard 
and maintain British owner.hip of the conce.aion in 
the ca •• of A.P.O.C •• ecuring the conceaaion. A.P.O.C. 
wa. committed in writing to the maintenance of the 
.trictly Briti.h character of the 1 ••••••• ,and in any 
ca •• could b. prev.nted,by the two government dir.c-
tor. on the company'. board from .elling the concea-
.ion to a foreign company. Th. Syndicate had mad. 
no auch commi tment in wri Ung, and a. it waa a .mall 
private company lacking mon.~ and t.chnical experience 
it hop.d, rath.r than to work the conce.sion, to aell 
it 'to the highe.t bidder without any weight being Oi-
16 
ven to political conaiderations. A. later develop-
ment. w.r. to .how how deciaive this clau •• waa in 
opening the door for American entry into the Gulf, 
it i. ironic that the draft conceaaion propo.ed by 
the Syndicate and rejected by the Colonial Office in 
1925 contain.d a .pecific clauae pr.v.nting the Syn-
dicat. from tran.f.rring the conc.a.ion to a non-
Briti.h company.l? 
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A~ter securing the Bahrein oil conc •• sion on 2 Decem-
ber 1925 Holmes diverted hi. attention to .ecuring 
the Kuwait one. In January 1926 he told the political 
r.si~ent of hi. intention to approach Shaikh Ahmad 
and requ •• ted him to in.truct the political agent in 
Kuwait to tell the Shaikh that the Briti.h Govern-
ment had no objection to hi. granting a conce •• ion 
to the E.& G.S. Hol.e. assured the political resi-
dent that he had prepared ~or the Shaikh's considera-
tion the .ame draft conce •• ion a. had been accepted 
by the Shaikh of Bahrein, which had been approved 
be~orehand by the Colonial O~fice.18 
Shortly thereafter, on 18 February, Holmes 
arrived in Kuwait and rented a house for a year. He 
met the Shaikh .everal times to conclude a deal to 
sink two artesian water well. in Kuwait and not, as 
might have been anticipated, ~or discussions on the 
oil conce.sion. The oil issue was avoided because 
both the Shaikh and Holmes pre~erred to po.tpone an 
oil agreement for different reasons. The Shaikh was 
currently at odds with British officials a. he refused 
to delegate jurisdiction over Persian subjects in 
Kuwait to the political agent, as had been requested 
by the Persian Government of the British Government. 19 
Therefore he did not want to reopen with Hol.e. the 
oil question to which the political agent had objec-
ted so .trongly in the pa.t. Con.equently he did not 
approach the politieal agent for British Government 
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approval of the Syndicate. 
For its part, the Syndicate was in no position to 
undertake any further financial commitment in order 
to s.cure the Kuwait oil concession and therefore 
Holme. did 'not ask for the political agent's support. 
The SyndiCAte was now in a very serious financial 
predicament and wished to delay an agreement until 
more money wAs'available. The additional money was 
inject.d in July 1925 by two dir.ctors, Janson and 
Tarbutt, when the chairman, Sir Edmund Davis, l.tt 
the'Syndicat., but this WAS insuffici.nt to me.t 
outstanding debts, and by 1926 the Syndicate owed Ibn 
Saud £6,000'- two years rent for the EI-Hasa conce.-
sion. 
The Syndicat. claimed to have spent a large sum 
of money in'th. Gulf and that it could aLford no more 
on it. own. In thes. circumstanc •• the most r.ason-
able action tor Hol.e. to take was to conclude a 
wat.r agr .... nt a. h. had done pr.viously in Bahr.in, 
and which prov.d succ.ssful in .nabling hi. to secure 
the oil conc.ssion lat.r when the Colonial Oftice cea-
•• d to object. 20 The wat.r proj.ct would keep him in 
close touch with the Shaikh whil.t at the same time 
extra data on Kuwait's geology could be obtained. At-
t.r .igning the wat.r agr.em.nt with the Shaikh, Hol-
.e. r.turn.d to London to help in .olving the Syndi-
cate's financial crisis. 
Meanwhile in London the Syndicate-s directors 
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had already tried to raise extra money by selling part 
or all of their holdings in the Persian Gulf - the El-
Ha.a, Neutral Zone and Bahrein oil conce.sions, with 
a promise of obtaining the Kuwait concession. They 
negotiated with the major British oil companies -
Shell, Burmah Oil Company and A.P.O.C. - and with va-
rious com~ies and financial institutions. however 
all but A.P.O.C. declined the Syndicate's otfer. Shell 
and Burmah Oil were engaged in Iraq and India respec-
tively and in any ease were not intere.ted in compe-
ting against their clo.e as.ociate A.P.O.C. Burmah 
Oil had been the second largest shareholder in A.P.O.C. 
since 1914 while the Shell Group was in clo.e contact 
with A.P.O.C. in Iraq and was being supplied with 
large quantities of crude oil on a long-term contract. 
The other financial organisations were deterred from 
becoming involved since they realised the difficulty 
of marketing any oil found in competition with & great 
neighbour and in a world market already well-supplied. 21 
Moreover there was no incentive because of a lack of 
positive geological information about oil deposits. 
The only company searching tor geological evi-
dence of oil in Kuwait and still actively interested 
in the region was A.P.O.C. On 30 october 1925 H.E. 
Nichols, one ot A.P.O.C.'s managing directors, in a 
personal letter to Sir John Shuckburgh, Assistant 
Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office, requested per-
mission to carry out a geological survey ot Kuwait. 
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He explained the need to widen the company'. know-
ledge o~ the Persian Gul~'. regional geology and as-
sured 5huckburgh that the survey bore no relation 
to the Kuwait oil concession. 22 
,The Colonial O~~ice considered that A.P.O.C. 
was entitled.to carry out a geologieal survey in 
Kuwait Whether or not they were seeking oil or merely 
interested in, geological data which would assist 
them in their interpretation o~ the Persian ~ields, 
as the E.& G.5. had never been granted exclusive 
rights when. the Colonial O~tice had approved its o~­
~er to the Shaikh. 23 , There~ore the Colonial O~tice 
in~ormed the political resident that there was no 
objection to. two geologists employed by A.P.O.C. 
making a geological .urvey o~ Kuwait territory pro-
vided the Shaikh gave his con.ent be~orehand. The 
Shaikh reluctantly agreed, but not be~ore receiving 
the political agent's assurance that the survey had 
no connection with the question o~ the oil concession, 
a. he was .till re~using to open oil negotiations 
24 
with A.P.O.C. 
The A.P.O.C. geologists arrived on 7 january 
1926 and completed their reconnaissance by 7 February. 
Their report held no promi.e ~or Kuwait's oil pros-
pects. ,The results o~ this survey had been received 
at A.P.O.C.'. headquarters in London by aid-February 
just prior to an E.& G.5. approach ot~ering to sell 
the El-Hasa. Neutral Zone and Bahrein oil conce •• ions 
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together with any conces.ion. in Kuwait they might 
•• cur.. Wil.on, now the managing director o~ the 
D'Arcy E.::q>loration Company who conducted the nego-
tiation. on behal~ o~ A.P.O.C., .xpr •••• d inter.st 
in the Syndicate'. off.r and comm.ncedneootiation. 
which went on ~or .ix we.k •• · By'24 March the two 
compani.s were very clo.e to concluding an agree-
.ent. 'The re.aining ob.tacle to be .ettled was the 
~inal price ~or the conce •• ion., which wa. ot rela-
tively minor importance a.the .um wa. in the region 
o~ £55,000-£60,000. ' Howev.r on 7 April the Syndi-
cate was in~oraed that in view o~ a r.port by A.P.O.C.'. 
geologi.t. the company wa. withdrawing th.ir late.t 
propo.al •• 25 Negotiations were broken ot~ .. but wil-
son's explanation wa. not entirely accurate a. A.P.O.C. 's 
directors had known all along ot the negatiVe result. 
o~ the recent geologicalsurv.y. 
The .ain reason tor the withdrawal wasth. term., 
consid.red un~avourable by A.P.O.C., 'on which 'the Syn-
dicat. had secur.d 'th ••• concession.,' •• pecially the 
royalty payments and the obligation to pay cu.toms 
duty on imported materials.. A.P.O.C. considered that 
acceptance in the Gul~ o~ any liability to cuatom 
duti.s and high royalty payments waa a most dang.rou. 
precedent as it might ~~.ct 'the Per.ian concession. 
This waS' consid.red paramount, and the company was 
not pr.pared to antagoni •• the P.raiAn Government, 
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which already wanted to modity some ot the original 
claus.s ot their conc.ssion to A.P.O.C. A.P.O.C. 
hoped that in view ot the retusal ot any other com-
pany to take up an option on these concessions, as 
.eemed to be the case, together with the poor per-
tormance. ot the Syndicate, the Colonial Ottice and 
the Shaikhs would tinally reali.ethat only A.P.O.C. 
wa. capable ot exploiting the oil and would there-
tor. accept the company'. terms26 Untortunately 
tor the company, a. will be .e.n below, ita gamble 
did not pay ott and 800n &tterward. the situation 
was to change completely. 
Having tailed to obtain Briti.h capital, the 
Syndicate was torcedto look tor toreign assi.-
t&nce, particularly troa America and Canada. The 
Syndicate'. director. were helped by a tormer em-
ployee in their ettort. to intere.t American com-
panie.. Proteaaor Madgwick. who supervi.ed the 
Syndicate'. water operation in Bahrein and had close 
connection. with American oilmen, contacted his old 
friend T.E. Ward and .timulated hi. intere.t in the 
Bahrein oil conce.sion. Al though in 1924 t-Iadgwick 
had not been granted permi.sion by the political 
agent in Bahrein to carry out any oil .urvey work, 
he had neverthele •• done 80 a. reque.ted by Bolmes. 27 
He had tound encouraging .ign. ot oil pos.ibilitie. 
which he pa •• ed to Ward in 1926 atter reali.ing the 
Syndicate was looking tor a buyer. En route trom 
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·London to Canada to his new post, Madgwick met 
Ward, who was the President o~ Oil~ield Equipment 
Company, and gave him ~urther convincing detaila 
o~ the Bahrein geological structure. In the light 
ot.theae tacts·and contident ot Madgwick'.·techni-
calknowledge,·Ward approached the Syndicat. and 
asked tor a copy ot the Bahrein oil concession. 
On 19 August· 1926 Janson intormed Ward that Holmes, 
who had negotiated tor the conc ••• ion, waa due shor-
tly in the United State. ot America and would call 
on Ward to explain the whole position. 28 Holme. 
arri ved in New York on 21 September and he and Ward 
met representatives ot various oil companies in an 
ettort to stimulate their interest in the Bahrein 
oil concession. 
However the American companies showed little 
inter •• t in Bahrein as they considered it too insig-
niticant and too distant. They also had no geologi-
cal data ot the area and Madgwick's report was consi-
dered to be lacking in sound geological evidence. 
Thes. initial contacta were not encouraging. and 
upon Hol.es' return to· London Ward took it upon hia-
a.lt to continue negotiations, especially with the 
Standard Oil Company ot New Jersey and the Gult Oil 
Corporation. Ward'. decision to concentrate on the 
Standard Oil Company ot New Jersey and the Gult Oil 
Corporation was not accidental. Both companies were 
operating internationally and wanted to diversity 
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their oil sources. Both had outlets world-wide and 
wanted to obtain additional sources of supply in the 
eastern hemisphere in order to cut the cost of trans-
port and production. Thus, since the early twenties, 
they had been actively trying to gain a foothold in 
the ~1iddle East. 29 
When the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey 
and the Gulf Oil Corporation were approached again 
by Ward, the former stipulated the carrying out of 
& geological survey in'Bahrein as a condition for 
continuing negotiations. However, pres.ed for time, 
the Syndicate'replied that it would be impossible 
to s.cure the nece.sary permission and therefore 
stated that the negotiations should continue on the 
basis of tw;adgwick's report. The Standard Oil Com-
pany of New Jersey was no longer interested without 
proven geological data and therefore withdreW from 
the discussions .. 
Altho119h the Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf) geolo-
gists, upon re-examining Madgwick's report advised 
against Gult taking up the Bahrein option, Ward was 
soon able to change the attitude at W.T. Wallace, 
Gulfes principal negotiator •. ' By suggesting to Gulf 
that' they also acquire an option to the nearby areas 
of Bahrein, Ward overcame their objection to carrying 
out an oil operation in such a remote 'and small area 
as Bahrein, and assured them that it oil were disco-
vered there the surrounding area would remain under 
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the company'. control. The idea appealed to W. Wal) .. ace, 
who WAS reAdy to consider a Syndicate otter tor the 
EI-HA.a, Neutral Zone and BAhrein oil concessions, 
together with a p~omi •• o~ obtaining the Kuwait 
oil concession. 
Having secured a tentative o~ter, Ward hurried 
to London to confer with the Syndicate,directors. By 
now- July 1927 - the Syndicate was desperate to tind 
a buyer as they already owed Ibn Saud £9,000 for 
three years rent ~or the EI-Hasa conee.sion and soon 
would have to pay Rs.10,OOO (£750) to the Shaikh of 
Bahrein to extend the prospecting licancefor a fur-
ther year. Therefore the Syndicate'. directors ac-
cepted Ward'. advice quickly and agreed to otfer all 
their holdings in the Persian Gulf including that in 
Kuwait, the conce.sion for which had not yet been 
secured. Ward returned to New York authorised to 
negotiate an agreement with the Gulf Oil Corporation. 
Back in New York on 15 September he immediately 
reopened his negotiations with Wallace, which lasted 
tor more than two months. The main problem was the 
Gulf's insistence on .pecific assurances that the 
British Governmant would not oppose the transfer of 
the concessions to a Gult nomin... Wallace knew ot 
Britain's opposition to American oil companies secu-
ring oil conces.ions in the British Empire and zon.s 
of influence and of the difticulties in overcoming 
this obstacle. Hi. company was one of several Ameri-
can oil companies which had been negotiating to gain 
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a foothold in Iraq and obtain a stake in T.P.C. since 
t'" early twenties. 30 
Finally the Syndicate had no choice but to agree 
to obtaining formal written and effective assurances 
from the British Government that no objection would 
be rai.ed to the assignment of the concessions to a 
Gulf nominee. They did so in vie. of the fact that 
the agreement which had been initiated by the British 
Government and signed by the Shaikh in 1923 contained 
nothing to prevent them legally from transferring 
31 
their right to a toreign company. Nevertheless, in 
anticipation ot British Government opposition to an 
American company entering the Persian Gulf for oil 
conces.ions, it was stipulated by the Syndicate on 
Ward's advice that the Gult nominee to operate the 
concession should be a Canadian or British company. 
This contribution by Ward proved decisive in tacili-
tating the entry of American interests into the Per-
sian Gult, as the British Government was opposed to 
a company registered in the United States taking up 
these concessions and the Shaikhs of Kuwait and Bah-
rein were barred from signing any agreement with such 
companies. Moreover the company laws ot Canada per-
mitted one hundred per cent stock ownership by Ameri-
can citizens thus according the Americans complete 
control over any Canadian company which might operate 
the concession, without which American capital would 
not have been forthcoming. 32 
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To the Syndicate's great reliet two agreements 
were signed on 30 November 1927 granting the Eastern 
Gult Company, a subsidiary ot the Gult Oil Corpora-
tion, an option on the Syndicate's holdings in the 
Persian Gult. The tirst agreement Accorded Gult An 
option on the Bahrein oil concession until 1 January 
1929 and the second an option on the EI-Hasa and 
Neutral Zone concesaions, SUbject to revalidation, 
and an option on the Kuwait concession which had yet 
to be neQotiated tor by the Syndicate. Moreover, 
under the agreements' terms the Syndicate had to ob-
tain British Government consent to the transter ot 
the Kuwait concession when secured and that ot the 
Bahrein to the Eastern Gult Company's nominee. 
". 
,~ 
I 
In accordance with these secret agreements sig-
ned with the Gult Oil Corporation, Holmes r~turned 
to the Persian Gult to validate the nl-Hasa and Neu-
tral Zone oil concessions because ot arrQars in rent 
and to secure the Kuwait one. Holmes' salary and ex-
penses were now being paid by the Gult oil Corporation 
and h. made strenuous ettorts to deliver what the 
Syndicate had pledged. Well acquainted with Persian 
Gult politics, he preterred to deal first with Ibn Saud 
and then with the Shaikh ot Kuwait. He considered that 
Shaikh Ahmad would wait tor Ibn Saud's lead, as the 
latter waa regarded as the principal leader who otten 
dominated decisions made by other rulers ot the Per-
sian Gult. 
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However current political events in Arabia pre-
vented Holmes from approaching Ibn Saud who was en-
33 gaged in consolidating his authority in the Hejaz. 
Therefore as Gulf was pre.sing to secure the Kuwait 
oil concession as soon as possible Holmes reluctantly 
33 decided to approach first the Shaikh of Kuwait. At 
their .eeting at the end of April 1928 the Shaikh sur-
prised Holmes by his readiness to reopen the oil nego-
tiations immediately. In the presence of his closest 
advisers he praised Holmes as a friend and as without 
political aspirations, pointing to his deal with the 
Shaikh of Bahrein. Whilst discussing the initial 
terms of the concession the Shaikh even agreed to 
base the royalty payment upon output as had been set 
as a pre-condition in 1925 by the Colonial Office, 
instead of upon share participation as originally 
promised by the Syndicate. Hitherto the Shaikh had 
refused to accept this form of royalty payment, which 
had been offered by A.P.O.C., and Holmes reali.ed 
that he could there and then conclude an agreement 
provided he 'was prepared to pay a very large amount 
for the concession. ,34 He also noted the greedy 
attitUde of the Shaikh when he hinted at the Syndi-
cate connection with an American company. However, 
in order not to appear too anxious and hoping to de-
lay a conclusion until an agreement was reached with 
Ibn Saud, Holmes suggested preparing a draft conces-
sion and submitting it within a month for Shaikh Ah-
mad's consideration. 
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Back in Bahrein to prepare the ~inancial terms 
~or the Kuwait oil concession, Holmes immediately as-
ked the political resident to in~orm the Shaikh o~ 
Kuwait in writing that the Syndicate had been appro-
ved by the Colonial Ottice as a candidate ~or the oil 
concession.3S He was disappointed to discover that 
despite Colonial Ottice approval ot the Syndicate 
since 1925 the Shaikh had been denied this informa-
tion. Meanwhile when preparing the tinancial terms 
Holmes kept in constant touch with Wallace. the prin-
cipal negotiator tor Gult. and indicated to him the 
danger o~ ottering the Shaikh ot Kuwait exceptionally 
large payments betore dealing with Ibn Saud. Holm.s 
explained that this would probably result in 'Ibn 
Saud making heavier cash demands ~or Hasa and Neutral 
Zone concessions' which needed to be validated. 36 
However Wallace. an experienced oilman who appre-
ciated the political complieations in the Middle East, 
urged Holmes to conclude anagreament with the Shaikh 
even before a meeting with Ibn Saud. There was a 
practical reason tor wanting Holmes to secure the Ku-
wait oil concession quickly. GUlt had to take up their 
option in Bahrein by 1 January 1929 and~in order to 
justify to the shareholder. a venture in such a small 
territory they needed to secure the nearby territory 
a •• ell. As has been seen the company had originally 
become interested in Bahrein only atter being oftered 
options ~or ~urther oil conce.sions in the area which 
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~uld provide sutticient justitication tor commercial 
exploration there. 
In the circumstances Holmes returned to Kuwait 
in June determined to conclude an agre.ent with 
Shaikh Ahmad. He ottered the Shaikh tar more generous 
teras than tho.e accepted by the Shaikh ot Bahrein 
together wi th a Lincoln motor car as a personal pre-
.ent. In addition, he gave the Shaikh-s advi.ers 
cash payments promising thea more when the concession 
was signed. However s.veral weeks ot hard bargaining 
together with a proaise ot a turther increase in some 
ot the payments to the Shaikh and his advisera, were 
needed to bring the negotiations close to a conclu-
sion. 
When he allked tor the Gult directors' approval 
ot the t.rm. agreed, Hol •• s waa ord.red back to New 
York tor consultation. B,. now, Auguat 1928, the 
situation had changed dramatically and Gult'a whole 
operation in the Peraian Gult was suddenl,. being 
threatened b,. a new development. In Jul,. Gulf to-
gether wi th tour other Aaerican companies acquired 
a 23\ per cent ahare in T.P.C. and aigned the .0-
called Red Line Agre .. ent. Thia prevented each par-
ticipant in T.P.C., which included A.p.a.C., the 
Royal DIItch Shell COmpany, the Compagnie Franeaise 
d •• Petrol •• (C.".P.) and the live American oil 
companies, independently .ecuring oil conceaaions 
in certain area. ot the Middle aast, 
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including Bahrein, El-Hasa and the Neutral Zone. 
(Kuwait territory was excluded ~rom the scope of the 
Red Line Ag~eement.)37 Therefore as Gul~ could no 
longer exercise their Bahrein, El-Hasa and Neutral 
Zone options independently o~ T.p.e., their whole 
operation in the Persian Gul~ came under review. 
In addition, the Gul~ directors were becoming 
increasingly disappointed witb the course of the 
negotiations in Kuwait. They ~elt that the area ob-
tainable tor exploitation was too small and that the 
tinancial terms were relatively too high. There-
tore when Holmes, during the last phase of negotia-
tions,even increased some of the payments, he was 
called back to New York ~or consultation before sig-
ning the agreement with the Shaikh.'S 
Holmes le~t Kuwait on 11 August having practi-
cally settled the concession terms, promising to re-
turn soon to conclude the agreement with the Shaikh. 
He arrived in New York on 28 September, tbree weeks 
later than was expected as he had stayed in London re-
COVering trom dysentery. There~ore by the time be 
.et tbe Gult directors they had already reached a de-
cision in regard to tbeir Persian Gult operations. 
They had decided to o~~er only the Bahrein option to 
T.p.e. and to retain tbeir other options, whicb bad 
first to be validated (tbe al-Hasa and Neutral Zone 
concessions) and in the case ot the Kuwait oil con-
ce.sion to be obtained. 
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As Kuwait territory was excluded ~rom the scope 
o~ the Red Line Agreement and could be retained inde-
pendently by Gul~, Holmes was urged to secure it. Bis 
latest proposal. to the Shaikh ,o~ Kuwait were appro-
ved and he was immediately .ent back to Kuwait to 
conclude the agreement.39 A~ter staying in New York 
, r • ' 
~or only a week, Holme. returned hurriedly to Lon-
don to,con.ult the Syndicate'. director. about the 
implication. o~ the Red Line Agreement. 40 He then 
returned to Kuwait to tinali.e the oil agreement. 
Back in Kuwai t in November 1928 Holme. be-
came aware o~ a recent development which now pre-
vented hi. ~rom .ecuring the oil conce •• ion. He 
and the Shaikh were in~ormed by the political agent 
o~ a new clau.. s.t by the Colonial O~~ic. as a 
condition ~or their approving the Syndicate' •• e-
curing the Kuwait oil conce •• ion. Although in 
1925 the Colonial O~tic. initiated and approved 
the term. under which the Syndicate was allowed to 
.ecur. the conc •• sion, it .eems the Colonial O~­
~ic. now decided on a new clau.e to be in.erted 
into it. The clau •• was de.igned to ensure that 
the conce •• ion remained under British control, 
and had been intrOduced a ~ew month. earlier to 
the Shaikh ot Bahrein also. I tread a. ~ollow.,-
The company shall at all time. be and 
remain a Briti.h company'regi.tered in 
Great Britain or a British colony. and 
having it. principal place ot bu.ine •• 
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within His Majesty's Dominions, the Chair-
man and Managing Director (it any) and a 
majority ot the other Directors ot which 
shall at all times be British subjects, 
and neither the company nor the premises, 
liberties, powers and privileges hereby 
granted and demised, nor any land occu-
pied tor any ot the purpo.es ot this 
lease, shall at any time be or become 
directly or indirectly controlled or 
managed by a toreigner or toreigners 
or any toreign corporation or copora-
tions, and the local General Manager 
ot the company, and as large a percentage 
ot the local statt employed by the. as 
circumstanc •• permit, shall at all tim.s 
be British subjects or subjects ot the 
Shaikh. 
In this clause the expression 
'toreigner' means any person who is 
neither a British subject nor a subject 
ot the Shaikh, and the expression • to-
reign corporation' means any corpora-
tion other than a corporation estab-
lished under and subject to the law. ot 
soae part ot Hi. Majesty's Dominions 
and having its principal place ot busi-
ness in those dominions. 41 
Although the Shaikh was willing to grant the con-
ce.sion to Holmes and told the political resident so, 
Holmes could not accept the insertion ot the new claus. 
into the agreem.nt. He realised that such a clause, 
it inserted, would detinitely be unacceptable to Gult 
as it ettectively excluded American inter.sts direct-
ly or indirectly trom holding or operating the conces-
sion. The British nationality claus. which the Colo-
nial Ottice suddenly sought to impose was contrary 
to the t.rms and conditions ot the Syndicate's agree-
ments with GUlt and theretore could not be accepted 
by the Syndicate. It became obvious to Holmes that 
he could make no progress in Kuwait until the Colonial 
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OLfice had modified this new condition, as the Shaikh 
was willing to grant the Syndicate the concession 
only in accordance with British Government stipula-
tions. Therefore Holmes left for London to consult 
his colleagues and to help solve the Syndicate's la-
test crisis. 
In London the situation was much more serious, 
as the Colonial Office had already demanded that the 
same British control clause a180 be inserted into 
the already signed Bahrein oil concession, which Gulf 
had acquired from the Syndicate. Such an unexpected 
demand forced the Syndicate to concentrate its ef-
forts on a campaign ,to induce the Colonial Office to 
modify its attitude in regard to the Bahrein conCes-
sion. The Syndicate considered the Bahrein case 
more urgent than that of Kuwait, because Gulf's no-
minee was due to take pos.ession of the Bahrein con-
'cession shortly - 1 January 1020 - and because the 
Syndicate considered itself to b. in a stronger posi-
tion legally in resisting the colonial Office demand 
for a new clause in an agreement which had already 
been signed and approved by the British Government, 
while the Kuwait oil concession had yet to be signed. 
It was hoped that if the COlonial Office Were 
to waive or modify the nationality claUse in order 
to allow the Syndicate to fulfill its legal obligation 
to the American company, which in turn meant allowing 
American oil intere.ts into Bahrein, it would set a 
- 137 -
precedent ~or Kuwait. There~ore negotiations ~or 
the Kuwait concession were dropp.d ~or the time b.-
ing to be reopened only when a satis~actory solu-
tion ~or the Bahr.in on. had b.en ~ound. I~ a de-
cision were taken by the British Gov.rnment to mo-
di~y the British control clause in order to allow 
American oil interests into Bahrein, this would un-
doubtedly r.volutionise Britain's policy in the 
Persian Gul~ and have considerable consequenc.s ~or 
the Kuwait oil concession. From its beginning Bri-
tain's oil policy was nationalistic and had been 
in operation in the Per.ian Gult;and no Am.rican oil 
company had be.n allow.d hitherto to gain a ~ooting 
in this ar.a. Th.re was never any question o~ p.r-
mitting Am.rican oil int.r •• t. into the Gul~. and 
as Britain was .oon to change it. attitude towards 
Bahrein there is a need to explore the event. and 
rea.on. leading to this r.markable change. 
By examining three intere.ting and inter-r.la-
ted qu.stion. li.t.d below the actual .tory o~ the 
~ir.t American .uece •• and it. imm.nse eon.equ.nees 
~or Britain, the United State. and the Per.ian Gult'. 
political and commercial development will be revealedl-
a) Why the in.ertion ot the Briti.h contE! clause 
was .uddenly introduced and d.manded by the Co-
lonial O~tiee at this crucial .tage in the hi.-
tory o~ the Kuwait and Bahrein oil eonces.ion •• 
b) How negotiation. progr •••• d between the Syndicate 
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and the British Government and their in~luence on 
the American attitude. 
c) What the British Government ~inally decided regar-
ding the introduction ot American capital into Bah-
rein and the consequences o~ this on the negotia-
tions ~or the Kuwait and other oil concessions o~ 
the region. 
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PART III 
THE BRITISH 'NATIONALITY CLAUSE' VERSUS 
THE AMERICAN 'OPEN DOOR' 
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1. The Bahrein Precedent 
The initiative to ins.rt a British control 
clause in the Kuwait and Bahr.in dr~t conces.ion. 
cam. ~rom the political re.ident in the P.r.ian Gult 
and not ~rom the Colonial Ottice, a. was later sug-
ge.ted by the Am.rican.. On 8 December 1927 the po-
litical agent in Bahrein was a.ked by Holme. ~or a 
one-year .xt.n.ion o~ the exploration licence, the 
t.rms o~ the conc.ssion .igned in December 1925 allow-
ing ~or an .xt.n.ion o~ up to two y.ars trom 1927, 
subj.ct to_the concurr.nce ot the Shaikh, acting 
upon the political ag.nt's advic •• 1 Att.r con.ul-
ting the political re.ident, the political ag.nt 
approv.d HoI.... r.quest and shortly ~t.rwards the 
Shaikh .ign.d the supplem.ntary agr •••• nt. 
How.v.r, upon r.ceiving the r.lated pap.r., the 
political r •• ident in Bu.hire reali.ed that the ori-
ginal oil agreement aigned in 1925 laCked any clau.e 
s~.guarding the .aint.nance ot British control over 
the conce •• ion. It waa becau •• his suspicions r.-
garding the R.& G.S.'s r.lationa with American oil 
inter.sta had grown consid.rably at thia tim. that he 
notic.d the oafsaion. 
In January 1928 a party ot Am.rican g.ologists 
arrived in Bahr.in and atart.d an intenaiv. aurv.y ot 
the area a.arching tor oil. 2 As Britiah otticials 
wer. g.nerally appr.henaiv. wh.n oil proap.ct.rs 
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arrived in the Persian Gul~. especially ~oreigner.t 
the political re.ident went to Bahrein in mid-Febru-
ary to extract intormation ~rom Holme. about the 
American geologi.t. and their connection with the 
E.& G.S. 3 Atter looking closely at the situation. 
h. pointed out to the Colonial O~~ice on 2 April 1928 
that 
the original agreement between the Shaikh 
and the Syndicat ••••••••• contain. nothing 
to pr.vent the right. under it trom being 
tran.terred to an American or other ~o­
reign conce.sionary. 
The poli~ical resident. theretore sugge.ted that all 
tuture agreement. ot this nature should contain a 
special nationality clause in general accord with 
Britain's policy in the area. 4 
The. COlonial Ot~ice wa. somewhat surprised by 
the political resident's suggestion, as there had 
never been any question ot even considering permis.ion 
to American oil interests to penetrate the Gult and 
the mini.try wa. unaware ot any American company 
being interested in Bahrein.' However their rela-
tively weak legal position as regards torcing the 
Shaikh and the Syndicate to insert such a provision 
now was quickly recognised by the ministry. 
Hall, who had negotiated previously with the 
Syndicate, observed that although the Shaikh was bound 
to grant the concession only to a British Government 
nominee (the 1914 oil convention). the government had 
in tact already approved the conces.ion being granted 
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to the Syndicate and had themselves initiated the 
terms o~ that concession. However as he was unaware 
o~ the Syndicate's agr.ement with Gul~ several months 
.arlier, he anticipated no di~~icultie. in inducing 
the Syndicat. and the Shaikh to agr •• to amend Ar-
ticle XIII o~ the mining l.as. along the line. the 
6 Colonial O~~ic. waa about to propos.. Consequently 
the political r.sid.nt was instructed by the Colonial 
O~~ic. on 19 Jun. to advise the Shaikh o~ Bahrein to 
make the in.ertion o~ the nationality claus. (on the 
t.rms alr.ady quoted above) a condition o~ any ~uture 
agr .... nt reached with the Syndicate, particularly 
in the n.xt renewal o~ the exploration licence due 
at the .nd o~ 1928.7 
Th. decision to ins.rt now a special clause 
into the already sign.d Bahrein oil concesaion was 
taken without much consultation between the ministries 
involv.d and without any sense o~ urgency. Th. Syn-
dicate was n.ither consulted nor in~ormed at the time, 
as this clause was consid.red to b. in line with Bri-
taint. well-known oil policy and in general accord 
with imperial int.r •• t. in the P.r.ian Gul~. In this 
part o~ the world the British Governm.nt was known by 
the Syndicat. to have secur.d the legal right not 
only to prevent the Arab rul.r. ~rom granting oil 
conc •• sions to ~or.igners but also to s.lect the Bri-
tiah company which could obtain th.s. conc.aslona.8 
How.ver wh.n the Colonial O~tic. was intormed ahortly 
- 143 -
afterwards by the Syndicate's directors o~ their 
close connections with American oil interests, the 
situation changed dramatically along with the Colo-
nial O~~ice'. attitude. 
The very unusual and sudden step taken by the 
Syndicate in voluntarily revealing their secret at thatt 
particular time can only be explained by their be-
lie~ that the Colonial O~~ice was abbut to receive 
the in~ormation ~rom another source. Previously 
the Syndicate had hoped and thus endeavoured to keep 
their agreements with the Americans .ecret until they 
had concluded the relevant oil concessions in the 
Persian Gul~, as they knew the Colonial O~~ice would 
probably rai.e objections and create di~~iculties 
~or thea in the region. However when Holm.s r.turned 
~rom N.w York in October 1928 and in~ormed his col-
l.agu •• o~ Gul~'. intention .oon to o~~.r the Bah-
r.in option to T.P.C., the Syndicate's dir.ctor. 
assumed that their rival - A.P.O.C. - a aajor par-
ticipant in T.P.C. with special r.lation. with the 
British Governm.nt, would soon pas. this damaging 
in~ormation to the Colonial O~~ice.9 Ther.for. on 
17 October Janson and Holmes went to s.e Hall at the 
Colonial O~~ice and on th.ir own initiative r.v.al.d 
their connection with the Americans. (Ironically 
they later accused A.P.O.C. ot r.v.aling their arran-
g ... nt. with Gull, thus .xcu.ing th •••• lv •• to the 
American. lor not being able to s.cur. quickly 
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British Government consent to the transfer of the Ku-
wait and Bahrein oil concessions to Gulf'. nominee.) 
11all. who was quite surprised by the Syndicate's 
statement, was quick to remind Janson and Holmes of 
their verbal promise back in 1925 that control over 
the conces.ion would remain entirely British and of 
the ne.d to obtain the Shaikh'. and British Govern-
ment consent before conveying the concession to a 
third party, as was indicated in Article XIII of the 
mining lease. However.a he understood from the Syn-
dicate that the negotiations with the Americans were 
not yet concluded, he suggested that the Syndicat. 
should submit their ~inancial proposals to the govern-
ment for approval before these .ent further, as he 
was certain the Colonial Office would be oppo.ed to 
any American involvement. 
In light of the information received, Hall e.~ 
pecially appreciated the political resident' •• ugges-
tion and thus the urgent need for .ecuring the inser-
tion of the nationality claus. in any further agree-
ment signed by the Syndicate in the Persian Gulf, par-
·10 ticularly in Kuwait. He felt it fortunate that the 
Syndicate needed British Government approval for a 
further extension ot the exploration licence in Bahrein, 
thus enabling the government to make the Syndicate's 
acceptance ot the nationality clau •• a condition ot 
the approval. 
The communication promised by the Syndicate was 
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received shortly thereAfter on 22 October. but it 
merely asked ~or renewal o~ their existing explora-
tion licence ~or a ~urther period o~ one year. 11 
The Syndicate had not produced ~or Colonial Of~ice 
approval any ~inancial proposals to be put to the 
Americana aa had been promised because, as has been 
seen above, agreement. had already been Signed a 
year earlier. A~ter consulting the India O~~ice, 
the Petroleum Department and also the Foreign O~­
~ice, who had by now become involved as the issue 
could involve ~oreign policy considerationa, the 
Colonial O~fice in~ormed the Syndicate that the Bri-
tish Government would raia. no objection to its ex-
ploration licence being renewed ~or a ~urther year 
on the understanding that a British control clause 
would be ins.rted into the Bahrein oil conce.sion. 12 
Faced with strong government opposition to 
the Americans entering the Gul~. the Syndicate 
took immediate steps to enable them to ~ul~ill their 
legal obligations to Gul~ and to convince the Colo-
, 
nial O~~ice o~ the nece.sity o~ modifying it. atti-
tude. In the Persian Gul~ Hol •• s inlormed the po-
litical agent in Bahrein that i~ an extension o~ 
the exploration licence were not granted by the Colo-
nial O~~ice then the rental payaent o~ Rs.I0.000 
already made by the Syndicate to the B~hrein autho-
rities ~or tbeextenaion would be utilised instead 
~or the prospecting licence which, under the terms 
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o~ the concession, was to ~ollow the exploration li-
cence automatically. By so doing, the Syndicate 
would in ~act be able to circumvRnt Colonial O~~ice 
opposition as the prospecting licence was not con-
13 ditional upon the ministry's approval. 
In London, the Syndicate in~ormed the Colonial 
O~~ice that they had already signed two agreements 
with Gul~. justi~ying their action by explaining 
their legal position vis-a-vis' the British Govern-
ment, the Shaikh and Gul~. In their letter o~ 19 
December the Syndicate reminded 'the Colonial O~~ice 
that they h~d secured an oil concession in 1925 
~rom the Shaikh o~ Bahrein on term. negotiated with 
and approved by the ministry, and emphasised the 
~aet that at the ti.e no stipulation had been im-
posed as to the British character o~ a third party 
which might acquire the conce.sion ~roa the Syndi-
cate. Although Article XIII 01 the mining lease, 
the Syndicate argued, stipulated that the Shaikh's 
Fonsent, acting on the advice o~ Britain, was needed 
when conveying the concession to a third party, the 
.ame article provided that such consent should not 
be unreasonably witheld. ,There~ore, as the Syndi-
cate was in ~inancial di~~icultie. and could not 
raise the extra capital in Britain, and in view o~ 
certain stipulations they the.selve. had made which 
ensured that the concession rights should be exer-
cised only by a company registered in Britain or 
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Canada, they thus ~elt justitied in accepting Gult's 
otfer. Consequently, the Syndicate stated, they 
eould not aecept the Colonial Ottice's condition 
as it ",ould be resisted by the American company and 
inevitably lead to A elaim against the Syndicat& 
whieh eould only result in its liquidation. 14 
The Colonial Ottiee, whieh had just begun to 
realise the gravity of the situation, invited the 
Syndieate to aseertain more precisely their legal 
position vis-a.-vis Gult. At a meeting on 28 Deeem-
ber 1928 Colonial ottiee representative. accused the 
Syndicate ot granting right. whieh they could not 
dispose of except with the consent ot the Shaikh ot 
Bahrein. The Syndicate, for its part, Buggested 
that the Colonial Ottice use its intluence on 
A.P.O.C. 80 that T.P.C •• whieh A.P.O.C. controlled, 
might reconsider the Gult otter and accept the option 
for the Bahrein oil concession which they had rejec-
ted when it was ottered to them previously by Gulf. 1S 
This would provide a satisfactory way out ot the 
iapa.se, a. British interests would eontrol the con-
ee.sion through T.P.C. 16 Consequently, tor the first 
time the Syndicate handed over copie. of the two 
agreements concluded with the Amerieana and the mee-
ting was ended atter it had been decided to a •• it 
the Gult Oil Corporation would in fact exercise the 
option for the Bahrein concession which was due to 
expire in a few days on 1 January 1929. 17 
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ALter examining the agreements received ~rom the 
Syndicate, the Colonial O~~ice immediately sought 
India Of~ice and Petroleum Department advice on the 
situation. The two agreements were sent to the Pet-
roleum Department with a full account of the events 
to date, requesting the department's view as re-
gards allowing American interests into Bahrein. 
The Petroleum Department, which was well acquainted 
with the apprehension about Britain's supply posi-
tion, considered the wider implications of the is-
sue raised by the Colonial Oftice. The department 
assumed trom the information provided that if no 
other British company were interested in the Bah-
rein oil concession, as se .. ed to be the case in 
that the Syndicate had failed to raise British 
capital, it would be preterable to allow a foreign 
company into Bahrein to produce the oil, it it 
existed, rather than not have it produced at all. 
As most of Britain's supply came from the western 
hemisphere the need to develop any potential in the 
east was therefore evident. In any case, the de-
partment felt that in ti.e of war the oil produced 
would be in the effective physical control of Bri-
tain and therefore it was in Britain's interests 
to encourage oil development in Bahrein. 1S Finally 
the department agreed with the Colonial Ottice that 
it would be pre~erable for the Iraq Petroleum Company 
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(T.P.C. had now changed its name to the Iraq petroleum 
Company - I .P.C.) rather than .. purely Americ&n company 
to become involved in Bahrein. 19 
The India Office, however, in accordance with the 
Government of India's general policy of opposing the en-
try of foreign interests into the Persian Gult tor poli-
tical re"sons, indicated in their 13 March letter that 
it would be desirable it possible to withhold any exten-
sion of the Syndicate'S rights under th.ir December 1925 
agreement, unless the Syndicat. und.rtook to comply with 
20 the Colonial Office stipulation without reserve. Their 
vi.w waa strengthened by the British repr •• ent .. tives in 
the P.rsian Gult, who were .. gainst .. llowing American in-
tereats into Bahrein, especi .. lly on political grounds. 
Th. political .. gent in Bahr.in .. rgu.d that the oil com-
pany could .ventu .. lly control the Bahrein Government, and 
he advised against any r.laxation of Britain's nationa-
listic policy. 21 
On examination of the other ministrie.' vi.w. and the 
legal alternatives, the COlonial Offic. decided not to op-
pose turther the introduction ot American capital into 
Bahr.in. This r .... rkabl. deci.ion was bas.d on two assump-
tions, although .hortly afterwards one ot them turned out 
to be false. 22 Firstly the Colonial Otfice otticials con-
.idered that if they wi thdrew their opPOsi tion, the r.sul t 
would be that auch oil .. s might exist in Bahrein would in 
effect be dev.loped by r.p.c •• a cOlllpany consid.r.d to be 
controlled by British int.r.sts, because Gult was ..... ber 
ot I.P.C. and had signed the Red Line Agr .... nt. On the 
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other hand, it they were to continue their opposition, 
the result would be in all probability that any r.s-
erve. pre •• nt in Bahrein would remain undevelop.d, since 
the Syndicate had tailed completely in their ettort to 
obtain pur.ly Briti.h capital tor this enterprise. In 
this ca •• , eVen it A.P.O.C. were induced to put up the ca-
pital they al.o could not operate the conce.sion indepen-
dently ot I.P.C. 
Secondly, and this wa. the deci.ive factor in deter-
aining the Colonial Office-. view, the Briti.h Governm.nt 
could not legally oppose the American int.rest. in Bahr.in 
. . ' 
a. th.re wa. no British control claus. either in the agr.e-
aent or in the aining lease signed between the Shaikh and 
the Syndicate, and DO indication in any ot the document. 
that the capital and control of the concessionaire company 
had to rea&in predominantly British. Although under Arti-
cl. XIII ot the aining lea •• the Shaikh, acting upon Bri-
tain-s advice, had to agr .. to the transter of the conces-
sion to a third party, the .... article provided that con-
s.nt should not be unreasonably withheld. Th.r.for. it 
was con.idered that indep.ndent arbitration, which had 
be.n provid.d tor in the agr .... nt in ca.e of dispute, 
would not accept that the Colonial Oftice was acting r.a-
sonably in denying the Syndicat. the right to convey the 
l.as. to Gult •• rely on the grounds that the capital of 
that company wa. not predominantly Briti.h.23 Politi-
cal reason. were not considered to be justitiable by An 
arbitrator tor .uch a refu.al. 
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Therefore on 20 March the Colonial Office informed 
the Admiralty and the Foreign Office of their de-
cision that it would be advisable for the British 
Government 
to abandon the idea ot opposing the intro-
duction of American capital to operate the 
concession and to concentrate upon obtai-
ning such~.a degree ot Bri Ush control as 
may be practicabl~. 24 
Although the decision to allow in principle 
the Americans into Bahrein was taken prior to any 
representation on the i.sue trom the United States 
Government, it is widely believed that the State 
Department's intervention was the decisive tactor 
in facilitating the American entrance into Bahrein. 
This claim, which was initiated by the State De-
partment in 1945 and since repeated, is impossible 
to subatantiate. 25 Whatever the complex situation 
faced by the Britiah Government d.scribed above, 
the United Stat.a Government's response to requests 
tor diplomatic assistance was remarkably mild and 
completely ditterent trom that ot 1918-1920 concer-
26 
ning Iraq. 
In March 1929 Francis Loomis ot the Standard 
Oil Company and a repr.s.ntative ot Gult .et the 
Secretary ot State to complain that the British Go-
vernaent's recent decision 'not to permit any _xploi-
tation in Bahrein and Kuwait unless the company waa 
entirely owned and controlled by the British' was 
discrimination against American interesta. The two 
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companies which were contronted with the British na-
tionality clause in Bahrein requested State Depart-
27 
ment diplomatic assistance. The State Department 
did not accept the Standard Oil Company and Gulf's 
argument ot discrimination particularly against Ame-
ricans because they knew that the British would take 
the same stand towards other nationals trying to pene-
trate the Persian Gulf. 
Nevertheless. they f.lt they had a justifiable 
grievance in vie. of the tact that the Shell Group 
which was 40% British was reported to be very active 
in the United States, and that no Britiah company 
seemed interested in the Bahrein concession. The 
State Department considered that if 'Great Britain 
is going to keep Americans out not only of British 
territory and British dominions, but out of protec-
torates' the United States Government should live 
up to their own mining laws, ie. the Mineral Leasing 
Act of 1920, and 'throw the British out. ,28 Conae-
quently on 28 March 1929 the State Department instruc-
ted its Embassy to discuss the case of the Bahrein 
oil concession informally with the Foreign Office and 
toremLnd the British that the United States 'ia ex-
tramely liberal in regard to the operation ot petro-
leum concessions by foreign controlled companies. ,29 
It was only on 3 April, two weeks atter the 
Colonial Ottice's recommendation to allow the Americans 
into Bahrein, that the American Charg~ d'Attaires 
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discussed the concession in Bahrein informally with 
Foreign Office officials.R.Atherton informed the Fo-
reign Office that Gulf, with the Syndicat.'a con-
sent, had assigned the Bahrein option to the Stan-
dard Oil Company of California (Socal) which was not 
a member of I.P.C. and which had registered a com-
pany in Canada to operate the concession. At the 
same time, he explained that the State Department 
would like to have a general statement from the Bri-
tish Government on policy regarding the holding and 
operation by foreigners of petroleum concessions in 
territories such as Bahrein.30 
Although it became obvious from the informa-
tion provided by the American diplomat that the 
Colonial Office-s first assumption was false and 
& purely American company would operate the con-
cession and not I.P.C., which was dominated by Bri-
tish interests, the decision already made by the 
Colonial Office was not altered. By now the Admi-
ralty and the Foreign Office also accepted the Co-
lonial Office vie. and had agreed to allow American 
capital into Bahrein. 
The Admiralty, which had initiated Britain's 
nationalistic oil policy with a view to securing 
British supplies of fuel for the Navy, concurred 
with the Colonial Office recommendation. They ad-
mitted later that 
in vie. of the absence of & British con-
trol clause it was impossible to stop the 
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transfer and the best that could be done 
was to secure conditions which provide 
~or some British control over the ope-
rating company. 31 
There~or. in these circumstances, and obliged to 
choose between the development of Bahrein oil deposits 
by a ~oreign company with some form of British con-
trol rather than leaving them undeveloped as British 
capital was not forthcoming, the Admiralty preferred 
the former. In any case, the ministry considered 
that Britain's control of the Persian Gulf and a 
certain degree o~ control over the American company 
would assure the Admiralty's preferential position 
regarding the oil produced, and especially a pre-
32 emption in time of war. 
The Foreign Office for its part was glad to 
avoid disagreement with the United States Government 
over oil ~fairs, particularly ~ter the tension crea-
ted by the 'open door' principle demanded in Iraq 
which had ~fected relations between the two countries 
in the early twenties. 33 They agreed with the Colo-
nial Office that Britain 'would not be on strong 
ground in insisting on the exclusion of United States 
capital ~rom this particular concession', and accep-
ted the Colonial Office's view. They also informed 
Atherton meanwhile that the British reply 'might not 
be forthcoming for some period of time' due to inter-
departmental consultations. 34 
At the interdepartmental conference held on 
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7 May which comprised representatives ~rom the Colo-
nial O~~ice. the Foreign O~~ice. the Petroleum De-
partment and the India O~~ice, the Colonial O~~ice 
recommendation was' accepted. However the India O~­
~ice representative was unable to express any opi-
nion pending the receipt ot the Government ot In-
dia's view. Nevertheless the India O~tice ot~icials 
were aware ot Britain's weak legal position vis-a-
vis the Syndicate. They considered the Colonial 
.Ottice to be responsible tor the absence ot the 
British control clause trom the agreement signed 
between the Syndicate and the Shaikh o~ Bahrein, 
Which now lett the India Ottice with practically 
no alternative but to agree to a transter ot the con-
cession to American interests.3S Theretore when 
the Government ot India's strong opposition to the 
decision taken became known shortly afterwards on 
12 May the India Ottice assumed the role ot media-
tor between Simla and London in order to tacilitate 
a mutual agreement. 
The Government ot India's opposition retlected 
Britain's tear ot the consequences ot the Bahrein 
case in the Persian Gult. The Viceroy emphasised 
that it Britain gave way over Bahrein it would be 
'ditticult to prevent ground 'being cut under our teet 
all along the coast, tor our exclusive agreements 
are all on the same model •• 36 Although the Colonial 
Ottice recommended American entry into Bahrein it 
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was also aware that no ~oreign oil interests had 
hitherto gained a ~ooting in the Persian Gul~. I~ 
Britain were to change this policy now and allow 
American interests to obtain a ~oothold in Bahrein, 
it would be increasingly di~~icult to continue to 
exclude Americans ~rom other parts o~ the Persian 
Gulf, especially Kuwait. 37 
There~ore Kuwait had been given special consi-
deration, particularly as the oil concession had not 
yet been signed and the territory had been excluded 
from the scope o~ the Red Line Agree.ent, thus ena-
bling the Gul~ Oil Corporation to retain independently 
their option on any concession the Syndicate might 
obtain ~or the.. The various ministries were aware 
that the question of American partiCipation in Kuwait 
was likely to arise as soon as outstanding proble.s 
concerning the Syndicate's oil concession in Bahrein 
had been disposed ot, and in general they were pre-
pared ~or this. A debate, which would continue until 
chapter. was sparked ott within the ministries about 
the .erits and demerits ot the policy ot preventing 
toreign interests ~rom securing oil concessions in 
the British Empire and %ones ot intluence. 38 o.s-
pite certain misgivings about a nationalistic oil po-
licy in general, a tirm decision was made to resist 
American entry into Kuwait and two tentative steps 
.ere taken to implement this decision. 
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Firstly it was made clear to the Syndicate-a direc-
tors that even i~ permission were given ~or the ad-
mi.sion o~ American capital in the case o~ Bahrein, 
it would not be given in the ca.e of Kuwait, as it 
was unlikely that any conc •• sion would be given ~or 
that territory unless it contained the British con-
trol clause. Secondly it was decided that A.P.D.C., 
which was the only purely British oil company in-
terested in the region, might be sounded out as to 
the possibility of its applying tor the oil conces-
sion.39 Eventually the decision reached by the 
British Government was to allow the American company 
into Bahrein only subject to certain conditions 
which would ensure so ••• easur. at least o~ British 
political control over the operating company. Ac-
cordingly, in its reply to the united State. Govern-
.ent on 29 May the British Government expressed it. 
readiness to consent in principle to the participa-
tion o~ United States interests in the Bahrein oil 
concession but also indicated that any ~urther case 
o~ American participation in oil concessions in the 
Persian Gult would be considered on its individual 
merits. 40 Thi •• eant that a general .tatement .uch 
a. the United State. Government de.ired trom the 
Briti.h Government regarding the holding of oil 
conce •• ions by toreigners in the Persian Gult would 
not be .ade. 
Neverthele •• the State Department assumed rather 
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naively that their brie~ and in~ormal representation 
had persuaded 'the British Government to abandon its 
insi.tence on the British nationality clause in con-
41 
nection with the Bahrein conc •• sion ••••• • Cer-
tainly it was ov.r-optimistic to .ay the least to 
a.sume the British Gov.rnment would very quickly de-
part ~rom a long-e.tabli.hed policy a~ter some in-
~ormal repr •• entation, and indeed the case o~ Kuwait 
was to demon.trate the di~~iculties o~ persuading 
the Briti.h Government to depart trom its policy in 
the region. Obviou.ly the Unit.d State. were unaware 
o~ the ~act that the British Government con.idered 
it impossible to .top the trans~er o~ the Bahrein oil 
concession, in view o~ the absence o~ a British con-
trol claus. in the initial agree.ent, and had there-
~ore decided to allow the Standard Oil Company o~ 
Cali~ornia to take up this conce •• ion .ubject to cer-
tain condition. be~ore the United State. Embassy'. 
interv.ntion. Ironically this misapprehension o~ 
the situation helped Gul~ in enli.ting State Depart-
ment assistance when they asked ~or it in 1931 in 
connection with the Kuwait oil conce.sion. 
A. this decision had been reached regarding 
Bahrein. it now remained ~or the British Government 
to negotiate with the Syndicate, as the exi.ting 
conce •• ionaire, to establi.h the condition. under 
which the British would allow an .xtension o~ the 
exploration licence and the transfer.o~ the Bahrein 
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oil concession to the American company's nominee. The 
Syndicate's task was quite difficult as they had to 
find common ground between two opposinO forces, one 
of which wanted to secure maximum British control 
and the other minimum British control over the com-
42 pany which was to operate the concession. However, 
because of the government's weak leoal position, the 
main argum.nt put before the Syndicat. to be conveyed 
to the Americans was of a gen.ral political nature. 
had not the British Governm.nt been active in the 
P.rsian Gulf for the last hundred years there could 
have been no qu.stion of working an oil concession 
in th.se ar.as. Britain, the Colonial Offic. stated 
to the Syndicate's directors 
by sacrifice of .en and money had made 
the Gulf safe for ent.rprise. of this 
character and they had ev.ry rioht to 
impose such conditions on the conduct 
of comm.rcial .nt.rpri ••• in those 
region.. .&3 
Janson and Hol.es conduct.d the n.gotiations 
with the Colonial Offic. and the Americans .ffectively, 
with tact and discr.tion. They never attempted to 
dispute the right of the British Gov.rnment to impose 
condition. upon the participation of Am.rican capi-
tal in 'the op.ration of the conc •• sion, l.ading the 
British Gov.rnm.nt to believe that the Syndicate and 
the Americans had not 'discovered the lacunae in our 
legal position of which w. our.elve. are conscious 
. 44 
after a careful diagnosis of our ca ••• • Jan.on and 
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Holmes, who kne" tba t wi thou t Bri ti sh Governm~n t 
goodwill in the Persian Gulf it would be very diffi-
cult to operate, let alone secure further oil conces-
sions, therefore decided on compliance rather than 
confrontation • 
. After winning some modifications of the initial 
terms suggested, they assured the Colonial Office on 
. 
19 July that they·were not unreasonable and promised 
to do their utmost to induce their American friends 
to accept the conditions proposed •. However after 
consulting the American company'. representative in 
London, Major Harry Davis, Holme. and Janson returned 
to obtain further modifications from the Colonial 
Office. They explained that the Americans could not 
accept the current condition. as they had a very low 
opinion of the managerial abilities of Briti.h sub-
ject.. Having heard the explanation of the American'. 
objections, the Colonial Office agreed to amend the 
relevant section. but .tated that the.e late.t modi-
fication. repre.ented the extreme limit of the con-
ce.sion. which the British Government were prepared 
to make. 45 (The India Office had already displayed 
some reluctance to accept the modifications made so 
;tar. ) 
Then the Syndicate representatives suggested 
not negotiating any more with Major Davis as he was 
eager to obtain personal kudo. by .ecuring conditions 
more favourable than hi. American principal. probably 
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thought possible, and therefore proceeding to the 
United Stat •• to negotiate directly with Wallace. 
In Octob.r 1929 Janson and Holmes went to the Uni-
ted Stat •• and embarked on long negotiations with 
repr •• entative. of Gulf and Socal. They emphasi.ed 
the political climate in the P.r.ian Gulf and the 
, , 
fact that the Colonial Offic. had conceded much more 
, , 
than they had thought po •• ibl.. A. a result the 
Syndicat. wa. able to per.uade the American. to ac-
capt the conditions propo.ed in principle, .ubject 
to .om. minor modifications and clarifications. 
Nev.rthele •• it took .everal more months of 
,delicate negotiation. between the Syndicate and the 
other two parti.. - the Colonial Office and the 
American. - to conclud. a sati.factory agreement, 
which. allowed a Canadian company, the Bahrein Oil 
Company. to tak. po ••••• ion of the Bahrein Oil con-
ce •• ion. The tour,condition. agreed upon were con-
siderably ditferent from tho.e initially promulgated 
and emphasis.d in the main Janson and Holmes' achiev.-
, 
•• nt. In general it was agreed that the company 
to operate the conces.ion was to be r.gi.tered in 
Canada and only on. of it. five dir.ctors wa. to be 
a Briti.h .• ubj.ct. R.garding the rest of the com-
pany's employ ... , it was decid.d that the number ot 
Briti.h or Bahrein .ubjects would be conditional on 
the .ftici.nt working ot th.operation. 46 
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EVents which led to the signing of the Bahrein 
oil concession with Socal have in general been over-
looked and therefore a special effort has been made 
to establish the facts. It seems that the British 
Government was mainly concerned to maintain its po-
litical supremacy and not so much to safeguard Bri-
tain's oil interests. Therefore as it was forced to 
accept Americans in Bahrein in view of the omission 
of a nationality clause in the concession, it con-
aidered the eventual agreement sufficient to curb 
any potential American political influence, ie. to 
limit American personel and contact with the Shaikh. 
By this the government hoped that the American com-
mercial succes. would not precede political claims 
and influence which might undermine their supremacy. 
On the other hand the united State. Government without 
political or strategic aspirations raised the oil 
issue with the British Government only on an infor-
mal basis,and accepted any restrictive agreement 
reached by it. nationals on whose behalf they had in-
tervened. 
However the outcome in Bahrein reveals the arri-
val of a newcomer competing for Middle East oil, the 
implications of which passed unnoticed for a while, 
but which later had a considerable influence on the 
region's political and commercial development. Socal, 
which was not a member of I.p.e., ie. bound by the 
Red Line Agreement, eventually posed a direct threat 
to both the British Government and A.p.O.e. becau.e 
- 163 -
~or the ~irst time & wholly American owned company 
gained independently a ~oothold in the Middle East. 
However, be~ore turning to the wider implications 
o~ this development for the region, Britain and the 
United States, its in~luence on the ne90tiations 
for the Kuwait oil concession should be examined. 
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2. In Pursuit ot a 'Closed Door' 
The major phas. in the drawn-out negotiations 
~or the Kuwait oil concession started in August 1930, 
and as anticipated resulted in a ~ar more serious 
con~rontation than in Bahrein betwe.n the British 
Government and the E.& G.S. and eventually between 
the British and American Governments. 
Once a mutually satis~actory solution had been 
~ound regarding Bahrein, and the concession assigned 
to the Americans. the case o~ the Kuwait oil conces-
sion wa. reopened by the Syndicate. Holmes visited 
Kuwait at the beginning o~ August and in contrast 
to previous visits during the preceeding eighteen 
months recommenced the oil negotiations. H. in~or­
med the political agent in Kuwait ot his intention 
to negotiate an oil conce.sion and presented H.A. Dick-
son and the Shaikh with a dratt concession which had 
been drawn up by Gult and passed on to the Syndicat. 
several months betore. 1 Dickson, who had recently 
been instructed by the political resident that the 
British Government wished to ensure that events in 
Bahrein should not set a precedent tor Kuwait, indi-
cated to Holmes that the nationality clause must b. 
inserted in any conc.ssion agreed with Shaikh Ahmad. 2 
As this meant a further delay in negotiating 
the concession, because Gult could not accept a claus. 
which had the effect of excluding any but purely 
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British interests ~rom exploiting the conce.sion, 
Holmes wa. disappointed with the local British 
authoriti •• ' attitud.. He told the political agent 
that the'Syndicate intended to ask the Colonial 
O~~ice to modi~y the nationality clause on the same 
3 basi. a. had been agreed in Bahrein. There~ore 
on 23 Augu.t Hol ••• ·l.~t ~or London in order to 
a.si.t the Syndicate in their negotiations with 
the Colonial Of tic., having a.c.rtain.d the Shaikh'. 
willingness to n.gotiate an oil conce •• ion imme-
diately. 
In London the Syndicat. in~ormed the Colonial 
Of tic. of Holm •• - activiti •• in Kuwait and a.ked 
the mini.try-. approval of the enclo.ed draft con-
ce •• ion which now incorporat.d the ~our conditions 
agreed in the Bahr.in oil conce •• ion a. a .ub.ti-
tut. tor the nationality clau.e. Con.ultation 
then en.ued between the government mini.trie. con-
concerned to con.ider the reply to be given the 
Syndicat., while the Syndicate'for it. part con-
tinued to pr... th.ir ca •• a. th.y were con.tantly 
being urged to do by Gulf. The Syndicate reminded 
the Colonial O~fice that in September 1925 they 
had approved the Syndicate'. 
negotiating an oil conce •• ion with the 
Shaikh o~ Kuwait on the line. o~ the 
Bahrein conce •• ion in which conce •• ion 
no .tipulations in the nature of the 
nationality provi.ion. were .mbodied. 
Ther.~ore, the Syndicate explain.d, th.y and their 
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American colleagues saw no reason why the modi~ica-
tion made by the Colonial o~tic. in regard to the 
nationality clause'in·the Bahrein concession could 
not equally .ell be made in the Kuwait concession. 4 
However, the Colonial ottice viewed the matter 
ditterently. It was guided by political considera-
tions, including the strategic importance ot Kuwait 
at the head ot the PersianGult and the nece.sity 
ot maintaining intact Britain's supremacy in the 
region. It had already been agreed 'in principle 
as early as May 1929 by the Colonial Ottice, the 
India O~~ice. the Foreign Ottice, the Admiralty 
and the Petroleum Dep&rtmen t that over Kuwai t they 
should hold out tor the tull nationality clause 
thereby preventing the Syndicate and its American 
S associates trom repeating their Bahrein success. 
Britain's legal position in Kuwat, according to 
the Colonial Ottice and the India Ottice, was much 
stronger than in Bahrein, where the concession con-
taining no nationality clause had been granted to 
and taken up by the Syndicate. In contrast, no 
conce.sion had yet been signed tor Kuwait and Bri-
tain had eve~ right according to the 1913 oil con-
vention to set general terms, in particular with 
regard to the nationality ot the concessionaire. 
However despite their intention, contirmed 
since 1929, the various ministries tound it now 
increasingly di~~icult and e.baras.ing to continue 
I .... ;, •• ' 
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insisting publicly that a nationality clause should 
be inserted in the Kuwait oil concession, ie. pur-
suing a closed door policy. Britain's nationalistic 
oil policy, as seen above, had been initiated in 
1904 by the Admiralty, the Colonial Office and the 
India Office and supported by the Foreign Office. 
The policy was adopted partly because ot the great 
importance ot oil trom a detence point ot view and 
the Admiralty's aim ot securing as far as possible 
British supplies of oil fuel for the Navy, and 
partly because of opposition to the laroe, monopo-
listic toreign oil companies which threatened Bri-
tish oil companies. The British oil companies, 
which were s.all and vulnerable, needed protective 
.easures to survive and when first imposed the.e 
were considered by the British Government and the 
oil companies necessary for the maintenance and 
growth of Britain's oil industry. 
The re.ult was that a policy which discrimina-
ted against American interests, e.pecially in Bri-
tish mandated territory and zones ot intluence, pe-
riodically came under fire tro. the United States 
Govern.ent and occasionally caused strained rela-
tions between the two countries. Atter the First 
World War for instance the United States Government 
demanded a share tor American oil interests in Bri-
tish mandatory Iraq, a tormer territory ot the Turkish 
Empire. Eventually atter the Americans secured a 
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promise of a share in T.P.C. and further oil depo-
sits were discovered in the united States, the oil 
controversy between the two governments subsided. 6 
Nevertheless, in 1929 when negotiations for the 
Bahrein oil concession reached their climax, the 
United States Government asked Britain to make a 
declaration of its policy with regard to the holding 
and operation of oil concessions by foreigners in 
the Persian Gult. In view ot the importance ot the 
issue to Britain in terms both ot oil and relations 
with the United States, an interdepartmental con-
~erence was called to consider the matter. At that 
meeting on 7 May ,1929 the various ministries con-
cerned, although ~inalising the decision taken pre-
viously to allow the Aaericans into Bahrein, could 
not agree on a general policy tor the tuture and 
the reply to the uni ted States Governmen thad, 
therefore, been that every ca.e in the Persian Gult 
would be considered on its .erit.. It was also de-
cided that the Petroleum Department should prepare 
a memorandum setting out the views ot the various 
ministries - the Admiralty, the War Ottice, the Air 
Ministry, the Foreign Ottice, the Colonial Ottice, 
the India Otfice and the Board ot Trade - and recom-
mendinga tuture oil policy tor the British Empire. 
After consulting the ministries conc~rned ~,nd 
the major British oil companies - the A~P.O.C., the 
Shell Group and Trinidad Leaseholds - the Petroleum 
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Department concluded that the policy in its pres@nt 
torm had possibly outlived any usetul purpose and 
was no longer necessary. The British oil companies 
no longer needed protective measures and the chances 
ot tinding great oil tields in the British Empire 
were bGlieved to be poor. Furthermore, British oil 
companies were almost exclusively dependent on to-
reign sources o,t supply, and the resul ts tor Bri tain 
would be disastrous it the restrictive policy in 
the British Empire were to be adopted elsewhere. She 
theretore became more intere.ted in the 'open door' 
policy than any other country. 7 I t was now consi-
dered that this policy was harming Britain in so tar 
as it was preventing toreign capital trom assisting 
in the search tor oil in the British Empire, dama-
~ing British oil interests in the United States, in 
view ot the Mineral Leasing Act ot 1920, and resul-
. 
ting in an ocassional strain on diplomatic relations 
with the United States. 
To understand the shitt in government and cor-
porate convictions there is a need to reter to the 
direction in which the international oil industry 
developed durino the twenties. In 1928 the three 
major oil companies - the Standard Oil Company ot 
New Jersey, Shell and A.P.O.C. - which dominated oil 
markets outside the United States had r.ached an 
agreement by which this market was shared in propor-
tion to the percentage they held at the time. In 
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order to assure an orderly market and a stable price 
structure they agreed to recognise each others' rela-
tive share of the market. to share each others' fa-
cilities and to supply their markets from the nearest 
oilfields, thus buying crude oil from each other at 
an agreed price. 
This truce in marketing arrived at in the eastern 
hemisphere was to include joint production. In the 
same year the Red Line Agreement was signed under 
the provisions of which the signatorie., including 
these three major oil companies, agreed that only 
through T.p.e. could an interest in oil exploration 
be shown in Iraq. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf prin-
cipalities except Kuwait. It seem. that these two 
agreement •• ie. the 'As Is' and the Red Line, indi-
cated a growing co-operation between the major oil 
companies on matters of marketing and a joint con-
8 trol of a large portion of the world supplies. This 
high level of co-operation strengthened government 
and company conviction. that it wa. no longer bene-
ficial nor practical in the political and economic 
environment of the late twenties to pursue the for-
mer policy of exclusiveness and modification was 
Consequently in October 1930 the British Govern-
.ent decided that foreign interest. be allowed to hold 
and operate oil concession. in Crown land. in the Bri-
tish Empire. subject to various conditions. Thes. 
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were to safeguard the security aspect of the oil sup-
plies, and included fairly comprehensive British 
character and British exploitation clauses together 
with the obligation to retine oil locally and Admi-
ralty right ot pre-emption. 
Although Kuwait was not part ot the British Em-
pire, this decision obviously had some intluence on 
whether Britain could continue to insist on the na-
tionality clause there in detiance ot the 'open door' 
prinCiple which generally had been accepted tor the 
Empire itselt. It became clear to the Foreign Ottice 
and the Petroleum Department and the Colonial Ottice 
that it would be politically impossible to declare 
and justify a 'closed door' policy in Kuwait after 
having decided on a contrary course ot action tor 
the British Empire and indeed, being on the point 
of allowing foreign oil interests into British Guiana. 9 
Nevertheless the special political considera-
tions which had determined British policy in Kuwait 
since the beginning ot the twentieth century still 
existed. and this apparently prevented any relaxation 
of the nationality clause in Kuwait. It was teared, 
as in Curzon's days, that commercial inter.sts were 
the precursor ot political claims and that as a re-
sult ot the extensive commercial rights contemplated 
by the Syndicate in their draft concession, the Shaikh 
would be lett in the hands ot a toreign company and 
that this would endanger Britain's position. 
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Inde~d, so wide-ranging were those rights that 
a~ter consideration the political resident criti-
cized the Syndicate for claiming nearly ev~rything 
10 bar the right to tly their o~n flag in Kuwait. The 
political resident later went further in explaining 
what had been known all along, that oil interests 
were unlike ordinary commercial concern a aa they 
have 'infinitely larger resources, frequently w.ield 
much political influence and demand much more ex-
tensive coneessions.' In the ease of the Syndi-
cate'. drAft conces.ion, he pointed out, the Syn-
dicate was not •• eking merely for permission to 
explore and prospect tor oil but to construct roads, 
railways, ports, lighthouses, telegraphs etc. I~ 
this were achieved the Shaikh would become a pup-
pet in the hands of the Americans and Sri tm would 
to a large extent lose the influence it had exer-
11 
ci.ed and its whole position would be threatened. 
Theretore in order to prevent the Americans 
securing the concession, as political considera-
tion. demanded, and also to act in accordance with 
the spirit ot the Cabinet decision ot October 1930 
not to impose restrictions on American capital, 
there was a ne.d to attract British capital to .e-
cur. the Kuwait oil concession. The introduction 
ot A.p.e.C., in particular, which had previously 
been interested in the concession and·had .pecial 
relations with the British Government, seemed a 
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way out ot the ditticulties as it would serve 
British interests in Kuwait whilst not being at 
odds with the Cabinet decision to remove the na-
tionality restriction in the British Empire. 
In mid-october the Petroleum Department ap-
proached Sir J. Cadman with a view to ascertai-
ning whether there was any prospect ot British in-
teresta, A.P.O.C. or I.P.C., being willing to un-
dertake oil exploration in Kuwait. The depart-
ment most certainly indicated to Cadman the Bri-
tish Government wish to see British rather than 
12 toreign interests securing the conce.sion. How-
ever A.P.O.C., who had ceased competing tor the 
Kuwait oil concession in 1926 blaming the Colonial 
Ottica tor setting a very high royalty obligation 
and unduly onerous customs duties, asked to be 
provided with the general terms being ottered by 
the Syndicate tor the concession betore answering 
the Petroleum Department. In view ot the special 
relations w~ Cadman, a tormer colleagua,13 and 
with A.P.O.C., the Colonial Ottice agreed to pro-
vide the intormation asked tor, de.pite being 
aware ot the unethical procedure ot disclosing 
to one competitor the terms being ottered in con-
tidence by another. 14 
It soon became apparent to the Colonial ot-
tice that approaching Cadman to block the Americans 
in Kuwait instead ot having to impose the nationality 
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clau •• was not going to achieve it. intended objec-
tive and provide a solution to their problem. A.P.O.C. 
w.r. .till unwilling to comp.te on the t.rms offered 
by the Syndicate because the.e terms, e.pecially the 
high royalty and the custom. dutie., were conside-
red to be prejudicial to the company's exten.ive 
,conc ••• ion. in Per.ia and Iraq. Indeed, one ot 
, , the governm.nt-appointed directors of A.P.O.C. ex-
plained lat.r that th •• e conditions, if accepted, 
would have 'very materially prejudiced - in the 
fir.t plac. - the Iraq negotiations and in the .e-
cond - negotiation. with Per.ia on the .ubj.ct ot 
• the prolongation ot the conce •• ion. He al.o in-
dicated the tact that a company like ,A.P.O.C. when 
negotiating any .ingle concession 'must view the 
t.rm. in their r.lation to oth.r conc ••• ion ••••••••• 
and must consequently do its best not to create a 
precedent ,which might 'have crippling ettects el.e-
where.,lS Theretore company policy .ince 1926 
had been to di.credi t the Syndicate and prevent them 
trom securing the Kuwait oil conce •• ion rather than 
to compete and endeavour to secure it on terms simi-
,lar to tho.e offered by them· 
Furthermore as A.P.O.C. had been kept tully 
intormed of events in the Persian ,Gult by their em-
plOyee. and British otticers, they were banking on 
the local British authorities' insistence on the 
nationality claus. in Kuwait to thwart the Syndicate'''' 
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ettorts to obtain the concession. 16 Theretore the 
company's directors believed there was little ur-
gency tor the time being about any direct approach 
to the Shaikh. In any case the world depression 
which had hit the company's protits had reduced 
demand tor oil. This, together with the disco-
veries ot oil in Iraq, meant that the problem was 
over-production and not diminishing supplies, thus 
weakening the case tor oil exploration in Kuwait 
At that time. Moreover additional sources ot oil 
in the Gulf Area, where their aain supply was 10-
cated, would not have been as beneficial to A.P.O.C. 
as to Gult which was eager to diversify its sour-
ces of supply, and theretore endeavouring to se-
cure the Kuwait oil concession through the Syndi-
17 cate. Consequently on 13 January 1931 A.P.O.C. 
intormed the Petroleum Department that the geolo-
gical intormation at their disposal was not sut-
ficiently encouraging for them to take 'any tur-
ther ,steps in the matter.' 18 
Faced with such a delicate situation, whereby 
on the one hand Britain could not attract Britsh 
capi tal ,to block the Americans in Kuwai t and on the 
other hand could not acknowledge openly its opposi-
tion to American interests securing the concession, 
the Colonial Oftice tound retuge in claiming pub-
licly that the Shaikh and not the British Government 
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was now insisting on the ins.rtion o~ the nationa-
lity claus. in any oil agreement he might sion. 
This tactic, adopted by the Colonial O~tice in 
agreement with the India Ottice, the Petroleum 
Department and the Foreign Ottice, was inspired 
by reports receiv.d trom the British authorities 
in the Persian Gulf. 
In September 1930 Dickson, the political aoent 
in Kuwait. informed the political r.sident that 
'without any furth.r pr.ssur. from H.M.G,· the 
Shaikh him •• lf would insi.t on the introduction 
of the nationality clau ••• which the Shaikh called 
the 'God-•• nt clau •••• in any oil agreement he 
might ~ign.19 Sir Hugh Bi.coe. the political r •• i-
dent, &iter lengthy discu.sion. with the Shaikh 
during hi. vi.it to the .haikhdom in November 1930, 
r.port.d to the Colonial ottic. that Shaikh Ahmad 
was .xtrem.ly emphatic regarding the nationality 
claus. and that on no condition whatso.ver would he 
grant a concession to any conc.rn that was not en-
tir.ly British. Bisco. assured the Colonial Offic. 
that the Shaikh would not grant the concession to 
the Syndicate if there were any risk of it being 
transferred by them to a foreign concern, and indi-
cated that it was unlikely that any agr .... nt would 
be arrived at unles. the Syndicate s.vered their 
connection with their American coll.ague •• 20 
The Colonial Office therefore informed the E.& G.S. 
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on 31 January 1931 that the Shaikh o~ Kuwai thad 
de~initely re~used to grant a concession to any 
concern that was not altogether British and was 
insisting on the inclusion of the nationality 
clause in any oil agreement he was to sign. The 
Colonial Office seem to have been naive in assuming 
that the Syndicate or the Americans would accept 
that it was the Shaikh who now insisted on the na-
tionality clause which had first been suggested and 
enforced by the British Government. Nevertheless 
the Syndicate's proposed draft concession was rejec-
ted by the Colonial O~~ice on the grounds that it 
did not contain a British nationality clause which 
was being demanded by the Shaikh. 21 
As might have been expected, the Syndicate 
were surprised and made extremely suspicious by the 
Colonial Office's latest .tatement, especially in 
view of·Holme.' reports which had indicated the 
Shaikh's attitude to be somewhat different, and 
therefore they turned to Shuekburgh. Janson. the 
Syndicate's chairman, and Davis, Gulf'. representa-
tive in London, .et the A.sistant Under-Secretary 
to discus. the matter in a personal and inlormal 
way. They ln~ormed him that Hol.e. was about to 
return to Kuwait to proceed with hi. negotiation. 
with the Shaikh and asked tor the ministry's appro-
val. Shuckburgh was not in a position to object 
to Holme. being active in Kuwait although the 
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Colonial O~~ice was hoping that, having been infor-
med of the Shaikh'. attitude and the British Govern-
mente. refusal to advi •• him to the contrary, the 
Syndicat. would abandon its et~ort. to .ecure the 
conc •• sion. 
The Colonial Ot~ice's stated objection was not 
to the Syndicat. but to it. latest dratt which omit-
t.d the ~ull Briti.h nationality clause. Th.refore 
Shuckburgh admitted that Holme.' visit to Kuwait 
was the best course open to the Syndicate, while in-
dicating that the Briti.h GoVernment would neither 
help nor encourage the Syndicat. in any way to .ecure 
the conce.sion ~or the Am.ricans. B.~ore r.turning 
to the P.rsian Gult, Holm.s al.o call.d on Shuck-
burgh to asc.rtain the Colonial O~tice's .tand. Hol-
.e. o.ten.ibly .xpr •••• d doubts as to wh.th.r hi. 
visit to Kuwait would serve any use~ul purpose and 
r.qu.st.d the ministry's assistance. Encouraged by 
Holmes' statement Shuckburgh rep.ated the ministry'. 
unco-op.rativ. attitud •• 22 
Having asc.rtain.d that th.re was nothing to gain 
by staying in London, Hol •• s return.d to Kuwait in 
ord.r to s •• what could be done to pleas. the Shaikh. 
H. arrived in Kuwait in April 1931 and went ~irst to 
s •• the political agent to say that h. had com. to 
conclude the wat.r-drilling sche •• which had been in 
operation .ince 1926, and to pay the Shaikh compensa-
tion for failing to find water. Shortly atterward. 
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Holme. met the Shaikh and paid him compensation of 
Rs.IO,OOO for which the Shaikh highly praised his 
'generosity' as he had not expected any such pay-
ment. (Dickson, the political agent, considered 
this money to be another expensive gift from the 
Syndicate to win the Shaikh'. favour.) 
Later, this time without informing the politi-
cal agen t, Holmes called again on the Shaikh and 
gave him two draft. ·oil agreemen ts to con.ider. The 
first was the previous year's draft which the British 
Government had already rejected as being unacceptable 
to the Shaikh who insisted on a full nationality 
clause. The second was a new draft containing si-
milar terms of which clause 8 enabled the Syndicate 
to transfer the conce.sion to any British or Cana-
dian company. Having been informed of Holme.' ef-
forts to short-circuit event., the political agent 
asked him for a copy of the draft. which had been 
given to the Shaikh. When he visited Dickson soon 
after, Hol.es apologised for not .ending them b~fore 
but submitted a copy of the new draft agreement only. 
By this time British officers in general in 
the Persian Gulf considered that Holmes was bent on 
gaining hi. objective 'by hook or by crook' and 
therefore they were on their guard. Dickson had be-
come exceedingly suspicious of Holmes and considered 
him to be a very persistent and somewhat underhand 
negotiator. H. was about to leave Kuwait for a 
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~h~~e ~d eonfes$ed ~o ~nQ ~~~~i~~\ ~e$ident that 
he did not 't.el exactly happy at the thought that 
h.~Holmes,will remain in Kuwait after my departure' 
and warned Biscoe of the possibility of Holmes trying 
to push 'his present draft through by judicious palm-
oiling of certain high dignitaries.' Nevertheless 
he assured the political resident that he was confi-
dent the Shaikh would stand firm and that therefore 
Holmes would not succeed. 23 
However Holm •• waited until Dickson departed 
to bring off his planned 'coup'. He believed he 
could g.t past Dr. Greenway, the acting political 
agent whom he considered to be 'a good but simple 
sort of fellow. ,24 Indeed, shortly afterwards he 
succeeded in winning from the Shaikh a letter which 
could be interpreted as meaning that he would waive 
the British nationality clause if the British Govern-
ment agreed. It seemed therefore that the Shaikh 
had withdrawn his insistence on the full nationality 
clause to the extent of placing on the British Go-
vernment the onus ot insisting on its inclusion. 
In London, upon receipt of a copy of the Shaikh'. 
2 July letter to Holmes from the acting political 
resident in the Persian Gulf, the Colonial Office 
realised it was becoming more difficult and distinctly 
embarassing to maintain the attitude they had hither-
to adopted towards the Syndicate, ie. that it was 
the Shaikh who insisted on the British nationality 
clause, not they. However as event. had now turned 
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full circle for the British Government, their whole 
position had to be considered anew in order to find 
a way out of their difficulties. 
Heated consultation between the various minis-
tries resulted from this seemingly unfortunate change 
of mind by the Shaikh, and the Syndicate, as was to 
be expected, returned to press home their advantage. 
Armed with the Shaikh's letter, it adopted the posi-
tion that sinc. his opposition had now been overcome, 
the British Government .hould no longer object to 
the Syndicat.'s drAtt propo.als tor the Kuwait oil 
concession. Janson, who saw Shuckburgh on 24 July, 
.tr •••• d the Syndicat.'s willingn ••• to meet Bri-
ti.h Gov.rnm.nt r.quirem.nts in any way they could 
and requested that the political r •• ident be in.tructed 
not to continue to obstruct the Syndicat. in their 
attempts to conclud. an oil agre.m.nt with Shaikh 
Ahmad. 25 
However for the British Gov.rnment the Shaikh'. 
l.tter had changed littl.. Th •• am. political ob-
jections to the Syndicate securing the coneession 
for the Americans still existed, only a change in 
tactics was required to deprive the Syndicate 01 the 
conce.sion. (At this stage it is important to point 
out the broad und.rstanding on the i.sue betw.en 
the ministri •• concerned, especially noting the 
attitude of the Foreign Oflie.,which was .hortly to 
change it. tune a. a direct re.ult of United State. 
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Government intervention on behalt ot the Syndicate.) 
Consequently, the Syndicate was intormed that the 
government could express no opinion pending the re-
ceipt of the observations of the political resident 
and the political agent which could not be given until 
those two had returned to the Gulf after their leave, 
which was not expected to be before October 1931. 
Fortunately tor the Colonial Ottice, as Biscoe 
and Diekson were on leave in London they eould give 
their explanation of the Shaikh's letter immediately. 
At an interdepartmental conterence held in the Fo-
reign Ottiee on 20 August the two otlieers gave a 
eompletely dillerent interpretation ot the letter 
and assured those present that the Shaikh would be 
vexed it he knew of the Syndicate's interpretation. 
Dickson was contident that the Shaikh wanted to get 
rid ot Holmes. He repeated what he had previously 
told the Colonial Of lice, that the Shaikh meant to 
say in the letter. 
I am sick ot being bothered by you, so 
go and talk to the British Government, 
and it you can get the. to agree to 
anything, come back and we will se. 
about it. 26 
H. also aaaured the India Ottice that it would be 
possible tor them to extricate thems.lves trom this 
difficult position as the. Shaikh 'will eertainly be 
prepared to eat any words whieh he may have uttered 
if we wiah hi. to do 50.,27 
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Dickson's interpretation o~ the Shaikh'. let-
ter raised considerable doubts among the ministries 
concerned, and as his previous as.urance. that the 
Shaikh would stay ~irm and refu.e to deal with Hol-
mes and latterly that he would change the wording 
of this letter if asked had proved ~al.e, there is 
a nee~ to explain the reasons for the apparent er-
rors in his judgem.nt and interpretation o~ the 
situation. (A.P.O.C.'s director., who .ere also 
in~ormed of the Shaikh's letter by their contacts 
in the Persian Gulf, acc.pted the Syndicate's in-
terpretation and not Dickson's.) 
There were two main factors in~luencing Dick-
son and other British of~icers in the area in their 
failure to grasp the real situation in regard to 
the oil concession. The first was their political 
prejudices and the second the Shaikh's behaviour. 
Dickson, who had been political agent in Kuwait 
sinc~ 1929, described himself as a man who was 'very 
imperialistic and cannot stand the thought o~ an 
American concern getting'Kuwait. Naturally, there-
fore, he did everything in his power to prevent the 
Syndicate from succeeding in Kuwait. Indeed, on 
the one hand he repeatedly .tr •••• d to the Shaikh 
the importance attached by the British Government 
to the nationality clause and on the other hand 
corresponded on a personal level with Arnold Wilson 
~roa A.P.O.C., in~oraing hi. o~ events in Kuwait 
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and urging his company to compete for the concession 
by reporting various indications showing the possi-
28 bility of oil deposits in Kuwait. Consequently 
any information which was thought to weaken the 
Syndicate's prospects in Kuwait, particularly that 
giv.n by the Shaikh, was gladly accepted by Dickson 
and widely reported. 
Although the Shaikh was r.gard.d by the local 
British authoriti •• as b.ing -.a.ily .way.d and not 
po •••••• d ot much strength ot character' and a. a 
man who lik.d to us. an 'evasive style in which 
the Arab mind seems to delight', the political 
agent reported his negative comm.nts about the Syn-
dicate without any doubt. or r.servation •• 29 Dick-
son became to some .xtent a captiv. ot his own be-
liets and d •• ire •• and After emphaticAlly stressing 
tor .0 long the Shaikh'. strict condition of gran-
ting only a conc.ssion containing a tull nationality 
Claus., he could not but give the above unconvincing 
int.rpretation ot the Shaikh'. l.tter. 
The Shaikh'. attitude, which was the second 
contributory factor to Dickson's .ron.ou. judge-
ment in the oil conce.sion ease, should be .xplained 
in the cont.xt ot the political situation in the 
P.rsian Gult wh.reby Kuwait's ind.pendence was largely 
d.p.ndent on Britain. Its political po.ition vis-a-
vis her n.ighbour. and Britain is best illustrated 
by London'. reaction to the Acting High Commissioner 
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o~ Iraq's proposal on 24 July 1930 that the British 
Government 'should in ~act assist any tendency 
there may be in the direction o~ encouraging the 
absorption o~ Kuwait by Iraq.' This suggestion, 
completely at odds with Britain'. long-established 
policy in Kuwait. resulted in considerable consul-
tation within the Colonial O~~ice and among the 
mini.tries concerned - the Foreign O~~ice, the Co-
lonial O~~ice and the India O~~ice. The unanimous 
decision. reached in a relatively short time, was 
that the government should continue the policy hi-
therto ~ollowed. namely to maintain Kuwait as an 
uno~~icial protected state entirely independent 
o~ either Iraq or Ibn Saud's kingdom. It was 
considered by the .inistries that the British Go-
vernment could easily command obedience ~rom the 
Shaikh o~ Kuwait so long aa his independence was 
guaranteed, and that 'this ~ortunate situation 
30 
may be expected to continue.' (This also ex-
plains the British Government'. desire to se. no 
other power in Kuwait.) 
Th. Shaikh was .ell aware that he needed Bri-
tain's support and goodwill in his relations with 
Kuwait's more power~ul neighbours, ie. Persia, 
Iraq and Saudi Arabia, who had made territorial 
and other demands o~ him over the years. He appre-
ciated that 'the very existence o~ Kuwait depended 
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on H.M.G. continued ~riendship and advice and [he] was 
not prepared to jeopardise it.,31 
However, ~rom the beginning, he had regarded the 
oil concession AS a commercial ~~Air and shAred the 
inclination o~ his neighbour, the Shaikh o~ Bahrein, 
to grant it to Holmes. Th. ~Act that Kuwait was be-
ing deprived o~ badly needed revenue because the Bri-
tish Government insisted on a proviso which they had 
waived in the case o~ Bahrein also AggravAted and 
con~u •• d the Shaikh. Therefor. in order to Avoid di-
rect con~rontation with the British Government over 
the oil issu. but at the same tim. keep Holmes as 
an Active and inter.sted comp.titor, he adopted A 
somewhat manipulative policy. 
In July 1928, tor instance, having been intor-
med by Holme. ot the Syndicate's connection with a 
prosperous American oil company and having been o~­
~.r.d terms wbich were exceptionally generous, the 
Shaikh in~ormed More, then the political agent, 
that he con.idered 
the E.& G.S. a very weak conc.rn ••••••• 
and would have several other conditions 
o~ his own to lay down which th.y C the 
Syndicate] might well not accept. 32 
Th. political Agent interpreted the Shaikh' •• tate-
ment as m.aning that it was unlikely that Holme. 
would be granted a concession and reported Accordingly, 
while in ~act Holme. was closer than ev.r b.~or. to 
clinching an oil agreement in Kuwait with the Shaikh 
and_only hi. departure to New York prevented a succe •• -
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ful outcome. Consequently in London it was unclear 
from the political agent'. reports whether the Shaikh 
had refused Holmes a concession or whether Holme. 
had had to leave Kuwait before concluding an agree-
ment. The Colonial Office, confus.d by the informa-
tion provided, asked for clarification with details 
of the actual position and attitude of the Shaikh. 
As'a result the political agent .tated in a sp.cial 
report that the Shaikh had not refu.ed to grant 
a conce.sion to the Syndicate and that Holme. inten-
ded to return to Kuwait .oon to renew negotiations. 33 
Again, in 1930/31 the Shaikh repeat.dly told 
Dickson, a. s.en above, that h. would n.ver grant 
any conce.sion to Holm.s without the full nationa-
lity clause being inserted. How.ver while Dick-
son was away the Shaikh gave Holmes a writt.n state-
.ent rath.r vagu.ly word.d which was certainly 
op.n to the interpr.tation that if the British Go-
vernment were willing to waive the nationality 
clau.e the Shaikh would also be willing to do so.34 
Dickson in London was naturally surprised by the 
l~tter and as soon a. h. returned to Kuwai t he con-
fronted the Shaikh with this 'apparent volte fac.' 
which had annoyed the British Government. placing 
it in an awkward posi tion. 
It ..... that this time the political agent, 
with a certa.in lack of diplomacy, tri.d desp.rately 
to bring the Shaikh back into line, a.s he had assu-
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red the India O~~ice that the Shaikh would comply. 
Dickson promised that i~ the Shaikh repudiated the 
letter 'he would recover all lost ground and cer-
tainly obtain H.M.G. support and approval'. Dick-
son de~initely also assured the Shaikh o~ Britain's 
help in solving current disputes which were de-
priving Kuwait and himselt ot considerable revenue, 
ie. over the taxation ot his date gardens in Iraq 
and Ibn Saud's blockade~5 He reminded the Shaikh 
ot Britain's contidence and tavour, the con~erring 
on him ot th;!K.C.l.B. and the recovery ot £3,000 
trom Ibn Saud, urging him not to alienate Britain's 
sympa thy and support by opposing her well-known 
wishes. 
The Shaikh'. response to such direct and an-
noying pressure was much as betore. He stated ver-
bally to the poli tical agent that he had in no way 
whatsoever altered hi. views about the nationality 
clause and the necessity tor its insertion. He 
also as.ured Dickson that unle •• Holme. agreed to 
the inclusion ot the nationality clause he would 
ask him to leave hi •• tate as he desired no turther 
discus.ions over the que.tion ot the oil concession. 
However he excused himselt by saying that the ac-
ting political agent had approved the wording ot 
the letter be~ore it was .ent to Hol .. e., and that 
he had no reason to suppose atter being intormed 
in 1928 and 1930 ot the British Government's insis. 
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tence on the nationality clause that in 1931 they 
would revoke their dogmatic .tand on thi •• 3S (The 
acting political agent, Dr. Greenway, was unfamiliar 
with the oil issue and had been criticized tor tAi-
ling to reali.e the .igniticance ot the letter.) 
In contrast, while dining with Holm •• on 30 
October, the Shaikh repeated that his letter made it 
clear that the nationality clau.e was a questio~ 
to be settled between Holm.s' company and the Bri-
tish Govemment and that in no circumstance would 
he withdraw the letter. Inde.d the Shaikh never 
withdrew or changed the wording ot hi. letter to 
Holmes, a turther indication ot Dickson'. misjudge-
ment when he promised the India Ottice that the 
Shaikh would do so. 
By adopting this 'two-taced' approach, the 
Shaikh was successtul in mobilising British sup-
port whilat at the aame time maintaining Holm.a' 
interest as an active competitor tor the conc.asion. 
He thus improved hia own bargaining poai tion po-
litically and economically. However the Shaikh'. 
attitude waa naturally ot no aasiatance to the Bri-
tish Government in their ditticult and embarasaing 
predicament vis-a-via the B.& G.S, and eventually 
what they aaw as their deliverance came not trom 
the Shaikh but trom a totally unexpected quarter -
A.P.O.C. 
The company .uddenly revived it. interest 
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in the Kuwait oil concession and informed the Bri-
tish Government accordingly. This sudden move was 
due to the Shaikh's 2 ..July letter to Holmes, which 
the company interpreted in the same light as the 
Syndicate. The company's directors were continually 
kept fully informed of the situation in Kuwait, and 
as long as it was understood that the Kuwait oil 
concession was to have a British nationality clause 
they felt no need to compete for the concession 
against the Syndicate. However the Shaikh's let-
ter alerted them to the possibility of the Syndi-
cate's overcoming the nationality clause barrier, 
upon which they had been relying heavily to prevent 
a Syndicate success in Kuwait. 
Therefore in a letter dated 25 August the com-
pany explained to the Petroleua Oepartmen t that as 
, , 
a result of recent te.t boring. on the Persian Gulf 
coast they now considered the prospect of the exis-
tence of oil in Kuwait to be 1e •• remote than had 
hitherto been thought. Accordingly, the company re-
quested the British Government's permission to con-
, 36 duct another geological survey of Kuwait's territory. 
The Petroleum Department ilDlDediate1y informed the 
Colonial Office of this favourable development and 
advised that 'A.P.O.C. should be given every encou-
ragement and all facilities which can rea.onably be 
~forded the •• ,37 The Colonial Office for its part 
urged the political re.i~nt, who wa.. on hi. way 
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back to Bushire, to assist the company and secure 
the Shaikh's concurrence with the proposed geologi-
cal survey. 
The various ministries' quick response illus-
trates their bope that it A.P.O.C. competed for the 
concessionit would extricate them from tbe 'some-
what delicate position in wbicb tbey bave been placed 
by the activities ot Major Holme. on behalf ot Ame-
rican interests.,3S Thi. would rescue them from 
appearing to adopt a 'dog-in-tbe-ma.nger' policy, 
ie. insisting on a British nationality clause while 
no British company was interested in the concession. 
In the Persian Gulf the political resident 
and the political agent, excited by the news, were 
soon able to intora A.P.O.C. that the Shaikh had 
consented and that they could proce.d with the ex-
ploration as soon as they desired. The company, en-
couraged by the Shaikh's response, took steps to 
carry out a geological .urvey of Kuwait during the 
cold .eason, asking the political agent .eanwhile 
to 'hold up things where Holme. and his crowd are 
concemad. ,39 
Being well-intoraed Hol.es became alaraed by 
A.P.O.C.'s revival of interest in Kuwait and their 
intention to conduct a geological survey. He teared 
that the pressure of the British Govemment upon 
the Shaikh, combined with the renewed activities ot 
A.P.O.C. in Kuwait, might prove to be too strong 
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for the Shaikh to resist, and that the concession 
would be lost. Therefore in a letter dated 1 Novem-
ber Holmes urged the Syndicate'. directors to u.e 
every means in their power, diplomatic or otherwise, 
to force an early reply from the Colonial Ottice as 
to their attitude to the Syndicate securing a conces-
sion in Kuwai t in view ot the Shaikh's 2 July let-
ter. As the Syndicate's 3 November letter to the 
Colonial Ottice did not produce the desired result, 
.Holmes' line was followed, as in many other instances, 
and the Gult Oil Corporation was urged by the Syndi-
cate to approach the United States Government tor 
assistance. 
Although it gradually became clear that a na-
tionalistic oil policy was out of date, the British 
Government.still insisted on a 'closed door' .in 
Kuwait for political reasons. The desire to main-
tain its political supremacy in the region was re-
flected in government policy of preventing the American 
oil interests entering the field. Consequently, 
whilst unable to insist openly on a 'closed door' 
less specific .• ethods .ere employed ",ltich eventually 
sparked ott United State. Government intervention. 
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3. The United states Government Steps In. 
The Gult Oil Corporation,which .ince 1929 had 
kept the State Department and the united State. Em-
bassy in London regularly informed ot their ditfi-
culties with the British Government in securing the 
Kuwait oil concession, tinally requested diplomatic 
a.sistance. In a letter to the State Department 
dated 27 November 1931 they accused the British Co-
lonial Oftice ot being evasive tor more than a year 
and ot deliberately delaying its reply to the E.& G.5./ 
Gult application tor the Kuwait oil conce.sion in 
order to .ecure the concession for A.P.O.C. 'To all 
intents and purpose.', continued the Gult letter, 
A.P.O.C. and the Colonial Ottice were 'acting to-
gether to the end that American interests may be pre-
vented trom securing an oil concession in KUWAit.' 
Gult was particularly anxious in view ot the tact 
that A.P.O.C. was preparing to conduct a geological 
survey in Kuwait shortly, while they and the Syndicate 
had been waiting over four months tor the Colonial 
Ottice's reply as to whether it would now be prepared, 
in view ot the Shaikh's 2 July letter, to waive the 
nationality clause in the case ot the Kuwait oil 
concession. Theretore the Gult statement concluded 
that without prompt assistance from the United Sta-
tes Government the concession would be lost to the 
British company as a direct result ot a combination 
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of British Government pressure upon the Shaikh and 
1 the recent activities of A.P.O.C. 
Three days later a meQting took place between 
the Secretary of State and Gulf representatives. Wal-
lace, Stone and Stevens misled the Secretary by saying 
that in 1929 they had been led to believe by the Co-
lonial Office that an arrangement similar to that in 
2 Bahrein would be possible in the case ot Kuwait. 
However despite a willingness by the Shaikh ot Kuwait 
to aign the concession with the Syndicate and have 
it turned over to Gult, the British Government were 
still insisting on the British nationality clause, 
claiming this was the Shaikh'a wish. 
The Secretary ot State, unfamiliar with the case, 
enquired whether the Briti.h nationality clause effec-
tively prevented the entrance of an American company 
into Kuwait and whether any Briti.h compani •• were 
interested in the area. He waa informed that the Bri-
tish nationality clause prevented any .\merican com-
pany from controlling the concession and that recently 
A.P.O.C. had been showing aome intere.t in the con-
ceaaion deapite turning down the Syndicate'. offer to 
.ell their entire holding in the Persian Gulf and 
Arabia, as had other Briti.h companies. Con.equently 
the Secretary of State responded positively and re-
ferred the matter to the Near Eastern Division of the 
State Department. 
On meeting Wallace Murray, the Chief of the 
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division, Stone explained why Kuwait had been exclu-
ded ~rom the territory ot the ~ormer Turkish Empire, 
ie. excluded trom the Red Line Agreement. According 
to the Gult representative A.P.O.C. had been nego-
tiating at the time tor the Kuwait oil concession and 
did not wish 'their operatins to be hampered by being 
obliged to consult with the other members ot T.P.C.' 
This inaccurate and misleading explanation was pro-
vided deliberately in order to prove to the State De-
partment that 'there was a good deal ot jockeying 
done by the British oil intere.ts' in the Middle East. 3 
Finally, although saying they could not tell the 
Department what steps should now be taken, they .ugges-
ted neverthele.s that the United State. Emba •• y in 
London Should take the matter up with the appropriate 
Briti.h authorities. It .eem. that by providing mis-
leading intormation. a practic. later tollowed by other 
4 American oil companies asking tor state a.sistance, 
Gul~ strengthened its ca.e ~or State Department support. 
ALter considerable consultations involving the 
Assistant Secretary ot State, the department telt jus-
titied in raising the matter with the British Govern-
.ent. The State Department's oil policy in the Mid-
dle East was centered on the maintenance ot the topen 
door' principle, thus securing ~or American oil com-
panie. the privilege o~ competing tor oil concessions 
on an equal tooting with toreign companies. There-
~ore. in view o~ the department's beliet that becau.e 
._-.-. 
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o~ their informal representation about Bahrein the 
British Government had 'bAcked down completely ~rom 
its insistence upon the insertion ot the nationali-
ty clause', it seemed logical to insist upon such 
An agreement tor Kuwait since both were consid.red 
identical in status as 'puppet Arab state. nominally 
governed by native Shaikh •••••• but actually ruled by 
the British political Agents there.' It WAS decided 
to accord Gult precisely the same as.istance a. to 
Any other bona tide American company to remove the 
obstacles the British had set up against them and 
so leave them tree to negotiate tor the Kuwait oil 
concession on equal terms with any other company. 
However, betore promising such assistance the 
department ensured that GUlt was not aeeking a mono-
polistic concession in Kuwait, ie. that it was wil-
I 
ling to contine its exploitation rights to a reaso-
nabla area ot the territory.S The department could 
not support any monopolistic claims in view o~ their 
previous criticism ot the British Government tor mo-
nopolising potential oil-bearing territory in lraq.6 
Eventually, atter receiving an assurance to this ef-
teet trom Gulf, the State Department instructed the 
Embassy in London to take the matter up informally 
with the British Foreign otfi~e and to ask for a 
statement of British Gov.r~ent policy r~garding 
the development of petroleum resources in Kuwait by 
American companie •• 
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'" On 4 December the United states Charge d'A~~aires 
called on the Foreign O~~ice and raised the matter 
o~ the Kuwait oil concession in~ormally. Ray Ather-
ton atated the United Stat.s Government's wish to 
aecure the right o~ American interests to partici-
pate in the development o~ the petroleum resources 
o~ Kuwait upon an equal basis with British interests, 
ie, the wi.h to open the door ~or American interests 
in Kuwait a. had been done in Iraq and Bahrein. In 
View of the delay which had already occurred in the 
matter, Atherton continued, it was the State Depart-
.ent's hope that it would soon be possible ~or the 
Colonial O~~ice to give a ~avourable reply to the 
American company through the Syndicate. 
Ten daya later on 14 December, upon his return 
~rora Paris, Ambassador Dawes discussed the Kuwai t 
conce.aion with Sir ~obn Simon, the Foreign Secretary, 
and .hortly ~terw&rds the Counsellor at the Embassy 
also referred to the .atter when he .et the A.sis-
tant Under-secretary, Sir Laneelot Oliphant. 7 The 
United states Embassy's ag~ressive response to the 
State Department's request to raise the Kuwait i.sue 
informally was due to the tact that aince 1929 the 
various membera of the _baasy .t~~ had been pro-
vided with intormation by Gult indicating underhand 
.ethoda used by the British Government to exclude 
American intereata tro. Kuwait. 8 
Suddenly the Foreign O~fice found itself being 
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pressurised by one o~ Britain's most important allies 
on a subject ~or which they were not the responsible 
ministry and which they considered to be o~ rela-
tively minor importance. There were two important 
issues con~ronting the Foreign O~~ice at the time 
over which United States Government goodwill was e5sen-
tial. Britain's request due to the depression ~or a 
postponement o~ her World War 1 debts and the ne.d to 
restrain Japan's expansion in the Far East, particu-
larly in China. 9 Th.re~ore Sir Lanc.10t Oliphant 
asked the Colonial O~~ice, the ministry responsible. 
to expedite a reply to the Syndicate. 10 It is appa-
rent that as the Kuwait oil concession started to 
~~ect diplomatic relations betw.en Great Britain and 
the United States, the Foreign Of~ice became more 
and more involved until gradually they became the mini-
stry assuming greatest respon.ibi1ity ~or decision-
making. 
However the Colonial Office wa. anxious to pro-
crastinate over the Kuwait conce.sion, all the more 
since there was a 'likelihood that the A.P.O.C. may 
take the field'. They therefore suggested delaying 
a reply to the Americans at least until ~ter the inter-
departmental conference scheduled ~or 1 January 1932. 11 
In the circumstance. the Foreign O~~ice sent an inte-
rim reply to Atherton on 22 December saying that the 
issue was being considered by the various ministries 
concerned and promising a ~urther communication in the 
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near t'uture. 12 
Nevertheless the United State. Embassy continued 
to pre •• the Foreign Ot'fice tor a .ati.tactory reply. 
On 28 December the Ambassador again raised the i.sue 
with Sir John Simon and presented a memorandum which 
had been.prepar.d by Harry Davis, the London represen-
tative ot Gulf, .etting out certain facts to strengthen 
the Syndicat.-. cas.. Davi.- memorandum stated the 
Shaikh'. willingness to omit the British nationality 
claus. from the oil agre.ment provided the British 
Governm.nt agr •• d, tog.ther with the syndicat.'. 
preparedne •• to include in the conc ••• ion conditions 
.imilar to tho •• incorporat.d by the Colonial Ott'ic. 
in the Bahrein conc.s.ion. In addition, the memo 
al.o t'ocus.d on the r.al and sol. out. tanding i.sue 
between the two government. which was, according to 
the Am.rican. 'whether the British Governm.nt does 
or do.s not in.ist upon the inclu.ion in the Kuwait 
concession ot' the so-called 'British nationality 
clau •• ••• On 29 December Atherton again called on 
the Foreign Ot't'ice, this ti.e to express the hope 
that the Briti.h Government would not support an 
application trom a purely Briti.h company tor an oil 
conce •• ion in Kuwait while the question of the Syn-
13 dicate·. proposals were under con.ideration. (He 
was r.ferring, naturally, to A.P.O.C. which had been 
reported by Holmes as being active in Kuwait, .ince 
it had begun a geological survey on 15 December.) 
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Although it was considered that the United 
States Embassy waanow pleading on behalt of Gult. 
whereas originally it had stated ,that the United 
States Government did not wish to favour anyone 
American interest in particular. the Foreign Otfice 
still hoped that in a short while they would be 
able to give a satisfactory reply to the Americans. 
It realised that although the Colonial Ottice and 
the India Otfice were likely for political reasons 
to advocate that Britain should advise the Shaikh 
to maintain the British nationality clause, in fact 
these reasons could no more be justified in the 
case of Kuwait than they had been for Bahrein. The 
ministry believed it would be impossible to 'justi-
fy to any impartial tribunal insistence upon stric-
ter conditions in the case ot Kuwait than in the 
case of Bahrein' and the Colonial Office's argument 
was conaidered to be weak and apecioua. The last 
thing the ainiatry wanted now waa a renewed oil 
controveray with the United States similar to the 
one over I raq a tew yeara betore. and therefore 
they were prepared even at thia early stage to 
leave the Shaikh free to give the E.& G.S. the con-
cesaion. incorporating terma aiailar to those in 
their Bahrein coneession, if A.P.O.C. were not se-
riously interested. Unless A.P.O.C. were genuinely 
in the tield, wrote the Assistant Under-Secretary, 
'we cannot keep the United State. Ambassador in 
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suspens •• ,14 Howev.r ~or tactical reasons the Fo-
r.ign O~~ica wera not prepared at this stage to make 
this view known to the other ministries. 
At the con~erence on 1 January 1932, fac.d 
with united opposition ~rom the Colonial O~fice. 
the India Olfice and the Petroleum Department, the 
Foreign Ollice repre.entative chose to continue con-
cealing his ministry's view lor the time b.ing. In-
st.ad, the Foreign Ollice joined with the other mini-
stri •• - wish to ke.p the Americans out 01 Kuwait if 
at all possible. Accordingly the best course 01 
action wa. considered to be that 01 delaying matters 
lurther and holding 011 the Syndicat. until A.P.O.C. 
had linally made a decision. Meanwhile it was to be 
.tr •••• d to the Americans that th.re were other bid-
ders besides the Syndicate and ther.fore time wa. 
ne.d.d lor the comp.ting offers to be car.~ully con-
sidered. Nev.rth.less the Foreign Ollice r.presenta-
tive emphasised that he was only agreeing to this 
course 01 action on the understanding that A.P.O.C. 
would apply lor a concession in a relativ.ly short 
time, which the Petroleum Departm.nt assured them 
was the ca.e. It was decided the Foreign Oflice 
.hould prepare a draft note to the United Stat.s Em-
bassy describing the Shaikh's attitude, and .xplai-
ning that there had been other competitors in the 
lield lor some time so that in the Shaikh's intere.ts 
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time should be allowed to examine the advantages ot 
any proposals that might be made to him.iS The Fo-
reign Ottice representative thought it best in the 
circumstances to pursue this line in order to ease 
considerable tension with the other ministries and 
the United States Embassy. 
However despite the apparent agr.ement reached 
betw •• n the ministri.s at the conterence, contlic-
ting views soon .merg.d when the For.ign Ottice's 
. . 
draft reply to the United States Embassy was circu-
lated tor their obs.rvations. The Petroleum Depart-
•• nt suggested strengthening the paragraph regarding 
the application ot another company - A.P.O.C. -
which had been interested in the concession .ven 
betore the Syndicate. The Petroleum Department 
also suggested that the Foreign Ottice should tell 
Atherton that the Syndicate was not 
really the sort ot company which we like, 
since they are not themselves direct .x-
ploiters ot p.trol.um •••••• and the means 
they have adopt.d in dealing with the 
Shaikh are perhaps a little doubttul. 16 
The Colonial Ottice, tor its part, wanted to streng-
then the .ection dealing with the Shaikh's wish to 
insist on the British nationality clause, which he 
had recently r.peat.d to the local British authori-
ties. 11 Th. India Ottice went even turther, saying 
Britain should do its best to av.rt granting a con-
cession to the Syndicate without the nationality 
- 203 -
clause, even i~ the Shaikh were willing to grant one, 
regardlesso~ whether A.P.O.C.'s project materialised 
or not. 18 
The Foreign O~tice was quick to realise that i~ 
the India O~~ice and the Colonial Ollice were given 
their way Britain would soon ~ind itsel~ embarking 
on a new 'tight ~or oil' controversy with the United 
States which the ministry wanted to avoid at any cost. 
Such a policy was considered by the ministry to be 
prejudicial to Anglo-American relations and contrary 
to the spirit 01 the Cabinet decision 01 October 1930 
to allow in principle Aaerican oil inter.sts into 
the British Empire. Consequently the Foreign Ollice 
set out to bring the other .inistries round to their 
way ot thinking by picking the. o~~ one by one, be-
ginning wi th their staunchest opponents, the India 
Ottice. 
At an informal .e.ting wi th India Ollice otli-
cials Oliphant explained Foreign Office objections 
to the attempt 'to shelter •••••• b.hind the Shaikh'. 
As the Aaericans wished to know definitely wheth.r 
there would be any discri.ination on grounds of na-
tionality against an Aaerican company att.(!wpting to 
obtain an oil concession in Kuwait, he emphasised 
that it would carry no .eight to say that the Shaikh 
had told the British authorities that h. was in favour 
ot .aintaining the British nationality claus •• 'Th. 
Shaikh was enough ot an Arab' continued Oliphant 
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to say whatever he thought would be plea-
sing to his hearers At the time, and the 
Americans would merely believe that we 
were playing with them i~ we now tried 
to put down a re~usal to allow American 
enterprise in Kuwait to the Shaikh's 
wishes. 
There~ore, he argued, it was a matter o~ political im-
portance to work amica.bly wi th the Americans and not 
to give them cause ~or harbouring a grudge, especially 
a. their goodwill was needed in other more important 
ma.tter •• 
The India Oftice in general accepted the argument 
put ~orward by the Foreign Of~ice and w .. s inclined to 
agree. However, a. the Government o~ India h .. d pursued 
tor so long a policy of maintaining the principle of 
the n .. tionality cl .. u.e in oil conce •• ion. in the Per-
.ian Gulf and India, it was nece .... ry to con.ul t them 
~irst. Con.equently the lndi .. Office .. greed to tele-
graph to the Government of India as .oon a. possible, 
pointing out the political importance of the matter 
and .uggesting that the nation .. lity clause .hould no 
longer be insisted upon in Kuwait. 19 N .. turally the 
Foreign Office wa. sati.fied with the meeting'. out-
come, e.pecially a. the Indi .. Office promised to give 
them the opportunity of commenting on the telegram 
before it was .ent. 
Next, the Foreign Office turned their .. ttention 
to the Colonial O~fice. The mini. try tried to convince 
the Colonial Of~ice that in re .. lity the difference be-
~e.n the view. of the two mini.trie. was marginal, 
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and urged them to agree to the United States Embassy's 
being informed that Britain was prepared to waive the 
nationality clause so tar as Kuwait was concerned. 20 
The Colonial Ottice's view was distinct trom that ot 
the Foreign Oftice in so tar as they thought that Bri-
tain 'ought not to allow United States oil interests 
into Kuwait' but at the same time they realised that 
politically Britain could not tell the United States 
Government ot its insiatence on the nationality 
Clause, preterring this to be lett to the Shaikh. The 
Colonial Oftice had become disturbed by what they con-
sidered to be the weaker line adopted recently by the 
Foreion Office vis-a-vis the Americans and pointed 
out that the Foreign Ottice had changed its mind 
since the interdepartmental conterence of 1 January. 
They felt that the Foreign Office was now pressuring 
them to adopt a view they thought unacceptable, and 
looked for a way to hold up its advance. 21 However 
they were in an embarassing position as it was they 
who, in 1925, had carelessly proposed the drait con-
cession to be put by the Syndicate to the Shaikh of 
Kuwait which contained no nationality bar. they had 
to justify this action to the Foreign Office by saying 
that then 'the question of sale to the Americans had 
not been raised.,22 
The Colonial Ottice replied therefore that they 
would 'not propose at this stage to otter any obser-
vation upon the views expressed' by the Foreign Office, 
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and suggested bringing in the Admiralty, who were 
known to be ardent supporters o~ British oil interests 
whenever possible, to state their views on the issue. 
By this action, the Colonial O~~ice, who ~elt the na-
tionality claus. should be retained in Kuwait, were 
apparently hoping to gain an ally and to use the Ad-
miralty as a shield to repel the Foreign O~~ice's 
constant pressure, thus relieving them o~ their am-
barassing position vis-a-vis the Foreign O~~ice. As 
it was generally aware o~ the Admiralty's oil policy, 
the Foreign O~~ice was unwilling to bring them in, 
particularly be~ore they had agreed with the India 
O~~ice on the policy to be adopted. Eventually, 
therefore, it was agreed that the Admiralty would be 
consulted ~ter the India O~fice had received a reply 
fro. the Government o~ India to their suggestion to 
waive the nationality claus. in Kuwait, a reply which 
the Foreign O~~ice had good grounds ~or believing 
would be ~~irmative • 
.Just as the Foreign O~~ice hope~ully anticipated, 
the Government o~ India changed its stance and accepted 
the Foreign O~~ice argument. The Viceroy o~ India in 
a telegram dated 25 February admitted that 'it was 
perhaps a mistake o~ tactics to attempt to raise 
nationality bar question over Kuwait agreement' and 
!in view o~ Shaikh's tortuous attitude it is anyhow 
now no longer possible to pretend that objection 
comes from him.' Therefore the Government o~ India 
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suggested dropping this line altogether and thus 
agreed that 'subject to certain reservations, ba-
lance of advantage lies in admission of American 
interests. ,23, 
As the Admiralty had been acquainted with the 
Kuwait case and with the revival of A.P.O.C.'s in-
terest in the concession by the Colonial Office on 
2 March, the Foreign Oftice had to tace the Admiralty 
immediately. In a letter dated 4 March it provided 
the Admiralty with its proposed draft reply to the 
United States Embassy which told the Americans that 
the British nationality clause would not be insisted 
upon in the case of a concession in Kuwait. The Fo-
reign Office tried to cover themselves by pointing 
out that by so doing nothing in practice would be 
lost, as A.P.O.C. were at present carrying out a 
geological survey in Kuwai t wi th the Shaikh's sanc-
tion and therefore he would, no doubt, wish to con-
.sider any application made by the British company • 
. The Foreign Ottice concluded by saying that as the 
Colonial Oftice, the Petroleum Department and the 
India Otfice had all approved this draft reply, it 
was hoped the Admiralty would also concur thus ob-
viating the need tor an interdepartmental conterence 
as was proposed by the Colonial Ottice. At this 
stage it is interesting to note that the Colonial 
Office in its 2 March letter to the Admiralty stated 
that only the IndiA Office and the Government of India 
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had approved the Foreign Office's suggested reply to 
24 the United States Embassy. 
As had been hoped ~or by the Colonial Office, 
the Admiralty was quit. perturbed about the position 
in Kuwait and much to the Foreign Office's regret 
were .trongly of the opinion that aninterdepartmen-
tal .eeting with representative. of the Service De-
partments was required to consider the British Go-
vernment'. reply to the United State. Embassy. The 
Admiralty reali.ed from the information provided by 
the Colonial Offic. that n.gotiation between the 
ministries conc.rned had been going on ~or some time 
without the knowledge of the Service Departments. 
They w.re ther.~or. anxious to ensure that oil pro-
duction in Kuwait would be und.r Briti.h control. 
Apart from security of oil supply, the idea of a 
fl •• t of American tankers operating in the Gulf, 
and con.equ.ntly American warship., was unacc.ptable 
and con.ider.d dang.rous in Admiralty circle.. There-
for. the Admiralty pr •••• d ~or an early interdepart-
mental conf.r.nce, while hastily preparing the argu-
25 
menta to be put for~ard at it. 
'At the interdepartm.ntal conference held at the 
Foreign Oftice on 11 March the Admiralty and the Air 
Mini.try were represent.d. As might be expected in 
the circumstances, the m.eting developed into a ' 
veh .. ent dispute between the Service departments and 
the Foreign Office. The Admiralty, supported by the 
- 209 -
Air Ministry, argued that in view o~ the strategic 
position o~ Kuwait at the head of the Gulf the pro-
duction of oil there woul.:l provide an alternative 
to the Persian supply at a point nearer the areas 
in which the oil would be required, and more easily 
brought under e~~ective control by naval ~orces. 
(Interestingly, this argument had been used by Admi-
ral Slade as early as 191 •• ) As the United States' 
desire ~or,equal rights regarding concessions in 
Kuwait was considered by the Admiralty to constitute 
a direct challenge to Britain's position and pres-
tige vis-a-vis the Arab rulers on the shores of the 
Persian Gul~. it was essential it concluded, to en-
sure that British interests should predominate in the 
development of oil production in Kuwait shaikhdom. 
The Foreign Of~ice ~ailed to convince the Admiralty 
o~ the necessity to reply quickly to the Americans, 
who according to the Foreign O~~ice had been under 
the impression that, Britain was deliberately postpon-
ing an answer ~o~ ulterior motives. ,Nevertheless 
it,s.ems they ,succeeded in persuading the,Petroleum 
Department ,to declare its support ~or, their policy.26 
Since the Petroleua Department had originally 
dr~ted the revised policy regarding oil concessions 
in the British Empire and had suggested waiving the 
nationality clause so long as certain stipulations 
were inserted in its place, they had naturally been 
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close to Foreign Office opinion from the beginning_ 
However ~or tactical reasons the Petroleum Depart-
ment preferred to delay notifying the Americans of 
the British Government's change in policy, at least 
until negotiations .ere under way between the two 
countries ~or recognition of Britain under the terms 
of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. The act, which 
had been passed during the Anglo-American oil con-
~rontation in Iraq, provided that no leases on pub-
lic lands could be given to nationals of countries 
that did not grant similar rights to Ame:dcan in-
terests. 
However, as the stipulations suggested to 
serve as a substitute for the British nationality 
clause .ere considered stringent, the Petroleum 
Department ~oresaw some di~~iculty in inducing the 
United States Government to accept them as a rea-
sonable basis for such reciprocity. Included in 
these conditions were stipulations that the companies 
concerned .ere to be registered in British territory, 
that a majority o~ employees were to be British sub-
jects, that at least .50% of the oil obtained was to 
be re~ined on British territory, that the plant used 
should be capable o~ producing fuel oil suitable ~or 
Admiralty use and that the British Government was to 
retain the right of pre-emption in case o~ emergency. 
There~ore it was considered disadvantageous to reveal 
to the Americans be~ore the.e negotiation •• tarted 
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the new stand soon to be adopted by the British Go-
vernment. Consequently it was only in 1935 that 
the British Government r~que.t.d r.cognition under 
the terms o~ the Mineral Leasing Act o~ 1920.in~or­
ming the United State. Government o~ much Ie •• 
stringent stipulations than tho.e suggested by the 
Petroleum Department in 1930. 27 
At the con terence, in view ot Admiralty opposi-
tion, the Petroleum Department was obliged to ex-
plain that the revised policy approv.d in principle 
by the Cabinet, ie. to waive the nationality claus. 
in the Briti.h Empir •• had been devi.ed in the in-
ter •• t. ot the Briti.h oil companies and the Empire. 
Moreover.it was explained that the r •• triction to 
Briti.h capital o~ oil conce •• ion. in Briti.h or 
Briti.h-controlled territory tended to r.tard their 
development,which was contrary to the Admiralty'. 
declared objective. There~ore the mini.try argued 
that Kuwait .hould ~it in with the n.w general po-
licy. 
N.v.rth.l •••• d •• pit. the support given by the 
India O~~ice and the P.trol.um Department to the Fo-
reign o~tic., the reply to Ath.rton was .upended in 
view o~ the Admiralty's objection.. It was d.cided 
that the Admiralty should prepare a memorandum on 
the strategic aspect of the situation to be consi-
dered be~ore a reply could be given to the United 
State. Eabassy.28 
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Be~ore .ending the Foreign O~~ice their memo ran-
dum the Admiralty expressed ~urther criticism o~ its 
stand. In a letter dated 14 March they argued that 
paragraph II of the Foreign Oftice's proposed reply to 
the Americans was unfortunately worded, as it seemed 
to ainimise Britain's 'position as much as possible 
and to read almost like an apology for claiming to 
have any say in the matter at all.' There ~as no in-
dication in the reply, the Admiralty continued, that 
we have any right, but there is a de~i­
nite statement that the Shaikh is inde-
pendent. It is stated that he enjoys 
our protection but there is no sugges-
tion that this imposes any obligation 
on him or gives us any rights. Then 
his obligation to us as regards oil 
concessions is minimised by stating 
tha tit was an assurance given presu-
mably voluntarily by his predecessor 
many years ago. 
None o~ this, the Admiralty considered, bore any rela-
tion to the facts nor did it describe Anglo-Kuwaiti 
relations accurately.29 
Two days later the Admiralty's memo stressing the 
strategic importance o~ Kuwait was received in the Fo-
reign Of~iee. Any oilfields in Kuwait, it claimed, 
would be much more easily protected than those in Per-
sia and Iraq and would provide an immediate and con-
venient alternative to any interruption of oil produc-
tion in Persia. Kuwait was considered to be of far 
greater strategic importance than Bahrein, and the 
Admiralty ~e&red that a further concession to the Ame-
ricans in the Persian Gulf aight prove the point made 
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by Captain t-1&han from the United States Navy, which 
they quoted in their memo, namely that 
a eoncession in the Persian Gulf by arrange-
ment or neglect of local commercial interests, 
which now underlie political and military con-
trol, will imperil Great Britain's naval situa-
tion in the further .a.t, her political posi-
tion in India, her commercial interests in both 
and the imperial tie between herself and Aus-
tralia. 30 
However realising by now that there was no pros-
pect of obtaining the other departments' agreement 
to retention of the nationality clause, the Admiralty 
considered it •••• ntial that the conditions sugges-
ted by the P.troleum Department to replace the na-
tionality clause be strength.ned. Therefore in their 
memo they proposed the inclusion of an additional 
stipulation, which ensured that ov.r S~~ of the capi-
tal of the company securing the concession should 
be British. 
Th. Foreign Office w.re not impr.ssed by the Ad-
miralty's argument. On the'contrary, because the Ad-
miral ty wan t.d Sri tun not to permi t the Shaikh to 
grant a conc.ssion to be worked by foreign capital, 
whether A.P.O.C. appli.d for the conceaaion or not. 
the Foreign Office consid.red this view to take no 
account ot the gov.rnment'. obligation to promote the 
best interests of the Shaikh and his .haikhdom. In 
addition they were annoyed by the Admiralty'. stub-
borness, as th.y believed that the additional sti-
pulation ot at least SO per cent participation by 
British CApital would make the proposed conditions 
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tantamount to the retention o£ the British nationality 
clause and would there£ore be quite unacceptable to 
the Americans. The adoption o£ such a stipulation 
was considered to run counter to the revised policy, 
as it would not enable Britain to claim reciprocal 
status in the United States which was one o£ the main 
objects o~ this pOlicy.31 Consequently, having won 
considerable support ~rom the India O~~ice, the Petro-
leum Department and the Colonial O~fice and realising 
that nothing more was to be gained ~rom the Admiralty, 
the Foreign O£~ice o~~icials decided the time was ripe 
~or the Cabinet to make the ultimate decision. 
Meanwhile, as the Foreign Of~ice still could 
not provide the Americans with an answer, despite a delay 
o~ three months, Atherton was instructed by the State 
Department to raise the matter formally. For seve-
ral reasons the State Department decided to place its 
representation upon a ~ormal basis. ~~ile waiting 
~or the British Government's reply, the State Depart-
ment was persuaded by Gul~ that the British Govern-
ment was deliberately delaying a reply in order to 
secure the concession and present the Americans with 
a ~ait accompli. Wallace in~ormed the State Department 
that recently A.P.O.C. had strengthened its position 
in Kuwait and it was widely believed that the United 
States Government had ~ailed in their negotiations 
with the British Government. Moreover the State De-
partment wanted to obtain a de~inite decision i~ 
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possible before A.W. Mellon, whose family founded 
the Gulf Oil Corporation, took up his post Aa the 
new United States Ambassador to Britain. This, it 
was felt. might complicate matters further whilst 
minimi.ing the desire to present formally to the 
British Government the United States Government'. 
view of the 'open door' element in the current 
32 Anglo-American controversy in Kuwait. 
On 29 March in a not. to the For.ign Office 
Ath.rton .tated the Unit.d State. Gov.rnment'. de-
.ir. to •• e that 
the British Gov.rnment would be no l.s. 
liberal in the .atter of according open 
door right to Am.rican nationals in Ku-
w&it than it had .hown its.lf to be in 
the almost id.ntical ea •• of Bahrein, 
and h. indicat.d his gov.rnm.nt's hope of rec.iving 
a satisfactory reply shortly. Th. situation was fur-
ther complicat.d. said Atherton, by the fact that 
at the v.ry mom.nt the Briti.h Gov.rn-
.ent had under consid.ration the peti-
tion of the Syndicat ••••••• p.rmi.-
sion wa. granted to A.P.O.C •• a rival 
concern, to send a .. all party of geo-
logists to Kuwait· 
while the United Stat •• Embas.y 
on r.peat.d occa.ions requ •• t.d of the 
For.ign Office that the company in ques-
tion not be permitted to proceed with 
its operation p.nding a decision by the 
British Gov.rnment on the qu •• tion ••••• 
regarding op.n door right. for Am.rican 
nationals in Kuwait. 33 
In the circumstances, despite th.ir sympathetic atti-
tude towards the Americans, the Foreign Offic. could 
only reply that the issue would b. discussed at the 
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next Cabinet meeting and prOlilisQd to state Sri tain 's 
position immediately thereuter. 
At the Cabinet meeting on 6 April the Foreign 
Oftice, India Ottice and Petroleum Department all 
agreed to intorm the United States ~bassy that the 
British Government would not insist on the inclusion 
in any concession in Kuwait ot the clause confining 
it to British inter.sts but that 
on many points. including those d.sig-
ned to sate guard the intere.t. ot H.M.G. 
and the Shaikh, the draft concession 
submitted by the R.& G.S. would need 
revi.ion. 
(The Colonial Ottice tor its part saw no objection to 
the For.ign Of tic.'. propos.d reply to the United 
States Embassy provided the other ministries were in 
agreement.) This statement was considered to be con-
si.tent with the Briti.h Government'. moral obliga-
tion to advance the Shaikh'. intere.ts and with con-
sideration. ot general policy which had be.n ba.ed 
on political ground. so as not to antagoni.e the 
United State. and to win lat.r reciprocal richts tor 
British national. in America. The .tipulation tor 
ov.r SO p.r cent Briti.h capital participation sug-
gested by the Admiralty was r.jected a. being incon-
.i.tent with the revis.d oil policy. 
N.v.rth.l •••• a. r.gards the Admiralty's de.ir. 
tor compl.te control of oil production. the .tipula-
tiona proposed by the Petroleum Department were accep-
ted and con.idered suttici.nt since th.y had b.en 
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approved by the Committee of Imperial Detence. 34 The 
Admiralty aaw thia aa a victory and conaidered that 
the Foreign ,Ottice had ahitted ita atance by accepting 
all the meaaure. advocated by the Petroleum Depart-
.ent. They thus found it easier to back down over 
their stipulation for 50 per cent British capital 
p~rticipation. Theretore it waa decided that it 
A.P.O.C. did not put forward a satistactory otter tor 
a concession, the government would waive the nationa-
lity clause in the ease ot Kuwait, ie. accept the 
'open door' principle. 
However the Foreign secretary requested and ob-
tained the Prime Minister's peraission to notity the 
Americans betore ascertaining A.P.O.C.-s stand. He 
justitied this request on the grounds that the United 
States Government had hinted more than once that 'w. 
have been holding up a reply ••••••••• in the special 
35 interests ot the A.P.O.C.' As the Pri.e Minister 
agreed, on 9 April. atter tour months ot interdepart-
mental squabbling and manipulations, the Foreign ot-
tiee were tinally able to give what they conaidered 
to be a satistactory reply to the United States Go-
vernment. In their letter ot 9 April to the United 
States Embassy the Foreign Ottice indicated that 
should the Syndicate d.sire to rene. their applica-
tion to the Shaikh of Kuwait tor an oil concession, 
which they would subsequently transter to the Gulf 
Oil Corporation, the British Government would raiae 
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no objections to the application being considered 
by the Shaikh. 36 
Two days later Cadman was summoned to the Fo-
reign Otfice to bQ informed that the government was 
no longer insisting on a British nationality clause 
in the Kuwait oil concession,and for him to state 
hi. company's position. Cadman told Oliphant that 
according to the latest geological evidence (the 
company had been conducting a geological survey in 
Kuwait since mid-December 1931) aome oil might 
exist in Kuwait. but it would be of a very heavy 
nature which in the long run would be of no interest 
to A.P.o.c. (Indeed, the oil later discovered in 
1938 was of .. very heavy type.) He .tated therefore 
that from A.P.O.C.'s point of view the American. 
were welcome to what they could find there. 37 Ac-
cordingly, two daya later A.P.O.C. withdrew their 
geologist. from Kuwait and informed the Shaikh that 
a. the geological results were disappointing they 
were not interested in applying for a concession at 
present.38 
From a political standpoint, the Foreign Of-
fice-s main criterion when formulating any judge-
ment, Oliphant considered Cadman's stand to be emi-
nently satisfactory. He hoped the bitter arguments 
and feuding between the ministries concerned would 
subside whilst at the same time relations with the 
United States would return to an even ke.l. 
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However, a. events were soon to prove, Foreign 
Ollice delight was premature as A.P.O.C., contrary 
to its statements to the Foreign Ollice and the 
Shaikh, intended to compete lor the oil concessi~n 
and to continue their usual hall-hearted approach. 
In such circumstances British and American rivalry 
in Kuwait was to continue and therelore the Gull 
Oil Corporation was no doubt going to maintain it. 
pressure on the United State. Government to sate-
guard its intere.ts. However now that A. Mellon, 
who.e family had founded Gulf, became United States 
Ambas.ador in London hi. pre.ence and activities 
were to have repercussions on luture diploaatic 
comaunications regarding the Kuwait oil conce •• ion, 
thus lurther complicating Anglo-American relation •• 
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4. oil, an 'unclean subject' 
The British Government's decision o~ 6 April to 
waive the nationality clause in the ca.e ot the Ku-
wait oil concession and A.P.O.C.'s apparent lack ot 
interest naturally increased the prospects ot E.& G.5./ 
Cult securing the concession with a sub.equent end to 
the AnglO-American controversy in Kuwait. However 
two weeks later the Foreign O~tice were intormed 
that Cadman had called on the Colonial ottice and in-
dicated his company'. intention ot submitting certain 
proposals regarding the Kuwait oil concession in the 
near tuture, either through their local representa-
tives in the Gult or directly to the Colonial O~tice. 
Naturally surprised by the intormation the Foreign 
Ot~ice assumed that Cadman 'did not teel inclined to 
be so explicit with the Colonial Ottice as he was with 
Oliphant. 1 Nevertheless as A.P.O.C. intormed both the 
Foreign Ottice and the Shaikh ot Kuwait shortly atter-
wards ot their intentions it became clear that it in-
deed intended to return to the tield. 2 Cadman, aware 
ot the various ministries' vie.s, anticipated, and he 
was proven right, a much more tavourable reSpons. trom 
the Colonial ottic. than trom the Foreign Ottice. The 
Foreign Ottice tor its part, although considering that 
'trom the international point ot view it is very un-
fortunate that Sir J. Cadman should have reconsidered 
his original decision to withdraw trom the tield', 
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could do little in the circumstances and had to await 
any proposals A.P.O.C. might make. 3 
The ministry was already engaged in a battle to 
uphold the commitment they had mad. to the United 
Stat.s Embassy as the other mini.trie., •• pecially 
the Admiralty •. saw it a. laying too gr.at an empha-
si. on the Shaikh's intere.ts and dangerously mini-
mi.ing those ot Britain. The Admiralty already con-
.idered the statement to the Am.rican. not entirely 
.atistactory a. 'the Foreign Ottice l.tter to Ather-
ton was hurri.dly .ent o~t immediat.ly ~ter the 
Cabin.t meeting and other departments were given no 
opportunity to comm.nt upon it.,4 Contlicting 
views among the various mini.tries once more became 
apparent .oon ~ter the Cabin.t .eeting at which it 
had been intended to agree on a united stand and 
•• ttl. the mini.tri •• ' ~euding once and tor all .• 
Th. old controv.r.y was again reopened when 
the Colonial O~tice circulated two dr~t letters to 
be sent to the Syndicate and the political r •• ident 
relating to the recent Cabinet deci.ion to waive the 
nationality clau •••. A. regards the letter to the 
Syndicate, the Admiralty objected to repeating the 
phra.e which indicated the government'. readine.s to 
aee an American company acquire the conce •• ion. They 
theretore urged 
that every endeavour .hould now be made 
o ~hrough the medium ot the propo.ed letter 
..... "". 
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to the E.& G.S. to make it quite clear 
that H.M.G. in any conce.sion which may 
be granted to the Syndicate in respect 
to Kuwait will require the insertion 
o~ considerably greater sa~eguards to 
the British interest than it was possible 
to .ecure in the Bahrein concession. 5 
Eventually they succeeded in putting their view ac-
ross and therefore the phrase accepting the transter 
of the concession to the Eastern Gulf Company was 
deleted from the Colonial Oftice'. letter to the 
Syndicate. It stated in general the government's 
acceptance of the 'open door' principle in Kuwait 
and was sent on 10 May, a month after the United 
States Embassy had been intormed ot the government's 
deciaion. 6 
The letter of instructions to the political 
resident in the Persian Gult also caused conside-
rable con~lict among the various ministries. The 
Admiralty challenged the Foreign O~tice's pledge 
ot 'a fair field and no ~avour', wanting instead to 
instruct the political resident to give every sup-
port to A.P.O.C. and to prevent the Syndicate from 
.ecuring the concession. The instructions given 
eventUally to the political resident .ere the result 
o~ a compromise between con~licting views and were 
despatched atter some delay. The Colonial Ottice's 
9 May letter to the political resident atated on 
the one hand the government'. reversed policy ot no 
longer insisting upon the Kuwait concession being 
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confin.d to a pur.ly Briti.h concern. On the other 
hand howev.r, the political re.id.nt was in.tructed 
to inform the Shaikh that although A.P.O.C.'. geo-
logi.t. had been withdrawn the company was .till 
int.re.t.d in op.ning negotiation. with him at a 
conv.ni.nt junctur., and to indicat. the government'. 
oppo.ition to the imm.diat. granting of the proposed 
. 7 
conc ••• ion in it. pr.s.nt form to the Syndicate. 
Whil. procra.tination .arked the proc •• ding. 
in London, ev.nt. aoved rapidly in the Persian Gulf. 
In accordanc. with th.ir 23 April announcement to 
the Colonial Offic. of th.ir r.turn to the fi.ld, 
A.p.a.C. put forward an off.r ~or the Shaikh ot Ku-
wait'. consid.ration. Wilson used hi. private chan-
nel ot communication - Dickson - and asked him to 
make a verbal otter to the Shaikh on behalt of the 
company of £2,000 tor an exclu.ive pro.p.cting li-
cence, to be .x.rci •• d in the n.xt two y.ar •• 8 Al-
though this ott.r could not be considered comparable 
in any way to that ot Hol •••• nor in the Shaikh's 
best int.re.ts a. he already had before him an ott.r 
tor a tull conc.s.ion. the political ag.nt 'in a. 
tac ttul a .anner a. 1 coul d ' pla.e.d the com-
pany'. ott.r betore the Shaikh. 
Somewhat annoy.d by the company' •• trat.gy, i •• 
wi thdrawing it. geological t.am .,uddenly th.n r.qu ••• 
ting another geological .urvey, the Shaikh .xpr •••• d 
protound di.appointment and immediately r.jected 
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this otter. He explained to Dickson'that he had 
allowed an A.P.O.C. geological .urvey simply be-
cau.e the Briti.h Government .upportedtheir request 
and as they 'had been tooli.h enough to withdraw 
th.ir men h. could not .e. his way to l.t them in 
again' tor turth.r surv.ying and pro.pecting.9 
Thi. time even Sir Hugh Biscoe, who usually 
a •• i.ted A.P.O.C •• xpr •••• d criticism ot the com-
pany'. b.haviour. The R •• idency at Bu.hire re.ented 
the company's latest move, ie. Wilson'. l.tter, 
whieh was con.ider.d to be '.omething in the nature 
ot a direct contradietion to the impre •• ion' the 
company had hitherto given. The letter indieated, 
according to the R •• id.ncy, the po •• ibility that 
A.P.O.C. had no intention ot op.rating in Kuwait 
but was hoping only 'to tire out their rival. I • IO 
The political resident protested that a private letter 
trom Wil.on to Dickson was hardly la partieularly 
d •• irable manner ot dealing with this que.tion or 
on. which is calculat.d to in.pir. the Shaikh with 
contid.ne. in the intention ot the company.' tie re-
minded the Coloni40ttiee that A.P.O.C. had already 
gained a certain unpopularity on the Arab eoa.t ot 
the Per.ian OUlt by 1924 and ther.tore their claim 
to priority had been end.d in Mareh 1925 by the Co-
lonial ottic.. By eomparing the Syndieat., who had 
mad. num.rou. gitt. to the Shaikh and d.tinit.ly a.ked 
tor a tull conce •• ion with A.p.e.C., 'who have tor 
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years past shilly-shallied and now ~irst o~ all in-
~orm the Shaikh that they do not desire a concession 
and then in a very in~orPlal lDanner'ask ~or only a 
prospecting licence, the political resident lDade 
his point to London. Unless the A.P.O.C. were to 
come~orward formally with a definite request for 
a concession, he warned, there was not the least 
chance of the Shaikh agreeing to any proposals ~rom 
them. 11 
As it i. obvious that A.P.O.C. had lost con-
siderable ground and, to use Dickson's words, 'while 
A.p.e.c.'s stock has depreciated heavily Holmes' 
.tock has gone up', there.is A need to examine the 
reasons behind the company's devious strategy, es-
pecially as the explanation given by Chishola is 
12 impossible to justi~y. The company's strategy should 
be seen in the context o~ their policy, the main ob-
ject of which up to thAt stage had been to prevent 
the Syndicate ~rom securing the conce.sion rather 
than to .ecure it tor themselves. It .eem., there-
~ore, that the company when deciding on the course 
of Action to take in April were influenced mainly 
by two developments, namely by the British Govern-
ment'. decision to waive the nationality clause and by 
the positive results of their latest geological sur-
vey in operation .ince December 1931 which.indicated 
13 trace. of A heavy-type oil in Kuwait. There~ore 
it appears that in order to conceal .this information 
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~rom their rivals, the company declared negative 
~inding. ~rom their geological survey and in~ormed 
the Shaikh and the local British o~~icials that at 
present they were not interested in acquiring a con-
cession in Kuwait. By so doing A.P.O.C. presumably 
hoped to discourage the Syndicate, which had now been 
permitted by the government to renew its application 
~or the Kuwait oil concession. 1~ the company had 
shown greater interest in Kuwait atter concluding a 
thorough geological survey, no doubt as to Kuwait's 
positiVe prospects and potential would have existed. 
Support ~or this conclusion can be ~ound in 
a private letter ~rom Wilson to Dickson in which he 
indicated that A.P.O.C.'s withdrawal was ~or tactical 
reasons and that the in~ormation received ~rom the 
geological team was lot a nature that would greatly 
interest any of our competitors and we were not dis-
posed to make them a present of it.' At the s .. e 
time Dickson was in~ormed o~ the company's continuing 
interest in Kuwait and was requested as seen above to 
put ~orward verbally and in~ormally the company's 
request f;)r another geological survey of Kuwait terri-
tory.14 This roundabout method ot approaching the 
Shaikh via Dickson is another indication o~ A.P.C.C.'s 
desire to keep a low protile in Kuwai t and not draw 
attention to their activities and interest there. 
However, A.P.O.C.'s strategy neither ~oiled nor 
discouraged Holme.. Armed with a mes.age trom the 
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Syndicate-s London o~~ice saying that the British Go-
vernment had waived the nationality clause in the cas. 
o~ Kuwait, h. hurried to s.e the Shaikh. (The Syn-
dicate had originally obtained this in~ormation ~rom 
their American contact. and not directly ~rom the Co-
lonial O~~ice.)lS On 27 April Holmes arrived in Ku-
wait and whil.t dining with the Shaikh on the same 
evening told him o~ the British Government's deci-
.ion not to oppo.e the Syndicate'. application any 
longer. The Shaikh, rather surpri.ed that .uch a 
statement ca.e trom the Syndicate's repre.entative 
and not ~rom a British o~ticial, naturally reque.ted 
that Dickson intorm hi. ot the government'. wishe •• 
Con.equently, Hol.e. went to .ee the political agent 
and requested hi. to intorm the Shaikh otticially 
that the British Government had agreed to the omis-
sion ot the clause contining the concession to Bri-
tish interests and that there was no objection to the 
E.& G.S. renewing its application tor the oil conces-
sion. 
As Dickson was still unaware ot the recent Cabinet 
decision, becau.e the intormation was .ent to him a 
month atter the Americans had been informed, Holmes 
'with an air ot childish triumph' presented the tele-
gram he had received from London. The telegram quoted 
the Foreign Ottice letter to the United State. Em-
bassy and contained the tollowing sentence which indi-
cated the British Government's revi.ed attitude toward. 
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the Syndi ca t •• -
if ther.fore the E.& G.S. d •• ir. to renew 
their application to hi. Excellency the 
Shaikh of Kuwait for a conce •• ion, to be 
sub.equently tran.ferred to the Eastern 
Gulf Company, H.M.G. will rai.e no ob-
jection. 
Holme. reinforc.d the effect of the telegram by saying 
that hi. company had now won a 'wonderful victory' and 
d •• crib.d the For.ign Offic. l.tter to the United Sta-
t •• Emba •• y as 'the most abject climb down that it had 
been hi. fortune to see' admitting that h. had never 
thought they would surr.nd.r like thi •• 
The political agent r.mained calm d.spite Holme.' 
remarks, •• p.ciAlly that relating to the local British 
authoriti •• , (.xcluding Dick.on for the obvious r.a.on) 
who w.r., according to Holm •• 'out of date per.on. who 
think of nothing .l.e but how to maintain their per-
sonal pow.r ov.r local pot.ntat •••• He noticed that 
Holme. was 'annoy.d by the inclusion in the telegram he 
had r.c.iv.d of the .entence which indicated that the 
Syndicate would tran.fer the conce.sion to an American 
company. 16 
Th. political agent was Al.rted to the po.sibility 
that Holmes was .ndeavouring to allay the Shaikh'. ap-
prehension regarding the admi •• ion of an American com-
pany into Kuwait, e.pecially when he r.alised that 
Holme. had omaitted this •• ntence from the letter h. 
had given the Shaikh, a copy of which had al.o be.n 
.ubmitted to the agency. Therefor., con.id.ring this 
to be a significant point which would alarm the Shaikh, 
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Dickson raised the issue with Holmes. The E.& G.S.'s 
representative, realising the mistake he had made, 
(showing Dickson the telegram ~rom London) swallowed 
his pride and 'begged t , the political agent not to di-
vulge this in~orm&tion to the Shaikh. Holmes stated 
that such wording went against all he had promised to 
the Shaikh which in e~~ect was that although the money 
might be ~ound in America the company to work the con-
17 cession would be a British one. 
A ~ew day. later the only .evere row on record 
flar.d up betw.en the Shaikh and Holme.. At their 
meeting on 3 May the Shaikh accused Holmes ot having 
misled him. Th. Shaikh demanded an explanation ot 
the SUdden and secret desire by the Syndicate to trans-
ter the concession to an American company in view ot 
the fact that he had always been as.ured by Holmes 
that only a Briti.h or a Canadian company would operate 
the conce •• ion. Moreover, the Shaikh, who was pro-
hibited by treaty obligation from dealing direct with 
any nation except Britain, was concerned lest he had 
been intoraed of the British Cabinet's reeent decision 
by Hol.e. and not by the political agent becau.e the 
British Government was displeased by his conduct over 
the oil issue. 18 
Fortunately for Holm.s a few days later on 13 
May the political agent informed the Shaikh in a 
friendly manner ot the British Governm.nt's revi.ed 
policy. The political agent stated that the British 
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Government was no longer insisting upon confining the 
concession to & purely British concern and that any 
application ~or the Kuwait oil concession from any 
quarter, including the Syndicate, would be examined 
by the British Government with a view to the Shaikh's 
best intere.ts. 19 
Naturally pleased with the official information 
provided which indicated the British Government's 
continued friendship and goodwill, the Shaikh met 
Hol.es the following day. At their .eeting Holmes 
assured the Shaikh that there had never been any pro-
posal or intention by the Syndicate and their Ameri-
can a.sociates 'to transfer the Kuwait oil concession 
to the Eastern Gulf Oil Company but to & Canadian 
company..... Therefore, he pointed out that the 
Shaikh should interpret the British Government's rete-
renee to the transfer of the concession to the Eastern 
Gulf Company to .ean that they would not oppose the 
eventual transfer to a Canadian company which would 
be nominated by the former. Finally, Holmes explained 
the Syndicate's position vis-a-vis the British Go-
vernment and emphasised the ~act that its application 
contained a specific clause allowing the transfer of 
the concession only to a company registered in Bri-
tain or Canada, according to the same .tipul~tion. 
agreed in ,the ca.e of the Bahrein oil concession. 20 
Eventually the Shaikh accepted Holmes- reassurances 
and cordial relations were re-established between the 
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two. 
Shortly Afterwards, in accordance with the Bri-
ti.h Government permi.sion, Holme. re-submitt.d the 
Syndicate's·drAft conc.ssion tor the Shaikh's considera-
tion. The revised agreement compri.ed twenty-tour 
clause. which may be .ummari.ed a. giving the Syndicate 
.xploration rights ov.r the whole ot Kuwait except for 
the old walled city and sacr.d buildings, over & period 
of seventy cal.ndar years, the exact delineation of 
the conee.sion territory to be d.eided within the 
first five yeara. E~)loration waa to begin within 
nine months and .hould the company discontinue their 
op.ration for a continuoua period of two calendar 
year. the Shaikh would have the right to canc.l the 
agr •••• nt. Th. Shaikh would be .ntitl.d to & cu.tom. 
duty ot on. p.r cent on all oil and a •• ociat.d pro-
duets·and to have therioht to coll.ct ordinary duty 
on all p.r.onal :good., clothing and g.n.ral m.rchan-
di.e imported by the company for the p.raonal us. of 
it. employ.... Within .ixty day. of the .igning of 
the agreement the company would pay the Shaikh 
Rs.30.000 (£2,250) and on .ach subsequent anniv.rsary 
Rs.20.000 (£1,500). Should the company find oil in 
comm.rcial quantities the Shaikh would ree.ive instead 
of the annual paym.nts a royalty ot thr.e rupees and 
eight annas (Sa & 3d) p.r Engli.h ton of net crud. oil 
won and sav.d, .xcluding that r.quir.d tor op.rational 
purpo.... Th. amount payable to the Shaikh was not to 
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be Ie •• than Rs.70,OOO (£5,250) annually. 
Aa regards the aafeguarding ot British Govern-
ment interests, the ownership ot the conces.ion could 
be tranaferred only if the Shaikh sanctioned such a 
tranafer and provided a) that the a.aigne. company 
was to be one organiaed or registered either in 
Great Britain or Canada and which ahould maintain an 
office in Great Britain which at all time a was to be 
under the control of a Britiah .ubj.ct, b) that ot 
the fiVe directors ot the assigne. company one dir.c-
tor would have at all tim •• to b. a British subject, 
c) that the asaigne. company would at all times 
maintain in the Per.ian Gulf an official to be called 
the Chi.f Local Ropr.sentativ. who •• appointment 
should be approv.d by the Briti.h Gov.rnment and 
d) that as many aa posaible ot the .mployeea ot the 
assignee company in Kuwait should at all tim.s be 
British or Kuwaiti subjects, ao long as the company's 
operating etfici~~ywas not adv.r •• ly affected. (As 
ae.n above th.a. atipulations were identical to those 
acc.pted by the British Government in the caa. of the 
BAhr.in oil conc •• sion.)21 
How.v.r d.spit. the tact that cordial r.lations 
had be.n r.stor.d and that the Shaikh accepted Holm •• ' 
r.vi •• d application tor con.ideration, the former 
became much more cautious so as not to otfend the 
Britiah Government in r.gard to the oil is.u.. The 
Shaikh s.nt HoI •••• draft conc •• aion to be vetted and 
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approved by the British Government and assured the 
political resident that any additional conditions 
suggested by Britain would certainly be insi.ted 
upon. At their meeting on 22 May the Shaikh stated 
to the political resident that he 'did not wish to 
get into the bad books of H.M.G.' because ot the oil 
concession and indicated his wish to receive a tor-
mal request tor a tull concession trom A.P.O.C. and 
to postpone any turther neootiations with Holmes 
22 pending the government'. observations and advice. 
Nevertheless A.P.O.C. remained obdUrate and 
still retused to make a counter otter tor a tull con-
ces.ion or to approach the Shaikh directly. They 
sent A. Chisholm, their manaoer at Ahwaz who later 
became their chiet negotiator tor the concession, 
on a tact-tinding .ission. In Kuwait Chisholm be-
came acquainted with Dickson who admitted to belie-
ving in the future of Kuwait as tar as oil was con-
cerned and to being 'tull at imperialistic ideas'. 
He advi.ed Chisholm that A.P.O.C. should not 'let 
the grass grow under their teet any longer but should 
go right ahead and apply for an oil conces.ion at 
once. ,23 
In Bushire Chisholm met Biscoe, who also urged 
A.p.a.C. to apply tor a full concession, suggesting 
in partieular one ba.ed on the Syndicate's Bahrein 
concession. The explanation given by the political 
resident tor this sugoestion is rather interesting 
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as A.P.O.C. eventually did .ubmit to the Shaikh o~ 
Kuwait & draLt conce.sion similar to that ~or Bah-
rein. He explained to Chisholm that a concession o~ 
that type would not be a tinancial burden initially 
nor would it commit them to anything de~inite. Ac-
cording to the politicalre.ident A.P.O.C. could ask 
tor an exploration .licence tor two year. at the end 
ot which it could be extend.d ~or a turther two 
year. a. Holm •• had done in Bahrein. La.tly, h. 
concluded that it A.P.O.C.'s obj.ct ·wa. to rid. o~t 
competition this •• em.d ••••• a pretty ch.ap and .tt.c-
2" tiv. way ot doing so •••••• ' 
Chishola, who wa. inclin.d to agr •• with the 
view •• xpr •••• d by the local British o~~icers, wrote 
a detailed and compreh.nsive report to London. He 
outlin.d the Shaikh'. gri.vanc •• again.t A.p.a.C.'. 
attitude, •• p.cially the company'. r.~u.al to make 
a count.r otter tor the conc ••• ion. H. al.o provided 
tor A.P.O.C. the lat •• t terms b.ing o~~ered by the 
Syndicat. and conclud.d that A.P.O.C. 'mu.t come 
down with a count.r.o~~er it w. want to keep Holme. 
out. ,25 
Chi.holm'. report tog.ther with the di.cov.ry 
ot oil in comm.rcial quantiti.s in Bahr.in at the 
beginning ot Jun. strengthen.d the pro-Kuwait ~orces 
among A.P.O.C.'. dir.ctors and ev.ntually r •• ulted 
in constructiv. action. Ther. had been two school. 
o~ thought in A.p.a.c. con~ronting each other ~or 
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some time in regards to Kuwait's prospects. On., 
led by James Jameson, was closely associated with 
the development o~ the Persian oil~ields ~rom the 
beginning of 1908 and was therefore extremely an-
xious not to endanger the company's vital concession 
in Persia. They did not want an oil concession in 
Kuwait because they believed the Persian Govern-
ment might oust them ~rom Persia i~ they produced 
oil elsewhere in the Persian Gul~. In any case, 
competing against the Syndicate by o~tering a higher 
-II--
royalty ~or the Kuwait oil concession_trOm that 
being paid to the Persian and Iraqi Governments 
was considered to be a very dangerous precedent. 
However the other camp, led by Sir Philip South-
well. a new comer to A.P.O.C. and a great believer 
in Kuwait's potential. was les. sensitive about the 
Persian Government. Southwell was a geologist who 
had worked in Trinidad and when he visited Kuwait 
in March 1932 was positive he had discovered another 
'lake Trinidad' in Kuwait. 26 
Once a decision in favour of positive action 
had been taken by A.P.O.C.'s Board. Cadman autho-
rised A.P.O.C.'s Deputy General Manager in Persia 
to proceed to Kuwait and open formal and direct 
negotiations with the Shaikh for the first time 
since 1923. Accordingly Sir Neville Gass immediately 
went to Kuwait and, accompanied by Dickson. met 
the Shaikh. 
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At their meetings on 10 and 11 June Gass pres-
sed the Shaikh very hard to accept the company's of-
ter tor only a prospecting licence. The Shaikh 
listened patiently to everything Gass had to say and 
'betore finally replying conterred with Dickson and 
asked whether the British Government were 'ordering 
him to accept Mr. Gass' proposal.' When Dickson 
replied in the negative the Shaikh rejected the of-
fer torthwith and suggested the company should put 
forward in a reasonable period ot time a draft oil 
conce.sion on the lines of that submitted by Holmes. 
He emphasised that he wanted something he could 
place alongside and compare with the otter made by 
27 the E.& G.S. Although Gass tailed in his imme-
diate objective he was pleased he had been able to 
establish cordial relations with the Shaikh, after 
the distictly cold reception which he had originally 
been given, and promised to report the Shaikh's 
wish to London. 
In view ot considerable anxiety on the part 
ot British otficials together with reports trom the 
Gult. Cadman tinally decided to put his weight be-
hind Southwell whom he knew trom oil exploration 
. in Trinidad~'_ Theretore on 28 June the Shaikh was 
informed through the political agent that Cadman 
had giVen instructions tor the preparation ot a 
comprehensive conc ••• ion embodying exploration. pro.-
pecting and mining licenc •• to be presented shortly 
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for the Shaikh's consideration. 28 The Shaikh, sa-
tisfied with A.P.O.C.'s positive response, told the 
poli tical agen t that he now had 'two bidders and from 
the point of view ot a 'seller' this is all to the 
good. ,29 
A.P.O.C.'s decision to make an ~plication for 
a tull concession in Kuwait in order to outbid the 
Syndicate was received with mixed teelings in the 
various ministries in London. The Admiralty were 
relieved that at long last A.P.O.C. were taking a 
serious interest in Kuwait and were thus prepared to 
back the. to the hilt. The Foreign ottice tor its 
part maintained that the Cabinet decision at 6 April 
1932 amounted to a 'tair tield and no tavour,30 al-
though realising now more than ever the ditticulti.s 
tacing thea trora the Admiral ty on the one hand and 
the Aaericans on the other. 
At the interdepartm~tal meeting held on 5 Au-
gust to consider the British Govern.ent's attitude in 
vie. ot A.P.O.C.'s intention to compete seriously for 
the concession, these contlicting views came to light. 
The Admiralty, which considered that Britain should 
intluence the Shaikh on political grounds to accept 
A.P.O.C.'s otter even it the two otters were equal, 
received considerable support trom the other minis-
tries and the Foreign Ottice found itselt in a minority. 
In the circumstances, since they were in the 
minority, the Foreign Ottice wanted to postpone the 
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decision which would probably have been reached to 
influence the Shaikh on political grounds to accept 
A.P.O.C.'s offer. Therefore the Foreign,Office sug-
gested that the government .hould deter giving the 
Shaikh any advice until he had had an opportunity 
of comparing the two proposal. and had given .ome 
indication as to his opinion. (They hoped the 
Shaikh might of hi. own accord choose A.P.O.C.'. 
offer thus obviating the need for undue influence 
and avoiding the Americans accusing the British Go-
vernment ot bias in tavour ot the British company.) 
~u.tifying this course of action, ie. to let the 
Shaikh decide tirst, the Foreign Oftice gave the fol-
lowing explanation which was con.idered rea.onable 
and acceptable by the other mini.trie •• - 'we have 
sheltered our.elve. behind the Shaikh in the past' 
said Warner, ,and ,therefore 
we do not wi.h to give too much the im-
pre •• ion that he i. a puppet on who.e be-
half we are negotiating and who .ill be 
bound to accept whatever we think in hi. 
best interest.. 31 
Con.equently it was decided to wait until the 
term. of A.P.O.C.'. offer had been di.closed to the 
Shaikh and hi. reaction known. On 24 August the Co-
lonia! Office therefore intormed the political resi-
dent that he .hould 'deter any action until the Shaikh 
has had an opportunity of comparing the propo.al ••••• 
and has given indication of hi. wi.he. in the matter. ,32 
A few day. later the Colonial Office received 
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trom the political r.sid.nt in the p.rsian Gulf a 
copy of A.P.O.C.'. dratt conc •• sion which had b.en 
pr.s.nt.d by Chisholm to the Shaikh of Kuwait on 
16 Augu.t. As A.P.O.C. had made a close study of 
the Syndicat.'s terms. a copy of which th.y had re-
c.ived trom Dick.on during Chisholm'. visit. the 
Colonial Oftice reali •• d that on the tac. of it 
th.re was little to choos. bet.e.n the two oft.rs. 
N.v.rth.l.... according to the Colonial Ottica 
in one r •• pect namely the royalty, the 
E.& G.S. were d.finit.ly more tavourable 
than the A.P.O.C., provid.d ot cours. 
that the production ot oil i. of a r.a-
sonabl. amount. 
A. a r.sult ot having to mediate betw.en con-
tlicting vi.ws tor the la.t t.w month.. the Colonial 
Offic. had tri.d to adopt a neutral approach and an-
ticipated the tollowing .c.nario 
•••••••• th. Admiralty and to a le.s .xt.nt 
the India Offic. will urge .trongly that 
the conce •• ion be given to the A.P.O.C. 
Th. Petrol.um Department will critici •• 
the technical d.tai1s, and the Foreign 
Oftice will maintain .toutly that the 
ott.r ot the Anglo-p.rsian i. not good 
enough and that we should advise the 
Shaikh to accept £.&G.S. 
Theretore th.y conclud.d that the i.su. would pro-
bably have to come before the Cabinet again tor a 
decision. 33 A. this pr.diction proved correct as 
regards the consid.rabl. tim. r.quir.d by the various 
mini.trie. to agr •• on a common attitud., it .... s 
that two unr.lat.d'd.velop.ents in the P.rsian Gulf 
and London eventually pr.cipitat.d British Gov.rn-
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ment action. 
In the Persian Gulf A.P.O.C.'s representative 
arrived in Kuwait on 14 August and after consulting 
Dickson, who sugge.ted some amendments, presented 
the ShAikh wi th the company'. draft oil agr.ement. 
This contained provi.ion •• imilar to thoae ot the 
Bahr.in oil conc ••• ion and provided for a two-year 
exploration period to be tollowed by a two-year 
drilling period, After which a .eventy-year mining 
lea.e would come into etteet. In gen.ral the ti-
nanciAl term. w.re, an immediate payment on .igna-
ture ot Rs.,SO,OOO (£3,750) and an annual payment 
ot Rs.25,OOO (£1,875) which were higher than tho.e 
being ottered by the Syndicate. The royalty ot 
R •• 2.10 anna. (3. 11~d) was in line with what the 
company wa. paying in Peraia. and I raq and lower 
34 than that being ofter.d by the Syndicate. 
The next day, when he met the Shaikh, the po-
litical agent, who was ' anxiou. to a.sist A.P.O.C. 
in every way poa.ible, asked him tor hi. reaction 
to A.P.O.C.'. new draft agreement. The Shaikh re-
plied that he was pleased but mu.t be given time 
to compare it with that .ubmitted by Holme. betor. 
di.cus.ing matt.r. furth.r. 35 'A f.w day. later 
Ga •• arriv.d in Kuwait and during his m.eting with 
the Shaikh pr •••• d him for an answer to the company'. 
draft. The company wa. anxious to impre.. upon the 
Shaikh the various term. ot their draft conce •• ion 
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before the financial terms were inevitably leaked 
to Holmes. 
The Shaikh resented the pre •• ure and to the 
company's repre.entatives' surprise he now .tated 
that he 'was not at liberty to discuss the details 
of the draft agreement or even to put forward his 
own proposals' until the Briti.h Governm.nt had 
vetted and approved it.36 It seems that the Shaikh 
adopt.d the same attitude towards A.p.e.C. a. to 
the Syndicat., susp.nding negotiations until the 
British Government had inspected A.p.e.C.'s draft 
coneession and proffered its advic.. In the cir-
cumstances it was the only cours. of action open 
to him as a result of the company and the political 
agent importuning hi. for a deeision. 
However Gass and Diekson saw the situation 
differently_ They consider.d that the Shaikh wan-
ted to d.lay the negotiations in order to .nable 
Holme. to return from London to Kuwait. Th.refor. 
Dickson immediately approaehed the political resi-
dent .uog •• ting that h. should give his 'pr.liminary 
blessing' to A.p.e.C.'. draft and authorise Diekson 
'to t.ll the Shaikh that you approve of it a. far as 
I itgoe •• and have no objection to his opening formal 
di.cus.ion. withth. A.p.e.C.'s r.pr •• entativ •••• 
Dickson hoped that this would force the Shaikh to 
negotiate with A.p.e.C. and provide hi. with no 
t ;." 
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excuse tor 'sitting on the tence,.37 
Nevertheless, T. Fowle, the political resident 
who had replaced Biscoe who had .died a month earlier, 
did not follow the political agent's advice •. He in-
formed the Colonial Otfice of Dickson's and A.P.O.C.'s 
request and instead proposed that the government 
should advise the Shaikh betore he negotiated the 
concession. He explained that it the Shaikh discus-
sed the draft agreement with the company before the 
government's vie.s .ere known he might accept some 
clauses to which the government might later rai.e 
objections, either in their own interests or on be-
halt ot the Shaikh. Theretore in order to avoid 
an awkward situation tor the British Government in 
the future vis-a-vis both the Shaikh , and the company, 
and in accordance with Britain's moral obligation to 
advise the Shaikh, the political resident suggested 
to the Colonial Oftice on 25 August that the Shaikh's 
request for advice should be complied with. 38 (Ob-
viously he was still unacquainted with the British 
Government's decision ot 5 August, ie. to allow the 
Shaikh to choose,first, as the Colonial Office letter 
of instructions was not sent otf until 24 AUQUst.)39 
In London the Syndicate initiated the second 
development which exerted further presaure on the 
British Government to act and consequently comply with 
the Shaikh's request tor advice on the merits ot the 
two otters. The Syndicate, who strongly suspected 
the British Government of supporting A.P.O.C., noted 
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with increasing alarm that while the Shaikh had been 
barred ~rom negotiating with Holmes since June he 
was being allowed and even encouraged by Dickson to 
,negotiate with Chisholm and .Gass. Syndicat~ reports 
of. the ,tactics adopted by the Colonial Ottice in or-
der to hinder and delay the conclusion,ot Holmes' 
ettorts in Kuwait were sent regularly to the State 
Department via Gul~. 
The State Department learnt about the many mee-
tings Janson and Holmes .ere attending at the Colo-
nial Ottice and about their ~ruitles. attempts to 
persuade the British Govern.ent to accept tor the 
Kuwait oil coneession the same sateguarding stipula-
tions they had agreed to in Bahrein. Consequently 
~ter waiting ~or ,three months ~or the British Govern-
ment reply concerning these stipulations, merely to 
be in~ormed on 24 August by the Colonial Ottiee that 
A.P.C.C. had submitted A draft concession tor the 
Shaikh's consideration, the E.& G.S./Gult telt they 
had no choice but to call on United States Government 
support once again • 
. , ' However the State Department, whieh was also re-
ceiving reports about the situation via the United 
Stat •• Embassy in London, was not at a1l.willing to 
rai.e the i.sue once more wi t~ the British GovernJuent. 
Now that A.P.O,C. had become interested and active 
they considered that 
it would be asking a great deal ot the 
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British Government to expect them to re-
~rain ~rom supporting the government-con-
trolled A.P.O.C. in establishing itsel~ 
in British-controlled territory like the 
ahaikhdom o~ Kuwait in the clos. proximity 
o~ Anglo/persian oiltields in South Persia. 
In this respect they were also sensitive about the 
probability ot Britain renewing its accusation that 
the United States Government had engineered the can-
cellation ot oil concessions actually granted to Bri-
tish subjects in Haiti and Costa Rica. 40 Theretore. 
although aware ot the Gult Oil Corporation's di~ti­
culties in Kuwait, the State Department assured the 
company in a conciliatory way that they did not be-
lieve 'that these delays are necessarily indica-
tive o~ opposition' and advised them to continue 
their negotiations using the existing channel, ie. 
the syndlcate. 41 
However on 25 August Gul~ in~ormed the De-
partment that without the United States Government 
assistance any consent given previously to the entry 
o~ American interests into Kuwait was an illusion. 
On 30 August the Secretary o~ State was told that 
in spite o~ its ostensible acquiescence in an'open 
door' policy in Kuwait the British Government du-
ring the past ~ive months had 'made substantial 
progress in giving et~ect to an actual policy o~ 
exclusion o~ American interests ~rom that territory.,42 
Obviously Henry L. Stimson could not accept this 
clear breach o~ ~aith primarily because he had been 
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promised by the British Government the contrary. 
Consequently on 1 September the State Department 
instructed the United States Embassy in London to 
take up the Syndicate's case immediately with the 
Foreign Office and to urge the British Government 
to stand by its previous assurances. 
Atherton, in his note ot 6 September to the 
Foreign Office, stated the Syndicate's grievances 
against the British Government. The Syndicate, 
according to Atherton, had been placed in an un-
tair position in comparison with A.P.O.C. by the 
tact that the Colonial Office had not acceded since 
june to their request to be informed of the revi-
sions required in their dratt concession in order 
to sateguard the interests of the British Govern-
.ent adequately, while A.P.O.C. were at no such 
disadvantage. (As A.P.O.C. was a purely British 
concern Atherton assumed that no 'sateguards' were 
needed.) This, complained Atherton, was preventing 
the Shaikh from taking a decision on the Syndicate's 
draft concession while A.P.O.C. had submitted a 
draft concession which the Shaikh was being urged 
to grant. Atherton reminded the Foreign Office 
of its commitment of 9 April that the American in-
terests involved would be placed in as favourable 
a position as British ones in having their applica-
tion considered by the Shaikh. 43 
The Americans' protest could not have come at 
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a wor.e tim. for the Foreign Offic. a. they were al-
ready being urged by several of the mini.trie. con-
cerned to give preferential treatment to A.P.O.C. 
Even the Foreign Ottice accepted in gen.ral the argu-
m.nt that it was in the be.t int.re.t. ot the govern-
.ent that A.P.O.C. .hould .ecur. the conce •• ion and 
not E.& G.S./Gult, but they consider.d that the com-
.itment given to the United Stat •• Emba •• y was •••• n-
tial tor good Anglo-American r.lations which were 
vital, particularly at that tim., tor r •• olving im-
portant int.rnational ditticultie. and •• pecially in 
r •• training Japan'. expan.ion in the tar east. The 
For.ign Ottice was de.perat.ly k.en to win United 
·State •• upport tor its endeavour. to prevent Japan 
trom expanding h.r control turther in the tar east 
44 
and .ndangering Briti.h po ••••• ion.. Th.r.fore 
they were set to .tand by the a •• urance. given to 
the American. and ·to bring the other mini.trie. into 
line. 
At the int.rdepartmental me.ting convened on 
15 September to consider the .ituation in Kuwait And 
the note trom the United State. Emba •• y, the Foreign 
Ottiee .uceeeded once more in initiating a d.ci.ion 
which would .uit their purpo.... They .ugge.ted, 
and it was accepted by the other ministries, that in 
vi.w ot the Shaikh'. attitude and the r.newed United 
States Government interv.ntion the governm.nt .hould 
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now reverse the procedure agreed at the last inter_ 
departmental meeting. Instead of delaying any action 
until the Shaikh had given some indication of his 
wishes on the matt.r, it waa decided that the govern-
ment ahould b. the tir.t to compare the two offers. 4S 
The Foreign Offic •• ugge.ted this reverse line 
ot ac:tion ... it ju.titied th •. long wait .inc • .Iune 
~or. the Colonial Ofticereply, about which the Syn-
dic .. t. h .. d complain.d. It. w... ..1.0 in .. ccordance 
with .th ..... uranc •• giv.n previou.ly to·the Ameri-
cans th .. t. any ... pplic .. tion tor .th. conce.aion would 
be examined by the Briti.h Governm.nt in order to 
... tegu .. rd the Shaikh'. intere.t.. Th. mini.try was 
aw .. re ot ... growing .u.picion among Unit.dSt .. te. 
Embas.y otfici .. l. th .. t the government had deliberately 
h.ld .... tt.r. up tor the Syndic .. t •• 0 that A.P.O.C. 
could g.t in and .ubmit .. draft conce •• ion ~or the 
Shaikh' •. con.ider .. tion. Th.r.tor. it w ... believ.d 
that by .t .. ting the two otter. were being .xamin.d 
on their •• rit. by. the British Government in order 
to se. which suit.d the Shaikh'. be.t int.r •• t. com-
.ercially. the Foreign Ottice could t .. ce the Ameri-
can. and ju.tify the long del .. y. The other mini •• 
tri.s concerned .. ccepted the Foreign ottic.' •• ug-
ge.tion tor oth.r r .... on.. mainly becau.e they h .. d 
want.d to advise the Shaikh on the two dr .. tts all 
along and hoped .ventually to be able to couns.l 
him to .. ccept A.P.O.C.'. ott.r. 
- 248-
Consequently on 16 September the United States 
Embassy was in~ormedthat in accordance with the 9 
April statement. that every application would be com-
pared in order to see which appeared to be in the 
Shaikh's best interests, the British Government were 
considering both draft concessions. The Foreign O~­
~ice stated that the Syndicate's application was re-
ceiving consideration 'equally and pari passu with 
that o~ the A.P.O.C.' as the question o~ the pro-
visions designed to s~eguard the British Government's 
. interests was not to be discussed until the Shaikh 
had been advised and had made up his mind as to 
which company he wished to have the conces.ion. Fi-
nally, the note sent to the United States Embassy 
indicated that pending the government's observations 
no ~urther negotiations would be embarked upon with 
either applicant company, either in London with the 
British Government or in the Persian Gul~ with the 
Shaikh. 46 Accordingly on 30 September the Colonial 
O~~ice in~ormed the political resident in the Per-
sian Gult o~ the British Government's decision and 
instructed him to intorm the Shaikh ot Kuwait to 
wait ~or the government's observations on the two 
o~~ers be~ore negotiating turther with A.P.O.C. and 
the Syndicate. 47 
The State Department immediately conveyed the 
Foreign O~~ice's encouraging reply to Gul~ hoping. 
in vain as it appears, to resist turther pressure 
- 249 -
for diplomatic assistance. For their part, however, 
Gulf were dissatisfied with the Foreign Office's 
16 September letter and argued that the British Go-
vernment would eventually advise the Shaikh to ac-
cept A.P.O.C.'s offer regardless of its merits. In 
particular they challenged the British Government's 
rights under the Anglo/Kuwait Agreement of 1899, a 
copy of whiCh had been provided by the United State. 
Government, to advise the Shaikh aa to which of the 
two drafta was more suitable for him to accept. 
Although unaware of the oil convention Signed 
between Bri tain and Kuwai t in 1913 the State De-
partment juatified the British Government's stand 
saying 'it waa quite possible to read into the terms 
of the 1899 Agreement such a privilege for the Bri-
tiah.' Gulf was also told that the British position 
in the Persian Gulf gave them an obvious advantage 
over American interests and advised them 'that this 
situation is one which we simply had to face.' It 
i. clear, therefore, that the State Department's 
reaponse to Gulf'a reque.t disappointed the latter, 
thus indicating once again the half-hearted support 
being given to American oil companies in the Persian 
Gulf. 
Moreover the State Department rejected the 
proposal made by the.vice-president of Gulf that it 
should approach the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secre-
tary or the BritiSh Ambassador in Washington over the 
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Kuwait oil concession. According to the State De-
partment the issue was not sufficiently important 
to justity using these channels ot communication 
which were 'reserved tor highly unusual and impor-
tant subjects'. Consequently the Gult Oil Corpora-
tion had no alternative but to accept the State De-
partment's vie. and theretore conti ned itself to 
requesting that any advice given by the British 
Government to the Shaikh should be given without 
turther delay.48 
Accordingly the United States Embassy was in-
structed by the State Department to restate their 
view. The United states Government, the Embassy 
was told, was only asking tor American interests 
. to compete on an equal footing with others and 
tor the British Government to expedite any action 
which would permit the Shaikh to reach an early 
decision. 49 Consequently Mellon called on the Fo-
reign Oftice on 11 October and 'manitested some 
impatience at the length of the delays'. However 
as the Foreign Ottice .ere still waiting tor the 
Petroleum Department-s comments on the two dratt 
concessions, Mellon was told that the position re-
mained unchanged. Sir Robert Vansittart. the Per-
manent Under-Secretary, apologised tor not having 
any intormation to otter but promised an early reply.50 
Nevertheless, two weeks later, atter being 
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urged by Gul~'s representative in London and without 
the State Department's authorisation, the Ambassador 
called again. This time he handed over a memorandum 
describing the E.& G.S./Gul~ position vis-i-vis the 
British Government and the Shaikh ot Kuwait, a large 
part o~ which was already known to the Foreign ot-
~ice as hi. predecessor had submitted a similar 
memo. 51 He complained that in spite ot the promise 
given on 11 October that etforts would be made to 
expedite consideration ot the rival applications he 
had not received any further communication. 
By now the Foreign Ot~ice were inclined to be-
lieve that the Americans were treating the Kuwait 
oil concession as a major political issue and there-
tore were clearly embarassed. 'Nothing can make 
this case look well' noted Vansittart, and immediate-
ly urged the Petroleua Department to conclude their 
examination. Mellon was perfectly polite throughout, 
continued Vansittart. 'but it was quite plain that 
he considered that we were acting with deliberate 
dilatorine.s and indeed with duplicity.' He went on 
I wish to make it quite plain to all de-
partments concerned that I will no more 
submit to being placed in this intole-
rable position nor will I accept any 
~urther excuse whatsoever tor any tur-
ther delay. 
A.P.O.C. did not e.cape criticism either. Ac-
cording to Vansittart the company had thrown away 
their chance six years previously when they could 
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hAve bought the Syndicate out and now apparently 
. 52 
'wish to pop in on a change o~ mind'. (Thi. 
view was initiated by the Syndicate and widely 
shared by. the Americans.) By now the general view 
at.the.Foreign Ottice was that had A.P.O.C. made 
up their, minds earlier they would probably.have 
secured the concession without a struggle.and the 
most embarrassing and untortunate controversy ,with 
the.United States Government.could have been thus 
avoided. , . \ 
The letter sent immediately ~rom the F~reign 
Ot~ice .to the Petroleum Department urged a quick 
conclusion.to their examination o~the .applica-
tions and warned.that the 
un~ortunate atmosphere created at such 
an interview may well have important 
repercussions on questions o~ major 
political importance under di.cu •• ion 
with .the.Amba.sador. 53 
Within a week the Petroleum Department conclu-
ded their exulination ot .. the two applications and on 
11 November.a detailed memorandua was sent to the 
other ministries concerned. The Petroleum Department 
emphasised very clearly the advantageous points of 
A.P.O.C.'s otter and concluded that it was the margi-
nally moreoenerouS. In particular, they employed 
considerable skill when dealing with the di~~icult 
is.u.s ot A.P.O.C.'s lower royalty and their inability 
to pay any cu.toms duty.54 
Satis~ied to have a reply ~or the United States 
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Embassy, the Foreign Office immediately informed 
the Americans that the government had comp~ed the 
comparative examination and that the 'result of 
this examination i. already on its way to the Bri-
tish authoriti.s in the P.r.ian Gulf.'SS They na-
turally a.sumed that the other ministries would 
agree with them on providing the Shaikh quickly 
with the Petroleum Department'. technical advice, 
which gen.rally favoured A.P.O.C.'. offer, and al-
low him' to make hi. choice between the two applica-
tion. without further influence. 
'Howev.r it .e .. s the For.ign Office was too 
hasty in its as.umption a. various mini.tries es-
p.cially the Admiralty and the Colonial Office. 
held diff.rent vi ••• which naturally necessitated 
considerable further consultation and d.lay in in-
structing the political re.ident. The Admiralty 
were of the opinion that 
no l.gitimate .tep which might influence 
the Shaikh of Kuwait to award the conce.-
.ion to the A.P.O.C. rather than to the 
Aaerican int.r •• t ••••••••• hould be ne-
glected. 
However,'fully cognizant of the fact that the Ameri-
cans .hould not be giv.n any ground. for accusing 
the British Gov.rnment of 'having brought undue 
inflUence or pre •• ure to bear upon the Shaikh' they 
admitt.d it wa ••••• ntial that the choice must ul-
timately be made to app.ar entirely that of the ShAikh. S6 
The Colonial Office for its part r •• ent.d 
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Foreign O~~ice pressure to rush matters and could 
s •• no justification ~or the haste in deciding on 
such important an issue. They knew o~ the Admi-
ralty's strong opposition to increased United Sta-
tes in~luence in the Persian Gul~ and considered 
that the Petroleum Department's memo on its own 
would not b. su~~icient to cause the Shaikh to 
choose A.P.O.C.'s o~~er. They considered as 'quite 
absurd' the Foreign Office, suggestions that the 
government should not give the Shaikh any advic~ 
apart from the Petroleum Department's memo and 
that the Shaikh should take a definite decision 
as soon as possible, thus losing his opportunity 
to bargain and improve the financial terms offered 
for the concession. 57 
The Foreign Office was aware of the difficult 
task ot bringing the two ministries into line now 
that A.P.O.C. was determined to secure the conces-
sion. The fact that the Colonial Office was the 
ministry responsible and therefore issuing instruc-
tions to the political resident obviously compli-
cated mattera further. Nevertheless, the Foreign 
Office, in accordance with ita determination to 
avoid an acrimonious controversy with the United Sta-
tes Government, was set once more to ensure that the 
government continued with its impartial attitude 
towards any application for the Kuwait oil conces-
sion, as had been promised to the United States Em-
bassy. 
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To achieve this they once AgAin employed the tactics 
which had already proved successful in carrying the 
other ministries with them. The various ministries 
were approached individually this time with the 
temporary exception of the Admiralty, their staun-
chest opponents. 
The Foreign Otfice first approached the India 
Otfice informally and explained their difficulties 
vis-~-vis the Americans on the one hand and the 
combined forces ot the Admiralty and the Colonial 
Otfice on the other. The India Otfice were dispo-
sed to Agree in oeneral with what the Foreign Of-
tice had in mind since the Government of India had 
accepted the 'open door' principle in Kuwait the 
previous Feb. ary. It was theretore decided that 
the India Ottice rather than the Foreion Ottice 
would suggest to the Colonial ottice that the poli-
tical resident be instructed as the Foreign Office 
telt necessary. 
Next the Colonial otfice WAS asked to concur 
with the Foreign Ottice and the India Otfice view. 
Although the Colonial Ottice, as seen above, were 
oenerally aoainst the idea ot adopting a neutral 
attitude regarding the applications, as they consi-
dered it preterable that A.P.O.C. should secure the 
concession. they explained that it was too early 
to express any opinion as the issue had not yet been 
submitted to the ministry's higher authorities. 
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However the Colonial Ottice tell in with the Foreign 
Ottice'a proposal to postpone calling an interdepart-
mental meeting ~or the tim. being in order to enable 
it to discuss the matter privately with the Admi-
ralty ~irat, as they considered that,the Foreign ot-
tice was 'the p~otagonists in this matter' and 'it 
is better tor them to tight their own battles. ,58 
By then the Colonial Ottice was anxious to be re-
lieved ot the responsibility as they conaidered 
oil an 'unclean subject' and 'we are not in control, 
.e are not interest.d and the Middle East Department 
is not st~ted to deal .~ it. ,59 
As had been planned, the India Ottice imme-
diately approached the Colonial Ottice to suggest 
that the political resident should 
persuade the Shaikh to reach a decision 
as between the rival companies in the 
light ot the intormation contained in 
the Petroleum Department's memorandum. 
The India ottice's note also indicated the political 
proviso that should the Shaikh decide in tavour ot 
A.P.O.C., the government must be in a position to 
avoid any sugg.stion that pressure had been brought 
to bear upon him or that 'the deci.ion i. not His 
Excellency's own. ,60 
The Foreign Ottice tor its part immediately 
approved tormally the instructions by the India ot-
tice, but nevertheles. wished to .ee any draft tele-
gram which the Colonial Office might decide to send 
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the political resident as a result ot the India ot-
tice·sletter. Theretore the ministry asked to be 
provided with the draft telegram betore it was des-
patched but tor tactical reasons the request was 
made verbally and intormally so as to avoid the 
other ministries making the same request and thus 
causing turther delay and argument. 
However the Colonial Ottice was not in a 
hurry in any case to despatch any instructions to 
the political resident, at least not until they 
had obtained Admiralty concurrence. It did not 
believe that the Admiralty would accept the India 
Ottice's proposal without,an interdepartmental 
conterence. Theretore when. the Admiralty's opposi-
tion to the India Ottice's suggestion became known 
the Colonial Ottice called tor a conterence even 
though anticipating, halt in jest and halt seriously, 
that the main tunction ot the Colonial Ottice at 
the .eeting would be • to try and hold the balance 
and it possible prevent a physical assault by the 
Admiralty representatiVes upon those ot the Fo-
reign Ottice.,61 
The Foreign Ottice however still wished to 
avoid a conterence as they teared t~e Admiralty might 
succ.ed in mobilising support tor their view, as had 
been the case at the 5 August .eeting. Vansittart, 
in a personal letter to Sir B.M. Rynes-totonsell, the 
First Lord, stated the Foreign Ottice's conviction 
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that the only proper and consistent instructions to 
be despatched were those suggested by the India Of-
£ice on 12 November and with which the Foreign O£-
tice had concurred on 15 November. He .xplained 
that 'such a circuitous policy' a. had been sugges. 
ted by the Admiral ty, (ie. 
while appearing to give the Ameri-
can. all they want on the one hand, we 
should on the oth.r ••••••• n.ur. that 
our conc.ssion to the American. was in 
tact nugatory) 
could not have be.n succ ••• £ul in any circumstance. 
least of all in Kuwait 'where everything is known 
in the bazaars in & ~.w hours' and especially with 
'such an .av.sdropper a. Holme. on the spot .s an 
int.r •• ted li.tener.' To put it bluntly, continued 
Vansittart, 'I £eel sur. that it would be impos.ible 
••••••• to be quite so 'tricky' without being ~ound 
out' and ther.£ore in order to avoid plunging into 
anoth.r acrimonious controversy at the inopportune 
moment with the Unit.d State. Government the Admiralty 
should concur with the India Of~ice view. 
To .ake i. t easier £or .the Admiral ty . to back down 
the Foreign O~~ice pointed out that in ,any cas. the 
Shaikh .ight oive hi. decision in the. way the govern-
.ent wanted without it being n.ce •• ary to put further 
surrepti tiou. pre. sure on him. Thi. was because the 
Petroleum. Department' •• emo had concluded that A.P.OIC.'. 
o~fer was more advantageous to the Shaikh and the 
Shaikh had been report.d to pret.r dealing with British 
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sUbjects. ' Furthermore. the Foreign Office assured 
the Admiralty that if Holmes tried to exercise un-
due influence on the Shaikh (ie. A bribe) then the 
situation would be ditterent and the government'. 
62 
attitude could be both altered and justitied. 
Nevertheless despite the Foreign Office's despe-
rate etforts the Admiralty .till insisted that the 
political resident should influence the Shaikh to 
grant the concession to A.P.O.C. and that the i •• ue 
should be referred to an interdepartmental conference. 
At this conference held on 2 December 1932 
the two mini.tri •• ,a. might have been expected, 
.et head-on. The old argument. were reintroduced 
but this time mainly in order to win .upport trom 
the other mini.trie. involved. The For.ign Ottice 
repre.entative .tated that the Cabinet's 6 April 
deci.ion was equivalent to adopting a principle ot 
a 'tair field and no tavour' and therefore the Fo-
reign Otfice could not agree to any action lik.ly 
to provoke an accu.ation of bad faith from the Uni-
t.d State •. Government. H. continued by .mpha.i.ing 
the Foreign Otfic.'. main con.ideration tor this 
line which wa.'th ••••• ntial need for clo.e and 
fri.ndly r.lation. with the Unit.d Stat •• , particu-
larly tor the .olution ot num.rou. problem. ot world 
importanc •• 
The Admiralty were n.ither impr •••• d nor con-
vinced. Th.ir repr •• entative al.o referred to the 
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Cabinet'. 6 April decision which in the Admiralty'a 
view sanctioned an 'open door' policy in Kuwait 
only it no new consideration were raised as a result 
ot determining A.P.O.C.'. stand. He maintained that 
the appearance otA.P.O.C. in negotiations materially 
aftected the government'. decision and theretore the 
government .hould insist on the concession being 
granted to the British company. It aeems that the 
two ministries continued what had become common 
practice in that they interpreted the decisions ta-
ken collectively in a way which matched and promoted 
their own particular standpoint. e.pecially picking 
out tor emphasis parts ot these decisions supporting 
their own views. 
Atter strongpre.sure trom the 'Foreign Office 
it wa. agreed that th.instructions proposed by the 
Admiralty were inappropriate. Nevertheless 'as had 
been teared by the Foreign Ottice, the Admiralty 
succeeded in mobilising some support for their view. 
They argued successtullythat the political resident 
should ensure that the Shaikh understood tully that 
a decision in tavour ot A.P.O.C •• eant the conceasion 
would be developed by a British company, while a 
'decision in favour ot the E.& O.S. would inVOlve the 
introduction ot American element. into Kuwait. The 
ministries which supported the Admiralty'. demand -
the Colonial Office and the Petroleum Department -
hoped thia would deter the Shaikh trom granting the 
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concession to the Syndicate since he had been repor-
ted to prefer a British firm to an American one. 
Another demand made by the Admiralty was, however, 
only partly accepted. The ministry wanted special re-
ference to their vie. to be made to the political 
agent in Kuwait before the Shaikh was allowed to re-
open negotiations with the two companies. To this 
the Foreign Office eould not agree, and therefore 
it was decided to acquaint the politieal agent with 
the views of all the ministries eoncerned. In any 
ease, this part of the instruetions to the political 
resident, (ie. to acquaint the politieal agent with 
the ministries' views) was to be eommunieated by 
a private and personal telegram as the Foreign Office 
feared that it 'might be necessary to publish eorres-
pondence at a later date and that such an intimation 
to the resident might well be regarded as weighing 
the scales in favour of A.P.O.C.,63 Although a 
general understanding was reached at the meeting be-
tween the various ministries, the Colonial Office 
had still to seeure the other ministries' concurrence 
with the wording of the telegrams - official and unof-
ficial - to the political resident. (The Admiralty 
like the Foreign Office also wanted to see the draft 
telegrams before despatch.) 
While these eonsultations were taking place the 
United States Ambassador returned to the fray without 
State Department authorisation, for which he was later 
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admonished. On 13 December Mellon requested an ex-
planation ot the tact that he had been intormed by 
the Foreign ottic. on 11 November that the result ot 
the British Gov.rnment's .xamination ot the two ap-
plication. had b.en .ent to the P.r.ian Gult to be 
communicated to the Shaikh, while on 10 December the 
London agent ot Gult reported that the political 
agent in KUwait had stated h. kn.w nothing ot .uch 
a docum.nt. He al.o asked Van.ittart to give the 
Foreign Ottice'. reply to Atherton who would cable 
it to Wa.hington immediately in view ot the Ambas-
sador'. expr •••• d desire to discus. that matter with 
the State Departm.nt during hi. coming visit. 64 
By now the Foreign Ottice wa •• ur. that the 
i •• ue was considered very important in the United 
State. and th.retore urged the Colonial ott ice to 
despatch the agreed instructions to the political 
resident and to reed the Admiralty to withdraw its 
objections to .ome ot the telegram.' wording. Con-
sequently on 22 December the Colonial Ottice .ere 
tinally able to d •• patch the government'. in.truc-
tiona to the political resident. 
A. regard. the otticial t.legram, the politi-
cal resident was instructed to ensure that the 
Shaikh wa. tully aware that it the concession were 
granted to the E.& G.S. it meant the conce.sion 
would be transterred to an American company. Fur-
thermore it would be the Shaikh'. responsibility 
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to make a choice, and a de~inite decision should 
be reached as early as po.sible on the in~ormation 
provided in the Petroleum Department's memo. Ge-
nerally it was emphasised to the political resident 
that he should leave it entirely to the Shaikh to 
make a choice between the two ot~ers. As regards 
the private and personal telegram, the political 
resident was instructed to communicate all the 
relevant tacts, ie. all the correspondence which 
had pas.ed between the ministries concerned, to 
the political agent betore any discussions took 
place between the Shaikh and the companies- rep-
resentatives. 6S 
The Foreign O~tice, though not without con-
siderable ditticulty, had tinally succeeded in 
persuading the other ministries concerned to abide 
by the undertaking given to the United Stat.s Go-
vernment. The result was that the government's 
otticial policy was to allow the Shaikh to choo •• 
between the two otters without his decision being 
influenced by political considerations. The Fo-
reign Ottice-s strong stand by their pledge to the 
United State. Embassy was, as seen above, mainly 
due to broader political considerations, ie. to 
maintaining good Anglo-American relations, and re-
sulted in torcing the Admiralty in particular to 
abide by it. They were under the misapprehension 
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that the Kuwait oil concession was considered a major 
political issue in the United States and that the 
British Government attitude was seriously threatening 
to jeopardise long-term Anglo-American relations, par-
ticularly at a time when United States Government 
goodwill was most needed £or solving major interna-
tional problems. 
However, as has been seen. the State Depart-
ment did not regard the Kuwait oil concession as an 
is.ue worth £ighting ~or and there£ore retrained 
~rom intervening, pre~erring Gul~ to continue its 
representations to the British Government through 
the Syndicate •. The United State. Government which 
was ~aced with the problem o~ over-production and 
not that of dimini.hing re.erve. was not over-concer-
ned at the time with ~oreign oil. Furthermore, the 
Division of Near Ea.tern Af~airst which believed 
Gulf to have & .lim chance of .ecuring the conce •• ion, 
was in general unwilling to raise the issue with the 
Briti.h Government and in many instance. went so ~ar 
as to ju.ti~y the British stand. They accepted Bri-
tish supremacy and had no desire to encourage Ameri-
can interests to enter an area in which this might 
provoke Anglo-American confrontation. Thus when 
Mellon himself prote.ted strongly to the Foreign 
Office on 13 December and consequently prompted, as 
.een above, the British Government to act rapidly 
and ~avourably towards the B.& G.S./Gul~t he was 
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asked to leave the negotiations in Atherton's hands • 
. Moreover, contrary to Mellon'. independent action 
at that crucial time, the State Department decided 
to wait at least until January 1933 be~ore consi-
. dering what i~ any action they were prepared to 
take to expedite matters. They justified the delay 
about which Mellon was complaining, ie. the fact 
that the British Government's comments on the two 
dra~t concessions still had not reached the Shaikh, 
arguing that in view o~ the number o~ departments 
involved and the remoteness o£ the area it was 
'hardly surprising that they had not arrived in Ku-
wai t by 14 December.' 66 
Although the State Department's attitude was 
~ar from satisfactory in the eyes o~ the American 
oil company, nevertheless its intervention in Ku-
wait and previously in Bahrein reveala how the 
State Department was drawn into the region's poli-
ties irrespective of any desire to be involved. 
The American oil compani.s were in direct contact 
with the State Department which, being the only 
department responsible ~or foreign policy, could 
e~fectively translate its limited objectiv •• in the 
region into clear policy. However it was exactly 
the opposite with the British Government. 
The bitter'arguments and feuding between the 
ministries concerned combined with the dubious tac-
tics each adopted in pursuit o~ its ultimate goal 
gav., in some instances, the impression of a battle 
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between rivals rather than any interdeparUlental co-
hesion in promoting the State's interests. The dis-
pute involved not only a question o~ ~oreign oil po-
licy per se but also two opposing principle. o~ po-
litical outlook. The traditional attitude held par-
ticularly by the Admiralty was based upon Britain'. 
past policy o~ preserving the Persian Gul~ tor Bri-
tish interests regardless of global and local aspi-
rations. The new school, whose adherents were active 
in the Foreign Ottice, considered that the days when 
Britain could maintain its tormer position were num-
bered. Now, increased local nationalism and global 
considerations combined with limited resources dic-
tated a new outlook ot co-operation which would 
enable Britain to maintain a re.pectable role in this 
changing environment ot world politics. This ~unda­
mental diVersity of opinion, however, resulted on 
occasion in compromis. decisions containing element. 
o~ completely contrary views thus complicating matters 
further and increasing the impression of underhand 
dealing in this already 'oily subject'. 
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5. Second Thoughts on Policy 
Despite a ~ormal British Government commitment 
to allow the Shaikh a ~ree hand in choosing between 
the two o~~ers, various ministries and individuals 
in the Persian Gul~ continued their e~~orts to per-
suade him to incline towards A.P.O.C. The Admiralty, 
~or instance, still considered the instructions ~or 
the political resident to be unsatis~actory, as 
their opinion had been given no special mention. 
They decided, there~ore, to ameliorate this unsatis-
~actory situation by instructing the Commander-in-
Chie~, East Indies, to make a special and de~init. 
re~erence to their view. 1 On 20 December a secret 
telegram (secret ~ro. the other ministries as .ell) 
was despatched to the Commander-in-Chie~ instruc-
ting hi. to ensure during his coming visit to the 
Persian Gul~ that the local British o~~icials 'be 
in no doubt o~ the great strategic importance which 
Service departments attach to the grant o~ the con-
cession to the A.P.O.C.,2 
However in the Persian Gul~ there was no need 
to employ .uch a devious method. Dickson, who had 
received regular copies o~ correspondence between 
the government'. various ministries, had already 
been impressed by the Admiralty'. view and consi-
dered it to be 'rather to the point and largely 
voices my own views.' In general, it seems, he 
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criticised the ~oreign Ottice's view and contessed 
to the political resident that he could not under-
stand why in deterence to American reaction the go-
vernment was teartul ot intluencing the Shaikh to 
accept A.P.O.C.'s otter. Betore being acquainted 
with the government's decision ·to permit the Shaikh 
to choose between the two otters on their tinancial 
.erits he tried to intluence London not to tollow 
such a policy. On 28 December, tor example, he 
warned that 'H.M.G. must bring a certain amount 
ot direct pressure on the Shaikh' otherwise the con-
cession would be lost to Holmes. 3 
Nevertheless, as s •• n above, the government 
decided to remain neutral and the Shaikh was in-
tormed on 11 January 1933 by Fowle, the political 
resident, that formal negotiations could begin 
-tth A.P.O.C. and the Syndicate and that the ulti-
mate decision would be lett to his judgement. Ac-
cordingly the two companies were intormed that the 
Shaikh had been presented with the British Govern-
ment's long-awaited technical advice and that ne-
gotiations could now commence. 4 
On 19 January, soon &l'ter his return trom 
London where he spent some time in consultation, 
Chishol •• et the Shaikh and submitted A.P.O.C.'s 
revised proposals. The company had decided to re-
vise some ot the financial terms upwards trom those 
previously proposed in August even betore the Shaikh's 
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response to their original offer was known, thus 
rendering the Briti.h Government'. comparative 
.tatement on the original off.r. out of date and 
opening a new round of bargaining. Th. various 
paym.nt. in the new draft were .lightly increa.ed, 
the royalty how.ver remaining unchanged and there-
tore .till low.r than that b.ing ottered by the 
Syndicate. S The Shaikh, who by now had developed 
a cordial relation.hip with Chi.holm, promi.ed 
to study tht ne. otter but intimated that- a. he 
'mu.t make .very ettort to secure the be.t term. 
po •• ibl ........ th.r. could be no hurry in .uch an 
important matt.r.'O 
Th. tOllowing day the Shaikh m.t Holme. and 
provided him with copies of both A.P.O.C.'. lateat 
offer and the Briti.h Gov.rnm.nt'. comparativ. 
statement on the two original ofter., which con.i-
d.red A.p.e.C.'s ott.r to b •• up.rior to that of 
the Syndicat.. Hol ••• , like the Stat. Department 
which r.c.iv.d a copy torthwith, con.id.r.d the 
Briti.h Governm.nt's conclu.ion to be bia •• d and 
that the Syndicat.'s ott.r had b.en"twi.t.d and 
mi.int.rpr.t.d'.? H. told the Shaikh this and 
a •• ured hi. that the Syndicate'. ott.r in it. pre-
.ent torm was even more generous than A.p.e.C.'. 
revis.d otfer. He al.o indicat.d that the Syndi-
cat. was ready in any ca •• to top any oft.r made 
by A.P.O.C. .nd ther.for •• hould alway. be given 
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the opportunity to bid against it. It became ob-
vious.' ther.~or •• that the negotiations would take 
aome time as the companies intended to comp.t. 
against each other and the Shaikh naturally wished 
to secure the most ~avourable terms pos.ible. 
However the British Government, as has been 
sean above, was anxious to see the Shaikh taking 
a quick and de~inite decision as it hoped to dis-
pose o~ the oil controversy with tha United States 
Government as soon as possible. There~ore on 9 
February. less than a month a~ter negotiations com-
menced. the Shaikh was asked by Dickson wheth.r he 
had yet decided to whom he would grant the conces-
sion. The Shaikh resented the British Government's 
inter~erence at this early staoe as he considered 
it to be a ~urther limitation on his ~reedom o~ 
choice. He was already barred ~rom discussing cer-
tain points with the two companies and had been 
asked to insist on various stipulations, as yet un-
known. designed to s~eguard the government's in-
tere.ts and to be included at a later date in the 
agreement with 'the company which ultimately secured 
the concession. 8 There~ore the Shaikh made it 
clear to the political agent' that any attempt to 
hurry him into an immediate decision would be resen-
ted. He reminded Dickson that it took the British 
Government six months to give him their views and 
that the gov.rnm.nt had le~t the 'question o~ the 
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concession to his judgement.'O 
It seems that despite the British Government's 
technical advice and A.P.O.C.'s revised draft the 
Shaikh inclined towards the Syndicate. Besides ti-
nancial considerations there were three main reasons 
for this state ot aftairs which did not escape the 
political agent's caretul observation. when he re-
cently visited Bahrein to otter his condolences to 
the Shaikh of Bahrein on the death ot his father, 
the Shaikh had been given a long tour of the oilfields 
by Holmes and was consequently extremely impressed 
by the development ot the Bahrein oil industry by 
the Americans. Secondly, A.P.O.C.'s recent dispute 
with the Persian Government over the oil concession's 
terms had sparked otf considerable anti-A.P.O.C. 
feelings in Kuwait. The dispute resulted in the 
cancellation ot A.P.O.C.'s concession in Persia and 
in the British Government making a strong protest 
to the Persian Government. It was regarded in Ku-
wait. as in other parts ot the Middle East, as a 
prime example of the danger that lay 'in wait tor 
a small and weak state which dealt with a powertul 
company whose principal shareholder was the British 
Government. Thirdly, the Shaikh was disappointed 
with the lack ot support from the British'Government 
in solving his outstanding dispute. with his strong 
neighbours over the taxation ot his date gardens in 
Iraq and Ibn Saud's continued blockade ot Kuwait. 10 
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Consequently it became apparent to the political agent 
that the Shaikh 'wanted to give the oil concession to 
the E.& G.5. today, but is a~raid o~ doing so lest 
he o~fend H.M.G.,ll 
Indeed, the Shaikh certainly preferred to deal 
with the Syndicate but was fearful of the consequences. 
He knew that, despite the British Government's offi-
cial neutrality, granting the concession to the 
E.& G.S./Gulf would strain relation. with the protec-
tor of his independence. There~ore in order to 
avoid a confrontation with the British Government over 
the oil concession and in an eftort to extract him-
selt trom the dilemma ot having to choose between 
the two companies, the Shaikh suddenly suggested di-
viding his territory between A.P.O.C. and the 5yndi-
cate. He told Holmes 'to put up two new draLt con-
ce.sions (twin) in place ot the old single one' and 
to raise some of the financial payments. One of the 
territorial divisions would comprise 1,200 square 
mil.s which was to be reserved tor British interests, 
and the other was to compris. 400 square miles and 
would be res.rved for American interests. 12 
The Shaikh hoped by this mOve to appease the 
British Government as h. was o~tering British inte-
re.ts the larger share, and to secure more money 
tor himselt as A.P.O.C. would have to match the Syn-
dicate's revised payments in order to obtain their 
share. However the Shaikh was discouraged by the 
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political agent who, when acquainted with the idea, 
immediately protested that it was impossible ~or 
two 'separate concessions to be granted to two com-
panies in his 5m&11 state' and reported the new de-
v.lopment to the higher authorities. It seems that 
the political agent did not understand the Shaikh's 
position and. di~~ieulti.s and consid.red this plan 
eontrary to British interests. 13 
. The aetivities and views o~ the political 
agent must be given speeial att.ntion in order 
~ully to understand the situation in Kuwait,and 
in particular the Shaikh's decisions. As has been 
seen, Dickson tried to' persuade the British Govern-
ment to adopt an attitude biased towards A.P.O.C. 
and since he was a d.t.rmined man h •. continu.d in 
th.se .~~orts .ven ~ter the British Gov.rnment 
had deeid.d to adopt an imparti&lattitud •• In his 
many reports to his superiors a~t.r th •. government's 
d.cision was known, he ~requ.ntly emphasised any in-
~ormation which might lead to a revision o~ the 00-
vernaent's present attitude. 
On 1 February, ~or .xampl., b. again raised 
doubts 'on the wisdom o~ l.tting the Shaikh d.eid. 
things ~or hi.sel~, without our giving him advic. 
or guidane •• ,l4 On the next day h. reported a eon-
versation he bad had. with Shaikh Abdullah, who suc-
ee.ded Shaikh Ahmad in 1950 and who-was said to 
have 'accused H.M.G. ot doing a very wrong and immoral 
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thing in allowing the Shaikh the ~ree hand tha t he 
had been given in the matter.' According to Dick-
son, Shaikh Abdullah insisted that the British Go-
vemment· 
should most certainly have advised him 
rth. Shaikh ot Kuwai t J cl.arly and d.ti-
nit.ly that it was to hia int.r •• t ••••• 
to accept the A.P.O.C.'s draft con~.s­
sion and 'turn down' that ot the E.&G.S. 
He explained. and Dickson quoted him at some length, 
that 
it a child waa going to ~all down a well 
it waa the nurs.'a bu.in ••• to •• ize and 
.top it. it was not .u~tici.nt tor the 
nur •• to call to the child and .ay it 
mu.t its.l~ d.cid. whether talling down 
the w.ll was to it. advantage or oth.r-
wis •• 
In anoth.r r.port Dickson complain.d that the Shaikh 
had interpr.ted the'entorced neutrality' on hi. 
part a. weakn ••• on the part ot the government and 
that h. WAS talling incr.a.ingly under the control 
ot Holme. and drawing turther and further away trom 
Briti.h influence.15 
At the .ame tim. Ddckson did .verything in his 
power to .ncourage the Shaikh to come to t.rms With 
A.P.O.C. He was known to be its staunch .upport.r 
and was .oon identitied a. it. agent in Kuwait. As 
a r.sult ot Dickson's conduct in the oil issu. it 
i. not .urprising that the Shaikh .topped confiding 
in him, as a consequence ot·which the political agent 
was k.pt in the dark a. to the Shaikh's real intentions. 
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Dickson himsel~ acknowledged this situation when he 
reported that the Shaikh had adroitly avoided giving 
him the revised ~igures o~tered by Holmes and contes-
sed to the political resident that it was un~ortu­
nate as tin other matters I appear to have his com-
plete con~idence •• 16 , There~ore the political resi-
dent, the highest British authority in the. Persian 
Gul~, was obliged to urge the Shaikh not to conceal 
,in~ormation ~rom the political agent and to keep him 
au ~ait with the progress o~ the negotiations, but 
seemingly to,no avail. 17 
This state ot altairs in Kuwai t naturally gave 
rise to concern in London.· Both the government and 
A.P.O.C. were anxious about the report. ~rom the 
Persian Gult and ~eared, that it the Shaikh reached 
an early decision it would almo.t certainly be in 
~avour o~·the American group. The company ~or its 
part was most anxious to delay the negotiations ~or 
the Kuwait oil conce •• ion a. tar as possible. They 
reali.ed that the cancellation o~ their conce.sion 
in Persia and the uncertainty regarding the outcome 
o~. the negotiation. in the League o~ Nations, where 
the dispute had been reterred by the British Govern-
ment, were severely handicapping their et~ort. in 
Kuwait. Furthermore the company had been in~orm.d 
by Chisholm, who kept in close touch with the Shaikh 
and the political agent, that the Shaikh might de-
cide in tavour ot the Americans as a result o~ his 
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political grievances 'against the British Govern-
ment's inaction over his long dispute. with the 
Governments ot Iraq and Saudi Arabia. 
Theretore A.P.O.C. approached the government 
with a view to,its delaying the Shaikh's decision 
until Cadman returned trom his planned visit to 
Persia, and meanwhile requested it to tind a solu-
tion to the Shaikh's problems, ie. the 'taxation ot 
his date gardens and Ibn Saud's blockade. IS The 
company'. directors, like the political resident, 
probably hoped that it the government could solve 
these problems tor the Shaikh it might influence 
him in tavour ot A.P.O.C. and ga..in them time to 
solve their difficulties in persia. 19 The Shaikh 
seems to have,encouraged such a rumourin the hope 
of influencing the British Government to take an 
active role in settling thes. disputes to his sa-
tisfaction. 
At the interdepartmental meeting on 3 March 
convened to consider A.P.O.c.'srequest •• ie. to 
delay the Shaikh's final decision and to re.olve 
his ditticultie. in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the 
Petroleum Department championed the company. The 
Petroleum Department-s repre.entative warned that 
the Shaikh re.ented the attitude of the government 
regarding the two outstanding problema mentioned 
above and that his r eaentment might lead him to 
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give the concession to the E.& G.5. out o£ mere 
pique. Therefore he stressed the need to take 
steps to remove the Shaikh's grievances against 
the British Government ,in order to lessen the han-
dicap £rom which Cadman telt he was suttering. 
Although the Admiralty was not represented 
at the meeting they stated in a letter to the In-
, dia O££ice their support tor assisting the Shaikh 
in order to intluence hi_ indirectly to lean ta-
wards A.P.O.C., and they warned once more against 
allowing the Americans into an area which had hither-
to been regarded very largely as a British preserve. 20 
However the political ministries - the Foreign 
Ot£ice, the Colonial O££ice and the India Oftice -
rejected the Petroleum Department and Admiralty's 
argument, which had been initiated by Dickson, that 
the Shaikh would be influenced against the govern-
ment £or the ,political reasons suggested by Cadman. 21 
They argued that he was well aware that he was depen-
dent on the government tor his independence trom Iraq 
on the one side and Saudi Arabia on the other, and 
that he was not likely to risk torteiting,the good-
will ot the British Government by deliberately show-
ing spite. In any case, because ot the complexity 
ot the problems there was no prospect ot a settle-
aent Of either the date gardens or the blockade in 
the immediate tuture. Instead, it was suggested 
and accepted that the decisive tactor tor the Shaikh 
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was,~inancial and therefore A.P.O.C. should definitely 
outbid their rivals. Fina1ly. it was decided to as-
sist A.P.O.C.,in delaying matters in Kuwait but simul-
taneously urge the company to outbid their rivals fi-
nancially.22 
Accordingly on 14 March the political re.ident 
was informed in a private and personal telegram that 
as a new ~actor had been introduced, by the cancella-
tionof A.P.O.C.'. oil conce.sion in Persia there 
was no need now to pre.s,the Shaikh,~or a quick de-
cision and,he,should.be allowed to continue the pro-
23 
cess ot bargaining with both partie.. The next 
day the head o~ ,the Eastern Department in the Fo-
reign Ot~ice .etA.C. Hearn trom A.P.O.C. to discuss 
the situation. , , 
The Foreign O~~ice representative suggested 
that Cadman should visit the Shaikh in order to raise 
the ~inancial,terms being otfered and to estimate 
what result. could be gained from exerting hi. own 
personal influence. According to G. ,Rendel, Hearn 
was attracted by the idea but expres.ed certain ob-
jections to it. particularly from the Persian point 
of view. He said that the Persian Government might 
think that Cadman was procrastinating it instead ot 
ooing straight to Teheran he were to go to Kuwait 
to deal with what they considered to be a .ubsidiary 
and secondary question which they did not view with 
any sympathy. The Persian Governlllent had already 
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accused the company of diverting its attention and 
efforts from the development of the Persian oil-
tields to other areas, with the result thAt only a 
traction of the concession territory in Persia 
had been developed. 
Rendel replied that although the,Persians 
might be offended by Cadman's visit to Kuwait. it 
JIli~ht be Argued that there would be certain advan-
tages in not showing any undue haste to reach Tehe-
ran and in keeping the Persians guessing ~s to the 
exact object of the visit. 'Pos~ibly the Persians 
might even think' argued the Foreign Office rep-
resentative, that 
Sir J. Cadman was negotiating another 
concession to fall back on if hi s ne-
gotiations for the new Persian conces-
sion should not go well. 
Eventually both agreed that the British Government's 
proposal was only a recommendation and the ultimate 
decision as to whether to visit Kuwait or not lay 
entirely with Cadman. The next day Hearn intormed 
Rendel that their conversation would be conveyed 
to Cadman. who was on his way to Persia. when he 
reached Abadan. 24 
This episode was remarkable as it showed the 
extent of the company's and in particular Cadman's 
relative independence vis-.-vis the British Govern-
.ent, and its development from a small and weak con-
cern whose chairman WAS eager to comply with the 
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government'. wi.hes in return for diplomatic assis-
tance to a large and confident company whose chair-
man and director. 'have .ubordinated our political 
intere.t. to th.ir own commercial intere.t •• ,2S 
Cadman contributed immen.ly to this new pattern of 
relation. between the government and the company, 
about which more detail. will be given below, a. he 
was in clo.e touch with the various ministries and 
was well acquainted with their attitude. and aspi-
ration •• 
Upon hi. arrival at Abadan Cadman wa. given 
Hearn'. lett.r and decid.d to po.tpon. hi. vi.it 
to Teheran and go to Kuwait in.tead. On 25 March 
h •• et the Shaikh for two and a halt hour.. At 
their me.ting Cadman, a. will be .e.n below, em-
ployed all hi •• kill a. a top negotiator to per.uad. 
the Shaikh to grant A.P.O.C. the oil conce •• ion im-
m.diat.ly. He told the Shaikh that A.P.O.C. was the 
large.t Briti.h oil-producing company in the world, 
and although the Briti.h Government po •••••• d a con-
trolling tinancial intere.t in the company in order 
to .ecure .upplie. ot oil tor the Briti.h Navy it 
never interterred with the commercial management 
ot the company nor would it 'attempt to intluence 
an owner ot property to concede the oil right to the 
A.P.O.C.' Therefore, explained Cadman, the Briti.h 
Government had adopted a .trictly impartial attitude 
- 281 -
in the case ot the Kuwait oil concession and the 
Shaikh had been given a Lree hand to otter hi. oil 
rights to whomsoeverha wished. As regards his ri-
val., Cadman told the Shaikh that the Syndicate had 
originally approached A.P.O.C. with a view to se-
curing the Kuwait oil concession, alleging that the 
Shaikh was _averse to A.P.O.C. and that therefore 
they would obtain the concession on behalt ot A.P.O.C. 
A.P.O.C.'. management, according to Cadman, turned 
this otLer down as theypreterred to deal direct 
wi th the Shaikh and to give him the 
full payment. up to the limit he was 
prepared to 00 which would not be po.-
.ible when dealing through an interme-
diary to whom a commi.sion would have 
to be paid. 
Neverthele.. Cadman did not La!l to. warn the 
Shaikh that in the case ot the conce.sion going to 
the American. A.P.O.C., in their own intere.t., 
would be compelled to declare a local 'oil war' on 
the .aid company, thus hindering the development 
ot Kuwait'. oil potential. Finally, a. a turther 
inducement, A.P.O.C.'. chairman rai.ed the tinancial 
term. considerably except the royalty payment which 
.tayed unchanged, and oLtered to double .ome ot the 
revi.ed payment. yet again it the Shaikh were pre-
par.d to .ign a conce.sion agreement with A.P.O.C. 
torthwi the 26 
Th. Shaikh was particularly impr •••• d by Cadman'. 
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personal visit, as the latter was known to have met 
in 1913 'Mubarak the Great', the Shaikh's grandfa-
ther and Kuwait's most admired leader. 27 Neverthe-
less he declined to sign the oil agreement with 
A.P.O.C. immediately, explaining that he had pro-
.ised Holmes. who had taken the trouble to visit 
him earlier in the morning before leaving for Bah-
r.in. that h. would not close a d.al with A.P.O.C. 
without giving the Syndicate an opportunity to 
challenge A.P.O.C.'s latest off.r. Although A.p.e.C.'s 
repr •• entativ •• left Kuwait .atisfied with Shaikh 
Ahmad'. reception. they were apprehensive about 
Holmes' next move. 
As expected, a few day. later Holm •• returned 
from Bahrein and met the Shaikh. He immediately 
realised the damage done to the E.& G.S./Gulf pros-
pects by Cadman'. visit and therefore. without for-
mal authority from London. outbid A.P.O.C.'. latest 
offer. However a. the Shaikh was .till insi.ting in 
hi. bargaining with Holm.s on a divi.ion of hi. terri-
tory betwe.n A.P.O.C. and the Syndicate. Holme. made 
only one condition to which the Shaikh agreed, nam.ly 
that the conce.sionary area .hould be divid.d equally 
between the two companies in.tead of 75 per cent to 
British inter •• t. and 25 per cent to American inte-
r.st. a. previously propo.ed. 28 After securing bet-
ter terms from HoI.... Shaikh Ahmad informed Chisholm 
that A.P.O.C.'. late.t offer had been surpass.d and 
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enquired whether A.P.O.C. were prepared to better 
Holmes' counter-offer, thus .showing once again that 
he preferred to continue the bargaining process with 
both partie •• 
. ~eAnwhile in London the various ministries 
were confuse4 by reports from the Persian Gulf. The 
political ministries in particular challenged the 
accuracy of the political agent's reading of the 
situation and his conclusions. They considered the 
reports to be inadequate on a number of important 
points 'in particular on the question of the general 
attitude of the Shaikh and the extant to which he is 
29 being influenced by political considerations.' As 
seen above, the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office 
and the India Office did not accept Dickson's ba-
liet that the Shaikh might grant the Syndicate the 
concession because ot his political grievances 
against the British Govern.ent. Furthermore Dick-
son's attitude, and consequently his admission that 
the Shaikh was keeping him in the dark in regard to 
his real intentions, were also intluential in de-
termining the government to recall the highest poli-
tical authority in the Persian Gult tor consultation. 
Consequentlyon 1 April 1933 Fowle, the poli-
tical re.ident, was instructed to come to London as 
soon as possible, not however.beforepersonally seeing 
the Shaikh to intorm him that in no circumstances 
whatever was he to take a decision regarding the oil 
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concession during the political resident'. absence. 30 
London obviously wanted to ensure that the 'unscru-
pulou.' Holmes would not take advantage of Fowle'S 
absence as he did in 1931 when Dickson left Kuwait 
for a short while~ Shortly afterward. the political 
resident visited Kuwait and 'passed on the British Go-
vernment'. wish.s to the Shaikh. Fowle also asked 
him 'to submit any new proposal made by either party 
for the government's .xamination as he had done in 
the case of the initial proposal •• 
On arriving in London the political r •• ident 
wa. faced by anxious repre.entative. from the Colo-
nial Office, the Foreign Offic., the India Offic., 
the Admiralty and the Petroleum Department. At' 
lengthy conference. held on 26 April and 3 May 1933 
the .ituation in Kuwait was di.cu.sed throughly. 
Fowl. explain.dthat h. had impr •••• d upon 'the Shaikh 
that it was in hi. own intere.t to look to the Bri-
ti.h Gov.rnment for guidance. but in view of the 
attitude the government hadadopted over the question 
of tne'oil'conce •• ion Shaikh Ahmad probably f.lt that 
the government would have no .eriou. ground. for com-
plaint if he were to give the conce •• ion'to the Syn-
dicate. It was point.d out, however, that he had in 
effect flatlycontradict.d the advice tend. red by the 
government on the financial merit. of th.' two 'original 
draft conce.sion. and that he had .tat.d, contrary to 
the government'. conclusion, that in hi. opinion the 
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Syndicate's o££er was the better. 
Furthermore, the Shaikh'. latest proposal to al-
lot the northern part o£ Kuwait to A.P.O.C. and the 
southern part to E.&.G.S./Gul£gave grounds £or a con-
siderable suspicion and was not considered to be a so-
lution o£ the di££iculties. The various ministries 
suspected it ot being another o£ Holmes' devious ploys 
and teared that Holmes might have discovered during 
his water exploitation that the southern area had po-
tentially more oil than the northern one. It was there-
tore not out ot the question that the part to b. allo-
cated to A.P.O.C. might be comparatively unremunerative. 
(Whether Holmes knew it or not the southern part o£ 
Kuwait indeed proved later to be tar richer in oil 
than the northern area.) However the political agent's 
opposition to the scheme on the.grounds ot Kuwait's 
small surtace area was rejected £or the time being. 
F.e •. Starling, the director ot the Petroleum 
Department, explained that as the Standard Oil Company 
o£ Cali£ornia's (Socal) present concession in Bahrein 
didnot COver the whOle territory British interests 
had recently wanted to acquire a tooting there, and 
there£ore the British Government should watch events 
in Bahrein betore 'vetoing the ne. proposal [the di-
vision ot Kuwait territory] .erely on the grounds o£ 
. the smallness ot Kuwait.' Instead, it was decided 
that the Shaikh should be urged to submit £or the 
government's consideration any new otter, including 
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the latest.'twin concessions' which had been, as seen 
above, drafted by the Syndicate on the Shaikh'. spe-
citic instructions.31 
, It seems that by now the Foreign ettice were 
inclining towards the views of the ministries con-
cerned and agreed on a less impartial attitude. They 
now considered that the Shaikh should be intormed 
that h. was endangering his own interests by disre-
garding the British Government's advice on the ti-
nancial •• rits ot any otter made him. The ministry 
accepted the view that as long as A.p.e.C.'s otter 
was considered superior by the British Government 
and the Shaikh intormed accordingly, any prot •• t 
which might come trom the United States Embassy 
should not be taken too seriou.ly. In any case, the 
Foreign Ottice telt les. pressured a. tor the last 
tew month. no repre.entation regarding the Kuwait 
oil conce •• ion had been made by the United States 
Emba.sy which considered its task to have been ac-
complished since Gult'. otter was being considered 
by and negotiated with the Shaikh. (No doubt the 
end ot Mellon's term ot ottice as the United States 
Amba.sador in March 1933 contributed to the inacti-
vity ot the Embassy over the oil i •• ue.) 
Atter an absence ot a month Fowle returned to 
the Persian Gult and on 13 May .et the Shaikh. At 
the meeting the political re.ident conveyed to him 
the British Government's de.ire to vet any new otter 
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including the 'twin' submitted by Holmes, and refer-
red to the Shaikh's commitment to abide by the govern-
mentis advice. As regards A.P.O.C.'s latest offer 
presented during Cadman's visit, the political resi-
dent stated his view that it went very much further 
than anything previously proposed and stressed to 
the Shaikh the strength of.A.P.O.C.'s position in the 
Persian Gulf. Shaikh Ahmad resented this considerable 
direct pre.sure which, according to Holmes, took 
the form of a threat that the British Government 
would decline to support him if he did not give the 
oil conces.ion to A.P.O.C. 32 Therefore the Shaikh 
immediately decided to suspend all negotiations for 
the concession for an indefinite period. On 13 May 
he informed Muhammad Yatin, lIolm.s' interpreter,of 
his decision and on the next day conveyed this to 
A.P.O.C.'s representatives. 33 
This sudden move, news of which was also sent 
to the political agent, stunned and confused all the 
participant. in the oil negotiations. The British 
Government suspected that a. Holmes was to leave 
Kuwait shortly the Shaikh had decided to auspend the 
negotiations mainly in order to wait his return with 
34 possibly more attractive proposals. The political 
resident thought that the Shaikh considered it best 
to gain time by temporkilystopping counter-bids 
from both partie., particularly in order to see the 
outcome of the oil negotiations which were taking 
place in Saudi Arabia and nearing their climax. Holmes, 
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on the other hand, suspected that the British Govern-
ment had ordered or in~luenced the Shaikh to sus-
pend the negotiations in order to assist A.P.O.C. 
He ther.~or. paid a stormy visit to the political 
agent be~ore leaving ~or London. He protested 
strongly that 'It looked like a ramp engine.red by 
A.P.O.C. and the British political authorities to 
keep him out o~ Kuwait' and warned that he would 
again enlist United States Government support on 
behal~ o~ the Syndicate. 35 
A.P.O.C., though generally satis~ied with the 
Shaikh's decision as they were anxious to slow down 
the negotiations, believed, according to Chisholm, 
that he had been in~luenced by a combination o~ 
three ~actors.-
the strong pressure being put on him 
by both competitors and their suppor-
ters in Kuwait, his balie~ ••••• that 
the competitors would shortly combine 
and save him ~rom the di~~icultie. 
and odium o~ deCiding between them 
and ~inally his desire to wait ~or Ibn Saud to grant 
his oil concession in order to see to whom and on 
36 what term. it wa. granted. 
However it seems the Shaikh'. main reason for 
suspending the negotiation. e.caped the various par-
ticipants. Thi. WAS the strong and direct pre.sure 
put upon him by the British Government during the 
political resident's latest visit on 13 May. The 
Shaikh now realised that the ~ree hand Accorded him 
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to choose between the two companies' o~~ers had been 
canc.lled, as h. had been warned to submit any pro-
posal ~or the British Government's observation and 
to Abide by their advice. From the beginning, ie. 
the .arly twenties, the Shaikh had considered the 
oil concession to be a commercial issue and there-
tore insisted on n.gotiating tr •• ly tor comm.rcial 
terms. Only a tew days be~or. m •• ting Fowl. and 
d.ciding to suspend the negotiations h. was repor-
ted by Dickson as having spok.n at th.ir m •• ting 
som.what .xcit.dly •••••••• and app.ared 
to m. to be anxious to convey that im-
pression that w. should l.t him alone 
in the pr.liminary d.tails ot trying 
to g.t the E.& G.5. and A.P.O.C. to 
bid against .ach oth.r. 37 
Th.r.fore it seems that, despite being anxious to 
continue the bargaining proc.... the Shaikh d.cided 
in the new circum.tanc •• to r.peat his tactic o~ 
.uspending the n.gotiations when.v.r he t.lt he was 
not being allow.d by the Briti.h Gov.rnment to ne-
gotiate tr •• ly on the commercial t.rm. ot the conc.s-
sion and to s.cure the most ~&vourable terms pos.ible. 
He had adopted this tactic, as s.en abov., in 1924/5 
wh.n it proved succes.tul a. the Briti.h Gov.rnment 
then allowed the Syndicate to comp.te ofticially tor 
the Kuwait oil conces.ion, and it seems he repeated 
.. " 38 
this exercise now in 1933. 
It is evident that oil negotiations in and 
around the Gul~ were inter-relat.d and exercised con-
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siderable influence on events in Kuwait. The dis-
pute between A.P.O.C. and the P.rsian Government, 
which was eventually referred to the League of Na-
tions, damaged the former's prestige and caused de-
lay in the negotiations for the Kuwait oil conc.s-
sion. Consequently both the British Government 
and the company r.alised the pot.ntial danger posed 
by the situation in Persia and the government'. 
pressure for a quick decision by the Shaikh decrea-
sed. 
On the other hand however, the company used 
Kuwait as a means of exerting pres.ure on the Per-
sian Government to come to terms and r.new its con-
c.s.ion in Per.ia. As .een abov., following a .ug-
gestion by the British Gov.rnment Cadman decided to 
postpone a visit to P.rsia and visit.d Kuwait in-
.tead. This illustrate. that even at this early 
stage ie. before oil was discovered in Kuwait, it 
was becomino a well-established practice to play 
one country off against another, a tactic which later 
intensified as every oil producing country pr •••• d 
for as full & production as possible thus strengthen-
ing the oil companies- ability to retain their control 
for so long, particularly over the price of oil. 
Meanwhile negotiations for the Saudi Arabian 
oil concession were approaching their climax and 
the most influ.ntial Arab ruler in the Persian Gulf 
i •• Ibn Saud, wa. about to grant hi. oil conc •• sion. 
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No doubt his decision was to have an impact on the 
Bri ti sh Governmen t and the Shaikh o~ Kuwai t as 
ha.d been the ca.se in 1923. 
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6. The Richest Prize: Saudi Arabia 
As seen above, in 1923 Ibn Saud granted the 
E.& G.S. the El Hasa oil concessionl but by their 
~ailing to pay the agreed rent ~or a number ot 
years the concession lapsed. 1 Now. ten years la-
ter, Ibn Saud's desperate n.ed tor money to meet 
the growing demands o~ his kingdom in~luenced him 
to o~ter the concession again to the highest bid-
der. The commercial bene~its o~ the pilgrimage 
~rom which Saudi Arabia derived most o~ its reve-
nue had been seriously hit by the depressionl and 
theretore Ibn Saud's ~inancial position had deterio-
rated considerably. On 18 March Ibn Saud invited 
Holmes to Jedda to bid against the other competi-
tors ~or the concession. 
Holm.s was indignant to arrive and discover 
that the Standard Oil Company o~ Cali~ornia (Socal). 
represented by Philby and Karl Twitchell, was nego -
tiating independently ~or the concession in direct 
contradiction o~ their promi.e to nominate Holmes 
2 
as their representative. It .eems that Socal ~elt 
him to be incapable o~ exerting the in~luence on 
Ibn Saud which he claimed he could and in any case 
they did not have complete con~idence in him in 
view o~ his connection with GuI~.3 Theretore atter 
staying in Jedda tor only three days and without 
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seeing Ibn Saud, Holmes departed leaving I.P.C. and 
Socal to compete for the concession. 
Although the British Government was anxious to 
see I.P.C. secure the concession rather than Socal -
a purely American company ~ Ibn Saud's independence 
since 1927 and his suspicions about the British Govern-
ment's deep involvement in the oil issue, well known 
since 1923, prevented the government from supporting 
4 
I.P.C. openly. Furthermore, as I.P.C. were otfering 
much lower payments tor the concession than those 
being ottered by the Americans it was obvious to the 
British Minister in Jedda that they were 'unlikely 
to do business.'S Theretore Sir Andrew Ryan kept 
Major Stephen Longrigg, I.p.e.'s representative, sup-
plied with any usetul intormation received secretly 
trom Philby and other sources but avoided direct in-
tervention on behalt ot the company with the Saudi 
Government. Eventually, atter relatively short nego-
tiations, Ibn Saud granted the concession to Socal 
because they oftered tar better terms than tho.e 
otfered by I.P.C. 6 
It seems that A.P.O.C., as the dominant partner 
in I.P.C., did not do as much as it could, ie. by 
ottering considerably less than the Americans, to ob-
tain the El Hasa concession which, it secured, would 
undoubtedly have strengthened their and the British 
Government's position in the Persian Gult and Saudi 
Arabia. However such criticism, which came trom va-
rious quarters, cannot be justitied atter examining 
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the situation care~ully. In generAl A.P.O.C. were 
uninterested in developing more production in the 
Persian Gul~ becAuse o~ the e~~ect this would have 
upon production in Persia. The company had enough 
crude to meet their requirements ~rom their existing 
sources. To increase their share o~,the world mAr-
ket would mean price competition which was unaccep-
table in view o~ the 'As Is Agreement' signed in 
1928 atter a damaging international price war be-
tween Shell and the Standard Oil Company o~ New 
York.? Therefore, from the beginning A.P.O.C. in-
fluenced I.p.e. to restrict production in Iraq 
and to develop Iraq's,huge potential slowly. Gra-
dually A.P.O.C. and I.p.e. became.identi~ied with 
a policy of restriction o~ production and their 
object in obtaining fresh oil concessions in the 
Persian Gul~ was a preventive measure and not asso-
ciated with any desire for extensive exploitation. 8 
Moreover, atter the First World War when the 
Americans and the French were permitted to partici-
pate in I.p.e., A.p.O.e. had understood that the 
American oil interests would then be satisfied 
with their share in I.p.e. and thus be controlled 
in the Middle East by the Red Line Agree.ent. They 
considered it advantageous to include all the Ameri-
can oil companies interested in Middle East oil in 
I.p.e. on restrictive terms rather than let them 
operate ~reely. They there~ore agreed to share with 
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the ~ive remaining American companies still interes-
ted in Middle East oil their slice o~ I.P.C., thus re-
ducing their share ~rom 47.5 per cent to 23.75 per 
cent. 9 The American oil companies initially interes-
ted in Middle East oil were eager to sign the Red 
Line Agreement as they regarded it as advantageous 
to negotiate tor oil concessions in the Middle East 
through a British company supported by the British 
Gover~ent.lO 
However Socal was a late-comer to the Middle 
East, ie. atter the Red Line Agreement had been signed, 
and obtained, as seen above, the Bahrein oil conces-
sion independently. WhileA.P.O.C. were tied to 
I.P.C. and its many international elements and bar-
red by the Red Line Agreement trom acting indepen-
dentlY'anywhere in the area except Kuwait, Socal ap-
proached the Saudi Government independently in order 
to secure the £1 Hasa concession which lay near their 
operation in Bahrein. As regards the tinancial term. 
tor the £1 Hasa conce.sion A.P.O.C. and I.P.C. could 
not attord to match those ottered by their rival as 
they were concerned not to create a precedent in 
Saudi Arabia which might have crippling ettects in 
Persia and Iraq Where their main and paramount oil 
conce.sions existed. 
Socal, on the other hand, had been eager since 
1920 to diversi~y its sources and secure toreion re-
serves particularly in Central and South America. 
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They needed additional oil reserves to expand inter-
nationally and avoid depletion o~ their Cali~ornian 
reserves. Consequently ~rom 1920 to 1928 they had 
spent approximately SO million dollars on toreign 
exploration, concessions and drilling in the we. tern 
11 hemisphere without much success. Having tailed to 
discover additional major .ource. ot aupply where 
their markets lay ie. in the weatern hemisphere, 
they bought in 1928 the Gult option tor the Bahrein 
oil concesaion,which was ottered to them atter 
Gult had signed the Red Line Agreement, and eventually 
secured in 1930 the Bahrein oil concession tor a 
relatively high royalty payment. 
The discovery o~oil in Bahrein in 1932 , the 
knowledge that the oil bearing strata ot southern 
Peraia extended towards the Arabian .ide o~,the 
Persian Gult and the indicationa ot oil in shallow 
wella near Saudi Arabia'a coast strengthened the com-
pany's beliet that valuable oil resource. were to be 
~ound in Saudi Arabia!2 Although Socal'. vulnerability 
had been evident since 1932 ie. having ditticultie. 
in aarketing the oil produced in Bahrein in the eas-
tern hemisphere, they were eager to aecure the near-
by territory ot Saudi Arabia and theretore prepared 
to otter relatively high terms tor the concession. 13 
Eventually they secured the Saudi Arabian oil conces-
sion and in view ot their inability to market large 
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quantities o~ oil in the East without upsettingexis-
ting marketing positions and triogerino of~ an inter-
national price war, they sold half of their share ot 
both concessions to the Texas Oil Company which was 
not a partner in I.p.e. either and had markets east 
o~ Suez. 14 
Socal's success in securino the £1 Hasa conces-
sion on 29 May caused strong reaction in British of-
ficial circles where it was now realised it had been 
an error in the first instance to allow this coapany 
into Bahrein. The British Government felt politi-
cally threatened particularly by this eompany whieh 
seeured both the Bahrein and Saudi Arabian oil eon-
cessions and was independent of I.p.e. It meant 
that for the ~irst time a wholly Ameriean owned ven-
ture was established in the Persian Gulf without 
any ~orm of British influenee and eontrol. This 
strengthened the British Government's eonviction, 
therefore, that British interests should secure the 
rest o~ the Persian Gulf oil coneessions beforea 
bloc of independent American oil interests was tormed 
along the entire Arabian coast ot the Persian Gult, 
with ensuing political'implications. 1S 
The immediate task was, however, to prevent the 
Ameriean company trom securing the Neutral Zone oil 
conee.sion as it was believed that whoever obtained 
the eoncession in the area betw •• n Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia would eventually obtain the Kuwait conces.ion. 
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It was ~eared in government circles that Ibn Saud 
who was reported as wanting to intluence the 
'Shaikh of Kuwait's policy in a senae adverse to 
A.P.O.C.', might have already granted the Neutral 
Zone concession to Socal and that he planned to 
~orce the Shaikh of Kuwait to add his signature to 
the agreement later, thus presenting the British 
Government with a fait accompli. 16 This he had 
done in 1924 when granting the Neutral Zone oil 
concession to the E.& G.S. and later issuing an ul-
timatum to the Shaikh of Kuwait to add his signa-
ture to the agreement, as both rulers were equally 
responsible for the area. l ,? 
The British ofticial who predicted this alar-
ming sequence ot events was no other than Dickson. 
The political agent in Kuwait, who was caretully 
monitoring events in the Persian Gult and was in 
direct communication with other British officials 
in the area, anticipated a tar-reaching conspiracy 
on the part ot Ibn SAud which would have repercus-
sions beyond the oil issue. He put torward the 
theory that through the oil conc.ssions Ibn Saud 
was planning a tclose rapprochement betw.en Kuwait 
and Saudi yah and the secret transference ot our poli-
tical ascendency over Kuwait' to himselt, thus lea-
ving the British Government 'out in the cold'. He 
reported that it was almost certain that Ibn Saud 
had included in the &1 Hasa concession that ot the 
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Neutral Zone and that shortly he would tell the Shaikh 
o£ Kuwait to give his consent to Socal working the 
concession. 
Ibn Saud's next move. according to Dickson, would 
be to intorm the Shaikh that in the circumst.nces, ie. 
with the Americans operating in the Neutral Zone, it 
would be impossible 1r him to give the Kuwait oil 
concession to A.P.O.C. and theretore he must settle 
the matter in favour of Holmes and his American asso-
ciates. In return, the Shaikh would be promised that 
the blockade, which for years had been strangling Ku-
'wait, would be lifted. Consequently Ibn Saud, accor-
ding to Dickson'. scenario, would utilise his oil 
interests to obtain complete political control over 
Kuwai t. As Dickson blamed Holmes for almost any set-
back su£tered by British imperial interests in the 
Persian Gulf he concluded that on no account should 
the Neutral Zone be allowed ,Ito be used as a pawn 
by either Bin Saud. the Shaikh of Kuwa.it or Holmes 
without H.M.G. permission.,18 
Although Dickson'. prediction proved false be-
cause Ibn Saud did not include the Neutral Zone con-
cession in that granted to Socal and did not influence 
the Shaikh of Kuwait to close with Holmes, his reading 
of the situation won considerable support. locally 
and in London. 19 Even though admitting that Ibn 
Saud's letter to the Shaikh of Kuwait 'did not atter 
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all mention oil as Dickson assumes', the political 
resident .till .upported the latter's view, and 
therefore the Shaikh of Kuwait wa. warned of the 
de.ire and designs of Ibn Saud to absorb him, u.ing 
20 the oil concessions as a mean. to this end. This 
warning to the Shaikh not to li.ten to overtures 
from Ibn Saud, whether ju.tified or not, weakened 
Holm.s' po.ition and that of his American backers 
in Kuwait, which in turnstrengthened the local 
British officer.' in.i.tence on .uch a theory. 
In London the reports from the Per.ian Gult 
were reinforced from two .ource., both connected 
with Dickson. The British Mini.ter at Jedda, Sir 
Andrew Ryan, basically agreed with Dick.on's view 
and .ugge.t.d to London that Ibn Saud might soon 
make the following point to the Shaikh ot Kuwait 
in order to bring hi. und.r hi. control 
if you must be dependent on someone why 
be dependent on tho.e untrustworthy im-
periali.ts when you might depend without 
being exactly dependent on a man like me, 
old triend, fellow Mo.l.m, tell~vArab 
and the one big independent man in Arabia. 21 
A.P.O.C., on their own initiative and in an 
unprecedented move, provided the British Government 
with copies ot the recent report. they had been re-
ceiVing from the Per.ian Gulf, which contained the 
.ame warning as that is.ued by Dickson. According to 
the r.port. ot the company'. g.neral manager in Per-
.ia it •• em. that he, like Dick.on, had a •••••• d the 
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situation as meaning that Ibn Saud was planning to 
use his ne. position in the oil world to obtain po-
litical control ot Kuwait. He reminded his collea-
gues in London that in 1923 Ibn Saud had included 
the Neutral Zone and Qatar oil concessions in the 
El Hasa concession granted to Holme's, and Cox appa-
rently 'without sayino a word crossed ott Qatar 
and the Neutral Zone and handed the map back to the 
Great King.,22 (This story was probably told by 
Dickson, who was present at the Ojar Conterence 
where this took place.) 
Atter considerable consultation both internally 
and with A.P.O.C. it see.s that the British Govern-
.ent decided to take tirm and decisive steps to 
restrain turther American penetration, through the 
Syndicate or independently, into the Persian Gult, 
and instead to secure the rest ot the oil concess-
ions ot the area tor British interests. However, 
handicapped by the tact that A.P.O.C. was the only 
entirely British company interested in that part 
ot the world and was untortunately bound by the Red 
Line Agreement, it became necessary to support both 
A.P.O.C. and I.P.C. in Kuwait and the Persian Gult 
respectiVely although the latter contained American, 
French and Dutch interests. 23 
As regards the Neutral Zone, it was decided to 
support I.P.C. in its ettorts to secure the conce.-
sion. Theretore, as the British Government could 
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determine the future oil concessionaire of the Neutral 
Zone only through the Shaikh ot Kuwait, who was bound 
by the 1913 oil convention, he was approached and re-
minded that he was not a free agent in respect of the 
Neutral Zone oil concession and had to obtain the 
British GoVernment's approval and consent betore ac-
cepting any offer. 
Holme.,. who had been seen to be working against 
the British Government in the Persian Gulf, was dis-
mis.ed by the Bahrein Oil Company as their Chief Lo-
cal Representative in Bahrein after the government 
had informally exerted pressure on the company's of-
fice in London, and therefore by September 1933 he 
had left the Persian Gulf. 24 He was to return to 
. Kuwait only in February 1934 atter the British Govern-
ment had reluctantly agreed to his appointment as one 
of the negotiators for the Kuwait conce.sion on be-
half of the ne. joint subsidiary of A.P.O.C. and Gult. 
As regards the Kuwait oil concession, the go-
vernment decided to assist A.P.O.C. further and to 
that end now encouraged Shaikh Ahmad to pay an unof-
ficial visit to London. Hitherto the line taken 
by the government had been one of discoUraging the 
Shaikh frca eoaing on a private visit to London before 
,the oil concession had been granted to one of the com-
peting parties. 25 PreviouslY it had been considered 
that this would be seen by the Americans as an attempt 
to influence the Shaikh to close with A.P.O.C. and 
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might there~ore spark of~ an American protest. However 
in the altered circumstances, ie. the essential need to 
secure the Kuwait oil concession ~or British interests 
and in the absence o~ any United States Government in-
tervention, it was considered advantageous at this 
stage to have the Shaikh visit London. 
The India Office approached Buckingham Palace in 
order to arrange for him to b. received by the King. 
They explained to the Palace the importance of the oil 
issue and that the government were 'particularly an-
xious that the Shaikh's decision should be ~avourable 
to British interests.,26 Consequently the political 
resident was in~ormed of the India Of~ic.' s plans ~or 
the Shaikh in London and told that the government 
would be glad to give the Shaikh some degree of of~i­
cial recognition on his proposed private visit to 
London. 27 
However, despite British Government encouragement, 
the Shaikh apparently decided not to vi.it London at 
this atage and accordingly informed the political agent. 
At the time there were rumours circulating in Kuwait 
that Holmes was expected back aoon as A.P.O.C. and the 
Gulf Oil Corporation had joined forces and were about 
to send hi. over to negotiate ~or the conc •• sion. Ap-
parently Holmea informed the Shaikh from London, 
through his a.sociate Muhammad Yatin. of the negotia-
tions betw.en A.P.O.C. and Gulf to form a joint company 
to secure the Kuwait oil concession. Evidently dis-
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turbed by these rumours, the political resident re-
ported them to the India Office and asked for further 
information as to their truth. 28 Somewhat surprised, 
, the India Oftice claimed to have no knowledQe of 
such an arrangement and in turn approached the Pe-
troleum Department,which was in close touch with 
A.P.O.C., for 'further light on this latest Kuwait 
rumour.,29 
Consequently, within a fe. days Sir William 
Fraser, A.P.O.C.'s deputy chairman, asked to meet 
British Government representatives in order to dis-
cuss his company's position and difficulties in the 
Persian Gulf. On 11 December 1933 at an interdepart-
.ental meeting he stated, to the surprise of the 
government, that A.P.O.C. had reached an agreement 
with Gulf on sharing the Kuwait oil concession on a 
fifty fifty basis. He explained that A.P.O.C. 
could not afford to have & rival foreign oil concern 
in Kuwait on the flank of their operation in Persia 
and therefore they were most anxious to obtain a con-
cession in Kuwait. However they had been obliged to 
come to an agreement with Gul! 
owing to the danger that by granting too 
favourable terms to Kuwait they might in-
volve themselves in difficulties with the 
Persian Government who might also accuse 
them of frittering away their energies 
outside Persia. 
Pressed by the British Government representatives 
regarding the need to obtain the government's appro-
val to such a scheme, he stated that Cadman had in-
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structed him to say that this agreement had been en-
tered into with the speci~ic approval o~ the govern-
ment. The government representatives were much dis-
turbed by Fraser's statement and telt he had somehow 
misrepresented the case. There was & teeling among 
the ministries concerned that 
they have rather sacriticed our interests 
to their own in reaching an understanding 
ot the type described, without any consul-
tation with or previous notice to H.M.G. 
It was.aoreed that A.P.O.C. had raised some major 
points which the government would have to examine 
caretully.30 
Two days later, the. India O~fice intormed the 
Foreign Otfice that they and the Admiralty had no re-
cord of any such approval having been given to A.P.O.C. 
and asked the Foreign Otfice whether they had offi-
31 cially given such approval. Although it was ad-
mitted that informal discussions ot a general nature 
about the possibility of a joint A.P.O.C.-Gult ven-
ture in Kuwait had taken place, .the Foreign O~tice 
stated that ~they have not been able to trace any 
record ot any detinite approval having been given 
32 here on behalt ot H.M.G •. to any such scheme.' 
The India Otfice immediately went back to Fra-
ser and tacttully requested details ot 'the nature 
of the approval.to which you reterred and the date 
33 on which it was given.' Obviously annoyed by the 
Inida Otfice's uncooperative attitude and unable to 
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produce any written confirmation of government approval 
of the joint venture, Fraser sugoested that Cadman, who 
had the reputation within the company of being able to 
sway the government in difficult situations such as 
this, should calIon the India ottice personally to 
explain the position. It seems that whereas the govern-
ment were finally prepared to take active action to 
ensure that British interests, particularly A.P.O.C., 
would obtain the Kuwait oil concession, the company 
in its own interests had presented the government 
with a tait accompli. The consequences ot this, it 
accepted, would be a further penetration of American 
oil interests into the only territory in the Persian 
Gult where A.P.O.C. could secure the conce.sion inde-
pendently ot I.P.C. 
However, before seeing whether Cadman suceeeded 
in securing government approval tor the competitors 
to join torces in Kuwait and thus obviously to the 
last phase of the long negotiations tor the Kuwait oil 
eoncession, it i. extremely important to ascertain 
whether or not the government were presented with a 
tait accompli, to examine how the Anglo-American joint 
venture evolved and tinally what stipulations were 
imposed on the joint company by the British Government 
in order to s.cure its interest.. By so doing, a 
further inSight will be gained into Britain's objec-
tiv •• in the Persian Gult and a determination that 
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British interests should secure the region'. oil con-
cessions even if it meant revoking a promise given to 
the United States Government. Light will also be 
thrown on the new pattern of relations which develo-
ped between the British Government and its 'national 
champion' which was in complete contrast to that of 
the early period. 
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PART IV 
THE Jl"USION OP' INt1!gSTS 
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1. 'If you can't beat them, join them' 
The British Government were first acquainted as 
early as January 1932 with the idea that A.P.O.C. might 
take up the Kuwait oil concession jointly with Gulf 
on a fifty-fifty ba.is. While A.P.O.C.'. geologists 
were surveying Kuwait's territory, and its directors 
still considering whether to comp.t. seriou.ly for a 
concession in Kuwait, Wilson broached the subject 
with the Petroleum Department. This A.P.O.C. direc-
tor, who favoured the idea of going into Kuwait and 
was soon to leave the company to join Parliament, ex-
plained that a joint venture might provide a reasonable 
way out ot the ditficulties for A.P.O.C. and the go-
vernment. Hi. reasoning was based, a •• een above, 
on the company's inability tor internal rea.ons to 
compete against the terms otfered by the American., 
and on the gov.rnm.nt's being pr •••• d by the United 
Stat.s Gov.rnm.nt at the time to.adopt an 'open door' 
. 1 
for American intere.t. in Kuwait. 
,In general the two companies, A.P.O.C. and Gult, 
already enjoyed a broad under. tanding and clo.e co-
operation as partners in I.P.C. The;etore in A.P.O.C. 
circle. it was f.lt that a mutually .ati.tactory agree-
ment would not be too difticult to arrange. llowever 
as the company had not yet determined wheth.r or not 
to enter the race in Kuwait no further reference to 
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the scheme was made either to the government or to 
Gul~. 
Consequently, &iter A.P.O.C.'s board had ~inally 
decided to apply ~or a comprehensive concession in Ku-
wait, the company approached Gul~. In a letter dated 
26 July 1932 A.P.O.C.'. representative in the United 
States tried to ascertain Gulf's intentions and posi-
tion regarding an oil concession in Kuwait. He inform-
ed Wallace that A.P.O.C. had been interested in secu-
ring an oil concession in Kuwait since the early twen-
ties and blamed the lack o~ support on the part o~ 
the British Government ~or their ~ailing to obtain it 
previously. To substantiate hi. claim which, to use 
hi. words 'to an Ameriean ••••••• may well seem incre-
dible', he re~erred to the recent government decision 
to waive the nationality clause in the case of the 
Kuwait oil concession. 
A.P.O.C.'s inactivity in Kuwait since 1926 was 
put down to the company'. refu.al to accept the high 
royalty and other conditions offered by Holme. a. they 
con.idered they could have a prejudicial effect on the 
I.P.C. negotiation. ~or the Iraq oil concession. As 
Gulf had a share in I.p.e., A.P.O.C.'s representative 
made a point o~ mentioning that hi. company'. inacti-
vity in Kuwait was directly bene~icial to I.P.C.'s 
negotiation. with the Iraqi Government and th.re~ore 
beneficial alao to Gul~. Finally he announced his 
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company's determination to secure the concession as 
it lay within their sphere of influence, and assured 
Wallace that A.P.O.C. had done nothing to determine 
the British Government's attitude towards Gulf's agent, 
2 the E.& G.S. 
The Gulf Oil corporation'. reply was totally un-
expected. Wallace rejected A.P.O.C.'s claim that it 
was not supported by the British Government and stated 
that according to his information they had received 
support and highly preferential treatment trom the go-
vernment. He referrei to his company's conviction that 
the British Government had introduced the nationality 
clause in the case ot the Bahrein and Kuwait oil con-
cessions only after being intormed by A.P.O.C. of the 
American tag attached to the E.& G.S. As has been 
seen above, this accusation was ill-founded and had 
been initiated by the Syndicate, who blamed Gulf 
tor revealing their agreement with the Syndicate to 
3 the other partner in I.P.C., ie. A.P.O.C. Emphasi-
sing his company's equally strong determination to 
secure the Kuwait oil concession, wallace stated his 
hop. that atter A.P.O.C.'. policy had been reviewed 
by its 'more responsible official.' the Syndicate would 
receive the consideration to which it was entitled both 
from the British Government and A.P.O.C., referring 
onCe lIlore to the close links betw.en the two." 
This correspondenee was reported to London, where 
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shortly ~terwards negotiations between the two compa-
nies were resumed. While in London, Gul~'s chairman 
met CAdman. At their meeting Colonel Drake raised the 
Kuwait issue and expressed surprise that A.P.O.C. should 
be hampering Gul~'s e~~orts to secure the concession 
since 'the A.P.O.C. had been offered the territory and 
had declined it.,5 He was obviously re~erring to the 
negotiations between A.P.O.C., and the Syndicate in 
1926 when the ~ormer rejected an option on all the Syn-
dicate's holdings in the Persian Gulf. 6 
Not completely realising the very close links 
between Gul~ and the B.& G.S., Cadman replied that 
Drake must be mistaken. A.P.O.C. had neVer refused 
to 00 into Kuwait and they considered the terri tory 
to be within their natural and particular sphere o~ 
influence. Cadman, in ~act, restated A.P.O.C.'. lono-
standing conviction,broughtto the government's no-
tice as early as 1912-13, that their commercial inde-
pendence re.ted on their controlling oil exploita-
tion near their Persian oilfields.7 
Acutely aware of the Foreign O~tice's deep an-
xiety to de~use the Anglo-American oil controversy in 
Kuwait, Cadman in~ormed Oliphanto~ his conversation 
with Gul~'s ch&irman. At their meeting Cadman repor-
ted on the two companies' present position and told 
Oliphant that on his coming visit to the United Stat.s 
he would most certainly r&ise the issue with Gul~'s 
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directors. According to Cadman, A.P.O.C. considered 
that Gult's activities in Kuwait were an intringement 
in spirit ot a limitation agreement signed between 
the big oil companies not to overlap into each others 
zones. 
8 Not wishing to add turther complications to 
an already complicated situation, Oliphant urged Cad-
man to avoid anything likely to aggravate Anglo-Ameri-
can relations. 
As he had intended"Cadman raised the Kuwait is-
sue once again with Gult's directors during his visit 
to the United States in November 1932. At his meeting 
with Gult's vice-chairman responsible tor overseas 
operations, Cadman restated his company's position. 
However this time he was contronted with copies ot the 
1926 correspondence between A.P.O.C. and the E.& G.S. 
which implied that the tormer had indeed declined to 
go into Kuwait. surprised and embarassed by the accu-
rate intormation obtained by Gulf trom their associa-
tes, the E.& O.S., CAdman replied that Gult would se-
curethe Kuwait oil conce.sion,only 'over his dead 
body,.9 
,Back in London, Cadman intormed the Foreign ot-
tice ot his negotiations in the united States. How-
ever, shortly Afterwards, he was asked by Oliphant to 
provide the Foreign Ottice with more details ot the 
position ot A.P.O.C.'s negotiations with Gult. It 
seems that Cadman's previous report had been misinter-
preted. J.H. Hall, who had been acquainted with the 
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oil'issue since his days in the Colonial Office, 
gained the impression from his recent conversation 
with Cadman that A.P.O.C. and Gulf had practically 
agreed to share the proposed Kuwait oil concession 
on a fifty-fifty basis. However as the American Em-
bassy were still pressing the Foreign Ottice hard 
on behalt ot Gult, the former was lett with no alter-
native but to conclude that it was 'possible that Gult 
did not consider the proposed arrangement with A.P.O.C. 
as near completion as Cadman did. 10 
In his reply Cadman told Oliphant that the &i-
tuation was tar'trom what Hall understood. He ex-
plained that he had given Hall only an 
impression of what I thought might 
ultimately aris. in conn.ction with 
the Kuwait negotiations in view ot 
my di.cu.sion. with the Mellon Group. 
N.v.rth.l •••• according to Cadman, A.P.O.C. intended 
to press ah.ad to the bitt.r end in ord.r to .ecur. 
the concession. ll A. th.y con.id.red Cadman'. answer 
.till not .ufticiently explicit, the Foreign Office 
as.umed theretore that the n.gotiation. bet.een the 
two compani •• w.r •• till at a preliminary .tage and 
that both .id •• w.re .till trying to obtain the con-
ce •• ion independently. irre.pective ot their nego-
tiation. to join force.. Nevertheles., the mini.try 
decid.d to intorm the India ottice and the Admiralty 
of the current .ituation. 
Th. India Ottice were alarm.d by the po.sibility 
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o~ a joint Anglo-American venture in Kuwait. They 
opposed in particular a ~i~ty-~i~ty share to include 
the actual exploitation o~ the concession which meant 
a large contingent ot Americans in Kuwait. The Ad-
miralty were equally concerned, as they considered 
such an agreement on a ~i~ty-~i~ty share in Kuwait 
to be unacceptable without adequate compensati.ng ad-
vantages ~or British interests els.where in the Per-
sian Gult. ,The Admiralty suggested that in return tor 
allowing. the Americans a SO percent share in Kuwai t 
the Americans should transter to British interests 
their controlot.the,Bahrein and £1 Hasa oil conces-
sions. 13 \ ~y, allowing the Americans to participate 
in a consortium under British control in Kuwait 
they hoped,in.return to .achieve British control over 
the Bahrein and £1 Hasa oil. concessions, where the 
Americans had succeeded ~or the ~irst time in obtai-
ning an independent tooting in the area. They re-
commended there~ore that Cadman be intormed that a 
joint Anglo-American venture· in Kuwait would not be 
regarded as satistactory by the British Government 
without their proposed arrangement tor the oil con-
cessions otBahrein and £1 Hasa. 
The Foreign ottice were alarmed by the India 
Ottice and Admiralty'. respon.e. They immediately 
approached G. Rendel, who together with Cadman was 
responsible ~or presenting Britain's case against 
the cancellation ot A.P.O.C.'s concession in Persia 
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be~ore the League o~ Nations in Geneva. Rendel was 
asked to obtain a clear statement ~rom Cadman as to 
A.P.O.C.'. position vis-a-vis the Gulf Oil Corpora-
tion regarding the Kuwait oil concession, and to 
explain the British Government's deliberations about 
a joint venture. At their ~reCJuent meetings the Fo-
reign Office representative obtained a clear picture 
~rom Cadman of A.P.O.C.'s policy in Kuwait. 
Cadman reported that A.P.O.C. were determined 
to acquire a controlling interest in the Kuwait 
oil concession in one form or another, since they 
could not 'allow A rival group to operate so close. 
as it were, to their flank.' Th.re~ore they would 
try to secure the concession and simultaneously 
try to come to some arrangement with Gulf on the 
basis o~ A fifty-fifty share. Nevertheless the 
Foreign O~fice representative was assured that the 
joint company would have to be British, with A.P.O.C. 
retaining the management of such a company and being 
entrusted with the exploitation work. 
There were some difficulties, explained Cadman, 
which delayed a solution. On the one hand the Ame-
ricans were suspicious that after securing the con-
cession on this joint basis A.P.O.C. might re~rain 
from developing it for some time. On the other hand, 
A.P.O.C. were concerned that if they .ecured the con-
cession on this basis and developed it at once 'the 
Persian Government may revive the accusation that 
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they [A.P.O.C.) are ~rittering away their energies 
elaewhere than in Persia.' Consequently, according 
to C&dman,.A.p.O.C. did not intend to pursue the mat-
ter until atter their current negotiations with the 
Persian Government were concluded one way or another. 14 
In the report ot hi. conver.ation with Cadman, 
Rendel concluded theretore that most ot the tear. ex-
pr •••• d by the India ottice and the Admiralty were 
unn.c •• sary a. A.p.e.C. w.re committed to preventing 
the Kuwait conce.sion talling under etfectiv. control 
ot the American ••. The Foreign Ottice wa. particularly 
relieved a. Cadman promi.ed that in any agreement 
reached with Gult the exploitation work would have 
to be accorded to A.P.O.C. 
Shortly atterward.,Cadman re.um.d his contact 
with Gult. Betore leaving tor Teheran h. met Mellon, 
who was to return shortly to the United State. atter 
concluding his term ot ottice as the United State. 
Ambassador. At their .eeting on 1 March 1933 Cadman 
stated his conviction that the current state ot attair. 
in Kuwait whereby the two companies were competing 
again.t each other would be costly in terms ot royalty 
and dev.lopment obligations t~ whichever conc.rn ul-
timately .ecured the conce.sion. He sugge.ted, there-
tore, that the two companies s.ttle their ditterences 
without any outside assi.tance, by which he meant the 
E.& G.S., and .hare the conces.ion equally. Mellon 
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explained he was not ~ully aware o~ Gul~'s current 
.tand and promised to acquaint them with A.P.D.C.'. 
proposal •• 1S 
In the circumstance. Cadman decided to leave 
the door open ~or Gul~ and meanwhile to intensi~y 
A.P.O.C. '. competition ~or the concession.'He in-
~ormed A.P.O.C.'. representative in the United Sta-
te. o~ the' .ituation, instructing him' to continue 
the negotiations, while in Persia the company's rep-
resentatives were ~nstructed to pres. hard ~or the 
Kuwait conce.sion in'order to ahow the Americans 
that 'we are in dead erne.t to .ecure the conce.sion 
and shall go to any lengths to do so.' 16 
Gul~'s uncompromising stand was mainly due to 
Holmes' over-optimistic reports ~rom Kuwait. He had 
reported up to May 1933 that the Shaikh was determined 
not to grant the concession to A.P.O.C. As regards 
Gul~'s prospects, Holmes had reported that the 
Shaikh wanted to close the deal with him but was 
being prevented ~rom doing so by local British of~i­
cials. Therefore, when A.P.O.C. approached Gul~ to 
conclude a deal whereby the concession would be 
shared, they concluded that A.P.O.C. were willing to 
share it because the Shaikh was indeed ~avourably 
inclined towards the Syndicate. A.P.O.C.'s persis-
tence was seen as a sign o~ weakne.s indicating their 
inability to secure the conce.sion independently, and 
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this ~urther encouraged Gul~ to reject the proposed 
offer. 
However all this had changed by mid-May when 
the Shaikh's sudden suspension of the negotiations 
~or an indefinite period forced Gul~ to reconsider 
its position. The Gulf directors assumed that the 
Shaikh's move was designed to raise the bidding still 
further and therefore .aw the possibility of the 
bargaining continuing indefinitely. 
Holmes' astonishment at the Shaikh's move and 
his report of the current setback served to strength-
en the Gulf directors' belief that his previous op-
ti_ism had been unfounded. Moreover the State De-
partment's half-hearted support was very disappoin-
ting to the company, and with Mellon'. departure 
. from London they felt they might eventually los. the 
concession altogether. 17 Consequently, during hi. 
stay in London Wallace approached A.P.O.C. to discuss 
the situation in Kuwait. He found A.P.O.C.'s di-
rectors more willing than ever before to come to 
some arrangement over Kuwait because the Persian dis-
pute had already been solved to their satisfaction 
and their oil eonces.ion renewed for a further sixty 
years. 1B 
For its part Gulf preferred to secure an inde-
pendent oil conce.sion on half of Kuwait's territory, 
thus leaving any scheme ~or a joint venture in abeyance. 
They were particularly afraid that because of A.P.O.C.'s 
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large supplies ~rom Persia production in Kuwait would 
be restricted, thus depriving them o~ the ~ull bene-
~it o~ their hal~ interest in the conce.sion. To 
this proposal A.P.O.C. obviously could not agree as 
they wished to control the exploitation work and 
production in the whole o~ Kuwait territory which 
they considered essential'and had already promised 
the British'Government would be the case. Neverthe-
less the two'companies agreed to continue their ne-
gotiations and meanwhile suspended any e~~ort to 
secure the concession independently. The so-called 
-standstill,agreement' was signed on 23 May to cover 
the next three weeks but was subsequently extended 
to eight months, the period ultimately required to 
overcome the various di~~iculties in ~orming the 
19 
-joint concern - the Kuwait oil Company. 
There were three main issues ·to settle be~ore 
the ~inal ~ormation o~ the Kuwait Oil Company, espe-
cially as British dominance had to be secured. Fir-
stly the Gul~ Oil Corporation had to be released 
~rom its agreement with the £.& G.S. and in particu-
lar its commitment to pay the Syndicate one shilling 
over-riding royalty per ton which was regarded by 
Cadman as unacceptable and as-little short o~ black-
.&11_. 20 Secondly it was vital to s~eouard A.P.O.C.'s 
special interests and to agree on the method by which 
this would be achieved. Thirdly the British Govern-
.ent'. approval and con.ent had to be obtained a. 
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the Shaikh could negotiate only with a company appro-
ved by the British Government. 
The agreement between the E.& G.S. ~dt~ Eas-
tern Gult Company was signed on 6 November 19~~. It 
comprised twelve clauses and virtually released the 
two parties trom their mutual obligations. The Syn-
dicate was paid a total ot £36,000 in return tor re-
leasing Gult trom a claim to any and all cash payments 
and royalties and giving an undertaking not to obtain 
at any time any conc.ssion in Kuwait tor themselves 
or any other party. Nevertheless Gult kept open an 
option to re-employ Holmes as their negotiator tor 
the Kuwait oil conc.ssion as he was considered ca-
pable ot s~eguarding Gult's interests in Kuwait 
21 
and had great knowledge ot local conditions. 
The agreement between A.P.O.C. and the Gult Ex-
ploration Company, a subsidiary ot the Gult Oil Cor-
poration ot Pensyl vania, was signed on 14 December. 
It provided tor the tormation ot a joint company struc-
tured on the basic principle ot equality between the 
two partners. The Kuwait Oil Company was, to be regis-
tered in London with a board ot six directors to be 
nominated equally by A.P.O.C. and Gult. 
However A.P.O.C. succeeded in ensuring that they 
would control the quantity of oil produced in Kuwait 
by substituting oil from other sources. Claus •• ight 
of the agreement permitted A.P.O.C. to supply its 
partner with crude oil trom alternative sources, ie. 
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Iraq or Persia, in amounts which did not exceed the 
quantity which in the absence of such alternative 
22 
supply Gul~ might have required ~rom Kuwait. This 
stipulation was immensely important to A.P.O.C. as 
it enabled them to control the amount ot oil produ-
ced trom Kuwait and to coordinate oil production 
trom their various sources in the Gult. In theory 
A.p.a.C. would be able to reduce Kuwait's production 
to a minimum to please the Persian Government or 
when production exceeded demand, or to boost pro-
duction to a maximum. They were to start this lat-
ter tactic when their Persian oilfields were na-
tionalised in 1951-.. This stipulation was of no 
commercial consequence to Gult as it provided them 
with thetull amount ot crude to Which they were 
entitled either trom Kuwait or other A.P.O.C. sour-
ces, ie. Persia or Iraq. Nevertheless, realising 
the restrictive nature ot clause eight on Kuwait's 
future production, the company was apprehensive 
that knowledge ot this secret agreement could have 
a very adverse eftect upon the Shaikh who might 
penali.e them for accepting it. 23 
Another important clause tor A.P.O.C. bound 
the two partners reciprocally to ensure that Kuwait's 
oil would not be used to upset or injure either 
company'. marketing position directly or indirectly 
at any time or place. Consequently as this agree-
ment bound only the two partners in the Kuwait Oil 
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Company and not the parent companies, a further agree-
ment,similar to the principal agreement, was signed 
between the Gulf oil Corporation and A.P.O.C. and its 
subsidiaries thus ensuring complete security tor each 
group's markets. This latest undertaking, however, 
was of immense importance and later caused Gulf con-
siderable ditticulty. In ettect it meant that their 
share of Kuwait's production could not be sold in any 
market in which A.P.O.C. was directly or indirectly 
interested, ie. Europe and the East, and theretore 
they had to sell a large amount ot it unrefined. 
A.P.O.C. were naturally sati.tied with the agree-
ments reached with Gult and considered them to sate-
guard their special interests. Finally, after kee-
ping the British Government in the dark since the 
'standstill agreement' was signed, they approached 
the government tor its approval. It seems that 
A.P.O.C. had decided to intorm the government and 
ask for its blessing only atter reaching an agreement 
with their rival and it is quite obvious why the com-
pany chose to pursue such a policy. 
As has been seen, Cadman was aware of the India 
Office's and in particular the Admiralty's unrealis-
tic demands for British interests if the British Go-
vernment agreed to a joint Anglo-American venture in 
Kuwait. Therefore, as an ex-government official, he 
realised that it would be impossible to negotiate with 
Gult while simultaneously securing the various ministries' 
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consent on every stage of these delicate negotiations. 
The A.P.O.C. chairman knew of the deep division which 
existed between the various ministries concerned and 
theretore he counted on the Foreign Oftice and the 
Petroleua Department, who wanted a settlement to the 
Anglo-American oil controversy in Kuwait, to carry 
the India Otfice and the Admiralty atter being presen-
ted with a tait accompli. To reject the Anglo-Ameri-
can venture in Kuwait or to create too many ditficul-
ties tor-A.p.o.C. would be unacceptable to the govern-
ment, as Cadman was aware, since the alternative 
would be a purely American company securing the con-
cession. most probably Socal. This was especially 
so in view of the tact that A.P.O.C. was the only Bri-
tish oil company interested in Kuwait and of the Bri-
tish Government's undertaking to the united States 
Govern.ent that the Americans would'be tree to com-
pete in Kuwait on equal terms. 24 
The government representatives present at the 
11 December meeting were therefore surprised when Fra-
ser announced the understanding reached between A.P.O.C. 
and Gult. As a result arrangements were made tor Cad-
man to visit the India Oftice to substantiate Sir Wil-
liam Fraser's claim that the proposed agreement for 
a titty-titty exploitation in Kuwait had been speciti-
cally approved by the government. 
At his meeting with the deputy Under-Secretary in 
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the India Office on 4 January, Cadman related his pre-
vious discussions with the Foreign Office and the Pet-
roleum Department. Although the India Office were 
aware that no official approval had been given for 
the agreement reached between British and American 
interest., they accepted Cadman's claim that 'there 
was sufficient reason for the A.P.O.C. to assuae that 
a fifty-fifty arrangement with the Gulf Corporation 
25 
would not be objected to by H.M.G.' As seen above, 
A.P.O.C.'s undertaking to secure the exploitation 
work in Kuwait was given only verbally to the Foreign 
Office and therefore was unknown to the India Office. 26 
However it was' agreed that the government would not 
be committed in advance to approval of a conce.sion 
being granted by the Shaikh of Kuwait to a joint con-
cern un1e.s they were satisfied that'the government's 
interest. were adequately safeguarded. In order to 
appease the India Office Cadman indicated A.P.O.C.'s 
readiness to meet the government's requirements in 
every way possible but made sure it' was understood that 
this held good only provided no objection was raised 
by Gulf. 
It seems that the British Government intended 
to impose much more stringent stipulations in Kuwait 
than 'those agreed for Bahrein. which were now con-
sidered to be of very little value. 27 The Admiralty 
in particular insisted that at least SO per cent of 
the oil obtained should be refined either in Kuwait 
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or at some Indian port,ie.inBritish territory, that 
the plant should be capable ot producing fuel oil 
suitable for Admiralty us. and that the government 
should retain the right of pre-emption in case ot 
emergency.28 By now, especially att.r the discovery 
ot oil in Bahrein, the Admiralty considered it had 
been a most serious mistake to allow the Americans 
into Bahrein without .at.guarding Britain's oil in-
tere.ts. They particularly appreciated now the spe-
cial value ot an oil .upply which, without tear ot 
political complications, could be protected in war 
by a minimal torce compared with that required to 
protect the Anglo-P.r.ian, oiltield •• 
The India,Ottic. wanted to limit a. tar a. po.-
.ible the number ot American. in Kuwait and make their 
appointment .ubject to government approval. Th • 
• trong •• t oppo.ition to the .ntryot the Am.ricans 
into Kuwait wa •• xpr •••• d by the political re.ident, 
who sugg.sted to the India Ottice that A.P.O.C. be 
told categorically that the Briti.h Gov.rnment 'can-
not agr.e to Shaikh giving conce •• ion to the group 
unl ••• exploitation on the spot is British.' Fowl., 
who could not be consider.d in any way prejudiced 
against A.P.O.C., by now ,had become very critical ot 
the company which, to us. his words, 'appear to have 
adopted distinctly evasive tactics' in their pres.nt 
neootiations with the British Governm.nt. In parti-
- ~Z7 .. 
cular, he accused .the company o~ trying 'to blu~f 
that H.M.G. had. agreed to ~i~ty-fifty exploitation 
on the spot.' 29 It se .. s that the, relative posi-
tions o~ the government ministries. had changed con-
siderably in order to suit their own objectives. 
nae Foreign Office and the Petroleum Department had 
now become A.P.O.C. supporters while the Admiralty 
and the. British o~ficials in the Persian Gul~ had 
become critical o~ the company. 
However the various .lnistries and in parti-
cular the India Office and the AdmirAlty, soon be-
came aware o~ their inability to ~orce A.P.O.C. to 
agr .. to all the stipulations they desired. It 
bee .. e obvious. thAt it would be much aore difficult 
to secure agre_ent to stipulations designed to 
sateguard the British Government's interests from 
a purely American company".speeiallyfroa Socal 
which had obtained the Bahrein concession with f.wer 
strings attached and was interested in Kuwai t, than 
~rom a combine which was 50 per cent British-owned. 
nae aenace of Socal, Ibn Saud's favourite, entering 
the field in Kuwai tatter obtaining the Bahrein and 
£1 Has. Conces.ions always po.ed a threat. naia 
forced the British GoverDIDent to eomprondse and to 
conclude their negotiations with A.P.O.C. in a r.la-
Uvely abort ti.e. (Although officially representa-
tives of Gulf and A.P.O.C. conducted the negotiations 
with the Bri tisb Governaent, in practice Cadman and 
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his deputy,were in charge ot them.) 
Indeed. within a month ot negotiations commen-
cing the political agreement, as it was called, was 
praeticallyagreedupon, and even before it had, been 
signed by the parties concemed the negotiations in 
Kuwait .ere reopened with the government's blessing. 
Cadman showed great skill in negotiating with the 
government and achieved considerable concession.. By 
then he had gained the reputation in company circl.s 
ot being a trouble-shooter with the ability to pre-
.ent the company's case succe •• tully to the govern-
.ent and to win its support. Although priaarily 
dealing wi th the India Ottice, he urged the Foreign 
Ottice and the Petroleum Departaent privately to 
help hi. overcome that l •• s cooperative ainistry. 
HoI ... ' appointaent. tor instance, caused considerable 
eli .agreamen t between the gov.rnaen t and the Kuwai t 
Oil Company representatives. B.caus. ot Hol •••• 
great local intluence and close relationship with 
Gsalt, he was appoint.d on behalf ot the Am.dcAns to 
n.gotiate tor the conc.ssion in Kuwait. The British 
Government objected strongly to this action .s they 
had gone to considerable lengths to remove hi. fro. 
the P.rsian Gult. Theretore Cac:lman had to take this 
i •• ue up with the British Government. SO 
On tbe one hand, he, aaked the Foreign Ottice 
• to help to get the other departments cODcemed to 
accept Major Hol.es' , 31 while at the .... ti •• h. 
,'.\0. 
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told the India e~~ice quite bluntly what the conse-
quenc •• would be it Ho1Il'le.' appointment wera reject.d 
by the British Government. From the point ot vie. ot 
succe.stu1'negotiations with the Shaikh, explained Cad-
man,' it might be better to accept Gulf's nOll'linea ra-
ther than employ an'Americannational. In anyca.e, 
it Hol.es .are to be replaced, continued Cadman, his 
capACity and opportuniti.s tor intrigue might be v.ry 
dangerous and ther.fore it was better to keep hi. under 
tight contro1.32 
A.p.e.c.'s' chairman al.o consid.red that Gulf 
might su.pect A.P.O.C. ot being behind Hol •• s' rejec-
tion as he wa. known to be su.piciou. ot A.p.e.C., 
and theretor. Cadman pr •••• d the Briti.h Gov.rnment 
hard to accept the GUlt nGain... H. succeed.d in hia 
ettorta and it waa agreed that in n.gotiations with 
the Shaikh Hol.e. would occupy a •• condary position 
to that ot"A.P.O.C.'s nominee'and be replaced at the 
tirst sign'ol his cauaing trouble. (Although Cadman 
proais.d this to the India ettice,' he was tairly sura 
that Holmes would not playa secondary role as his ex-
perience, knowledge and cordial relations with the 
Shaikh since 1923 were tar great.r than those ot the 
young Chi shola. ) 
AIlother difficult point at isaue with the Britiah 
Government was the Admiralty's stipulation that at 
least SO per cent of the oil obtained should be refined 
ei ther in Kuwai t i taelf or SOIDe Indi&1 port. The com-
- 330 -
pany argued that they would not be able to ~ind ade-
quate aarket. ~or this r.~ined oil and there~ore it 
wa •• tated that A.P.O.C. would have no intere.t in 
the conce •• ion i~ it were aade subj.ct to a r.~ining 
clau... The company'. policy was to build r.~in.rie. 
n.ar the company'. big market. in Europe, u.ing the 
33 Abadan r.~in.ry to .upply the .a.tern aarket. ~~.n 
they were approach.d on the i •• ue by A.P.O.C., the 
Foreign Ottice immediately let the India Ottic. have 
their vi.w. They .tated that it would be 'a thou.and 
piti •• it negotiation. with the company w.re allowed 
to break down' and indicated their .upport tor the 
3. 
company. Con.equ.ntly a 'compromi.e' was ~ound 
giving the company the right to Choosewhether or not 
to build a re~inery in Kuwait. 35 
From this account it ..... that A.P.O.C. were 
in a very .trong position vi.-a-vi. the Briti.h Go-
vernment who d •• perately wanted to aaintain British 
intere.t. in Kuwait, and this wa. eVentually reflec-
t.d in the tinal clau.e. ot the political agr .... nt. 
The provi.ion. ot the agr .... nt .igned on 5 March 
aay be .ummari.ed ~tollow •• -
a) A provi.ion stipulating that the iaportation ot 
~or.ign per.onnel to Kuwait be .ubject to the Bri-
tish Governm.nt's consent, .uch consent not being 
unreasonably withh.ld it r.quir.d ~or the etti-
ci.ncy o~ the company'. operation. 
b) A provi.ion that one o~ the superior local .. ploye •• 
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be designated, subject to the approval of the Bri-
tish Government, chief local repr.sentative to be 
responsible for the company's local r.lations with 
the Shaikh. 
c) A provision sat.guarding the British Gov.rnment's 
right to select .ite. tor d.tence purpos.s, aero-
dromes, telegraph., wirel.ss or development of har-
bours. 
d) A provision tor pr .... ption of oil produced in Ku-
wAi t in ti.e of war •. 
e) A-provision leaving the company tr.e to d.cide wh.ther 
the oil produced in Kuwait should be disposed of in 
the fora of crude oil or of tinished products. 
t) A proviSion barring the company from transferring 
the concession to any other company wi thou t the 
British Government'. con.ent in writing, thus ensu-
ring again.t a repetition of .vents in Bahrein wh.re 
the Syndicate transt.rred the conc ••• ion to a pur.-
ly-American company.36 
The signing of the political agr .... nt. ie. the 
British Government'. approval for the Kuwait Oil COID-
pany to negotiate with Shaikh Ahmad. naturally initia-
ted the last pha.e in the long and complicated negotia-
tions tor what was to become lat.r one of the mo.t 
productive oilti.ld. in the ~rld. A. the Kuwait Oil 
Company represented the two compa~ie. who had previously 
been competing for the conce.sion and was the only com-
pany approved of and supported by the British Governaent, 
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there was little prospect o~ the concession going to 
another company.' Although the ~inancial terms had 
yet to be negotiated with the Shaikh, all concerned 
in London agreed nevertheless that within a tew 
weeks he would grant the concession to the British 
Government's nominee ~or relatively low payments 
aa no' ~urther competitor approved by the British Go-
vernment existed. 
However, the Shaikh was atill determined to 
secure the best terma possible, and although handi-
capped by the 1913 oil convention which bound him 
to negotiate only with the company approved by the 
, Sri Ush Government, he atill had the laat word. 
Theretore, to the surprise o~ all concerned the ne-
"gotiations between the Kuwait Oil Company and the 
Shaikh continued ~or'ten montha and the concession 
waa eventually aecured only on relatively high ~i­
nanclal terms compared wi th those ini ttally o~~ered. 
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2. The British Government Nominee: 
The Kuwait Oil Company 
As already indicated the Kuwait Oil Company'. 
repr •• entatives were hurri.dly sent ott to Kuwait to 
reopen the oil n.gotiation., and d •• pit. the politi-
cal agr .... nt still being und.r con.id.ration the 
British Gov.rnment .anctioned th.ir departur.. Th. 
goverllJlent was particularly anxious to get the con-
c ••• ion conclud.d betore any oth.r company, notably 
SocaI, .ntered the tield to comp.te again.t the Ku-
wait Oil Company. They con.ider.d that SocAl'. suc-
ce •• in SL)rein, where they had recently di.cover.d 
additional oil, aade it all the more nece •• ary to ta-
cilitate an .arly agr .... nt betw •• n Shaikh Ahmad and 
the Kuwai t Oi 1 Company. 1 
A.P.O.C. ~or th.ir part •• r. gen.rally anxious 
to get the negotiation. tor the Kuwait oil conc ••• ion 
out ot the way quickly a. th.y wanted to approach the 
Shaikh o~ Kuwait aft.rward. on behal~ o~ I.P.C. wi th 
a vi •• to .ecuring the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral 
Zone oil conc ••• ion. 2 In particular they w.r. awar. ot 
the po •• ibility that Shaikh Ahmad aight not r.c.ive 
th.ir r.pr •• entative., HoI ••• and Chi.hola, too ta-
vourably, and would instead bring in Socal in order 
to r.vive comp.tition tor the Kuwait oil conc ••• ion. 
A.P.O.C.'. nomine •• on the Kuwait Oil Company'. 
board wer. aware ot Socal'. pre.tige in the P.r.ian 
Gul~, particularly att.r this company had grant.d Ibn 
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Saud .uch tavourable tinancial terms tor the £1 Hasa 
oil conee.sion. Theretore. as they considered that 
without strong political .upport the Shaikh might at-
tempt to e"Ploi t the .i tua don by bringing in Soeal 
a. a bidder, A.P.O.C. recommended that the India ot-
tiee aake it abundan tly clear' to the Shaikh that the 
British Governaent would not approve proposals trom 
any other quarter tor hi. conce.sion. Furthermore, 
they .ugge.ted that he should be advi.ed to close 
wi th the Kuwai t Oil Company who were ottering gene-
rou. tinancial term. and .ere best eqUiped to exploi t 
hi. territory.' 
Consequently while Hol.e. and Chishola were on 
their way to Kuwait. 'the India ottiee instructed the 
political re.ident to intorm the Shaikh that the Bri-
tish Government would welcome a aucce.stul re.ul t to 
. hi. negotiation. with the Kuwait Oil Company in the 
near tuture •. The India Ottie ... phasi.ed to the lo-
cal ottic.r. - Fowl. and Dickson - that the gov.rn-
.ent .tood tirmly behind the Kuwai tOil Coapany par-
ticularly 'in order to di.inish the risk ot the 
Shaikh turning toward. Soeal .... 
, Having received the govem.ent· a instructions, 
the political resident .ad. a personal visit to Kuwait. 
He told the Shaikh on 16 F.bruary ot the formation ot 
the Kuwai t Oil Company and that Hol.e. and Chi sholm 
were to approach hi. ahortly to reopen the oil negotia.-
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tiona on behalf of this joint concern. However he 
warned the Shaikh not to commence negotiations until 
he had received formal permission fra. the British 
Government whieh would be torthea.ing shortly. The 
reason tor adopting ,this cautious attitude was due 
to his and Dickson'. experience in dealing with the 
Shaikh. Both believed that tormal strong support 
tor the Kuwait Oil Company by the British Government 
might produce negative results, as on previous occa-
sions, and place an unecessary strain on relations 
between th .. and the Shaikh. Dickson in partieular 
re.ented the period when the Shaikh had suspected 
hi. of being an A.P.O.C. agent and had consequently 
ceased all consultation with hi. o.er the oil issu •• 
Theretore at th. same ti.e a. instrUcting the Shaikh 
to wait tor the BoI'iUah OoveJ:lllllent's tormal con.ent, 
Fowl. adviSed the India Office that • too enthusias-
tic a backing ot the Kuwait Oil Company by H.M.G • 
• ay have an opposite' etfect to what i. de.ired. ,.5 
The tollowing day, betore leaving tor Bu.hire. 
th. poli tical r •• ident •• t Hol. ••• and Chi.hola who 
had ju.t arrived. He intormed them of hi. recent 
di scussion wi th the Shaikh and reques ted thea to keep 
Dickson tully in touch with the si tuation as it devel-
oped. Ful.ly appreciative ot the delicate situation, 
Hol.e. and Chishola avoided the oil is.ue altogether 
during their ini tial .eeting wi th the Shaikh. For 
his part. although exceedingly cordial and genuinely 
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pleaaed to be dealing with theae two, (he had initially 
auggested, aa aeen above, dividing hi. territory be-
6 tween the intereat. they respectively repre.ented), 
the Shaikh also Avoided the oil i •• ue aa he waa still 
waiting ~or·th. Briti.h Government'. ~ormal consent 
to negotiate ~r .. ly ~orthe commercial terma o~ the 
concesaion. Therefore it WAa ~only on 22 February 
thAt the oil negotiationa were re.umed ~t.r their 
·suapen.ion in May 1933, the Bri tiah Government'. con-
aent having been received. 7 
Howev.r, to hi. aatoni.hm.nt, the Shaikh quickly 
reali.ed that he waa being of~ered conaiderably le •• 
~avour&ble ter •• by the joint concern than tho.e la.t 
o~~ered by the two partners .eparately. The Kuwait 
Oil Company wa. o~fering Ra.200,OOO when the conce.-
.ion wa •• igned and R· •• 2.10 anna. royalty per ton of 
oil 'exported and sold' compared with Ra.400,OOO ini-
tial payment by A.P.O.C. and Ra.3.8 annaa per ton of 
oil 'won and .aved' of~ered by the Syndicate/Gul~.8 
The Shaikh reasoned that i~ hia conceaaion had been 
worth the .um. of~ered previously by the two com-
paniea .epara tell' there' was no rea.on why it .hould 
not be worth that to them jointly. 
It ..... ~rom a .eeting which ~ollowed soon 
Atter with the political agent that the Shaikh'. great 
enthu.ia .. Lor the joint concern had been ahort-lived. 
On 2S February he .et Dickson and this ti.e confided 
to hi. hi. difficulties over the oil i •• ue, in contra.t 
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to his previous conduct o~ keeping the political agent 
in the dark. He told Dickson o~ the Kuwait Oil Com-
pany's lat.st o~~.r,stating his anger and surpri.e 
at their impudence in otfering him .uch paltry terms. 
He intimated that h. was going to tell the Kuwait 
Oil Company'. repr.sentativ •• to 'clear out and leave 
Kuwait unles. they could .e. th.ir way to talk s.n.e' 
and o~ter reasonable terms. He aade it cl.ar that he 
was not prepared' to be bullied' by the Kuwai tOil Com-
pany,who were behaving as though they had eliminated 
All competi tion from the field through being supported 
by the British Government. Consequently he conveyed 
to Dickson his intention o~ ~rightening the Kuwait 
Oil Company by inforllling th_ o~ other oil companies, 
in particular Socal, who would be willing to bid ~or 
his conc.ssion ar.::d ot~er a • ~air and decent price'. 
Al though the poli tical ageD t agreed tha t the 
Shaikh had every right to secure the best tems pos-
sible ~roa the Kuwai t Oil Company he was quick to 
respond to the Shaikh'. plan. He told Shaikh AbJDad 
that the British Government 'had 'no use' ~or the 
Socal' and th.re~oJ:'e he should 'be very caretul in-
deed not to allow thea to come into the ~ield as 
bidders against the Kuwait Oil Company.' Naturally 
surprised by the prompt and ~ira respons., the Shaikh 
promised Dickson that although he might aanipulate 
and even coerce the Kuwait Oil company, he would grant 
the conce.sion only to a company approved by the British 
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Government. Neverthele •• he in.i.t.d, a. alway., on 
having a tree hand to negotiate the commercial term. 
with the company. Finally the Shaikh a.ked Dick.on 
not to di.clo.e th.ir conv.r.ation to Holm •• and Chi.-
holm a. hi. bargaining po.ition might thus be con.i-
" 
d.rably compromi.ed. 9 
Two day. later, the Shaikh .ummoned HollII •• and 
Chi.holm to tind out why the Kuwait Oil Company had 
made a 1 ••• tavourabl. ott.r than either ot tho •• 
made •• parately by A.P.O.C. or the Syndicate. H. 
r.terred to the ommis.ion ot various tavourabl. con-
.id.ration. ott.r.d pr.viously, particularly the ini-
tial payaent ot Rs.400,OOO, the royalty ot R •• 3.8 anna. 
and Holme.' remaining r •• ident in Kuwai t on behalt ot 
the conc ••• ionary company. 'Sp.aking with con.id.rabl. 
and unuaual h.at' the Shaikh .xpr •••• d hi. protound 
di.appointaeat with the attitude ot hi. per.onal 
trienda, Holm •• and Chi.holm, and thr.aten.d to turn 
to oth.r iater •• t.d compani •• , particularly Socal. 
Secau •• ot the Shaikh'. intran.igent mood, the 
two negotiator. decid.d to withdraw, proposing to .x-
plain the n ••• ituation .hortly.10 Th.y had antici-
pat.d the Shaikh'. hoatile r.spon •• in that they had 
alr.ady un.ucc •• a:lully advi.ed the Kuwai t Oil ComPAnY 
in London to rai .. the propo •• d t.rm.. Th.y alr.ady 
knew that it would be impo •• ibl. tor th ... to conclud. 
an agr .... ent wi th Shaikh Ahmad on the pr •• ent t.rm. 
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in view ot the previous otters made by A.P.O.C. and 
the Syndicat •• eparately and the recent term. accorded 
to Ibn Saud and the P.r.ian Government. 11 Howev.r 
a. their personal integrity was now at .take through 
their being accus.d.ot breaking taith with the Shaikh, 
they decided,to approach hi. individually to explain 
the .i tuation. 12 
Upon .eeting.th. Shaikh on 28 February, Chisholm 
did as much as h. could to appea •• him, .aying that 
the n.w otter contained n.w advantageous teras to 
.count.rbalance thos. submitt.d .arlier by A.p.e.C. 
A. regards Cadman's ~riginal ott.r ot an initial pay-
.ent ot Rs.400,OOO, h. remind.d the Shaikh that it 
had been conditional upon. immediate acceptance and 
had therefor. beeoa. null and void when rejected. 13 
Hol •• s adopt.d a dift.rent approach from that of Chi •• 
hoi. becau.. he was particularly alarmed by the 
Shaikh's hostile attitude towards hi. personally. He 
told the Shaikh that the teras initially ottered by 
the Kuwait Oil Coapany should be consid.r.d a. a 
.pringboard from which negotiations could be launch.d 
and promi.ed per.onally to do all h. could to p.r-
suad. the company to rai.. the t.rms being oftered. 
ay so doing Hoi .... hoped, and in this h. wa. proved 
correct, to r ... tablish the .ost friendly r.lations 
he had pr.vio".ly .njoyed wi th Shaikh. Ahmad and to 
re-gain hi. confid.nc., both of which w.r ••••• ntial 
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~or Holmes to Achieve his personal goals, more de-
tails o~ which will be given below. 
Meanwhile in London, .. larmed by the Shaikh's 
App .. rent 'stubbornness' and by the possibility o~ 
Soc .. l entering the ~ield while negotiations h .. d not 
been concluded, the various ministries considered 
w .. ys o~ I .. cilit .. ting an early .. gr .... nt between the 
Shaikh and the Kuwait Oil Company. Th. For.ign O~­
lice sugg.sted in~oraino the Shaikh th .. t the Bri-
tish Gov.mlllent could not allow the bargaining pro-
c.ss to continue ind.finitely. They now insist.d 
on active support tor the Kuwai t Oil Company and 
there~ore wanted the Sh .. ikh to be told decisively 
and ~om .. lly that the govemmen t 'wi sh the conces-
sion given to the Kuwai t Oil Company. ,14 
However the India O~~ice, the princip .. l alnistry 
responsible, thought it impr .. ctical to tell the 
Shaikh to grant the concession to no company other 
than the Kuwait Oil Company, considering th .. t this 
would prodUce .. very un~ortunate re .. ction on the 
part o~ the Shaikh. As s .. n above, they had been 
advised by Fowle and Dickson not to over-emphasise 
the strength o~ the British Governaent t • support 
~or the Kuwait Oil Company. The two o~Iicers in 
the Persian Q.\lt knew o~ the Shaikh's long-standing 
suspicion o~ the governaent regarding the oil conces-
sion and ot his conviction that it was a cOIIUIlercial 
and not .. political issue. 
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Furthermore, according to Fowle, committing the 
government totally to the Kuwait Oil Company would 
mean taking on trust that the ~inancial terms o~~ered 
by . the Kuwai t Oil Company were tair and generous al-
though the Shaikh considered.them to be tar trom his 
expectations. 1S. lbe British Government had not yet 
been provided with the actual tigures ottered to the 
Shaikh and indeed every revised dratt sent to them 
by the company up to October 1934 OBUIlitted. the tinan-
cial terms a. it had been agreed that they.ere not 
to be involved in the commercial negotiations. 16 
Theretore the political re.ident had proposed instead 
warning the Shaikh that the government would 'not 
consent to the grant 01' the conce.sion to any company 
which is not (like the Kuwait Oil Company) at least 
~ British', which in practice would have the same 
e~~ect as the .tat .. ent proposed by the Foreign Ottice 
but without antagonising the Shaikh unnecessarily.1? 
, The India Ottice, in backing this view, told 
the Foreign Ottice that in a matter such as this they 
au. t be 9'lided by Fowle, who was aware ot the governmen t' • 
policy and was in clos. touch with the Shaikh personally. 
Th. India Ottice warned that it the Shaikh .ere to be 
presented wi th an 111 timatwa to grant the conce •• ion 
only to the Kuwait Oil Company h. aight in the circum-
.tance. decide to suspend the negotiations yet again 
and declare that 'he would give the conce •• ion to no-
on.', while in reality he would later approach Socal 
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~or An o~~er.18 It seems that by now the various g0-
vernment o~~icials had become aware o~ the Shaikh's 
di~~.r.nt tactics and were there~or. anxious to avoid 
repeating previous mistakes. ' 
However the Foreign O~tice still had reserva-
tions about the proposed course ot action. They ar-
gued that the political resident's suggestion might 
fail to aehieve the government's object o~ exeluding 
Socal sinee it would always be possible ~or them to 
erect some kind o~ British facade and apply tor the 
coneession under,this guise. They also eonsidered 
that a written eommunication on the lines proposed 
aight cause di~~ieulty with the United States Go-
vernment who would feel bound to take the .atter up 
with the British Governaent in view of their having 
been promised that no diseri.ination against their 
nationals would be exereiaed in Kv.wait. 19 
Their proposal, however, ie. aetive support 
for the Kv.wai tOil Coapany, waa considered le.a likely 
to provoke an Ameriean protest aince Gul~, on whose 
behalf the United States Government had originally 
intervened, was now a partieipant in the Kuwait Oil 
Company on a fifty per eent basis, and was considered 
to have aore influence ia Washington due to Mellon's 
contacts there than Socal. Neverthel •• s After con-
siderable consultation the Foreign Otfice reluctantly 
agreed that the Shaikh ahould be ia~oraed orally along 
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the lines suggested by the political resident. It 
thus acquiesced in discrimination against purely 
American interests in Kuwait, despite a previous 
commitment to the contrary made to the United Sta-
tes Government. 20 Accordingly, the political resi-
dent was instructed to inform 'the Shaikh that the 
British Government would approve only a company at 
least 50 per cent British as a candidate for his 
oil concession. 21 
In the Persian Gulf Briti.h Government offi-
cial. were .atisfied to be in.tructed on the above 
line. a. they could continue to work for an .arly 
agr .... nt betw.en the Kuwait Oil Company and the 
Shaikh without being obliged to present the latter 
wi th an ul tim.twa and thus antagonise him and lo.e 
hi. confidence and trust onc. mor.. Dickson advi-
sed Molmes and Chishola to ask the Shaikh 'point 
blank what he wanted and thought a tit figure tor 
thea to off.r.' By so doing h. anticipat.d that 
soae progre.. could be achi.ved a. the two n.gotia-
tor. could start bargaining downwards until arri-
ving at a llutuAlly ... Ustaetory agr .... nt. H. told 
the Kuwait Oil Company's repr.sentative. that from 
the Sri Ush Govermaent's point of view it wa ••••• n-
tial that a quick conclusion to the negotiation. be 
reAChed betor. any newcoaer altered the then situa-
tion of a cl.ar fi.ld with no competitors. 
- 344 -
They decided to tollow this advice. and subse-
quently the Shaikh promised to provide them with his 
proposed terms shortly. Thus on 13 March the Shaikh 
summoned Hol.e.' interpreter and gave him in writing 
hi. term. tor the oil concessiont-
a) Initial payment ot Ra.SSO.OOO instead ot Rs.200.000 
otter.d. 
b) Rental payment of Rs.l20.000 instead ot Rs.6S.000 
,-' .ot't'.red. 
c) Royalty payment ot R •• 3.12 anna. instead ot Rs.2.10 
anna. otter.d. 
d) Export tax ot 5 anna. in.tead ot 2 annas ottered • 
• ) A local representative in Kuwait and a director 
on the company'. boazod in London, both to be ap-
point.d by the Shaikh. 22 
It ..... that by d .. anding terms tar higher than those 
anticipated or ev.n di.cu •• ed betore. the Shaikh was 
•• t on barpining tor a deal at lea.t a. favourable 
to hi. a. that ottered separately by A.P.O.C. and 
the Syndicat •• 
HoI •••• who was best acquainted with the Shaikh'. 
'psychological .ake-up' wa. particularly alarmed by 
the high royalty payaent now demand.d by hi.. He knew 
that A.P.O.C.'. director. on the Kuwai t oil Company 
~d would never accept them, because it they did 
there would be •• riou. repercu.sion. elsewhere in the 
Middle Ea.t, particularly in Persia wh.re a new agre.-
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ment had recently been concluded a~ter a serious dis-
23 pute which had involved the League o~ Nations. 
Therefore Holme. considered it best 'to negotiate ~or 
. . 
a lower royalty whilst being prepared to raise the 
other payment. initially oftered. Hol.e.' vi •• was 
shared by the political agent who also recommended 
that it the Shaikh would accept .. reasonable royalty 
the Kuwai t Oil Company '.hould not wa.te ti.e .. bout 
the initial figure but .hould act big and oenerou.ly.' 
. . 
However. Chi .hol. .eemed to be keener on hard bar-
gaining, thus he recommended th .. t the Sh .. ikh be per-
.uaded to .. ccept lower term. than tho.e Hol.e. was 
prepared to o~~er. 
By now rel .. tion. betwe.n Hol •• s and Chi.holm 
were .train.d and .. autual di.trust began to develop. 
Chi.hola. who had been in.tructed by A.P.O.C. to keep 
, . 
.. close ey. on Hoi.... in.i.ted on always ••• ting 
the Shaikh togeth.r wi th hi.. Hol ... s, on the other 
. , . 
hand, complain.d th .. t .hen both .et the Shaikh the 
latter .... 'a •• titt-n.cked and Ron-commital aa the 
. , 
proverbial pok.r' and th.refore in turn in.i.ted th .. t 
24 
each should ••• t the Shaikb •• parat.ly. Their dif-
t.rent backgrounds al.o contributed to the grOWing ten-
.ion between thea, a t.naion wbich wa. to inten.ify 
con.iderably l .. ter on. 
Hoi •••• then .. ged aixty and not a we .. lthy man • 
• a. d •• perat.ly keen to conclude an aoreement with 
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Shaikh Ahmad .s he was counting on receiving some ~i­
nancial consideration ~rom him &tter a success~ul con-
clusion to the negotiations. In ~act, it became com-
mon knowledge in Kuwait and London that the Shaikh 
had promised Holmes a position, and indeed &tter the 
cone.ssion was signed h. was nominated by the Shaikh 
in 1935 as his representatiVe in London. Chisholm, 
on the other hand, had permanent and secure employ-
ment with A.P.O.C. ud theretore was more concerned 
to achieve the best terms possible ~or his company 
rather than 'to pl.ase the Shaikh. Thus Holmes ap-
peared to Chisholm and consequently to London to be 
l.ss .hol.hearted in trying to redue. the Shaikh's 
demuds, in particular the ne. d_and tor a highly-
paid director in London. 
As the two could not see eye to eye on the Ilini-
m_ terms which the Shaikh might eventllally accept, 
as had been requested by London, they subaitted se-
parat. reports. Hol.es CORsidered the Shaikh might 
ul tim. tely agree to Rs. 450,000 as the ini tial pay-
ment, Rs.90,OOO as the rental and Rs.3.2 annas royalty, 
wh.r .... Chishola anticipated that it would be pos-
aible to reduce the terms further to Rs.425,OOO, 
Rs.IO,OOO and Rs.2.14 annaS respectively. 
Aa might have beeII expected the Kuwait Oil Com-
pany inatructed th_ to s.ttle on the best terms pos-
aible not exceeding, however, the initial and rental 
paymenta .u9gested by Hol •• s ud royal ty plus tax 
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exemption sugge.ted by Chi.holm. 2S They w.re also ad-
vised by the Kuwait Oil Company.on the in.i.tenee o~ 
A.P.O.C.'. nominee. on the board, 'to k.ep the royalty 
and the tax ex •• ption separat., a. it was maintained 
that this would'~acilitat. making that exemption 
permanent arid low.r the ~igure mentioned ~or royalty. 
A •••• n throughout. th.'comPany con.idered that the 
royalty qve.tion was more important 'than any other 
payment and ther.~ore wanted to k.ep it as low as 
'po •• ible. N.v.rth.l •••• it .oon becam. cl.ar to 
Chi.hol. also' that the Shaikh would n.ver accept a 
royalty lower than tho ••• ugge.t.d by Holm... London 
was th.r.~or. soon r.qv.st.d byth. two n.90tiator. 
to authori •• an incr.a.e o~ the royalty propo •• d. 
Howev.r. apart ~roa di~;tieulti •• conc.rning 
the comm.rcial t.r-., the political agr .... nt .ign.d 
between the Bri ti.h Governaen t and the Kuwa! tOil Coa-
pany was al.o cau.ing con.id.rabl. di.agr .... nt and 
delay. Thi. agr .... nt. which had been d •• igned to 
.ecur. the gov.rnment' •• trategic and political inte-
re.ts in Xuwait. contained various ~eature. which w.r • 
• een a. undermining the Shaikh'. po.i tiona Th.refore, 
a. it was aware o~the Shaikh'. sen.itivity and .us-
picion., the India O~fice asked the political r.sid.nt 
to advi.e on th.' tactic. to be employed' and 'at what 
.tage in hi. negotiation. with the company' the Shaikh 
should be provided with a copy of the political agre.ment. 26 
Fowle had propo.ed .upplying hi. with a ~ull t.xt of 
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this be~ore the company's representatives approached 
the Shaikh, as it would help to .ase any underlying 
tension and create a good impression on him. Never-
th.less, because of further consultation among the 
various ministri.s, the Shaikh was provid.d with a 
copy of this agreement on 12 April, long uter he 
27 had commenc.d negotiation. with Holmes and Chisholm. 
Although accepting the British Government's 
right to .u.guard their .p.cial int.rest. in Ku-
wait. the Shaikh was annoyed by the agreement .igned 
wi thout his con •• nt betw •• n the govemment and the 
Kuwai t Oil COmpany. Th •. fact that h. was provided 
with a copy of the agreem.nt only two months uter 
becoming aware of it. exi.tenc. did not help to allay 
hi •• uspicion.. In particular, h. wa. extremely 
unhappy about a provision to be ins.rt.d in the com-
m.rcial agr.ement which subordinated it to the pe-
litical on.. H. wa. alara.d that the government'. 
ultimate control ov.r the conc.ssion might grav.ly 
pr.judic. hi. pr •• tige and und.rmin. hi. independ.nce. 28 
He con~essed to Dickson that h. would become the 
laughing-.tock of other rul.r. in the Persian Gul~, 
particularly I bn Saud who would .ay 
broth.r Abmad i. not allowed to make 
ev.n a simple comm.rcial agreement 
with a for.ign busin ••• fira without 
the British stepping in and forcing 
hi. to ins.rt c.rtain by-your-l.av. 
clau •••• 
Quite apart from that the Shaikh alao rais.d objection. 
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to the ~act that the Kuwait Oil Company wa. solely 
r •• pon.ibl. ~or d.signating th.ir chi.~ local rep-
r ••• ntativ., .ubject only to Briti.h Gov.rnment ap-
proval. H. consid.red that as rul.r o~ the .tat. 
, 
and gtant.r o~ the conc.s.ion he should have a say 
in the selection o~ the company'. chi.~ local rep-
r •• entative. 29 
Ho •• ver, the gov.rnm.nt'. r •• pon.e to the 
Shaikh'. objection. wa. ~i1'll and prompt. De.pi te 
some reservation. expr •••• d by the local o~ficers 
who .ympathi.ed with the Shaikh'. gri.vanc.s, the 
India Office in.truct.d Dickson to .ecure the 
Shaikh'. concurrence in ~ull with the poli tical 
agr._.nt in due cour... Th.y in.i.t.d that the 
comm.rcial agreement be .ubordinat. to and control-
l.d by the political agr .... nt and r.~u •• d to give 
the Shaikh any right of v.to on the •• lection of the 
. 30 
company'. chi.~ local repr.sentative. According-
ly, the political agent •• t the Shaikh •• v.ral ti ••• 
and .xplained in gr.at d.tail the various clau ••• 
o~ the agr ... ent and the r.ason. und.rlying th ••• 
A. it bec .... cl.ar to the Shaikh that the Bri-
ti.h Governm.nt' •• tand was very ti1'll h. end.avour.d 
to avert at l.a.t the publication of the di.put.d 
ela"... H. told Dickson that h. had no obj.ction 
to the British Gov.rnment 'tying him up a. much a • 
• he cho.e both in the political agr .... nt or by oth.r 
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secr.t document', what in fact h. feared mo.t was 
this being ... de public on the conclu.ion of a .ati.-
31 factory agr.ement with the Kuwait Oil Company. As 
he appreciated the Shaikh's difficulti •• , the poli-
tical agen t .ugg •• ted,' and it wa. agr.ed by London. 
that the control c1au.e be confined to a .ecret 
letter to be .xchanged between the government and 
the Shaikh. while the Kuwai t Oil Company would be 
.worn to .ecrecy. Con.equent1y the Shaikh finally 
accepted the po1i tical agr.ement in lu11. 32 (Lat.r 
n.v.rth.l.... ... will be .een below. he again rai •• d 
the .ubj.ct of the chi.f local repre.entativ.·s 
appointaent. this ti •• wi th the Kuwai tOil Coapany 
however. and be ultimately succ.eded in securing 
the riObt'to s.l.ct this r.pr.sentativ. hi ••• lf, 
pending the government-s approval.) 
Although Shaikh Aha&d yielded reluctantly to 
British Government politiCAl pr •• sur •• be'wa. det.r-
ained not to do so vi.-a-vis the Kuwait Oil Company. 
To thea he expreaaed alar great.r li:nine.s and de-
termination design.d to secure bett.r financial t.rm. 
tba.n tho.e being ollered. In hi. r.lations with the 
company b. waa h.lped by Hoi.... a. • •• n .bove. and 
by a Dew d.ve10pmen t which b. ably .xplo! ted to the 
full. 
On 11 April the Shaikh "a. approached by another 
company offering hi • .ore advantageous terms for the 
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oil concession than tho.e proposed by the Kuwait Oil 
Company. Very 9rati1'ied that another company had come 
1'orward'to bid against the Kuwait oil Company, parti-
cularly, at that ti.e and in the 'light 01' its being 
on. hundred pel' c.nt British controlled, he promi •• d 
the company' a r.pre.entativ. that he would con.ider 
th.ir ott.r. At the .... ti.e h ••• t Hol ••• and Chis-
holm and in1'oraed them ot the arrival ot a new COlD-
pany, the n ... ot which he r.1'u.ed to divulge, and 
warned them ot the con.equenc •• 01' their not acc.p-
'ling hi. tera •• 
Hol •• s and Chiahola weI'. i.pr •••• d by' the Shaikh' a 
tira atti tude, reali.ing that it 1IOuld be u.el ••• to 
continue th.ir bargaining proc.... They con.ider.d 
that th.ir .uperior. in London had no conception 01' 
the di1'ticul t 'ataoaphere in Kuwait and .til1 1 ••• 01' 
the s"spiciou. men tal • make-up' ot the Shaikh. Th.y 
1'elt that th.ir handa weI'. being unnec •• aarily ti.d 
by London and th.r.1'ore con.ider.d that now the Shaikh 
had been Approached by anoth.r company the aucc ••• ot 
th.ir n.gotiation. wa. in jeopardy. Th.y .ugge.ted 
proc.eding to London to explain and empha.ia. the 
•• riousne •• ot the .ituation in person, ju.titying 
this' _va by saying that unl ••• the agreement weI'. 
r.ached on the Shaikh'. lat •• t term., arrived at 
only attar hard bargaining tor two month., no 1'urther 
progre.. could be aade in Kuwai t. 33 By so doing th.y 
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hoped toi.pre •• the Shaikh with their personal en-
deavours, to convey his views to London and to give 
the political agent ti.e to heal the ill-~eelings 
created by the political agreement. 
However the Kuwait Oil Company,in full agree-
.ent with the British Government, turned the. down 
and rejected any idea of suspending the negotiations 
for two or three aon ths. Both the SJOvernaen t and 
the company were anxious to conclude the unexpectedly 
long negotiations as soon as po.sible, and therefore 
the two repre.entative. were instructed to continue 
the bargaining proce.s on the terms previously au-
thorised until a satisfactory conclusion was reached. 
The Bri tish Governaent did not take seriously 
Shaikh Ahaad' s • ta tamen t about a new Bri Usb company 
being interested in the concession,'particularly in 
view of the Shaikh'. previous admission to Dickson 
of his intention to frighten the Kuwai t Oil Company 
and hi sad_an t re~usal to di sclose the company' s 
name.
34 Therefore it was con.idered in Whi tehall 
that the Shaikh .ight have invented the new one hun-
dred per cent Briti.h company in order to extract 
better teras from the Kuwait Oil company.'S Never-
thele •• , .a a preeautio~ary .easure enquiries, which 
proved negative, were made as to whether the British 
Oil Development Company, the only other partly owned 
Briti.h company to have oil interests in the region, 
ie. Iraq, was interested. 36 Furthermore, the govern-
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.ent instructed the political resident to ascertain 
whether the Shaikh had been approached by an outside 
company and· to remind hi. tha t • he is not to nego-
tiate with any new company without prior consulta-
37 
. tion wi th H.M.G.' 
By now the two negotiators. particularly Holmes 
·who believed the Shaikh had indeed been approached 
by another coapany. ~eared the worst, ie. the Shaikh 
turning to the new company and breaking ott neoo-
tiations with the Kuwait Oil Company. They there-
tore redratted the oil agr .... nt to sait the Shaikh'. 
latest demands without authori.ation troa London. 
Dratt No.4 as it was called, accorded the Shaikh a 
. royalty ot Rs.3 •• annas, an initial payment of 
Ra.4SO.000 and a rental. payment ot Ra.85.000. In 
add! tion it included three important provision. 
which particularly outraged both the British Govern-
.eDt and the Kuwait Oil COmpany lat.ra-
a) A proviaion that the a.lection and appointaent ot 
the chiet local repr.sentative ahould rest entire-
ly with the Shaikh in consultation with the Bri-
tiah GovernaeDt. 
b) A provision according the Shaikh a director in 
London at a aalary ot not lea. than £1.800 per 
ann_ to be paid by the company. 
c) A proviaion accordin9 the Shaikh royalty on oil 
tonnage 'won and aaved' and not on oil tonnage 
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'exported and sold', the ~ormula o~~.r.d by the com-
38 pany. 
HAving •• cured the Shaikh's agr .... nt to this dra~t the 
two negotiators s.nt it to London ~or the Kuwait Oil 
Coapany·. approval. 
As aight hAve been expect.d the Kuwait Oil Company 
were ~uriou. with their representAtives' eonduct, par-
tieularly thAt o~ Hol •• s whos. hand was clearly to be 
s.en behind the various provisions. They promptly re-
ject.d this ~ourth drAtt and indicated to Holmes and 
Chishola that serious thought was being given to .en-
ding out two company principals to continue the n~go­
tiations. Sia"l tan.ously the government WI\S int'ona.d 
o~ the situation. special r.~er.nce to the ~.h&ikh's 
renewed demand to select the chi.1 local repr ••• nta-
1:i ve being .ade. 
lVbil. both the government and the company were 
Asse •• ing the sitUAtion th.,latter wa. in~oraed that 
the Shaikh had pre.ented their repre.entAtive. with 
an ,,1 tillatwa. According to HoI •• s and Chi.holm, the 
Shaikh had now stated iiraly thAt unl.s. the company 
'Accept drAtt no." in toto h. would not be prepared 
to discuss the matter further with the. at present'. 
And th.refor. n.gotiations would be susp.nded until 
atter the .uamer.39 
This lat.st developaent stunned the Kuwait Oil 
Compaay·. directors who eould not under.tand the reason 
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tor the Shaikh's sudden decision to suspend negotia-
tions and to ask the two negotiators to leave Kuwait. 
They could only assume that there was so.e reason which 
had not been mad. clear to thea tor his insist.nc. on 
br.aking ott negotiation. tor three months d.spit. the 
con.iderable progress alr.ady made. 40 Theretore they 
immediat.ly approached the Briti.h Government to dis-
cu •• the situation, which ..... d to have taken a turn 
tor the wor.e. The Kuwai t Oil Company intormed the 
India Otfice that in the circum.tance. they had no 
option but to comply wi th the Shaikh and to recall 
Holme. and Chi.holm tor consultation. It appears 
they agreed to .u.pend the n.gotiations because they 
considered their po.ition and interests to be secure 
in vi .. ot the Shaikh's promise not to entertain or 
discuss any otter trom other partie. tor three months. 
Th. India Ottic., av.rse to the negotiations being 
.u.pended, urged the company to d.lay a deci.ion 
Wltil turther intormation about the .ituation had been 
received trom the political authoriti.s in the P.r-
sian Gulf. 
On 8 ..June, atter receiving the political resident's 
report, the India ottic. sWllDOned the Kuwai t Oil Com-
pany r.pr.sentatives tor consultation. At their .eeting 
the India ottic. pr .... t.d Fowle.'. vie. ot the situa-
tion in Kuwait trom which it was apparent he conside-
red Holm.s to be the 'nigger in the wood pile'. 41 Holmes 
was blamed tor the latest ditficulties which were due 
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• ainly to hi. working wi th the Shaikh on hi. own be-
hal~ so that h. aight beCOllle the Shaikh'. representa-
tiv. either locally orin London. There~ore it wa. 
sugge.t.d that the company should r.call Hol.es as 
.oon as possibl., leaving Chishols to continu. the ne-
gotiation •• 
Fa.ced wi th such a blunt accusation, the company'. 
r.pr •• entativ •• admi tt.d that th.y also suspected Hol-
a •• o~ advising the Shaikh in order to •• cure p.rsonal 
gain ~roa the conc.ssion. Although Chishol. had added 
hi •• ignatur. to the report. receiv.d ~rora KuwAi tit 
wa. consid.r.d that Hol ••• aight have had secr.t con-
.ultation .ith.r directly or oth.rwi •• with the Shaikh 
be~or .... ting his jointly with Chishola. Eventually 
as the British Government d.sired the negotiations 
to be continued and concluded without any interruption, 
it was agr.ed that the company .hould con.id.r two al-
t.rnativ ••••• ith.r the corapany principal. should go to 
Kuwait th .... lv ••• or th.y .hould at one. r.call Major 
Hol ••••• 42 . 
Four day. later anoth.r ••• ting took pla.c. be-
tween governa.n t repr.sen ta ti ve. and the company. the 
Foreign ot~ice being repr. sen ted. The corapany .tated 
their deci.ion to wi'tbdraw Hoise. and leave Chi.hols 
to continue the n.gotiation.. In accordance with hi. 
previous und.rtaking Fra.er as.ured the gov.rnsent that 
Hol ••• would not be .ent back to Kuwai t i~ the .u.pi-
cion. about his proved to be well ~oUllded. Accordingly" 
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on the .ame day - 12 June - Chishol. was in.tructed 
to continue the negotiation. while Hol ••• was asked 
to r.turn to London. How.ver,in order not to raise 
the Sbaikh and Holm.s' suspicions, the latter was 
promi.ed h. would r.turn to Kuwait ~ter a bri.f 
period of consultation in London. 43 
Inde.d, there i. no doubt tbat Hol ••• intormed 
and advi •• d th. Sbaikh secr.tly, leaving Chishol. out 
in the cold. Chisholm hi.self acknowledged that 
·Hol ••• • appreciation ot the situation at that time 
was more perceptive than' biB own. H. attributed it 
howev.r, to 'same sixth •• n •• •• which .ight w.ll 
bav. been th. r.sult ot Hol ••• • .l.v.n y.ar. clo •• 
r.lation. with the Shaikh. 44 
N.v.rth.l •••• London'. plan was toiled by the 
Shaikh. In the cirCWllstanc •• h. t.l t h. could not ac-
c.pt the wi thdrawal ot Hol.e. alon., who •• posi tion 
vi.-a-vi. bis principals would be w.aken.d and greatly 
underain.d it Chishola wer. to .tay in K"w&! t to con-
tin". n.gotiation.. Th.r.for. wbil. Hola •• took ia • 
• ediat •• t.p. to l.av. Kuwait the Shaikh thr.aten.d 
to withdraw biB und.rtaking not· to n.gotiat. wi th oth.r 
parti •• in the a.anti •• unl ••• Chi.hol. accompani.d 
Hol.e. to London. Faced wi th this thr.at the Kuwai t 
Oil Company had no choice but to in.trYct Chisbola 
to leave alao, att.r .ecuring Briti.h Gov.rnment appro-
Val. 4S 
Wheth.r or not HoI ••• po •••••• d sea. '.ixth .en •• ' 
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the Kuwai t Oil Company .found it increasingly di.f.ficul t 
to remove hi. as a negotiator in Kuwait, despite their 
growing .uspicionand dis.ay at'hi. activities. By now 
hi. clo •• relation.hip with and in.fluence on the Shaikh 
were undi.put.d and it was recogni.ed that only he had 
the ability to conclude' the negotiation.. Dickson, 
who was on leav. in London at the .... tim., al.o sup-
port.d the vi •• that Hoi ••• was' the be.t n.gotiator 
to end the n.gotiations .ucc ••• fully. At a ••• ting 
h.ld in 'the India O.f.fic. the Kuwai t Oil Company's r.p-
r.sentativ •• h.ard Dickson'. a ....... nt ot the situa-
tion. H. told tho •• pre.ent that the Shaikh ne.d.d 
car • .ful handling now that h. knew • that his hors. was 
apparently .0 valuable' and that Hol •• s, what.ver his 
.fault. WA. 'very ald.l.full in hi. handU,ng'o.f the 
46 Shaikh., 1 t W&8 agr •• d, 'th.r • .for., by both the gov.rn-
.en t and the company that Hoi... .hou1 d accompany Chi s-
ho1. to Kuwait to continu. the n.gotiation •• 
Now that Hoi •••• position had be.nd.cided, the 
Kuwait Oil Coapany con.id.red'the t.ra. to be ottered 
the Shaikh &.ft.r th.summ.r. Th. two n.gotiators, par-
ticularly Hol ••• who r.garded the po.sibi1ity ot' a new 
company entering the competition as very s.riou., ad-
vised acceptance'ot' dratt ne.4 in .full. Th. Kuwait 
Oil Company could not agr •• to thi. in vi.w of the high 
royal ty being demanded. Th.y Agreed to pay .for a r.p-
resentative in London in lieu ot' a dir.ctor, but re.fu •• d 
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to pay Ra.3.4 annas royalty per Engliah ton ot oil 
'won and aaved'. Dratt no.4 waa reviaed in the torm 
ot Dratt no.S, and although according the Shaikh aome 
ot hi. d_and. it tell .hort on the satter. ot the 
, . " . . 47 
royalty and the director. Both the British Govern-
.ent and the Kuwait Oil Company were optimi.tic that 
on their return HoI ••• and Chishola would quickly ar-
rive at an agre .. ent with the Shaikh. They were a.-
sur.d by Dickson that a triendly reception awaited the 
two negotiators now that the political ditticulties 
had been overcome and the company was now ottering 
the Shaikh better teras than betore. However. as had 
been the ca.e on other occaaiona. the Shaikh waa not 
to contora with London'. expectation.. He w .. s atill 
determined to aecure hia latest d .. ands and intended 
to exploit every .ean. po.sib1e in order to torce the 
Kuwait Oil Coapany to yield completely. particularly 
over the royalty p~ent. 
A. the only company perai tted by the Bri ti sh Go-
vernaent to negotiate with the Shaikh. the Kuwait Oil 
Coapany telt contident ot .ecuring the concesaion on 
tayourable terma. They inaiated on a .uch lower ro-
yalty trca that 1a.t ottered by the Syndicate hoping 
'. '," 
their negotiator •• Ho1.es and Chishola' who knew the 
Shaikh well. would succ .. d. However aa Hol.ea joined 
the Shaikh in his ettort. to raise the teras being 
ottered. the company found itaelt in an incr .... ingly 
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di~~ieult position. Eventually,with the arrival o~ 
a new mysterious competitor in. the ~ield the situa-
tion was complicated yet ~urther, but now ~or the 
British Government as well as ~or the eompany. 
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3. The Unexpected Rival and the Signing of the Concession 
.While the Kuwait Oil Company tinalised Holmes 
and Chi shola , s return to Kuwai t with a certain degree 
ot optimism, Shaikh Ahmad was engaged in reviving 
competition tor his concession. Despite having been 
warned in April against negotiating with any other 
company without the British Government's consent. he 
was not prepared to relinquish his contact with the 
other company showing interest in the concession. 
On 2 September he intormed thea that he was 
ready to grant a concession based on the terms otfe-
red, provided he was allowed by the British Govern-
.ent to/do .0. 1 However, since he was aware that he 
'did not quite play the game by H.M.G.' he urged the 
company to sublai t a copy of the dratt concesalon for 
2 the government's consideration and approval. By so 
doing the Shaikh hoped to justify his conduct vis-a-
vis the British Government and simultaneou.1y spell 
out to the Kuwai t Oil Company the better terms being 
ottered tor his concession. 
A month later, still unaware ot what had taken 
place in Kuwait during their ab.ence, Hol.es and Chis-
holm reached sasra. Under inatructions to delay their 
arrival in Kuwait in order to allow the political agent 
ti.e to .ett1e the question concerning the appointment 
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oE the chieE local representative once and tor all, they 
remained there three days. During that time rumours 
came to Holme.' attention ot a my.t.rious British COlll-
pany otEering every condition demanded by the Shaikh 
tor the conc ••• ion, including the down payment, the 
annu&l paym.nt, the royalty, a director in London and 
thes.lecting of the chief local representative. Thes. 
rumours alara.d hi. con.iderably, in particular the 
innuendo that this late arrival on the seen. had prac-
tically conclud.d a conc ••• ion agr .... nt with the 
Shaikh. 
On arriving in Kuwait Hol.e. i .. ediately approa-
ched his old friend. and inforaants with a view to sub-
.tantiating th •• e rumour.. To his profound disappoint-
aent he confirmed that the Shaikh was indeed negotiating 
wi th a Bri ti.h company c&ll.d Trader. Limited (Traders) 
through th.ir Iraqi repre.entativ. - .J. Gabri.l, who 
wa. &lao one of the Shaikh'. l.oal advi.er •• 3 The fact 
that Holae. knew ot no oil interest. being held by Tra-
der. together wi th GAbriel'. long. tanding and clo •• 
tie. with A.P.O.C. in Iraq, led hi. ,to conclude imme-
diately that this company was acting a. A.P.O.C.'. ag.nt. 4 
It ..... that Hol.e. t.l t no great n.ed for any 
.ub.tantial evidence to reach the conclu.ion that A.P.O.C. 
was ~h. hidden hand behind Trader.. A. A.P.O.C. had 
in.i.ted &ll along on an unreasonable royalty tor the 
Shaikh he believed th.y were now playing a double game 
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o~ o.ten.ibly negotiating through the Kuwait Oil Com-
pany but .iaultaneously doublecros.ing their American 
partnera by negotiating exclusively through Trader •• 
Surprisingly, this ~ar-reaching auspicion was indepen-
dently arrived at by Dickson. The political agent, who 
in the paat .had persiatently endeavoured to .ecur. the 
Kuwait oil conce.sion tor A.P.O.C., co~ld neither, 
howev.r, accept nor approve such underhand dealing on 
the part ot A.P.O.C. Theretor. he now accused the. ot 
'hindering progrea. trOll the atart with the deliberate 
intention ot preventing the Shaikh trOll giving the oil 
concession to the Kuwait Oil Company', whilat biding 
their tiae tor a d.adlock in negotiationa at which point 
they would 'walk ott with the pri2e' through Trader •• 5 
Consequently, Hol .. a aecretly contacted the Ame-
ricans to wam thea o~ their partner'. devioua plan. 
In a letter to be delivered via hia wil. in London h. 
in~oraed St.venafrom Gulf of his findings and the conclusions 
h. had been lorced to arrive at. H. explained that the 
English cuatoaarily aanaged to '.alve th.ir consience' 
when involved in the queationable d.al. by deluding 
th .... lve. that .uch action would beneti t their country. 
To _phaaia. thia point to the Mericans he quoted Di.-
raeli, 'My country right or wrong_ I hope ahe aay al-
waya be right but .i th.r way still ay country.' As a 
way out of the present ditticultie. Hol .... ugg.sted 
to the Americana that they in~lu.nce their partner to 
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accept forthwith the Shaikh's terms, as they had be.n 
specifi.d in dr&ftno.4. and thus clinch the deal. This, 
according to hi_, would be the only way ot thwarting 
A.p.e.C.'s plan, because it the British Government 
becua. aware 'that I had giv.n the guae away I would 
6 be in a very awkward posi tion. • 
Hol •• s believ.d that A.P.O.C. and the government 
.ere co-conspirators in this plot and theretoI'. he 
urged the Shaikh to work closely together with him 
to prev.nt the English stabbing the Am.ricans in the 
back. E.vidently h. succe.d.d, as it is qui te cl.ar 
that Chishola waa hardly being consult.d by the Shaikh 
now and indeed wa. d.liberat.ly exclud.d frOil the in-
cr.aaingly freql&.nt ••• tinga which •• re taking plac. 
between Hol.es and t~ Shaikh. Chishola. who clai_.d 
that he and cons.q.&ently A.P.O.C. kn.w nothing ot Tra-
ders until Dec .. ber 1934. when they l.arn t of their AC-
tivity frea the British Gov.rnment, admitted that his 
personal relation. with the Shaikh 'v.re nev.r the 
.... att.r October 1934.,1 
Atter six weeks ot hu:d bargaining the Shaikh fi-
nally auogest.d two alt.rnativ. ott.r. fro. which the 
Kuwai tOil Coapany ••• t chooae.-
a) A royalty ot R •• 3." anna. including tax .x"ption 
. ! 
t 
,', 
; 
; 
l 
bas.d on the 'won and saved t tormula, wi th paymen t~ / , 
ot RS.415.000 on signature and Rs.95,OOO rent. " 
b) A royalty of Rs.3.6 annas including tax .x .. ption 
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ba •• d on the • .xport.d and sold' t'ormula, .i th pay- ~ . 
•• nta ot' R •• 600,OOO on .ignatur. and R •• l00,OOO rent. 8 
(It i. obvious t'rom th ••• two alternativ •• that the 
Shaikh was very .uch aware of the financial advantage. 
to be gain.d t'rom the 'won and .av.d' :tormula. and 
th.r.for. it i. conc.ivab1. that Ho1 ••• • knowl.dgeable 
advice lay behind this demand.)9 In the .vent of 
eith.r o:t:ter being accept.d, the Shaikh agr.ed to 
having a r.pr •• entativ. in London in lieu of a direc-
tor, thus narrowing the gap t'urther bet ••• n him and 
the Kuwait Oil Company. Con •• qu.ntly, the two nego-
tiator. int'oraed London o:t the Shaikh'. :tinal teras 
recOlalleneling that altemativ. (a) be acc.pted for 
•• ttl_.nt. 
However in London the .i tuation wa. :tar :trOlll 
.traight:torward, a. the Am.rican •• er. becoaing in-
crea.ingly .u.piciou. of th.ir partner and the Briti.h 
Government. Although Chi.ho1. clai.ed that Ho1 ••• ' 
theory .a. i_edt a t.ly eli .. i •• ed by the Am.rican. a. 
fanta.tic, the record prov •• the contrary. Th. India 
Ot':tice lat.r gained the i.pr ••• ion and ind •• d admit-
ted that 
the .:t:tect of the ••••••••••• int.rv.ntion 
of Trader. Limi ted has been to arou •• not 
unnatural .u.picion o:t the attitude o:t 
H.M.G. in the .ind. of the Am.rican part-
ner.. 10 
Th. Am.rican po.ition wa. SOIlewhat d.licat.. They lac-
k.d concr.t •• vidence to .ub.tantiat. Hol.... c1ai •• , 
and it waa con.idered that an attempt to obtain .uch 
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evidence openly would lead to a deterioration o~ rela-
tion. wi thin the Kuwai t Oil Company and 81i gh t al so 
l.ad to the r.ve1ation o~ .ecr.t in~ormation which had 
been provided by Ho1 •••• 11 rhus instead o~ approaching 
A.P.O.C. directly other chann.l. and •• thods ot enquiry 
. had· to be _p10yed. 
At a .eeting held at the India Ottice on 24 Octo-
ber Guy Steven. asked whether the Sri ti.h Gov.rnment 
knew ot any oth.r company wi.hing· to cODlpete tor a con-
c ••• ion in Kuwait. As the an.wer wa. negative Stevens 
telt sure he had made no progre •• whatsoever in hi. 
enquiries about Ho1 •••• accu.ation, nor had he been 
able to thwart hi. partner'. plan. A.P.O.C. appeared 
to know nothing ot Trader. and .till were not prepa-
red to grant the Shaikh a higher royal ty and thus 
clinch the d.al. Despite some pressure trom the go-
vernment indicating that the royalty being o~~.r.d 
'to the Shaikh was lower than that gran ted to the Shaikh 
ot Bahrein in 1925, A.P.O.C.'s nominee on the Kuwait 
Oil Company'. board _phatical1y .tated that' the 
other teras were .uch .or. gen.rou. than in Bahr.in', 
12 
and ret".ed to rev!.e thea upward •• 
However, an untorseen and draaatic development 
precipitated a sudden change in A.P.O.C.'. attitude 
and con •• quently the acceptance ot the Shaikh'. tinal 
ten. by 'the Kuwai t Oi 1 Company. On 19 Novembar the 
For.ign Ottice wa. approached by Lord Lloyd on behalt 
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o~ Traders. Lloyd. who later be~ame the Se~ret&ry o~ 
State ~or the Colonies, in~orm.d the Foreign O~~ice 
that the company had secured an oil ~oncession ~rom 
Shaikh Ahmad -subject to the approval o~ H.M.G.' He 
told the head ot the Eastern Department that in his 
vi .. oil exploration in the Gult should as ~ar as pos-
sible be kept under purely British control and there-
~or. urged the governaent to lend one hundred per 
cent support to this coapany competing against an 
Anglo-American combine. 1! 
This startling request tor government support 
ot Trader. ca.e as a bombshell to the Foreign Ottice 
and naturally reintroduced the old .. barras.ing 
question ot Anglo-Aaeriean rivalry in Kuwai t. Rendel 
appreciated the political intluence Lord Lloyd might 
wield aaong right-wing conservative ... ber. ot Parlia-
ment and tel t Wleas" at the thougbt he aight pillory 
the Foreign Oltice tor their past deterence to the 
Aaerieans. Therelore he explained that the Foreign 
Ottice were only indirectly concerned in this matter 
whieb, in tact, was the responsil:lilityof the India 
Oltice. 
Surpri.ed and deeply concerned when told 01 Lord 
Lloyd's visit to the Foreign Otlice and in particular 
o~ the tact that the Shaikh had comai tted hi.sel~ to 
another company. the India Ot~ice i .. ediatel" instruc-
ted the political resident to investigate the situa-
tion in detail. Fowle was intormed that 'a serious 
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situation would arise' if the Shaikh had indeed promi.ed 
the conces.ion to Trader. and was in.tructed to provide 
a. a matter of urgency any inforaation which _ight 
throw light on Lord Lloyd'. allegation •• 14 'Three day. 
later, the India Office rec.ived a .hort reply from the 
political re.ident, who .tat.d that the Shaikh of hi. 
own accord had informed Dickson of an approach mad. by 
a totally Briti.h-controlled company but that the 
Shaikh in turn had r.ferred this company to the govern-
_en t for approval. 15 
B.fore the Briti.h Gov.rnment .er. able to a ••••• 
this complicated .ituation Lord Lloyd r.turn.d to the 
.cene. He told repre.entative. of the For.ion Office 
and the India Office that h. intended rai.ing 'the mat-
ter in Parliament becau •• he telt .trongly that there 
was a real danger ot the AIIlerican. e.tabli.hing them-
•• lve. in Kuwait as in other part. ot the Per.ian Gulf. 
It was hi. view, with which other. in Parliament agr.ed, 
that Britain'. po.ition and intere.t. in the Peraian 
Gult were being gravely threatened by the weakn ••• of 
the government in agreeing to the adai •• ion ot AlDeri-
can oil conc ••• ionair... Th.r.fore h. urged the rep-
re.entative. ot the Foreign ottic. and the India Offic. 
to agree to influence the Shaikh jointly in ord.r to 
guarantee the conc •• aion going to a pur.ly Britiah company 
and Dot an Aaglo-Alleric&ft combin •• 
Explaining the gov.rnment'. po.i tion via-l-vi. the 
- :369 -
Shaikh and the Kuwait Oil Company. Lord Lloyd was war-
ned that any pr .. atur. publicity about the oil qu •• -
tion in the Gul~ might •• 11 have pr.cisely the r.sult 
which h. want.d to avoid. particularly in Qatar wh.re 
Sri Ush and American COlllp.U tion WAS in progr ••• and 
the Shaikh was being pr •••• d •• cr.tly by the Sri ti.h 
16 Gov.rnm.nt to grant the conc ••• ion to A.P.O.C. N.-
v.rth.l •••• appr.h.nsiv. of being attacked in Parlia-
ment ~or being biased in favour o~ a coabin. half 
01med by Gulf. and also of th. furor. which could 
•• 11 en.u. froa .uch an accu.ation at a tim. wh.n 
Am.rican pen.traUon was not only evident but .aldng 
sub.tantial progr.... the India Offic. prOJRi •• d to 
give Trader. a .ympath.tic h.aring before any decision 
conc.rning the Kuwait oil conc.s.ion WAS taken by the 
gov.rnm.nt. 
Con .. qu.ntly, the n.xt day two dir.ctor. of Tra-
d.r ••• t India Offic. of~icial. to pr.sent them wi th 
the company'. appli~ati~:11 Trad.r. repr ••• nted com-
.. rcially sound British interests - a li.t of a •• ocia-
ted compani.. WAS subia! tted - and it wa. on thi. ba.is 
that they sought government approval and .upport for 
th.ir application. They .ubmitt.d a copy of th.ir 
draft conc •• sion which grant.d the Shaikh bett.r t.rm. 
than tho •• off.red by th. Kuwait Oil Coapany, together 
wi th a translation of a l.tt.r from the Shaikh in 
which h •• tat.d hi. r.adin ••• to grant th .. a conc ••• ion 
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pending British Government approval. 18 
The India Offic. now found its.lf in an extreme-
ly awkward and .. barrassing situation which they attri-
buted aainly to the Shaikh'. conduct. On the one 
band, in view of th.ir clo •• relation. and pa.t nego-
tiation. with the Kuwait Oil Company they f.lt it 
would be iapo •• ibl. at thia advanced .tage of tbe pro-
c.-dJ.ngs to awi teh tbeir .upport to another company, 
.ven thougb it was pur.ly Dri U.h. On the other hand, 
howev.r, they wanted to avoid laying th ..... lv •• open 
to the .lighte.t .ugge.tion that th.y were di.crimi-
nating again.t a purely Briti.h company which in fact 
was offering better terms to the Shaikh than those 
of it. Anglo-Am.rican competi tor. It was decided to 
a ..... the .ituation very carefully, including any 
action which .hould be taken wi th the Shaikh in view 
of the breach of trust h. had committ.d by dealing 
secretly wi th Trader., whil.t re.erving for the tille 
being any .tatement to the Kuwait Oil Company about 
another application bavino been .ubmitted for the Ku-
wai t oil cone •• aton. 1' 
However, the Aaerican. on the Kuwait oil Company 
board who bew 
of the fact that an all-Sri ti.b company 
had applied ••••••••• and that Parliaaen-
tary pr ••• ure aight be brought ••••••• in 
favour of an all British company 
were now quit. certain of an A~P.O.C./Bri ti.h Gov.rn •• nt 
plot. 3D Th.r.fore at a aeeting h.ld at the India Office 
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on 12 December Stevens was determined to ascertain by 
hook or by crook the validity o~ Holmes' accusation. 
H. reported the substantial progre •• which had been 
aade 1at.ly in the ~inancial discus.ions with the Shaikh, 
stating that the gap between hi. and the Kuwait Oil Com-
pany had been con.iderably narrowed. Nevertheles., he 
provocatively sugg.sted that the Kuwait Oil Company 
.ight adjourn negotiations in order to pres. the Shaikh 
to accept a lower royalty i~ the gov.rnm.nt could con-
:firm th.ir lat •• t .tat .. ent that 'no application had in 
~act been received ~rom any oth.r competitor.' 
It ..... that at last the Americans had succeeded 
• 
in pinning down the Bri ti.h Gov.m.ent, becau •• in vie. 
o~ Trad.r.' recent application the India O~~ic. could 
not give such con~iraation and could not a •• ure the 
Aa.rican. as r.quested that 'no other coap.ti tor would 
be allowed to ent.r the li.t •• ' Cons.quently the In-
dia O~~ic. r.luctantly adaitted that anoth.r applica-
tion :tor the Kuwait oil concession was curr.ntly und.r 
coasideration. Wh.n pressed hard ~or ~uth.r in~oraation 
and an explanation o:t the exact po.ition and attitude 
o~ the government, the India O~~ic. r.presentative. 
stated only that it was the gov.rnment's policy to give 
~ull and ~air consid.ration to all partie. involved, 
including the Shaikh. 
Fac.d wi th what wa. consider.d to be a shi:tt in 
the British Gov.rnment's attitude, a. the Kuwait Oil 
Company had been led to believe and inde.d had act.d 
- 372 -
as though no other competitor would be permitted, Ste-
vena announced at the .eeting that the Kuwait Oil Com-
pany was now ready to accept the Shaikh'. latest terms 
in lull and to instruct their negotiators to clinch 
the agre.ent wi th hi.. He obviou.ly assumed that in 
view ot the political agreement signed betwe.n the 
. Kuwait Oil Company and the British 'Govermaent a commer-
cial agreement with the Shaikh would resolve the com-
plication. cauaed by Trader.' application. Despite 
the COIIlpany's sudden deciaion Steven. was intormed 
however that the '.ignature by the Shaikh and the 
approval 01 H.M.G. were two dilterent thing.' and 
therelore the Kuwai t Oil Company .hould not take the 
o 21 government'. approval tor granted. Thi. new non-
comaittal attitude adopted by the govemlll.nt was ex-
plained by the need to eXAilline very carelully every 
application lor the conce.sion in order to .ateguard 
the Shaikh'. intere.t., a reason otten used by the 
Briti.h Government when it .uited it. purpose. 
In view ot the altered circwastances A.P.O.C.' s 
nomin ... on the Kuwait Oil Company'. board had no 
choice but to agr .. with their American associate. and 
accept the linal tem. demanded by the Shaikh. Any 
relusal at this crucial stage to accept hi. teras lorth-
with, when it was known that all concemad were aware 
01 the rival application, would have had serious impli-
cations wi thin the Kuwai t Oil Company and would have 
jeopardi.ed any pro.pect ot .ecuring the conce.sion. 
- 373 -
Therefore on 13 December Holmes and Chisholm were in-
.tructed by telegram to accept the Shaikh-. tinal de-
mands and to sign the oil concession on behalt of the 
Kuwai t Oil Company. 22 
Ironically, however, it wa. at this late .tage 
that the Shaikh ot Kuwait suddenly gave a clear indi-
cation ot his intention to grant the conce.sion to the 
Kuwait Oil Company regardl ••• ot the eompany's deci-
sion to accept his tinal teras in tUlle In contrast 
to hi. previous behaviour, which had been characterised 
by procrastination in order to gain better teras, the 
Shaikh suddenly became exceedingly anxious to conclude 
the deal wi th the Kuwai t Oil Company despi te the tac t 
that he had no knowledge yet ot the eompany's latest 
decision. On 12 Dec_ber, a day betore Holmes and 
Chisholm were instructed to sign the oil agre .. ent 
on the Sh4kh -. tera., he intoraed Gabriel that there 
was no need tor the latter to visi t Kuwai t because he 
had already decided to grant the concession to the 
Kuwai t Oil Company.2J This completely unexp4tcted move, 
which .urprised the sri tiah Government in particular 
and wa. obviou.ly unknown to the company, call. tor 
some explanation ... it retlects the large degree to 
which the oil conce.sion had become politicised and 
the true nature ot relations between the Bri ti.h Go-
vernment and the Shaikh. 
The Shaikh well kne. that he had not tollowed 
British Government instructions. He had .ecretly 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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carried on negotiations with Traders and had eventually 
accepted their o~~er de.pite having been explicitly 
warned that the government expected hi. to consult 
them be~ore entering into discus.ion. with any other 
company. Ind.ed, a.tter learning the true ai tuation 
the governaent indicated extreme displeasure 'with his 
behaviour, which waa consider~d to be undermining Bri-
tain's posiUon in the Persian Gult. Moreover, in 
view o~ Traders' direct negotiations with the Shaikh 
the American parmer in the Kuwai t Oil Company had 
expressed some doubt as to the extent to which Bri-
tieb' Goven-ent aPprov&l was necessary tor the granting 
o~ an oil concession in Kuwait.· The India O~~ice ~elt 
that it had b4Mn outwitted by the Shaikh and was appre-
hensive about the repercussions ot this on neighbou-
ring shaikhdoms. In particular anxiety was ~el t that 
the Shaikh o~ Qatar ai9ht now grant a conce.sion • to 
the Standard Oil or some other wholly American company' 
and present the Bri Ush Government wi th a ~ai t accompli. 2. 
Indeed, he had alreAdy indicated that' he had no in-
tention o~ enterino into any serious negotiations with 
A.P.O.C. aa be was beino encouraged to do by the Bri-
tish Governaent, pendino the tinal ·outcome ot the ne-
.' , ' 25 gotiationa tor the Kuwait oil concession. 
consequently. thtt Bri U.h Goveinaent considered 
various ways ot consolidating their cOntrol over Shaikh 
Ahmad, _ong them the 'conclusion o~ a {omal treaty 
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wi th Kuwait ••••• under which the Shaikh's hands would be 
Dluch 1Il0re tightly tied than now.' 26 It s.ems that the 
loose arrangement existing between Bri tain and Kuwai t, 
ie. 'an ind.~endent Arab state under British protection, 
but not a British protectorate', had been designed 80 
that Britain would not be fully committed and would thus 
have a certain degree of flexibility. This was now 
having .. boomerang .ffect on the sateguArding of govem-
.ent interests. 27 Consequently, it was suggested that 
in the .eantime the Shaikh be warned that 
s\lpport would be reaoved fro.. him and 
possibly even that the question ot suc-
cession may have to be considered if 
there is any si.ilar incident in the fu-
ture 
particularly regarding the Neutral Zone oil concession. 28 
However before any action was taken the poli tical resi-
dent was instructed on " neeember to proceed i_ediately 
to Kuwait to obtain the Shaikh's explanation as to the 
circumstances 'in which be took this action in face of 
warning conveyed to bi. by Dickaon.,29 
Al though the Shaikh waa asked to explain hi a beha-
viour on 14 nee_ber, two days atter he had spontaneously 
decided. to break off n..,Uations wi th Traders, there is 
no doubt that he had learnt unofficially tro.. Dickson 
of the delicate aituation developing in London since 
Lord Lloyd's intervention on behalf of that company. Dick-
son, who leaew ot the British Govemaent's deliberationa 
and its. conviction that a serious s1 tuat10n would ariae 
if the Shaikh COIIlIIlitted hi.selt to Traders, probably 
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advised the Shaikh to close the deal quickly with the 
Kuwai t Oil Company. He assumed, and was proven right, 
that a quick decision by the Sh .... ikh to grant the eon-
cession to the Kuwai t Oil Company would ease the growing 
anger' in London towards him and solve the British Govern-
.ent's difficulti.s vis-a-via Traders and their power-
ful political sponsor •• 
Support for th1. conclusion can be found in Dick-
acn's admis6ion that he had endeavoured to 'save the 
Shaikh's bacon to &0lIl. extent with H.M.G.' and in the 
tact that later he strongly advised ~ government 
against rebuking th.Shaikh, saying it would only 'han-
dicap .e in dealing wi th the Shaikh in respect of other 
important .attar. that are due to come up. ,30 Dickson'. 
close relations with the Shaikh and hi. confidential 
advice during the last phase ot the negotiation. no 
doubt determined the Shaikh'. decision, a. in Holm •• ' 
case, to reward Dickson wi th the post ot chiet local 
representative upon hi. retirement in 1936. 
Tbi. attl tude, which reflected thfl common danger 
of identifying wi th the local ruler'. view tor the sake 
ot good relations and 1n the genuine belief 'that .uch 
an "" .. s.ent of a. .i tuation was correct, had a further 
i.plica tion. Dickson'. rela tiona wi th Hol.e. had im-
proved considerably as both shared by now a ccmmon goal-
that of lacilitating an agre .. ent between the Shaikh 
and the Ku.wai tOil Coapany. Evidently the poli tieal 
. \, " 
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a.gent went even further and revealed to Holmes but not 
to Chisholm secret information received trom London ad-
vising hi. ot the British Government'. difficulties over 
Traders' application - the same information he had given 
the Shaikh.31 
-Nevertheless, 'despite the apparent willingne •• tor 
ditterent reasons damonstrated by both the Shaikh and 
the Kuwai t Oil COmpany to sign an oil agreement torth-
with, the India Ottice was still insistent on an inter-
departmental conterence to decide whether or not to 
approve such an agreUlent. In vie. ot Traders' power-
ful poli tical sponsors they tel t they could not take a 
decision on such a sensitive .atter without consulting 
and obtaining the concurrence ot the other ministries 
On 19 December repre.entative. ot the India ot-
tice, the Foreign Ottice, the Admiralty And the Petro-
lewa Department met to consider the government's atti-
tude towards the two applica tiona tor the Kuwai toil 
COIlc.asion. The India Ottice suggested approving that 
of the Kuwait Oil Company becau •• the Shaikh h.1.d now 
accepted it and in view of the government's paat rela-
tiona wi th and commi tmen t to the Kuwai t Oi 1 Company. 
The Foreign Otfice accepted this view believing it would 
be impossible tor the government to act against the 
Ku.wAit Oil Company in view ot the involvement of the 
United Stat.s Government in the history ot negotiations 
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for the concession. However, in order not to embarrass 
them.elve. vis-a-vis Lord Lloyd and his conservative 
supporters in Parliament and in view of the possible 
pulici.ing of their past deference to the Americans, 
they suggested, a. in previous cases when it had sui-
ted their interests, that 
H.M.G. should not the.selves veto the app-
lication of Traders Ltd. but should fix the 
responsibility on the Shaikh. which could 
easily be done in view of His Excellency'S 
recent communications to that company. 
The AdIIliral ty also accepted the line suggested, as they 
regarded Traders as having clo.e ties wi th the Sri tish 
Oil Development Company, which was under considerable 
foreign influence. The Petroleum Department went fur-
ther and advised that Traders' application should be 
rejected, justifying this recommendation on the basis 
o~ A.P.O.C.'s right to apecial conaideration by the 
govemmellt ill the Persian Gulf. 32 
Nevertheless Lord Lloyd's threat to rai se the ma t-
ter ill Parli_ent waa viewed with concerll and given full 
consideration. It was with some reliet that the me .. 
ting noted that becau .. ot hia hoatile attitude towards 
A.P.O.C. he intended atta.cld.ng the government for retu-
aing a fair opportuni ty to Traders to compete, but was 
not going to aake an is •• e ot the tact that in 1932 
the government OtIght to have given strong support to a 
p.rely Bri Usb company, A.P.O.C •• against its Amedcan 
rival and to have retv.aed to consent to an 'open door' 
policy tor Aaerican interests in leuwAi t. Therefore, 
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in vie. of Trader.' direct dealing with the Shaikh, their 
absence of proven abilit,y in and experience of oil exploi-
tation on a large seale, and the Shaikh's recent decision, 
the various .inistries felt they had sufficient ground. 
for ju.tifying 'approval of the Kuwait Oil Company'. ap-
plication. Thus, although for diff.r.nt r.asons best 
.uited to'.ach ministry's stanc., the .eeting recommended 
allowing the Shaikh to sign the conc ••• ion 'Ifi th the Ku-
wai t Oi 1 Company. 
I t was wi th .. c.rtain d.gr •• of s .. ti.faction that 
on 23 December the Shaikh did so, pl ..... d wi th the com-
.erci .. l t.ra. for whichh. had bargain.d so hard and 
genuinely hoping that r.la tions wi th the Dri ti ah Govern-
.ent would r.tum to an even keel without retribution 
from his "protector'. Despite being handicapped by Bri-
tain's control and nationalistic oil policy, Shaikh Ah-
.ad plaved .. supremely cl.ver g.... and was able to 
&chieve far great.r succesS than could have been .xpected 
in the circumstances. H. was also .ore suceesstul, tor 
.xample, than 'the Shaikh ot Qatar who lat.r granted a 
conc.ssion to I.P.C.33 H. secured in full his final 
teras ot Rs.475,OOO on signature, Ra.95,OOO annual rent 
and a royalty of Rs.! and a tax exemption ot 4 anna., 
baaed on oil 'won and s .. v.d'. This .ethod of ca.lcula-
tion for royalty, according to A.P.O.C.' s adai.sion, 
accorded the Shaikh about '15-20 "percent additional re-
venue.
34 1ft .. dd! tion, apart from oth.r ben.fi ts such as 
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~re. petrol and a paid visit ·to London and the right to 
.elect the chie~ local repr.sentativ., h. s.cured the 
right to nominate a repr.sentative in London to be paid 
by the company and to attend board .... ting.. However, 
as in the cas. o~ the oth.r shaikhdoas the Shaikh's 1'0-
yalty was.at~ected by Sterling devaluation because the 
agre_ent did not include a gold claus. a. in Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia, thus explaining the lower incom. he and 
oth.r Shaikhs rac.i ved compared wi th Saudi Arabia and 
Iraq.35 
Finally, what o~ Hol .. e.' accusation ot & joint 
sri USh Government/ A.P.O.C. conspiracy? The evid.nce 
.how. beyond doubt that the government was not invol-
ved in .uch ... chese and treat.d Trader.' application 
.. s a .traight~orward.ott.r. With A.P.O.C. also there 
is no concret •• vid.nce to substantiate Hoi •••• and 
Dickson's conviction. Having said that, how.v.r, th.r. 
i. c.rtainly evid.Dce o~ und.rhand dealing by A.P.O.C. 
Chiabola pers1stently claimed that he and cons.qu.ntly 
A.P.O.C. were not awar. o~ Trad.r.' application until 
12 Decesber. when. the Ind:1& O~~ic. in r.ply to a dir.ct 
enquiry ~roa st.ven. reluctantly adaitted having 1'.-
ceived another application ~or the Kuwait oil conc •• sion. 
This 1n turn would explain why A.P.O.C. took no st.ps. 
to int'lu.nc. the governm.nt to reject nad.rs' applica-
tion betore that date and why they adopt.d a surprisingly 
low pro~il. when the Americans tried to a.certain wh.th.r 
another application tor the conc.ssion had ind •• d been 
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submitted • 
. However, in vie. ot the circumstance. such a claim 
is almost impossible to accept. I t is certainly not a 
plausible argument that a large organisation such as 
A.P.O.C •• with so many experienced employees in the 
tield, could have tailed tor so long to come by this in-
tormation, when 1. t was uncovered by Holmes wi thin days 
ot his return to Kuwait. The A.P.O.C. argument is ren-
dared even weaker by two tacts. First, there is evi-
dene~ to show that a company representative in Iraq 
passed the intormation about .. new British company 
'tormed in Blac:kpool tor the purpose ot obta.ining oil 
concesaion at Kuwait' as soon .. s this company appeared 
in the region.36 Second, A.P.O.C. admitted to the Bri-
ti ah Governmen t tha t they .ere .. t a. loss to unders tand 
why the Shaikh wanted to .uspend the negotiations tor 
three months but neverthele.s retrained trora .sking 
the government whether another company was competing tor 
the concession.37 There is no evidence ot any such 
enquiry aade by A.P.O.C ... s regard. another application 
be~ore 12 December while the AIIerican. had been trying 
desperately to extract this intormation tra. the Sri tish 
Governaen t tor some mon th •• 
Such ... i tua.tion gives rise to .uspicion in vie. 
ot A.P.O.C.'s exceptionally close relations with the 
British Government and ot Cadman's ability to mobi1i.e 
support wi thin government ministrie.. this in turn re-
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fleets onee again the somewhat less than straightLorward 
behaviour ~hich eharaeteri&ed the eompany's attitude 
during the long negotiations for the Kuwait oil conce.-
sion, particularly vis-a-vis its .ajor shareholder -
the British Government. 
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CONa..USION 
The .igning of the agreement between the Kuwait 
Oil Company and the Shaikh ended one of the most com-
plicated and prolonged negotiation. for any oil con-
ce.sion in the Middle East. The negotiation. spanned 
many year. and involved nUilerou. participants from 
the Briti.h Cabinet and most of the principal British 
Government ministries to the United State. Government. 
the Shaikh Of Kuwai t and various oil companies. The 
British Government intere.t shown in the Kuwait oil 
conce •• ion in 1013, when Shaikh Mubarak was asked to 
give an undertaking to grant the conce •• ion only to 
a British Government nominee. continued up· to the mo-
ment when Shaikh Ahmad .igned an agre_ent with the Ku-
wai t Oil Company in 1034. Thi. direct government in-
volvement. event. in neighbouring .tate. and oil com-
pany policy explain why so .any year. elap.ed before 
an oil conce.sion wa •• igned. Moreover. the Shaikh'. 
determination to obtain better terms than tho.e ini-
tially offered by government and company al.o caused 
delay and complicated matter. further. 
Apart trom pre.enting a full hi.tory of the oil 
conce •• ion, the detailed account oiven above furnishes 
an in.ight into the complex! tie. of .. eroing Bri Ush 
foreign oil policy and it. confrontation with local and 
global oppo.ition. Thi. ca.e .tudy therefore provides 
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an opportunity to outline the characteristics o~ govern-
ment behaviour, relations between parent governments and 
major oil companies and the political development o~ the 
Persian Gult states during the inter-war period. 
When the decision-aaking process within the British 
Government is considered one realises how many .inis-
tries were ,involved and bow varying .ere the attitude. 
they adopted. This diversity ot opinion resulted in an 
apparent lack ot coherent government policy in the Per-
sian Gult. While the Foreign Ottice pre.ented the Bri-
tish Government's attitude regarding the ownership ot 
oil concessions in the Persian Gult at international 
level, the British otticials who impl .. ented that poli-
cy were instructed by other ministries who.e view. were 
at variance with those ot the Foreign Ottice. This re-
intorCed the impression ot vacillation • 
. The important role ot the otticials in the Persian 
Gult and London in 90vernment decision-a&king has been 
emphasised throughout. The advice given bv the British 
ot~icers in the Persian .Gult was highly regarded in Lon-
don, and in aany instances deci.ion. were made on the ba-
sis ot such ifttormation. The probl .. was that the.e po-
litical otticers .ere otten intluenced by their local 
eftv1rorimeftt. The political resident and the political 
agent were aftected bv the vi .. s and aspirations ot the 
local rulers and attached greater importance to thea 
than did their colleagues in London. Thus intormation 
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sent to London was in .ome cases particularly designed 
to promote these officers' proposals and convictions 
whilst other and conflicting relevant information was 
minimi.ed. Furthermore instruction. received from Lon-
don were sometimes modified to suit local aspirations, 
a fact which emphasises once again the important role 
1 played by these Briti.h officials. 
Equally important was the decisive role of the 
ministry officials compared with that of the politi-
cian. in formulating the various ministries- attitudes. 
The various secretaries of state were rarely involved 
in the process of formulating their ministry's view 
and were approached by their subordinate. only when 
the oil issue was to be presented in Cabinet or in or-
der to exert strong pres.ure on the other ainistries 
concerned. The oil issue was dealt with exclusively 
by civil servant. and therefore de.pite changes in g0.-
vernment and political personalities the basic attitudes 
of the various ministries reaaifted constant over long 
periods. 
This diversity of opinioft wi thin the Sri tish G0-
vernment had also to be taken into account when analy-
sing relations between parent governments and oil com-
panie.. Relations between the British Govema_nt and 
A.P.O.C.(Britiah Petroleum) changed considerably over 
this period. Frota a total dependence by A.P.O.C. on 
government goodwill and therefore & readine.s to com-
ply with govemaent wishes, a situation developed in 
- 386 -
which even the government realiaed that the company was 
sacrificing government interest. to secure commercial 
benefits. 
Two major factor. contributed to the company' a 
abilitoY to achieve both .pecial privileges and indepen-
dence via-A-via the Britiah Governaent, coamercial .uc-
cess and Cadman's cha1raanship. By the early thirties 
the company had become one of the three major companies 
controlling sale. of patrolaua outside the United Sta-
tes, and their atrong posi tion, acknowledged world-
wide, had been secured by various agre .. ants signed be-
twean the major oil companies ai.ed at .haring these 
oil markets. Consequently they beC&ID8increasingly 
less depend_t on the Sri tisb Govarnment tor the backing 
so deaperately required in 1914, ie. financial as.is. 
tance, .. large oil tuel contract and diplomatic sup-
port, and now considered their gover.-_t connection 
to be burdensome ra thaI' than beneficial'- 2 
The strong position tha eoapany had established 
in the Middle Bast' had deterred any othar British oil 
co.pany trca compatition, with the result that A.P.O.C. 
had baooaa the only purely British oil concern inte-
restad in the Persian Gtalf oil potential. 'This in tum 
atrengthened A.P.O.C.' s poai tion vis-a.via the British 
Govarnaant. which desparately wanted froa 19" to pre-
vent American intere.t., particularly the Standard 011 
Company ot California, which had alraady secured the 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabian conca •• ions, froa securing 
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oil conc.aaions particularly in Kuwait, Qatar and the 
Trucial Coast. The government was ther.~ore obliged 
to place incr.asing reliance on the company to se-
cure the remaining oil eonc.ssions, either indepen-
dently or through I.P.C. 
P'urtheraore Cadman'. knowledge o~ govemlllent pro-
cedure as a ~or .. r government employee was o~ immen.e 
benetit to A.P.O.C. Alway. aware o~ each Idnistry·. 
vi .. and objectiv.s, CAdaan achieved a far great.r 
independence trom and influ.nce on the government 
than had been thought possible in 191". By playing 
one ainistry ott against another he was abl. to se-
cure retrospectively governm.nt approval of and sup-
port tor a controversial agr .... nt h. had concluded 
with Gult which accorded them a titty per c.nt .har. 
of the Kuwai toil conc.ssion at a ti.. when the Bri-
tish Governm.nt were ac:ta.ant a'bout U .• i ting Am.rican 
penetration into the region. 
C&draan gained the .. eputation in the company cir-
cle. o~ a trouble-shooter with the ability to present 
the company's case succe.s~ully to the gov.rnment ~d 
, . 
to gain it. support. His behaviour .hould al.o be 
viewed in the context of hi. having been nominated 
to succeed Greenway only atter .trong government pres-
sure on the company's directors. 3 This did not .. esul t 
in his compliance wi th government wishes as had been 
hoped by the government and indeed as aight have been 
expected, ~t rather in a greater deteraination to 
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demonstrate to his colleagues his independence of govern-
•• nt control. 
By the early thirties ther.for., the British Govern-
aent bee .... identified with the company and WAS alleged 
to determine company policy abroad when in r.ality it 
ex.rci •• d very little control ov.r the company. The 
la tt.r pur.ued its objectives a. did any oth.r commer-
cial conc.rn, wi til Kant attention to poli tical consi-
derations, •• pecially the delicate and .. barrassing 
position of its aajor shareholder, ie. the gov.rnment. 
The uns .. ti.f .. ctory n .. ture of .uch governa.nt-eompany 
relation. was fully realised only in the late forti.s 
when .. complie .. ted and .eriou •• ituation d.velop.d in 
Per.i... The government then felt the full impact of 
it. obligation to support the company against the P.r-
.ian GoYeftUlent despite di ... 9r .... nt wi th the company'. 
polici •• and acUvi ti... In 1946 Bevin, the L.abour 
For.19ft Secr.tary, eoaplained that anything the company 
did • react. upon the relationah1p. between the Bri ti.h 
Goveraaent and P.r.ia' and thAt .... For.ign Secr.t .. ry 
, ' 4 
I have no power or influeftce to do anything .. t all.' 
wi thout doubt, the .. factor. wi thin the Sri Ush 
CUlp contributed to the d.v.lopment of the al .. raing 
ai tuation in the P.rsian Galt d.scribed and criticised 
by Lord Lloyd in October 19.14. Howev.r, a.l though go-
YeftUlent policy tluc~ted con.ider .. bly, causing confu-
sion both in London and the Per.ian Gulf, 8ri tain s.-
cur.d wh .. t was beli.v.d to be her paramount interest. 
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~ben all ~actor. are con.idered it .ee •• that Britain'. 
concern over American entry into the Per.ian Gul~ wa. 
cau.ed le •• by worries about oil supply than by the po-
litical repercu •• ions o~ an American ~oothold in the 
region. Political con.id.rations, ie. maintenance of 
political dominanc., weI' •• upr .... and th.refore when 
the Briti.h Government had no alternative but to allow 
Soc&! to obtain a conce •• ion in Bahr.in becau.. the 
agreement already signed contained no Briti.h natio-
nality· clau •• , they in.i.ted on various stipulation. 
de.igned to curb any potential American political in-
~luence. The.e .tipulations weI'. designed to sate-
guard Britain's political interest., i •• limit Ame-
rican influence on and contact with the Shaikh, but 
they bore no relation to securing British oil intere.t •• 
Thu. when a shallar situation developed in 1932 
in Kuwait the British Government wa. prepared in the 
short t.rm to allow American intere.t. to compete on 
the SUle basis as in Bahrein. This 'open door' policy 
however was soon to change atter Socal di .covered oil 
in Bahrein and shortly atterwards secured an oil conces-
sion in independent Saudi Arabia. 
The British Government bllllediately recognised the 
political danger ot a strong and uncontrolled Aaerican 
~oothold in the Per.ian Gul~. It telt politically 
threatened and it took positive steps to prevent SOCal 
or any other American company trom securing addi tional 
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oil concession. exclusively in the region. Therefor. 
although promising th.Unit.d States Government an 
equal opportunity ~or American oil int.re.t. in Kuwait, 
in reality the Briti.h Government acted dif~erently 
and endeavoured to secure the conc.ssiona ~or a Bri-
tish company. Eventually during the thirties the re-
maining key oil conces.ions ot the Persian Gulf, ie. 
Kuwai t, Qatar and the Trucial Coast. were all .ecured 
by Bri tish-controlled companies which. al though con-
. taining AJBerican elements due to corporate arrange-
ment., were still considered sutfici.nt to sat. guard 
Britain's interests, since th.y had .igned special 
political agr .... nt. with the British Gov.rnment • 
. ' 
Neverth.l.s. it i. wid.ly believed that United 
States Gov.rnment .upport was the decisive :factor which 
,> ~&Cilitated the changing balance ot oil conc •• sion ow-
nership between rival Am.rican and British companies 
in the Persian Gult. AI though claiming to the contrary 
since 1945. an explanation tor which will be given later. 
the State Department was not at all eager to become in-
volved and repeatedly rai.e the isaue ot the Kuwait oil 
conce •• ion with the British Government. Whatever the 
compl.x .ituation taced by the British Government, 
which a. seen throughout ~&Cilitated the progr.ss ot the 
American oil companies, the state Department took only 
very li.i ted and UDenthusia.tic st.ps in aupport ot 
AlDericu i_reat. in the P.rsian Gult. 
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Throughout this period United States policy 
in the region waa limited to obtaining an topen door-
~or American intere.ta. The State Department wa. 
solely intere.ted in this a.pect o~ the rivalry be-
tween Bri Ush and American oil COIDpanie. and there-
~ore once this objective waa con.idered to have been 
achieVed, whether in reali ty this was .0 or not, it 
showed little intere.t as to which coapany would even-
tually secure the conce.aion. . I t did not inaist tha.t 
any particular coneeaaion be granted to any particu-
la.r American company and in any ease re~u.ed to aupport 
exclu.ive right. ~or American inter •• ts in negotia-
tion. with the Britiah Government. The State Depart-
ment re~rained ~roa taking any action de.pi te being 
regularly in~oraed by it. represen ta ti ve in Baghdad 
that the British Government would oppo.e any ~,arth.r 
attempts by American oil companies to enter the region 
and wa. doing everything po •• ible tofrustrate the Ameri-
S 
can group intere.ted in the Kuwait conee.aion. 
Moreover, de.pite nat was believed to be breach 
o~ a proal .. by Britain in the ca.e o~ Kuwai t the 
State Department pre~erred to let the American group 
.ettle i t. di~:ticul tie. independently rather than 
rai.e the matter again with the Briti.h Governaent. 
Thi. stand was rooted ift a State Department conviction 
that AIIlerican intere.t. had a better chance ot' gaining 
oil conce.sion. in the Middle Ba.t in conjunction wi th 
British intere.ts. Thi. vie. eventually in~luenced 
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Gult to compromise and join torces with the British com-
pany on untavourable terms. To understand this attitude, 
which was in sharp contrast to that ot the mid-torties, 
United States' objectives in the region during the inter-
6 
war period should be emphasised. The United States Go-
Vernment had no foreign oil policy and was not concemed 
with toreign oil. Moreover the State Department had no 
desire to challenga Britain's domination nor to increase 
United States intluence in the region. State Depart-
ment otticials had neither poli tical nor strategic ob-
jectives in the· shaikhdolll. which were viewed a. tailing 
wi thin the Bri Usb sphere of intluence, and in view of 
the strong isol .. tionist sentiaents of the inter-war 
period they wer. in general loath to become involved in 
Middle Bast altairs. In any c .... , a saall Near-Eastern 
Department within the State Department could hardly be 
considered adequate tor a deep involvement in the region. 
Eveatually as the Uni ted State. and Sri tish G0-
vernment atUtudes were charaCterised by isolationist 
and iaperialist policies respectively it is hardly sur-
priSing to learn that in the BriUsh-controlled Persian 
Gult American oil compani •• secured coaplet. control 
only ot the Bahrein conce •• ion. 7 
Finally, what of the intluence ot the oil issue in 
the region's political development? The various shaikhs 
realised the strate9!c and political iaportance of the 
oil concessions rel .. tively early and set out to beneti t 
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politically from this importance. This was particularly 
apparent'in the cas. o~ Qatar, when the Shaikh secured 
a de~inite British commitment to defend hia territory 
againat Ibn Saud in return for hia granting the conces-
sion to a Sri tish Company. He induced the Bri tish G0-
vernment to declare the territory An official British 
Protectorate, an action they hAd resolutely avoided 
for decadea. For hi. part the Shaikh of Xuwai t indica-
ted the hope that in return tor hia granting an oil 
concession to British intereata Britain would aolve 
hia problems 'vis-a-vi. the Iraqi and Saudi Arabian Go-
In Qatar and Kuwait in particular the British G0-
vernment insi.ted on the conce.aiona going to Britiah 
intere.t. and Dot to Aaeric&ft one., a. part of a cam-
paign to curb Ibn Saud'. iDtluence also. They auspec-
ted that the incliDation expres.ed by both ahaikh. to 
follow Ibn Saud'. lead was politically motivated and 
therafore they were determined to preven t Socal in par-
, 8 
ticular froa obtaining the.e conce •• iona. Ihi a was done 
despite the government'. beiDg aware that the British 
compuie., ie. I.P.C. and the Kuwait Oil COIlpany, 
would bave little inducement to develop oil concessiona 
rapidly so Dear their main oilfielda in Iraq and Persia. 
nu. demonstrate. once again that British Government 
policy was motivated SAinl, by political considerations 
and that tar less importance was attached to local 
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interests. This restrictive attitude adopted by the 
British Government over the oil issue which was moti-
vated by political objectives, wa. re~lected in its 
general policy towards the shaikhdoms and contributed 
to the ~act that independence ca.e relatively late to 
this part of the world. 9 
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Per.ian Gu1t knew all along the *rue purpo •• ot 
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.xt.nsion tor a turth.r period ot two y.ars sub-
ject to the consent ot the Shaikh and the British 
Governm.nt. Howev.r it alao provided tor a two 
y.ar prospecting licence to be grant.d on appli-
cation either &.ft.r the .xpiry ot, or whilst the 
.xploration licenc. was in .tt.ct. 
14. E.& G.S. to Colonial ottic., 19 Dec.1928, C.O. 732/ 
34 No.59115 
15. T.P.C. was ott. red th.Bahr.ln option on 30 October 
1928 but the Dutch and British repr •• entativ •• tlatly 
r.jected it and alao object.d to the Gull Corpora-
tion operating the conc ••• ion independ.ntly. Th. 
m&in r.ason tor A.P.O.C.' s oppo.i tion to T.P.C. or 
Gull ~n9 involved in oil exploitation in the 
Persian GUlt was due to their ov.r-production in 
P.raia. In view of a world oil glut the company 
had r.Lrain.d trom any extension of ita operation 
in P.raia and in tact had shut down producti v. 
wells in consideration ot world ov.r-p~ction. 
Obviously any turth.r production in the Gult would 
hAve complicated their position in P.rsia where they 
weI" being urged to expand production. This policy 
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732/39 No.69035 
40. For.ign O~~ic. to Atherton, 29 May 1929, Ibid. 
41. Stat. Departant Memo, 15 June 19<&8, 890B 6363/6 
Divi.ion o~ Near Eastern At~airs to As.istant Secre-
tary o~ State,' 1 Dec.1931, 890B 6363/3 
42. Colonial O~~ice to For.ign o~tice, 17 Jun. 1929, F.O. 
371/13730/281/3091 
43. Meeting between Colonial ot~ic. and B.& 0.5., 31 July 
1929, C.O. 732/39 No.69035 
- 431 -
44. Minute by Walton (India O~~ie.), 15 Aug.1929, 
L/P&S/10/993 No.S331 
45. Meeting betw.en Colonial Office and E.& G.5., 8 Aug. 
1929, C.O. 132/39 No.6903S 
46. Chi.hola A.H.T., Ope cit. note 46 
- 432 -
2. In Pursuit o~ a 'Closed Door' 
1. Gul~ Oil Corporation to E.&G.S., 19 March 1930, E.&.G.S. 
Board Minute, 30 Sept.1930, J. Jan.on'. Collection, Lon-
don 
2. Political re.ident to COlonial Ottice, 1 Sept.I030, 
C.O. 732/.5 No.79178 
3. Political re.id.nt to COlonial Ottic., Ibid. 
•• E.& 0.5. to COlonial ottic., 17 Oct.193O, C.O. 732/ 
45 No.79178 
5. S.. pp. 156-157 _ 
6. For the Anglo-American controver.y in Iraq ••• 
pp.61-62 and 15. 
7. CAB 24/215 No.1017 B, 16 Sept.1930 
A •• uly ... 1920 .. govemll.nt paper .tated that 
while .~.guud •• hould be in.i.t.d on, 
it ._. to be .. very doubt~ul policy 
~or a country 11k. the Unit.d Kingdoa 
which depended more than any other both 
on ~oreign inve.tment and on drawing raw 
a .. terial ~roa ~or.ign land. to •• t an 
exampl. o~ .xclu.iven •••• 
Meme o~ the Acqui.ition ~ ~or.ign.r. o~ aining and 
oil right. in Briti.h Dominion., 23 April 1920, 
F.O. 371/4J29/192310 
8. For d.tail on the development o~ the international 
oil indu.try ..... .. 
Larson H.M., KDowlton and Popple e.s., N:W Hori2on •• Hi.r.H Q~ s~ i11 Company o~ Ne .1!ra;i (New 
Vor ,I 71) pp. . - i 
9. CAB 23/65 71 1930 
- 433 -
10. Political resident to Colonial O~tice. 17 Sept.1930, 
C.O. 732/45 No.79178 
11. Political resident to Government ot India, 6 Feb.l932, 
R/1S/1/639 No.193 
12. Petroleum Department to Colonial Ottice, 28 Oct.1930, 
C.O. 732/45 No.19178 
13. Sir -John cadman, who 'organiaed and directed the Petro-
leum Executive under Walter Long during the War and 
. adviaed the Colonial Ottice on oil mattera. had re-
tired in October 1921 to join A.P.O.C. aa technical 
adviaer. However the Britiah Gov.rnment augg.ated 
to Gr.enway, A.P.O.C.' a chairaan. that cadman ahould 
be appointed aanaging director. Gr.enway replied 
on 21 September 1922 that' there waa very atrong 
oppoai tion to the propoaal' and retuaed to appoint 
CAdman to the proposed poat •• pecially aa ahortly 
betore the A.P.O.C.' board had contiraed that D. 
Stewart was to succeed Greenway on his retirement. 
However the Bri tiah Government continued to pre •• 
upon Gr.enway Cadman's appointment explaining that 
his 'intimate knowledge ot the oil policy ot the 
gov.rnaent •••••••• ay be utiliaed to the beat ad-
vantage ot the company.' eona.quent1y A.P.O.C •. 
gave in and Cadman was invi ted to join the board. 
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the Dri tisb oovernmClt is backward in 
ACCOrdinG reasonably fair treatment to 
the A.P.O.C., but I .. alw."s glad to 
. learn aoaethinG n ... 
8908 6363/120 
5 •. Chishol. A.H.T., op.cit. Not. 76 
6. See p.l23 
8. Hi.ute b.v Olipbaat, 13 Oct.1932, V.O. 371/16002/ 
121/5295 
Por the aor ..... t. signed between the aajo1' oil 
coapani •• du.d.nG the thirties .... 
Blair .J.M., PMt COD"'l " Oil, (New York,1976) pp.54-76 
10. Hi.ute b.v Warner, 27 Dec.1932, P.O. 371/16003/121/ 
6830 
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12/25 
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413 
13. Admiralty to Foreign Ottice, 27 Jan.1933, Ibid. 562 
14. Rendel to Warner, 3 Feb.1933, Ibid. 723 
15. Memo by A.W. Mellon, 1 March 1933, 683.6 Kuwait 
16. Chishola A.H.X., op.cit. Note 77 
17. See pp.286-290 
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posed on Gult when eventually the two companie. com-
bined their torces. 
18. For the new cODces.ion which accorded the Persian 
GoYernaen t hi gher royal ty see. 
Elwell-Sutton L.P., Persian Oil (London,1955) pp.22-23 
19. Chishola A.H.X., op.cit. p.37 
20. Minute ~ Oliphant, 23 Feb.1933, F.O. 371/16835/12/ 
913 
21. Ward T.E., op.cit. pp.233-239 
The E.& G.S. retained their over-riding royalty in 
Bahrein but sol:l its right in Kuwait. During the 
sixties the over-riding royalty in Bahrein wa. 
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Chishola A.H.X., op.c!t. Note 96 
Anderson I.H., Aramcol ~. United stat •• and Saudi 
Arabia (New Jer.ey, 19 1 pp.Ji-66 
Department ot State Nemo, 4 Nov.1943, Petrol ... Di-
vision ot the United State., Box 1, lot 17 
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its oil intere.t •• 
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it llight be truslated in auch a way as to uncleraine 
hi. independence Md .tatu.. A.p.O.e. in turn were 
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in Chi.hola A.H.T., op.cit. p.64 
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1935, R/15/1/645 No.49 
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11. Ironically Chi.hol. ba.ed hi. conviction partly on 
. the fact that the Aaericaa. never intomed A.P.O.C. 
ot HoI •••• accu.ation. S .. Chi.hol. A.H.T., op.c!t. 
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F.O. 311/11809/160/1003 
15. Politic~ re.ident to India Ottice, 22 Nov.1934, Ibid. 
16. Se. p.291 
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S .. 8908 6363/52 
17. Traders Li.ited was a- saall company controlled by 
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18. Chishola A.H.T., op.cit. Note 139 
19. Miaut. W La! thwai te, 13 Dec.10"., L/f'&S/12/3811 
No. 1621 
20. Thi. secr.t -iatormation was provided by the political 
agent through Hoi ....... Chi.hola A.H.T., op.cit. 
Hotel4.1-
21. M .. ting ot 12 Dec.lt34, F.O. 311/11810/160/7570 
22. Chishola A.H.T •• op.cit. Note 145 
23. Shaikh ot Kuwait to Gabriel, 12 Dec.1934, cited in 
Chishola A.H.T., op.cit. Note 141 
2.. Minute by Laithwaite, 
L/P&S/12/"812 No.1.S. 
18 Dec.l034, 
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25. Foreign O~~ice to India O~~ice, 3 Dec.1934, Ibid. 
26. Minu te by Lai thwai t e, 
Ibid. 
18 Dec.1934, 
21. Generally the British Government rejected sugges-
tions o~ any declaration o~ a 'protectorate- over 
the Persian'Gul~ ahaikhdoms partly because this 
was considered to overstretch British commitments. 
See Comai ttee o~ Imperial De~ence CAB 16/94 
28. Minute by La! thwai t e, 
L/P&S/12/3812 No.1454 
18 Dec.1934, 
29. India o~~ice to political resident, 4 Dec.1934, 
F.O. 311/11810/160/1510 
30. Political agent to political r.sident, 28 o.c.1934, 
R/15/1/64S No.21 
cited ia Chishola A.H.T., op.cit. Note 127 
31. Cbiahola A.H.T., op.cit. p.1S and Note 143 
The ar .... t put ~orward is that the Shaikh kn •• 
o~ the complicated situation which had developed 
in London,either directly ~roa Dickson or ~roa 
Hola •• , be~ore he was told o~~icially on 14 Decem-
ber by Fowle. Thi. explain. hi. sudden deciaion 
to grant the concession to the Kuwai t Oil Company 
on 12 Dec_bezo before even being aware that the 
COIIpany had accepted hi. royalty d_and. 
32. M .. ting of19 Dec.19S4 cited in Chi.hola A.H.T., 
op.cit. Note 150 
33. The Shaikh of Qatar granted hi. conc.ssion to 
A.P.O.C. on behalf o~ I.p.e. on 1 ••• favourable 
teras. For the concession teras ... F.0.311/ 
19961/269/3883 
34. Dr~t record of diacus.ion., 8 .June & 24 oct.19S4, 
L/P&S/12/3811 Nos.3912 & 6645 
It i. inter.sting to note that in the various 
palications on the ~inancial a.pect. of Middle 
East oil conce.sions, the ~oraula o~ 'won and 
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.aved' was not discu.aed. 
Mikdashi Z.A., A Financial Analyaia of Middle Eas. 
t.rn oil Cone ••• lon. 1901-65 (New York.1966) 
AI-S&b&h Y.S.F., The Oil Economy of Kuwait (London, 
o 1980) pp.31-42 
Issawi C. & Yeganeh M., The Economics 6f Middle Eas-
tern Oil (New York,1962) 
35. Blair .1.104., The control of Oil (Ne. York~1916) 
pp.41-53 
36. MubAmllad Ahmad to Chi.hola, 30 Aug.19?1, cited in 
a coatidenti&1 auppleaentary aonograph to The 
First Kuwait Oil C9!'!c! •• ion by A.H.T. Chisholna. 
(Mu.hAmllad Ai'Ul&d was A.P.O.C.'. legal repre.enta-
tive in Iraq.) 
31. See pp.3S4-35S 
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CONCLUSION 
1. See p.l02, 116, 186,267, 340 350 
2. See pp.58 & 169 
Policy regardino oil conce •• ion. in Briti.h territory, 
Sept.1930, CAB 24/215 
•• Minvte br Bevin, 20 ~.ty 1946, ~.O. 371/52735/7357 
Thi. pattem ot .. vemaent-coaapany relaUon. wa. to 
continae and theretore dvria9 tbe Ab&daa cri.i. a 
tew yeU" lateso the "orei9ft ottice ia parUc.tU' 
wa. bitterly critical ot the company bMt neverthe-
le" CORtinaed to back A.P.O.C. vi.-a-vi. the Per-
.i_ Oovel1lllent. 
S_pao,. A. H~J:£:Ji!fl!fttm~Glrat iil Companies yd the WOr __ ~_ ,91 p. 20 
5. Aaerican Con • .tate, Ba9bdad, to State Department, 27 
..1 .. e & 12 Dec.19'., 7toB toP' 1S/ .. & 12 
6. The State Departaent .ince 19 • .1 clai.ed to have .up-
ported ..... rican oil intere.t. vi .. rou.ly durino the 
inter-.. period i. the Per.ian Ql1t. while the re-
cord pre_ted throagbcn&t abowa otherwi.e. 
See.Mae by ..1.H. Lot'ta., 19 Mq 19".Hi'~CAl Revie. f! !'Mur!ted 'fllJ!a5,p18 911 PoliSW' I, Fetro-
... v ;Ioa, 
Al.o. Special C ••• j tt .. iave.U.-d.on petrOl ... re-
aoarce., 27 & a ..1 .. e 19.t6S, 78th Conore •• 
rhi. ahcMald be viewed in the context ot a cban-
gi •• URi ted State. oil policy together wi tb a dawnino 
awar ..... ot the rePon" _ .. oil re.erve. wbich be-
gan alter 19.2. 
In view of the beliet that Aaerican doIIe.Ue 
oil re.erve. were bei.O dild.iabed by the war the 
URited State. Governaent .et a CCNr.e to correct the 
.i wation ia which the ... tem b..t.pher., in parti-
calar the Ual ted State., bad been prod1lCino a di.-
proportionately lar .. ahare ot the world" oil ,upply. 
Thi .... rgia. _ oil policy nece •• iuted a tar 
.reater direct poli tical and ecoaoaie involv .. ent 
in the MicN1e Ba.t in order to .apport AIledean oil 
intere.t. there and en •• re a rapid increa.e in Middle 
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East oil production to counter-balance production 
in the West. 
There~ore with the n.w global order emerging 
al'ter the war this new oil policy became one o~ 
the ~actors re~leeted in the United Stat.s' in-
creased involvement in the region. It alao ex-
plains why the State Departaent haa claimed undue 
credit aince 194.5 ~or aupporting ita nationala 
vigoroualy in their aucceaa~ul attempts to obtain 
a large part o~ the Peraian Gul~ oil conceaaiona, 
which only in the aid-~ortiea weI'. recognised aa 
being extraely abundant and atrat.gically blpor-
tant to the United State.. . 
see. ~oreign petrol ... policy o~ the United State., 
Petrol ... Division, Box 1. 10t·17 
7. IAlring the in ter-war period the Kuwai t. Qa tar and 
Trueial Coa.t oil cone ••• ion. were all aeeured by 
Briti.h-ccmtrolled COIDpani.a which aigned .peeial 
political agr .... nt. with the Britiah Government. 
Muh_ad M.A., D. !JeiStd AJ;ab lairat.s (London, 
1980) pp • .58-7l 
a. In an intere.ting interview wi th Colonial O~~ice 
o~~icial. Hol.e. had to .. sure th_ that there w •• 
nothing poli tical in the desire by the Shaikh o~ 
Kuwait to have Aaeriean intere.ta enter hia prin-
cipality. 
9. Kuwait gained it. independence in 1961, while Qatar 
not until 1971. 
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